Compare commits
21
Commits
v6.0.1-251
..
v3.2
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
 Enginex0
|
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Enginex0
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Enginex0
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Enginex0
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Enginex0
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
|
7c4df3e237 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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1ac08411be | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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a11a5e41a2 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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c367aa5efc | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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88781ff31d | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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409fb5fcc3 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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0cf8f70544 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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7ecea09ec6 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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887c5fc666 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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ce0ca18d98 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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fa28e9fc71 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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c3822197b1 | ||
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Enginex0andGKI Builder
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f276806096 | ||
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Enginex0
|
9aa4a33c5e |
+73
-110
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ name: Build
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [ "main" ]
|
||||
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
|
||||
paths-ignore:
|
||||
- '**.md'
|
||||
- '.github/**'
|
||||
- '!.github/workflows/**'
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches: [ "main" ]
|
||||
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
|
||||
paths-ignore:
|
||||
- '**.md'
|
||||
- '.github/**'
|
||||
- '!.github/workflows/**'
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
|
||||
concurrency:
|
||||
@@ -16,9 +22,18 @@ concurrency:
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
build:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
id-token: write
|
||||
attestations: write
|
||||
contents: read
|
||||
|
||||
outputs:
|
||||
releaseName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
|
||||
debugName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
- name: Check out
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
submodules: "recursive"
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
@@ -30,25 +45,6 @@ jobs:
|
||||
java-version: 21
|
||||
cache: 'gradle'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Rust toolchain
|
||||
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
|
||||
with:
|
||||
targets: aarch64-linux-android,armv7-linux-androideabi,i686-linux-android,x86_64-linux-android
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Cache Rust artifacts
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: |
|
||||
~/.cargo/registry
|
||||
~/.cargo/git
|
||||
~/.cargo/bin/cargo-ndk
|
||||
native-certgen/target
|
||||
key: rust-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('native-certgen/Cargo.lock') }}
|
||||
restore-keys: rust-${{ runner.os }}-
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Install cargo-ndk
|
||||
run: command -v cargo-ndk || cargo install cargo-ndk
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set up ccache
|
||||
uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
@@ -64,106 +60,73 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: Build with Gradle
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
chmod +x ./gradlew
|
||||
|
||||
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug -Porg.gradle.parallel=true -Porg.gradle.vfs.watch=true -Dorg.gradle.jvmargs=-Xmx2048m
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Read version
|
||||
id: ver
|
||||
- name: Prepare artifact
|
||||
if: success()
|
||||
id: prepareArtifact
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
|
||||
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
|
||||
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
RELEASE_FILE=$(find out -name "*Release*.zip" | head -1)
|
||||
DEBUG_FILE=$(find out -name "*Debug*.zip" | head -1)
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -z "$RELEASE_FILE" || -z "$DEBUG_FILE" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Error: Could not find release or debug files in out/"
|
||||
echo "Contents of out/ directory:"
|
||||
ls -la out/ || echo "out/ directory does not exist"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Extract names
|
||||
RELEASE_NAME=$(basename "$RELEASE_FILE" .zip)
|
||||
DEBUG_NAME=$(basename "$DEBUG_FILE" .zip)
|
||||
|
||||
echo "releaseName=$RELEASE_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
|
||||
echo "debugName=$DEBUG_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
|
||||
|
||||
- name: List build artifacts
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
echo "Release: $(ls out/*Release*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Release*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
|
||||
echo "Debug: $(ls out/*Debug*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Debug*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
|
||||
mkdir -p module-release module-debug
|
||||
unzip -q "$RELEASE_FILE" -d module-release
|
||||
unzip -q "$DEBUG_FILE" -d module-debug
|
||||
echo " Release: $RELEASE_NAME"
|
||||
echo " Debug: $DEBUG_NAME"
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
- name: Upload release
|
||||
if: success()
|
||||
id: release
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
|
||||
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Release.zip
|
||||
name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
|
||||
path: "./module-release/*"
|
||||
retention-days: 30
|
||||
compression-level: 0
|
||||
compression-level: 6
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
- name: Upload debug
|
||||
if: success()
|
||||
id: debug
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
|
||||
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Debug.zip
|
||||
name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
|
||||
path: "./module-debug/*"
|
||||
retention-days: 7
|
||||
compression-level: 0
|
||||
compression-level: 6
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
- name: Upload release mappings
|
||||
if: success()
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: release-mappings
|
||||
path: app/build/outputs/mapping/release
|
||||
name: release-mappings-${{ github.run_number }}
|
||||
path: "./app/build/outputs/mapping/release"
|
||||
retention-days: 30
|
||||
compression-level: 9
|
||||
|
||||
release:
|
||||
needs: build
|
||||
if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
permissions:
|
||||
contents: write
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
fetch-depth: 0
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Read version
|
||||
id: ver
|
||||
- name: Summary
|
||||
if: always()
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
|
||||
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
|
||||
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
|
||||
path: zips
|
||||
|
||||
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
|
||||
path: zips
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Extract changelog
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
ver="${VER#v}"
|
||||
awk "/^## TEESimulator-RS v${ver%%-*}/{flag=1; next} /^## TEESimulator-RS v/{if(flag) exit} flag" module/changelog.md > /tmp/notes.md
|
||||
cat /tmp/notes.md
|
||||
env:
|
||||
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Create release
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
gh release delete "$VER" --yes 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
RELEASE=$(ls zips/*Release*.zip | head -1)
|
||||
DEBUG=$(ls zips/*Debug*.zip | head -1)
|
||||
gh release create "$VER" \
|
||||
--title "$VER" \
|
||||
--latest \
|
||||
--notes-file /tmp/notes.md \
|
||||
"$RELEASE" \
|
||||
"$DEBUG"
|
||||
env:
|
||||
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Bump update.json
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
COUNT=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
|
||||
RELEASE_NAME=$(basename zips/*Release*.zip)
|
||||
ZIP_URL="https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/download/${VER}/${RELEASE_NAME}"
|
||||
jq ".versionCode = $COUNT | .zipUrl = \"$ZIP_URL\"" module/update.json > /tmp/update.json
|
||||
mv /tmp/update.json module/update.json
|
||||
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
|
||||
git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
|
||||
git add module/update.json
|
||||
git diff --cached --quiet || {
|
||||
git commit -m "chore(release): bump update.json to $VER [skip ci]"
|
||||
git push origin HEAD:main
|
||||
}
|
||||
env:
|
||||
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
|
||||
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
echo "## Build Summary" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
|
||||
echo "- **Status**: ${{ job.status }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
|
||||
echo "- **Gradle Tasks**: assembleRelease, assembleDebug" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
|
||||
if [[ "${{ job.status }}" == "success" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "- **Release Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
|
||||
echo "- **Debug Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1 @@
|
||||
out
|
||||
.gradle
|
||||
.kotlin
|
||||
app/build
|
||||
build
|
||||
native-certgen/target
|
||||
app/src/main/jniLibs
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,139 +1,140 @@
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<h1 align="center">TEESimulator-RS</h1>
|
||||
<p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
|
||||
<a href="https://t.me/superpowers9"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?logo=telegram" alt="Telegram"></a>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
# TEESimulator – A Full TEE Emulation Framework
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
**TEESimulator** is a system module designed to create a complete, software-based simulation of a hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environment ([TEE](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty)) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation).
|
||||
|
||||
> [!NOTE]
|
||||
> Fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) with native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and AOSP-compliant attestation behavior. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
|
||||
The project's goal is to move beyond simple certificate patching and build a robust framework that can create and manage virtual, self-consistent cryptographic keys.
|
||||
|
||||
## What It Does
|
||||
## ✨ Core Principles
|
||||
|
||||
TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level inside the `keystore2` process and generates entire certificate chains from scratch, signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions. Apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate device.
|
||||
* **Bypass Hardware-Backed Attestation:** The primary goal of this project is to defeat Key Attestation, a security mechanism that allows apps to verify that they are running on a secure, unmodified device. This module provides the tools to bypass these checks on rooted or modified devices.
|
||||
* **Stateful Emulation:** Instead of patching responses from the real TEE, the ultimate goal is to create and manage virtual keys entirely in a simulated software environment. Any request concerning a virtual key will be handled by the simulator, ensuring perfect consistency without ever touching the real hardware.
|
||||
* **Architectural Interception:** By hooking low-level Binder IPC calls to the Keystore, the framework can transparently redirect requests for virtual keys to the software-based simulator, while allowing requests for real keys to pass through to the hardware TEE.
|
||||
* **100% FOSS:** Licensed under GPLv3, ensuring it stays free, auditable, and compliant with open-source laws.
|
||||
|
||||
This is not TrickyStore. TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the internals are different: native Rust cert generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and AOSP-spec attestation behavior.
|
||||
## 📱 Requirements
|
||||
- Android 10 or above
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
## 📦 Installation & Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
> [!IMPORTANT]
|
||||
> A valid `keybox.xml` is required for hardware-level attestation. Without one, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware checks.
|
||||
1. Flash this module via (Magisk / KernelSU / APatch) and reboot. It will replace [TrickyStore](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore), [TrickyStoreOSS](https://github.com/beakthoven/TrickyStoreOSS) and their forks.
|
||||
2. (Optional) Place a hardware-backed `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`. This provides the cryptographic "root of trust" for the simulator.
|
||||
3. (Optional) Customize target packages in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`.
|
||||
4. (Optional) Customize the simulated security patch level in `/data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt`.
|
||||
5. Enjoy!
|
||||
|
||||
1. Android 10+
|
||||
2. Root manager: KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch
|
||||
3. `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
||||
**All configuration files are monitored and will take effect immediately upon saving.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Quick Start
|
||||
### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
|
||||
|
||||
1. Download the latest ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases)
|
||||
2. Install via your root manager and reboot
|
||||
3. Place your keybox at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
|
||||
4. Configure targets in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
|
||||
5. Verify with Play Integrity or Key Attestation Demo
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
**Native Cert Generation** — `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 chains in Rust using `ring` and manual DER encoding. BouncyCastle fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
|
||||
|
||||
**Binder Interception** — PLT hook on `ioctl()` in `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside `keystore2`. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions.
|
||||
|
||||
**AOSP Compliance** — Self-signed certs for non-attested keys (matching `ta/src/keys.rs`), correct AuthorizationList tag ordering, version-guarded extension fields, `authorize_create` enforcement.
|
||||
|
||||
**Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. File-backed with file-level locking.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rate Limiting** — Per-UID hardware keygen cap (2/30s window, 2 concurrent). Overflow falls to software certs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
All config files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are hot-reloaded via `FileObserver`.
|
||||
|
||||
### target.txt
|
||||
|
||||
Controls which apps get intercepted and the simulation mode.
|
||||
|
||||
| Suffix | Mode |
|
||||
|--------|------|
|
||||
| `!` | Force software key generation |
|
||||
| `?` | Force leaf certificate patching (real TEE key, patched cert) |
|
||||
| *(none)* | Automatic selection |
|
||||
|
||||
Multi-keybox support via `[filename.xml]` headers:
|
||||
This file provides the master cryptographic identity for the simulator. It contains a private key and a valid, hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. The simulator uses this to sign the virtual certificates it generates, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
|
||||
|
||||
```xml
|
||||
<?xml version="1.0"?>
|
||||
<AndroidAttestation>
|
||||
<Keybox DeviceID="...">
|
||||
<Key algorithm="ecdsa|rsa">
|
||||
<PrivateKey format="pem">...</PrivateKey>
|
||||
<CertificateChain>...</CertificateChain>
|
||||
</Key>
|
||||
</Keybox>
|
||||
</AndroidAttestation>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Mode and Keybox Configuration (`target.txt`)
|
||||
|
||||
TEESimulator currently operates in two primary modes as it transitions towards full emulation.
|
||||
You can control the simulation mode and the specific keybox.xml file used on a per-package basis.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Mode Suffixes
|
||||
|
||||
* **`!` → Force Generation Mode:** Creates a complete, software-based virtual key. This is the foundation of the full TEE simulation.
|
||||
* **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking Mode:** A legacy mode where a real TEE key is generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and modified.
|
||||
* **No symbol → Automatic Mode:** The module selects the most appropriate mode for the device.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Multi-Keybox Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
You can specify different keybox files for different groups of applications. This is done by adding a line with the filename in square brackets (e.g., [demo_keybox.xml]).
|
||||
|
||||
All applications listed after this line will use the specified keybox file, until a new keybox is declared. Applications listed before any custom keybox declaration will use the default `keybox.xml`.
|
||||
|
||||
For example:
|
||||
```
|
||||
# These two apps will use the default /data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml
|
||||
com.google.android.gms!
|
||||
io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?
|
||||
|
||||
# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps.
|
||||
# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/aosp_keybox.xml
|
||||
[aosp_keybox.xml]
|
||||
com.google.android.gsf
|
||||
|
||||
# Switch again to another keybox.
|
||||
# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/demo_keybox.xml
|
||||
[demo_keybox.xml]
|
||||
org.matrix.demo
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### security_patch.txt
|
||||
### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)
|
||||
|
||||
Override patch levels reported in attestation certificates. Global defaults at top, per-package overrides with `[package.name]`.
|
||||
This file allows you to configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` that the simulator will report in its patched or forged attestation certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
| Key | Scope |
|
||||
|-----|-------|
|
||||
| `system` | OS patch level |
|
||||
| `vendor` | Vendor patch level |
|
||||
| `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
|
||||
| `all` | Sets all three |
|
||||
**Note:** This only affects the Key Attestation data generated by the simulator. It does not change the actual system properties of your device.
|
||||
|
||||
Special values: `today`, `YYYY-MM-DD` templates, `no` (omit tag), `device_default`, `prop` (read from system property).
|
||||
#### Global and Per-Package Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
You can set a global patch level that applies to all applications, and you can also override these settings for specific packages. The syntax is hierarchical:
|
||||
|
||||
* Settings defined at the top of the file, before any `[package.name]` line, are **global** and serve as the default for all apps.
|
||||
* To create a specific configuration for an application, add its package name in square brackets (e.g., `[com.google.android.gms]`). All settings following this line will apply *only* to that package until a new package context is declared.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Configuration Keys and Values
|
||||
|
||||
You can specify the patch level for the following components using a `key=value` format:
|
||||
|
||||
* `system`: The main OS patch level.
|
||||
* `vendor`: The vendor patch level.
|
||||
* `boot`: The boot/kernel patch level.
|
||||
* `all`: A convenient shorthand to set the same date for `system`, `vendor`, and `boot` simultaneously. Any individual key can still be used to override the value set by `all`.
|
||||
|
||||
Dates should be provided in `YYYY-MM-DD` format (e.g., `2025-11-05`).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Special Keywords
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to static dates, several special keywords provide advanced, dynamic control:
|
||||
|
||||
* **`today`**: Dynamically uses the current date every time an attestation is generated. This ensures the device always appears up-to-date without needing manual edits.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Date Templates**: You can create semi-dynamic dates using `YYYY`, `MM`, and `DD` as placeholders for the current year, month, and day. For example, `YYYY-MM-05` will always resolve to the 5th of the current month and year.
|
||||
|
||||
* **`no`**: This keyword instructs the simulator to **completely omit** the corresponding patch level tag from the generated attestation.
|
||||
|
||||
* **`device_default`**: This keyword forces the simulator to fall back and use the device's **real hardware value** for that specific patch level. This is essential for creating exceptions to a global override or an `all` rule.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Example Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
This example demonstrates how to combine global settings, per-package overrides, and special keywords for fine-grained control.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
# --- Global Configuration ---
|
||||
# This is the default for all apps unless specified otherwise.
|
||||
# - Forge a recent system patch level, the 5th of the current month (a common patch date).
|
||||
# - Use the device's real vendor patch level.
|
||||
# - Do not report a boot patch level at all.
|
||||
system=YYYY-MM-05
|
||||
vendor=device_default
|
||||
boot=no
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Per-Package Override for Google Play Services ---
|
||||
# This app will report an older, specific date for its system patch.
|
||||
# It will inherit the global settings for vendor (device_default) and boot (no).
|
||||
[com.google.android.gms]
|
||||
system=2025-10-01
|
||||
system=2024-10-01
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Per-Package Override for a Demo App ---
|
||||
# This app gets a completely custom configuration.
|
||||
[org.matrix.demo]
|
||||
# Set a base date for all patch levels...
|
||||
all=2025-09-15
|
||||
# ...but make an exception: use the real boot patch level instead of the one from 'all'.
|
||||
boot=device_default
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Building from Source
|
||||
|
||||
Prerequisites: JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
git clone --recursive https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS.git
|
||||
cd TEESimulator-RS
|
||||
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Output ZIPs in `out/`. Gradle invokes `cargo ndk` automatically to cross-compile `libcertgen.so`.
|
||||
|
||||
Push to `main` or use **Actions > Build > Run workflow** to trigger CI.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
| Root Manager | Status |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| KernelSU | Tested (Action button + lifecycle scripts) |
|
||||
| Magisk | Supported |
|
||||
| APatch | Supported |
|
||||
|
||||
## Community
|
||||
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/SuperPowers_Telegram-Join-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
## Credits
|
||||
|
||||
- [JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) — original TEESimulator and interception architecture
|
||||
- [5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore) — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception
|
||||
- [LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt) — PLT hook library
|
||||
- [ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring) — Rust cryptography library
|
||||
- [MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd) — AOSP compliance work via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157)
|
||||
- [fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524) — contributor and collaborator
|
||||
- [huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares) — collaborator and tester
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
[GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE)
|
||||
|
||||
+17
-84
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import com.android.build.api.artifact.SingleArtifact
|
||||
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
|
||||
import javax.inject.Inject
|
||||
import org.gradle.process.ExecOperations
|
||||
import org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget
|
||||
|
||||
plugins {
|
||||
alias(libs.plugins.android.application)
|
||||
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
|
||||
|
||||
val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
|
||||
val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
|
||||
val verName = "v6.0.1"
|
||||
val verName = "v3.2"
|
||||
|
||||
android {
|
||||
namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
|
||||
@@ -66,76 +65,12 @@ android {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kotlin {
|
||||
compilerOptions {
|
||||
jvmTarget.set(JvmTarget.JVM_21)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
dependencies {
|
||||
compileOnly(project(":stub"))
|
||||
compileOnly(libs.annotation)
|
||||
implementation(libs.bcpkix)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Rust native cert gen build task ---
|
||||
val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
|
||||
description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
|
||||
|
||||
workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
|
||||
|
||||
commandLine(
|
||||
"cargo", "ndk",
|
||||
"-t", "arm64-v8a",
|
||||
"-o", rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs").absolutePath,
|
||||
"build", "--release"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
inputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/src"))
|
||||
inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.toml"))
|
||||
inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.lock"))
|
||||
outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))
|
||||
|
||||
environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
|
||||
environment("PATH", "${System.getProperty("user.home")}/.cargo/bin:${System.getenv("PATH") ?: ""}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AGP auto-detects jniLibs/ as an input to mergeJniLibFolders — wire the dependency
|
||||
tasks.configureEach {
|
||||
if (name.endsWith("JniLibFolders") && name.startsWith("merge")) {
|
||||
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Auto-rewrite module/update.json on every packaging build so versionCode and
|
||||
// zipUrl track gitCommitCount automatically, matching module.prop.
|
||||
val refreshUpdateJson by tasks.registering {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
|
||||
description = "Rewrite module/update.json to match current verName and gitCommitCount."
|
||||
|
||||
val updateJsonFile = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("module/update.json")
|
||||
val capturedVerName = verName
|
||||
val capturedCount = gitCommitCount
|
||||
|
||||
inputs.property("verName", capturedVerName)
|
||||
inputs.property("gitCommitCount", capturedCount)
|
||||
outputs.file(updateJsonFile)
|
||||
|
||||
doLast {
|
||||
val fullVer = "$capturedVerName-$capturedCount"
|
||||
updateJsonFile.writeText(
|
||||
"""{
|
||||
"version": "$fullVer",
|
||||
"versionCode": $capturedCount,
|
||||
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/$fullVer/TEESimulator-RS-$fullVer-Release.zip",
|
||||
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
|
||||
}
|
||||
"""
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
androidComponents {
|
||||
onVariants(selector().all()) { variant ->
|
||||
val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() }
|
||||
@@ -144,23 +79,21 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
// --- Define output locations and file names ---
|
||||
// Stage all files in a temporary directory inside 'build' before zipping
|
||||
val tempModuleDir = project.layout.buildDirectory.dir("module/${variant.name}")
|
||||
val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-RS-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$capitalized.zip"
|
||||
val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-$capitalized.zip"
|
||||
|
||||
// Task 1: Prepare all module files in the temporary build directory.
|
||||
// Using Sync ensures that stale files from previous runs are removed.
|
||||
val prepareModuleFilesTask =
|
||||
tasks.register<Sync>("prepareModuleFiles${capitalized}") {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
|
||||
description = "Prepares all files for the ${variant.name} module zip."
|
||||
|
||||
if (isDebug) {
|
||||
dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
|
||||
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
|
||||
}
|
||||
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
|
||||
dependsOn(refreshUpdateJson)
|
||||
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
|
||||
|
||||
if (isDebug) {
|
||||
from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) {
|
||||
@@ -177,14 +110,13 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val nativeLibsDir = if (isDebug) {
|
||||
"intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
|
||||
}
|
||||
from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) {
|
||||
into("lib")
|
||||
include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
|
||||
from(
|
||||
project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
|
||||
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
|
||||
)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
into("lib") // Place them in the 'lib' subfolder of the staging directory.
|
||||
include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Now, copy and process the files from 'module' directory.
|
||||
@@ -199,7 +131,8 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
// Use expand() for simple key-value replacement.
|
||||
expand(
|
||||
"REPLACEMEVERCODE" to gitCommitCount.toString(),
|
||||
"REPLACEMEVER" to "$verName-$gitCommitCount",
|
||||
"REPLACEMEVER" to
|
||||
"$verName ($gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-${variant.name})",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -210,7 +143,7 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
// Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory.
|
||||
val zipTask =
|
||||
tasks.register<Zip>("zip${capitalized}") {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
|
||||
description = "Creates the flashable zip for the ${variant.name} module."
|
||||
dependsOn(prepareModuleFilesTask)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -223,7 +156,7 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
fun createInstallTasks(rootProvider: String, installCli: String) {
|
||||
val pushTask =
|
||||
tasks.register<Exec>("push${rootProvider}Module${capitalized}") {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
|
||||
description =
|
||||
"Pushes the ${variant.name} module to the device for $rootProvider."
|
||||
dependsOn(zipTask)
|
||||
@@ -237,7 +170,7 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
|
||||
val installTask =
|
||||
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}${capitalized}") {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
|
||||
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider."
|
||||
dependsOn(pushTask)
|
||||
commandLine(
|
||||
@@ -250,7 +183,7 @@ androidComponents {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}AndReboot${capitalized}") {
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
|
||||
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
|
||||
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider and reboots."
|
||||
dependsOn(installTask)
|
||||
commandLine("adb", "reboot")
|
||||
|
||||
Vendored
-6
@@ -7,9 +7,3 @@
|
||||
-keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.App {
|
||||
public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen {
|
||||
native <methods>;
|
||||
*;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-keep class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertGenConfig { *; }
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ set(CMAKE_CXX_STANDARD 23)
|
||||
set(CMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS ON)
|
||||
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fno-rtti")
|
||||
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS} -fno-exceptions")
|
||||
set(CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE "${CMAKE_CXX_FLAGS_RELEASE} -DNDEBUG")
|
||||
|
||||
# LSPlt configuration
|
||||
OPTION(LSPLT_BUILD_SHARED OFF)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,21 +235,19 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
|
||||
struct RegistrationEntry {
|
||||
wp<IBinder> target;
|
||||
sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
|
||||
std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
|
||||
mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
|
||||
std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;
|
||||
|
||||
public:
|
||||
BinderInterceptor() = default;
|
||||
|
||||
bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
|
||||
// Checks if a specific Binder instance is currently registered for interception
|
||||
bool isBinderIntercepted(const wp<BBinder> &target) const {
|
||||
std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
|
||||
auto it = registry_.find(target);
|
||||
if (it == registry_.end()) return false;
|
||||
const auto &codes = it->second.filtered_codes;
|
||||
return codes.empty() || std::find(codes.begin(), codes.end(), code) != codes.end();
|
||||
return registry_.find(target) != registry_.end();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Main entry point for processing the "Man-in-the-Middle" logic
|
||||
@@ -350,14 +348,14 @@ static sp<BinderStub> g_stub_instance = nullptr;
|
||||
|
||||
namespace {
|
||||
|
||||
constexpr binder_size_t kMaxInterceptableDataSize = 256 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
|
||||
if (!txn_data || txn_data->target.ptr == 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
// AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
|
||||
// System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
|
||||
// Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
|
||||
if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
|
||||
// Bypass interception for oversized payloads to prevent thread starvation from flood attacks
|
||||
if (txn_data->data_size > kMaxInterceptableDataSize)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
bool hijack = false;
|
||||
@@ -389,7 +387,7 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
|
||||
// This is safe because we are holding a strong reference.
|
||||
wp<BBinder> wp_target = target_binder_ptr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (g_interceptor_instance->shouldIntercept(wp_target, txn_data->code)) {
|
||||
if (g_interceptor_instance->isBinderIntercepted(wp_target)) {
|
||||
info.transaction_code = txn_data->code;
|
||||
info.target_binder = wp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer
|
||||
hijack = true;
|
||||
@@ -428,29 +426,44 @@ void processBinderReadBuffer(const binder_write_read &bwr) {
|
||||
uintptr_t ptr = bwr.read_buffer;
|
||||
uintptr_t end = ptr + bwr.read_consumed;
|
||||
|
||||
LOGV("[Hook] Processing Read Buffer: Size=%llu, Consumed=%llu", bwr.read_size, bwr.read_consumed);
|
||||
|
||||
while (ptr < end) {
|
||||
// Ensure we can read at least the command header
|
||||
if (end - ptr < sizeof(uint32_t))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(ptr);
|
||||
ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
|
||||
|
||||
// Calculate payload size from the ioctl command code
|
||||
size_t cmd_size = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
|
||||
|
||||
// Log the command using our generated to-string function
|
||||
LOGV("[Driver -> User] Command: %s (0x%x), DataSize: %zu", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd), cmd, cmd_size);
|
||||
|
||||
// Safety check: ensure the command's data does not exceed the buffer
|
||||
if (ptr + cmd_size > end) {
|
||||
LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overrun parsing command 0x%x", cmd);
|
||||
LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overflow detected while parsing command %s", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (__builtin_expect(cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX, 0)) {
|
||||
binder_transaction_data *txn;
|
||||
// We are primarily interested in BR_TRANSACTION commands to intercept
|
||||
if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
|
||||
binder_transaction_data *txn = nullptr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
|
||||
txn = &reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr)->transaction_data;
|
||||
// The data is wrapped in a secctx struct
|
||||
auto *wrapper = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr);
|
||||
txn = &wrapper->transaction_data;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
txn = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data *>(ptr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
inspectAndRewriteTransaction(txn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Advance pointer to the next command
|
||||
ptr += cmd_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -470,17 +483,13 @@ int intercepted_ioctl(int fd, int request, ...) {
|
||||
// 1. Call original kernel ioctl to let the driver do its work
|
||||
int result = g_original_ioctl(fd, request, arg);
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. After the call returns, check if it was a BINDER_WRITE_READ and if it succeeded
|
||||
if (result >= 0 && request == BINDER_WRITE_READ && arg != nullptr) {
|
||||
const auto *bwr = static_cast<const binder_write_read *>(arg);
|
||||
// Fast reject: only enter the parser if the buffer could contain a BR_TRANSACTION.
|
||||
// Pings, ref ops, and looper management never produce BR_TRANSACTION, so scanning
|
||||
// their buffers is pure overhead (~2-5us per ioctl in debug builds).
|
||||
if (bwr->read_consumed >= sizeof(uint32_t)) {
|
||||
uint32_t first_cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(bwr->read_buffer);
|
||||
if (first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX
|
||||
|| bwr->read_consumed > sizeof(uint32_t) + _IOC_SIZE(first_cmd)) {
|
||||
processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We only care about data read FROM the driver (i.e., incoming commands)
|
||||
if (bwr->read_consumed > 0) {
|
||||
processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -523,29 +532,18 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
|
||||
if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
|
||||
return BAD_VALUE;
|
||||
|
||||
// We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
|
||||
if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
|
||||
LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
|
||||
return BAD_TYPE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
|
||||
int32_t code_count = 0;
|
||||
if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
|
||||
codes.reserve(code_count);
|
||||
for (int32_t i = 0; i < code_count; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t c = 0;
|
||||
if (data.readUint32(&c) == OK) codes.push_back(c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p with %zu filtered codes", target.get(), codes.size());
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p (all codes)", target.get());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
wp<IBinder> weak_target = target;
|
||||
|
||||
std::unique_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
|
||||
registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback, std::move(codes)};
|
||||
registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback};
|
||||
|
||||
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p", target.get());
|
||||
return OK;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,13 +2,11 @@
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/wait.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/prctl.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/resource.h>
|
||||
#include <signal.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
#include <time.h>
|
||||
|
||||
static volatile sig_atomic_t should_exit = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,12 +27,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
|
||||
const char *daemon_path = argv[1];
|
||||
char **daemon_argv = &argv[1];
|
||||
|
||||
int backoff_ms = 500;
|
||||
|
||||
while (!should_exit) {
|
||||
struct timespec child_start;
|
||||
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &child_start);
|
||||
|
||||
pid_t pid = fork();
|
||||
|
||||
if (pid < 0) {
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +39,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
|
||||
if (pid == 0) {
|
||||
// Child: become the daemon
|
||||
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // Die if parent dies
|
||||
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 10); // lower CPU priority than foreground
|
||||
execv(daemon_path, daemon_argv);
|
||||
perror("execv failed");
|
||||
_exit(127);
|
||||
@@ -58,18 +50,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
|
||||
|
||||
if (should_exit) break;
|
||||
|
||||
// Exponential backoff on rapid crashes, reset if child was stable
|
||||
struct timespec now;
|
||||
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &now);
|
||||
long lived_ms = (now.tv_sec - child_start.tv_sec) * 1000 +
|
||||
(now.tv_nsec - child_start.tv_nsec) / 1000000;
|
||||
|
||||
if (lived_ms > 30000) {
|
||||
backoff_ms = 500;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
usleep(backoff_ms * 1000);
|
||||
if (backoff_ms < 30000) backoff_ms *= 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Instant restart - no delay
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,17 +6,15 @@ import android.content.Context
|
||||
import android.content.ContextWrapper
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.os.Looper
|
||||
import java.io.File
|
||||
import java.security.Security
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.BootStateManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.AbstractKeystoreInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeystoreInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
|
||||
import kotlin.system.exitProcess
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Main application object for TEESimulator. This object manages the application's lifecycle,
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +23,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
|
||||
object App {
|
||||
// The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
|
||||
private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
|
||||
// The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
|
||||
private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
|
||||
@@ -33,26 +33,21 @@ object App {
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@JvmStatic
|
||||
fun main(args: Array<String>) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Welcome to TEESimulator!")
|
||||
|
||||
Thread.setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler { thread, throwable ->
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Uncaught exception on ${thread.name}", throwable)
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Uncaught exception on thread '${thread.name}'. Exiting for restart.", throwable)
|
||||
exitProcess(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Welcome to TEESimulator!")
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
purgeDebugDiagnostics()
|
||||
// Initialize the Android framework environment
|
||||
prepareEnvironment()
|
||||
|
||||
// Spoof boot-state props before any hook attaches, so keystore2's
|
||||
// cached snapshot reflects the spoofed values.
|
||||
BootStateManager.apply()
|
||||
|
||||
// Load the package configuration.
|
||||
ConfigurationManager.initialize()
|
||||
|
||||
// Initialize and start the appropriate keystore interceptors.
|
||||
initializeInterceptors()
|
||||
|
||||
// Load the package configuration.
|
||||
ConfigurationManager.initialize()
|
||||
// Set up the device's boot key and hash, which are crucial for attestation.
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootKeyAndHash()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -62,8 +57,6 @@ object App {
|
||||
Security.removeProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
|
||||
Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider())
|
||||
|
||||
NativeCertGen.initialize("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/libcertgen.so")
|
||||
|
||||
// This starts the message queue processing. It blocks here indefinitely
|
||||
// processing messages until Looper.myLooper().quit() is called.
|
||||
Looper.loop()
|
||||
@@ -73,25 +66,6 @@ object App {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Release builds never emit diagnostics. Sweep any `.bin` dumps a prior
|
||||
* debug install left in the world-readable temp dir so they can't act as a
|
||||
* detection artifact for apps that probe /data/local/tmp.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun purgeDebugDiagnostics() {
|
||||
if (SystemLogger.isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
val stale =
|
||||
File("/data/local/tmp").listFiles { _, name ->
|
||||
name.startsWith("teesim-") && name.endsWith(".bin")
|
||||
} ?: return
|
||||
stale.forEach { runCatching { it.delete() } }
|
||||
if (stale.isNotEmpty()) {
|
||||
// warning() bypasses the rate limiter, so this once-per-boot audit
|
||||
// line survives the noisy startup window.
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("Purged ${stale.size} stale debug diagnostic(s) from /data/local/tmp")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Initializes the necessary Android framework internals to satisfy KeyStore requirements. */
|
||||
private fun prepareEnvironment() {
|
||||
// 1. Prepare Main Looper
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,11 +2,8 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
|
||||
|
||||
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
|
||||
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
|
||||
import java.security.MessageDigest
|
||||
import javax.crypto.Mac
|
||||
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Boolean
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Enumerated
|
||||
@@ -43,12 +40,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): Extension {
|
||||
val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
var formattedString =
|
||||
keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
"Forged attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Forged attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, DEROctetString(keyDescription.encoded))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -131,59 +127,33 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
return properties
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
|
||||
private fun buildKeyDescription(
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): ASN1Sequence {
|
||||
val creationTime = System.currentTimeMillis()
|
||||
val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel, creationTime)
|
||||
|
||||
val uniqueId =
|
||||
if (params.includeUniqueId == true && params.attestationChallenge != null) {
|
||||
computeUniqueId(creationTime, createApplicationId(uid).octets)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ByteArray(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
|
||||
val fields =
|
||||
arrayOf(
|
||||
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
|
||||
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)),
|
||||
DEROctetString(uniqueId),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
|
||||
), // attestationVersion
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
|
||||
ASN1Integer(
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
|
||||
), // keymasterVersion
|
||||
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
|
||||
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
|
||||
DEROctetString(ByteArray(0)), // uniqueId
|
||||
softwareEnforced,
|
||||
teeEnforced,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return DERSequence(fields)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
|
||||
val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
|
||||
val message =
|
||||
ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
|
||||
.putLong(temporalCounter)
|
||||
.put(aaidDer)
|
||||
.put(0x00)
|
||||
.array()
|
||||
val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
|
||||
mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
|
||||
return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
|
||||
val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
|
||||
if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
|
||||
file.readBytes()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
|
||||
ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Builds the `TeeEnforced` authorization list. These are properties the TEE "guarantees". */
|
||||
private fun buildTeeEnforcedList(
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
@@ -212,110 +182,23 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_DIGEST,
|
||||
DERSet(params.digest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.ecCurve != null) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_EC_CURVE,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(params.ecCurve.toLong()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.blockMode.isNotEmpty()) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_BLOCK_MODE,
|
||||
DERSet(params.blockMode.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.padding.isNotEmpty()) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_PADDING,
|
||||
DERSet(params.padding.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(params.rsaPublicExponent.toLong()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.isNotEmpty() && attestVersion >= 100) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
|
||||
DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.earlyBootOnly == true && attestVersion >= 4) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.noAuthRequired == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
list.addAll(
|
||||
listOf(
|
||||
),
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE),
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGIN,
|
||||
ASN1Integer((params.origin ?: 0).toLong()),
|
||||
),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(0L),
|
||||
), // KeyOrigin.GENERATED
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST,
|
||||
buildRootOfTrust(null),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Use the same logic as getSimulatedHardwareProperties to conditionally add patch levels.
|
||||
val simulatedProperties = getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid)
|
||||
@@ -412,32 +295,20 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
* Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by
|
||||
* Keystore.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
creationTimeMs: Long = System.currentTimeMillis(),
|
||||
): DERSequence {
|
||||
val list = mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>()
|
||||
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(creationTimeMs),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid: Int, securityLevel: Int): DERSequence {
|
||||
val list =
|
||||
mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
|
||||
ASN1Integer(System.currentTimeMillis()),
|
||||
),
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
|
||||
createApplicationId(uid),
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(
|
||||
@@ -447,39 +318,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.callerNonce == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.activeDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
params.usageCountLimit?.let {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1Integer(it.toLong()))
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
|
||||
list.add(
|
||||
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return DERSequence(list.sortedBy { (it as DERTaggedObject).tagNo }.toTypedArray())
|
||||
return DERSequence(list.toTypedArray())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -506,12 +345,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
* retrieved.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@Throws(Throwable::class)
|
||||
internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
|
||||
val appUid = uid % 100000
|
||||
if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
|
||||
return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
|
||||
val pm =
|
||||
ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
|
||||
?: throw IllegalStateException("PackageManager not found!")
|
||||
@@ -519,11 +353,12 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
pm.getPackagesForUid(uid) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No packages for UID $uid")
|
||||
|
||||
val sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
|
||||
val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
|
||||
val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<DERSequence>()
|
||||
val signatureDigests = mutableSetOf<Digest>()
|
||||
|
||||
val userId = uid / 100000
|
||||
// Process all packages associated with the UID in a single loop.
|
||||
packages.forEach { packageName ->
|
||||
val userId = uid / 100000
|
||||
val packageInfo =
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
|
||||
pm.getPackageInfo(
|
||||
@@ -536,36 +371,34 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
|
||||
pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES, userId)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
packageInfoList.add(packageInfo.packageName to packageInfo.longVersionCode)
|
||||
// Add package information (name and version code) to our list.
|
||||
packageInfoList.add(
|
||||
DERSequence(
|
||||
arrayOf(
|
||||
DEROctetString(packageInfo.packageName.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(packageInfo.longVersionCode),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Collect unique signature digests from the signing history.
|
||||
packageInfo.signingInfo?.signingCertificateHistory?.forEach { signature ->
|
||||
signatureDigests.add(Digest(sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())))
|
||||
val digest = sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())
|
||||
signatureDigests.add(Digest(digest))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return buildApplicationIdDer(packageInfoList, signatureDigests)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun buildApplicationIdDer(
|
||||
packages: List<Pair<String, Long>>,
|
||||
digests: Set<Digest>,
|
||||
): DEROctetString {
|
||||
val packageInfoList =
|
||||
packages.map { (name, version) ->
|
||||
DERSequence(
|
||||
arrayOf(
|
||||
DEROctetString(name.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
|
||||
ASN1Integer(version),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The application ID is a sequence of two sets:
|
||||
// 1. A set of package information (name and version).
|
||||
// 2. A set of SHA-256 digests of the signing certificates.
|
||||
val applicationIdSequence =
|
||||
DERSequence(
|
||||
arrayOf(
|
||||
DERSet(packageInfoList.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
DERSet(digests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
DERSet(signatureDigests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return DEROctetString(applicationIdSequence.encoded)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,11 +44,9 @@ object AttestationConstants {
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Key Lifetime and Usage Control ---
|
||||
const val TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 303
|
||||
const val TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = 305
|
||||
const val TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = 400
|
||||
const val TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 401
|
||||
const val TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 402
|
||||
const val TAG_MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = 403
|
||||
const val TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 404
|
||||
const val TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = 405
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,10 +56,6 @@ object AttestationConstants {
|
||||
const val TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 503
|
||||
const val TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = 504
|
||||
const val TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 505
|
||||
const val TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = 506
|
||||
const val TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = 507
|
||||
const val TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = 508
|
||||
const val TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = 509
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Attestation and Application Info ---
|
||||
const val TAG_APPLICATION_ID = 601
|
||||
@@ -95,5 +89,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Other Constants ---
|
||||
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
|
||||
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128
|
||||
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBox
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.toHex
|
||||
import java.util.Date
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Handles the modification (patching) of Android Key Attestation extensions within certificates.
|
||||
@@ -37,12 +36,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
* @return A new, cryptographically valid, patched certificate chain. Returns the original chain
|
||||
* on any failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun patchCertificateChain(
|
||||
originalChain: Array<Certificate>?,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
notBefore: Date? = null,
|
||||
notAfter: Date? = null,
|
||||
): Array<Certificate> {
|
||||
fun patchCertificateChain(originalChain: Array<Certificate>?, uid: Int): Array<Certificate> {
|
||||
if (originalChain.isNullOrEmpty()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Attempted to patch a null or empty certificate chain for UID $uid.")
|
||||
return originalChain ?: emptyArray()
|
||||
@@ -69,8 +63,6 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
keybox,
|
||||
originalLeaf.sigAlgName,
|
||||
uid,
|
||||
notBefore,
|
||||
notAfter,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Construct the NEW, VALID chain by prepending the patched leaf to the keybox's
|
||||
@@ -119,27 +111,17 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
keybox: KeyBox,
|
||||
sigAlgName: String,
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
notBefore: Date? = null,
|
||||
notAfter: Date? = null,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
// The issuer of our new leaf is the subject of the first certificate in our custom keybox
|
||||
// chain.
|
||||
val newIssuer = X509CertificateHolder(keybox.certificates[0].encoded).subject
|
||||
|
||||
val effectiveNotBefore = notBefore ?: originalLeafHolder.notBefore
|
||||
val effectiveNotAfter = notAfter ?: originalLeafHolder.notAfter
|
||||
if (notBefore != null || notAfter != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug(
|
||||
"Overriding cert dates: notBefore=${effectiveNotBefore} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notBefore}), notAfter=${effectiveNotAfter} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notAfter})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val builder =
|
||||
X509v3CertificateBuilder(
|
||||
newIssuer,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.serialNumber,
|
||||
effectiveNotBefore,
|
||||
effectiveNotAfter,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.notBefore,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.notAfter,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.subject,
|
||||
originalLeafHolder.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -164,7 +146,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
// Log the signature of the newly created certificate to observe its non-deterministic
|
||||
// nature.
|
||||
val signatureBytes = (newCertificate as X509Certificate).signature
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose { "Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}")
|
||||
|
||||
return newCertificate
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -286,10 +268,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation, uid: Int): Extension {
|
||||
val (allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
"Original attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
var formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Original attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the new Root of Trust and add/replace it in the map.
|
||||
val newRootOfTrust = AttestationBuilder.buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust)
|
||||
@@ -316,10 +296,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
|
||||
|
||||
allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] = sortedTeeEnforced
|
||||
val patchedSequence = DERSequence(allFields)
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
"Patched attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Patched attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
val patchedOctets = DEROctetString(patchedSequence)
|
||||
|
||||
return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, patchedOctets)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
|
||||
|
||||
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
|
||||
import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
|
||||
@@ -61,23 +60,12 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
// A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
|
||||
private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"
|
||||
|
||||
// Alias for the device-ID attestation capability probe.
|
||||
private const val DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_DeviceIdCheck"
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
|
||||
* attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Lazily mirrors whether the real TEE can attest device identifiers/properties (the tags added
|
||||
* by `setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded`). Hardware that never provisioned device IDs
|
||||
* returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS; the synthesizer consults this so it never forges a capability the
|
||||
* real silicon lacks. Cached.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val canAttestDeviceIds: Boolean by lazy { checkDeviceIdAttestation() }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
|
||||
* is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
|
||||
@@ -118,37 +106,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Probes whether the real TEE can satisfy device-ID/property attestation, mirroring its actual
|
||||
* capability. Gated behind [isTeeFunctional] so a dead TEE never triggers a second doomed
|
||||
* probe — it simply reports `false` (cannot attest), the faithful result for such hardware.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun checkDeviceIdAttestation(): Boolean {
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < Build.VERSION_CODES.S) return false
|
||||
if (!isTeeFunctional) return false
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
|
||||
val keyPairGenerator =
|
||||
KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
|
||||
val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
|
||||
val spec =
|
||||
KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
|
||||
.setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
|
||||
.setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
|
||||
.setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
|
||||
.setDevicePropertiesAttestationIncluded(true)
|
||||
.build()
|
||||
keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
|
||||
keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
|
||||
runCatching { keyStore.deleteEntry(DEVICE_ID_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation supported by TEE.")
|
||||
true
|
||||
} catch (_: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Device-ID attestation not supported by TEE; mirroring as cannot-attest.")
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
|
||||
* deleted after retrieval to clean up.
|
||||
@@ -191,12 +148,11 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
|
||||
// The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
|
||||
val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose {
|
||||
val formattedString = keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
var formattedString =
|
||||
keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
"Cached attestation data: $formattedString"
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.verbose("Cached attestation data: ${formattedString}")
|
||||
val fields = keyDescriptionSeq.toArray()
|
||||
|
||||
val attestVersion =
|
||||
@@ -293,10 +249,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
|
||||
verifiedBootKey = null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (verifiedBootHash?.all { it == 0.toByte() } == true) {
|
||||
verifiedBootHash = null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
|
||||
import java.math.BigInteger
|
||||
import java.util.Date
|
||||
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
|
||||
@@ -19,9 +18,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
val keySize: Int,
|
||||
val algorithm: Int,
|
||||
val ecCurve: Int?,
|
||||
val ecCurve: Int,
|
||||
val ecCurveName: String,
|
||||
val origin: Int?,
|
||||
val blockMode: List<Int>,
|
||||
val padding: List<Int>,
|
||||
val purpose: List<Int>,
|
||||
@@ -41,41 +39,21 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val model: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val secondImei: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val activeDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
|
||||
val usageCountLimit: Int?,
|
||||
val callerNonce: Boolean?,
|
||||
val nonce: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
|
||||
val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
|
||||
val earlyBootOnly: Boolean?,
|
||||
val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
|
||||
val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
|
||||
val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
|
||||
val maxBootLevel: Int?,
|
||||
val minMacLength: Int?,
|
||||
val rsaOaepMgfDigest: List<Int>,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
/** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
params: Array<KeyParameter>
|
||||
) : this(
|
||||
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
|
||||
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: 0,
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
|
||||
algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
|
||||
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
|
||||
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE) ?: 0,
|
||||
ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
|
||||
origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
|
||||
blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -117,32 +95,10 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
|
||||
model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
|
||||
secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
|
||||
activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
|
||||
originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
|
||||
usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
|
||||
usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
|
||||
callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
|
||||
nonce = params.findBlob(Tag.NONCE),
|
||||
unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
|
||||
includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
|
||||
rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
|
||||
earlyBootOnly = params.findBoolean(Tag.EARLY_BOOT_ONLY),
|
||||
allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
|
||||
trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
|
||||
trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
|
||||
noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
|
||||
maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
|
||||
maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
|
||||
minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
|
||||
rsaOaepMgfDigest = params.findAllDigests(Tag.RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes.
|
||||
params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun isAttestKey(): Boolean = purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
|
||||
|
||||
fun isImportKey(): Boolean = origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---
|
||||
@@ -159,10 +115,6 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAlgorithm(tag: Int): Int? =
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findEcCurve(tag: Int): Int? =
|
||||
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.ecCurve
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = Origin */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findOrigin(tag: Int): Int? =
|
||||
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.origin
|
||||
|
||||
/** Maps to AOSP field = LongInteger */
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findLongInteger(tag: Int): BigInteger? =
|
||||
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.longInteger?.toBigInteger()
|
||||
@@ -191,21 +143,6 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
|
||||
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
|
||||
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
|
||||
if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
|
||||
|
||||
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
|
||||
val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
|
||||
return when (curveId) {
|
||||
EcCurve.P_224 -> 224
|
||||
EcCurve.P_256 -> 256
|
||||
EcCurve.P_384 -> 384
|
||||
EcCurve.P_521 -> 521
|
||||
EcCurve.CURVE_25519 -> 256
|
||||
else -> 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Derives the EC Curve name. Logic: Checks specific EC_CURVE tag first (field=EcCurve), falls back
|
||||
* to KEY_SIZE (field=Integer).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.config
|
||||
|
||||
import android.os.SystemProperties
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
|
||||
|
||||
object BootStateManager {
|
||||
private val targets =
|
||||
linkedMapOf(
|
||||
"ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" to "green",
|
||||
"ro.boot.flash.locked" to "1",
|
||||
"ro.boot.veritymode" to "enforcing",
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state" to "locked",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
private val fillIfAbsent =
|
||||
linkedMapOf(
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.invalidate_on_error" to "yes",
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.avb_version" to "1.2",
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.hash_alg" to "sha256",
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.size" to "11904",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
fun apply() {
|
||||
for ((name, target) in targets) {
|
||||
val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
|
||||
if (current.isEmpty()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name absent on this device, skip")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (current == target) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already $target, skip")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: setting $name=$target (was: '$current')")
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, target)
|
||||
}
|
||||
for ((name, value) in fillIfAbsent) {
|
||||
val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
|
||||
if (current.isNotEmpty()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already '$current', skip")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: filling absent $name=$value")
|
||||
AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
// --- Configuration Paths ---
|
||||
const val CONFIG_PATH = "/data/adb/tricky_store"
|
||||
private const val TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE = "target.txt"
|
||||
private const val TEE_STATUS_FILE = "tee_status.txt"
|
||||
private const val PATCH_LEVEL_FILE = "security_patch.txt"
|
||||
private const val DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE = "keybox.xml"
|
||||
private val configRoot = File(CONFIG_PATH)
|
||||
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
// --- In-Memory Configuration State ---
|
||||
@Volatile private var packageModes = mapOf<String, Mode>()
|
||||
@Volatile private var packageKeyboxes = mapOf<String, String>()
|
||||
@Volatile private var isTeeBroken: Boolean? = null
|
||||
@Volatile private var globalCustomPatchLevel: CustomPatchLevel? = null
|
||||
@Volatile private var packagePatchLevels = mapOf<String, CustomPatchLevel>()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
// Initial load of all configuration files.
|
||||
loadTargetPackages(File(configRoot, TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE))
|
||||
loadPatchLevelConfig(File(configRoot, PATCH_LEVEL_FILE))
|
||||
storeTeeStatus() // Check and store the current TEE status.
|
||||
|
||||
// Start watching for any subsequent file changes.
|
||||
ConfigObserver.startWatching()
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Configuration initialized and file observer started.")
|
||||
@@ -83,40 +87,33 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
return packages.firstNotNullOfOrNull { pkg -> packageKeyboxes[pkg] } ?: DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
val mode = getPackageModeForUid(uid)
|
||||
return mode == Mode.PATCH || mode == Mode.AUTO
|
||||
}
|
||||
/** Determines if the certificate for a given UID needs to be patched. */
|
||||
fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.PATCH
|
||||
|
||||
/** Determines if a new certificate needs to be generated for a given UID. */
|
||||
fun shouldGenerate(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
|
||||
/** Determines if no operation is needed for a given UID. */
|
||||
fun shouldSkipUid(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == null
|
||||
|
||||
fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
for (pkg in getPackagesForUid(uid)) {
|
||||
when (packageModes[pkg]) {
|
||||
Mode.GENERATE, Mode.PATCH -> return false
|
||||
Mode.AUTO -> return true
|
||||
null -> continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Resolves the operating mode for a given UID based on its packages and the TEE status. */
|
||||
private fun getPackageModeForUid(uid: Int): Mode? {
|
||||
val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
|
||||
if (packages.isEmpty()) return null
|
||||
|
||||
// Lazily load TEE status if it hasn't been checked yet.
|
||||
if (isTeeBroken == null) loadTeeStatus()
|
||||
|
||||
// Find the first configured mode for any of the UID's packages.
|
||||
for (pkg in packages) {
|
||||
when (packageModes[pkg]) {
|
||||
Mode.GENERATE -> return Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
Mode.PATCH -> return Mode.PATCH
|
||||
Mode.AUTO -> return if (DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional) Mode.PATCH else Mode.GENERATE
|
||||
null -> continue
|
||||
Mode.AUTO -> return if (isTeeBroken == true) Mode.GENERATE else Mode.PATCH
|
||||
null -> continue // No config for this package, check the next one.
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null
|
||||
return null // No configuration found for this UID.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -174,6 +171,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
newModes[pkg] = Mode.PATCH
|
||||
newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
|
||||
}
|
||||
// No suffix means AUTO mode.
|
||||
else -> {
|
||||
newModes[trimmedLine] = Mode.AUTO
|
||||
newKeyboxes[trimmedLine] = currentKeybox
|
||||
@@ -282,6 +280,29 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Checks the device's TEE status and writes the result to a file for persistence. */
|
||||
private fun storeTeeStatus() {
|
||||
val statusFile = File(configRoot, TEE_STATUS_FILE)
|
||||
isTeeBroken = !DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional
|
||||
try {
|
||||
statusFile.writeText("tee_broken=$isTeeBroken")
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("TEE status stored: isTeeBroken=$isTeeBroken")
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to write TEE status to file.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Loads the TEE status from the file. */
|
||||
private fun loadTeeStatus() {
|
||||
val statusFile = File(configRoot, TEE_STATUS_FILE)
|
||||
isTeeBroken =
|
||||
if (statusFile.exists()) {
|
||||
statusFile.readText().trim() == "tee_broken=true"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
null // Status is unknown.
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A FileObserver that monitors the configuration directory for changes and triggers reloads of
|
||||
* the relevant settings.
|
||||
@@ -306,15 +327,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
)
|
||||
KeyBoxManager.invalidateCache(path)
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
|
||||
// Drop only the patched cert chains so the next
|
||||
// attestation request re-signs with the new keybox.
|
||||
// Do NOT drop generatedKeys — that would destroy
|
||||
// every alias/private key in memory and on disk,
|
||||
// logging users out of any app that pinned a
|
||||
// persisted keystore alias.
|
||||
// Patched chains are stale; generated keys survive rotation
|
||||
org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
|
||||
.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
|
||||
.invalidatePatchedChains("updating $file")
|
||||
.invalidatePatchedChains("keybox change: $path")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -344,29 +360,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
|
||||
return iPackageManager
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val callerCtx =
|
||||
java.io.File("/proc/$callingPid/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
|
||||
val selfCtx =
|
||||
java.io.File("/proc/self/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
|
||||
android.os.SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess(callerCtx, selfCtx, tclass, perm)
|
||||
} catch (_: Exception) {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
|
||||
val userId = uid / 100000
|
||||
return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
|
||||
try {
|
||||
getPackageManager()?.checkPermission(permission, pkg, userId) == 0
|
||||
} catch (_: Exception) {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
|
||||
fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
|
||||
return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -109,17 +109,17 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
|
||||
* `handlePostTransact`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
final override fun onTransact(code: Int, data: Parcel, reply: Parcel?, flags: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
// The native hook prepends a transaction ID to the data parcel.
|
||||
val txId = data.readLong()
|
||||
val result = try {
|
||||
val result =
|
||||
when (code) {
|
||||
// These codes are defined in the native layer to distinguish hook types.
|
||||
PRE_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePreTransact(txId, data)
|
||||
POST_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePostTransact(txId, data)
|
||||
else -> return super.onTransact(code, data, reply, flags)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: Throwable) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Interceptor exception, falling through to HAL", e)
|
||||
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The reply parcel is guaranteed to be non-null for our custom transactions.
|
||||
writeResultToReply(result, reply!!)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -293,21 +293,15 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun register(
|
||||
backdoor: IBinder,
|
||||
target: IBinder,
|
||||
interceptor: BinderInterceptor,
|
||||
filteredCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf(),
|
||||
) {
|
||||
/** Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service. */
|
||||
fun register(backdoor: IBinder, target: IBinder, interceptor: BinderInterceptor) {
|
||||
val data = Parcel.obtain()
|
||||
val reply = Parcel.obtain()
|
||||
try {
|
||||
data.writeStrongBinder(target)
|
||||
data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor)
|
||||
data.writeInt(filteredCodes.size)
|
||||
for (code in filteredCodes) data.writeInt(code)
|
||||
backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)")
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target")
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e)
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-3
@@ -68,12 +68,11 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()
|
||||
|
||||
/** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
|
||||
private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
keystoreService = service
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
|
||||
register(backdoor, service, this, interceptedCodes)
|
||||
register(backdoor, service, this)
|
||||
service.linkToDeath(createDeathRecipient(), 0)
|
||||
onInterceptorReady(service, backdoor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-108
@@ -1,51 +1,17 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import android.os.Parcel
|
||||
import android.os.Parcelable
|
||||
import android.security.KeyStore
|
||||
import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
|
||||
|
||||
data class KeyIdentifier(val uid: Int, val alias: String)
|
||||
|
||||
/** A collection of utility functions to support binder interception. */
|
||||
object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
|
||||
private const val EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC = -8
|
||||
|
||||
private fun synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode: Int): String =
|
||||
when (errorCode) {
|
||||
2 -> "Error::Rc(SYSTEM_ERROR)"
|
||||
4 -> "Error::Rc(PERMISSION_DENIED)"
|
||||
6 -> "Error::Rc(VALUE_CORRUPTED)"
|
||||
7 -> "Error::Rc(KEY_NOT_FOUND)"
|
||||
10 -> "Error::Rc(BACKEND_BUSY)"
|
||||
-3 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)"
|
||||
-6 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE)"
|
||||
-7 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM)"
|
||||
-29 -> "Error::Km(TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)"
|
||||
-49 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_TAG)"
|
||||
-75 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH)"
|
||||
-76 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_TAG)"
|
||||
else -> if (errorCode > 0) "Error::Rc($errorCode)" else "Error::Km($errorCode)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
|
||||
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
|
||||
writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
|
||||
writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
|
||||
writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
|
||||
writeInt(errorCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Uses reflection to get the integer transaction code for a given method name from a Stub
|
||||
* class. This is necessary for older Android versions where codes are not public constants.
|
||||
@@ -116,21 +82,12 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
fun <T : Parcelable?> createTypedObjectReply(
|
||||
obj: T,
|
||||
flags: Int = 0,
|
||||
diagnosticTag: String? = null,
|
||||
): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
|
||||
val parcel =
|
||||
Parcel.obtain().apply {
|
||||
writeNoException()
|
||||
writeTypedObject(obj, flags)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (diagnosticTag != null && SystemLogger.isDebugBuild) {
|
||||
val savedPos = parcel.dataPosition()
|
||||
val wire = parcel.marshall()
|
||||
parcel.setDataPosition(savedPos)
|
||||
val path = "/data/local/tmp/teesim-$diagnosticTag.bin"
|
||||
runCatching { java.io.File(path).writeBytes(wire) }
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[$diagnosticTag] reply len=${wire.size} path=$path")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -151,70 +108,6 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
|
||||
|
||||
/** Checks if a reply parcel contains an exception without consuming it. */
|
||||
fun hasException(reply: Parcel): Boolean {
|
||||
val exception = runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull()
|
||||
if (exception != null) reply.setDataPosition(0)
|
||||
return exception != null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
|
||||
errorCode: Int
|
||||
): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply = createErrorReply(errorCode)
|
||||
|
||||
fun normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply: Parcel): Parcel? {
|
||||
reply.setDataPosition(0)
|
||||
if (reply.readInt() != EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
|
||||
reply.setDataPosition(0)
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Advance position past message and stack header to reach errorCode.
|
||||
reply.readString()
|
||||
reply.readInt()
|
||||
val errorCode = reply.readInt()
|
||||
reply.setDataPosition(0)
|
||||
return Parcel.obtain().apply {
|
||||
writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
|
||||
writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
|
||||
writeInt(0)
|
||||
writeInt(errorCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
|
||||
callingUid: Int,
|
||||
): Array<Authorization>? {
|
||||
if (authorizations == null) return null
|
||||
|
||||
val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid)
|
||||
val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
|
||||
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
|
||||
|
||||
return authorizations
|
||||
.map { auth ->
|
||||
val replacement =
|
||||
when (auth.keyParameter.tag) {
|
||||
Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL ->
|
||||
if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) osPatch else null
|
||||
Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL ->
|
||||
if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) vendorPatch
|
||||
else null
|
||||
Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ->
|
||||
if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) bootPatch else null
|
||||
else -> null
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (replacement != null) {
|
||||
Authorization().apply {
|
||||
keyParameter =
|
||||
KeyParameter().apply {
|
||||
tag = auth.keyParameter.tag
|
||||
value = KeyParameterValue.integer(replacement)
|
||||
}
|
||||
securityLevel = auth.securityLevel
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
auth
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
.toTypedArray()
|
||||
return runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull() != null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+80
-486
@@ -1,40 +1,28 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
|
||||
|
||||
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.os.IBinder
|
||||
import android.os.Parcel
|
||||
import android.os.ServiceManager
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.Domain
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
|
||||
import java.security.SecureRandom
|
||||
import java.security.cert.Certificate
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Interceptor for the `IKeystoreService` on Android S (API 31) and newer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This version of Keystore delegates most cryptographic operations to `IKeystoreSecurityLevel`
|
||||
* sub-services (for TEE, StrongBox, etc.). This interceptor's main role is to set up interceptors
|
||||
* for those sub-services and to patch certificate chains on their way out.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@SuppressLint("BlockedPrivateApi")
|
||||
object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
private val stubBinderClass = IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java
|
||||
|
||||
// Transaction codes for the IKeystoreService interface methods we are interested in.
|
||||
private val GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getKeyEntry")
|
||||
private val DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
@@ -47,10 +35,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 34)
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntriesBatched")
|
||||
else null
|
||||
private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
|
||||
private val GRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "grant")
|
||||
private val UNGRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "ungrant")
|
||||
|
||||
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
stubBinderClass.declaredFields
|
||||
@@ -61,100 +45,33 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
|
||||
private const val RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED = 6
|
||||
|
||||
// KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess() became a public app API in Android 16 (API 36). Before that,
|
||||
// grant was a hidden API and SELinux denied untrusted_app, so a synthetic-key grant must answer
|
||||
// PERMISSION_DENIED pre-36 and a coherent virtualized grant on 36+.
|
||||
private const val GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK = 36
|
||||
private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
|
||||
private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
|
||||
|
||||
fun forgetDeletedKey(keyId: KeyIdentifier) {
|
||||
if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Cleared deletion marker for ${keyId.alias}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
|
||||
override val processName = "keystore2"
|
||||
override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry"
|
||||
|
||||
override val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
|
||||
listOfNotNull(
|
||||
GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
GRANT_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
UNGRANT_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.toIntArray()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* This method is called once the main service is hooked. It proceeds to find and hook the
|
||||
* security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
|
||||
setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
|
||||
setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Hooks the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder, which is hosted by the
|
||||
* same process, so synthetic key state follows real key-lifecycle events. Best-effort: if the
|
||||
* service is absent the synthetic plane simply forgoes lifecycle parity.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
ServiceManager.getService("android.security.maintenance")?.let { maintenance ->
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Found maintenance binder. Registering interceptor...")
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
maintenance,
|
||||
Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor,
|
||||
Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor.interceptedCodes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
} ?: SystemLogger.warning("Maintenance binder not found; skipping lifecycle parity.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept maintenance binder.", it) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(service: IKeystoreService, backdoor: IBinder) {
|
||||
// Attempt to get and intercept the TEE security level service.
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)?.let { tee ->
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
|
||||
val interceptor =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
tee.asBinder(),
|
||||
interceptor,
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
register(backdoor, tee.asBinder(), interceptor)
|
||||
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept TEE SecurityLevel.", it) }
|
||||
|
||||
// Attempt to get and intercept the StrongBox security level service.
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)?.let { strongbox ->
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
|
||||
val interceptor =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
|
||||
register(
|
||||
backdoor,
|
||||
strongbox.asBinder(),
|
||||
interceptor,
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
|
||||
)
|
||||
register(backdoor, strongbox.asBinder(), interceptor)
|
||||
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -170,20 +87,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
callingPid: Int,
|
||||
data: Parcel,
|
||||
): TransactionResult {
|
||||
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
|
||||
return if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
|
||||
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
else TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
|
||||
if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
|
||||
val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
|
||||
val isGMS = packages.contains("com.google.android.gms")
|
||||
|
||||
if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
|
||||
if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
|
||||
@@ -207,122 +115,35 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION)
|
||||
return handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid, data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val descriptor =
|
||||
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
// Domain.GRANT read (Android 16+ KeyStoreManager grant). Served for ANY grantee uid —
|
||||
// including isolated services (bindIsolatedService) with no package mapping — so resolve
|
||||
// it before the package-scoped skip; caller-binding in resolveGrant() is the real access
|
||||
// gate. On Android <= 15 no grants are ever issued (grant() denies), so softwareGrants is
|
||||
// empty and this falls through to the real keystore2.
|
||||
if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION && descriptor.domain == Domain.GRANT) {
|
||||
val grant =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.resolveGrant(descriptor.nspace, callingUid)
|
||||
if (grant == null) {
|
||||
// Ours but wrong caller -> KEY_NOT_FOUND (caller-binding); not ours -> real keystore2.
|
||||
return if (
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.softwareGrants.containsKey(descriptor.nspace)
|
||||
)
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
|
||||
else TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((grant.accessVector and 0x4) == 0) { // GET_INFO = 0x4 (access-vector gate)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val response =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(grant.ownerKeyId)
|
||||
?: return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
|
||||
// Same object the owner read returns -> coherent chain across planes.
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
val keyId =
|
||||
if (descriptor.alias != null) {
|
||||
KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
} else if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
|
||||
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
|
||||
)?.let { info ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
|
||||
.find { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
|
||||
?.key
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else null
|
||||
|
||||
if (keyId != null) {
|
||||
val isSoftwareKey =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
|
||||
if (isSoftwareKey) {
|
||||
deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (descriptor.alias == null) {
|
||||
if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
|
||||
// The probe pipeline (and some AOSP callers) switch follow-up
|
||||
// operations to KEY_ID semantics after generateKey returns a
|
||||
// KEY_ID descriptor. Without this branch, our software keys
|
||||
// are invisible to KEY_ID-based getKeyEntry calls and the
|
||||
// request falls through to the real keystore2 daemon, which
|
||||
// legitimately responds with KEY_NOT_FOUND. Duck Detector's
|
||||
// TimingSideChannelProbe captures that exception during its
|
||||
// warmup phase and surfaces it as
|
||||
// "Captured private binder exception during timing skip".
|
||||
// Resolving by KEY_ID and returning the cached response keeps
|
||||
// the call on the happy path, eliminating the warmup signal.
|
||||
val info = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
|
||||
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (info?.response != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found generated response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(info.response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val teeResp = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findTeeResponseByKeyId(
|
||||
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (teeResp != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found TEE response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(teeResp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Domain.GRANT is handled earlier (before the package-scoped skip); an alias-less
|
||||
// read reaching here is KEY_ID or unknown, so it falls through to the real keystore2.
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Handling ${transactionNames[code]!!} ${descriptor.alias}")
|
||||
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
|
||||
val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
|
||||
if (response == null) {
|
||||
if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}")
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
|
||||
if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId) != null) {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${descriptor.alias}, replying with empty response."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val response =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.Continue
|
||||
|
||||
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -331,57 +152,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it.keyParameter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
} else if (code == GRANT_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "grant", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val key =
|
||||
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
val granteeUid = data.readInt()
|
||||
val accessVector = data.readInt()
|
||||
// Synthetic (generatedKeys) AND patch-mode (teeResponses) keys are ours; both must grant
|
||||
// coherently so the Domain.GRANT readback returns the same chain the owner read returns.
|
||||
// Real hardware keys fall through to the real keystore2, which applies the same SELinux
|
||||
// gate the platform would.
|
||||
val ownerKeyId =
|
||||
resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)
|
||||
?.takeIf { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it) }
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
// Version-gated to mirror the real TEE 1:1. Pre-Android-16, grant was a hidden API and
|
||||
// SELinux denied untrusted_app, so keystore2 returns PERMISSION_DENIED. Android 16
|
||||
// (API 36) exposes KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess(), so an app grants its own key:
|
||||
// issue a coherent, caller-bound, access-vector-carrying grant whose Domain.GRANT read
|
||||
// returns the owner's chain.
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val grantId =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.issueGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid, accessVector)
|
||||
val reply =
|
||||
KeyDescriptor().apply {
|
||||
domain = Domain.GRANT
|
||||
nspace = grantId
|
||||
alias = null
|
||||
blob = null
|
||||
}
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(reply)
|
||||
} else if (code == UNGRANT_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "ungrant", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val key =
|
||||
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
val granteeUid = data.readInt()
|
||||
val ownerKeyId =
|
||||
resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)
|
||||
?.takeIf { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it) }
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
// Same version gate as grant(): denied pre-36, revoke the virtualized grant on 36+.
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.revokeGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
logTransaction(
|
||||
txId,
|
||||
@@ -392,7 +162,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Let most calls go through to the real service.
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -407,33 +176,10 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
reply: Parcel?,
|
||||
resultCode: Int,
|
||||
): TransactionResult {
|
||||
if (target != keystoreService || reply == null) return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
if (InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply)) {
|
||||
val normalized = InterceptorUtils.normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply)
|
||||
return if (normalized != null) TransactionResult.OverrideReply(normalized)
|
||||
else TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
val hardwareCount = reply.readInt()
|
||||
val softwareCount =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys.count {
|
||||
it.uid == callingUid
|
||||
}
|
||||
val totalCount = hardwareCount + softwareCount
|
||||
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
|
||||
writeNoException()
|
||||
writeInt(totalCount)
|
||||
}
|
||||
TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify getNumberOfEntries.", it)
|
||||
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
@@ -449,235 +195,83 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
|
||||
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
|
||||
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val keyDescriptor =
|
||||
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
|
||||
logTransaction(
|
||||
txId,
|
||||
"post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}",
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
callingPid,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid))
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Handling post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}")
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val response =
|
||||
reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
reply.setDataPosition(0) // Reset for potential reuse.
|
||||
|
||||
val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
|
||||
val authorizations = response.metadata?.authorizations
|
||||
val origin =
|
||||
authorizations
|
||||
?.find { it.keyParameter.tag == Tag.ORIGIN }
|
||||
?.let { it.keyParameter.value.origin }
|
||||
|
||||
if (origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED) {
|
||||
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
|
||||
|
||||
if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: userUpdated=true, skipping patch" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
|
||||
val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
if (retainedChain == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val authorizations = response.metadata.authorizations
|
||||
val parsedParameters =
|
||||
KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: isImport=${parsedParameters.isImportKey()} origin=${parsedParameters.origin} inImportedKeys=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)} hasPatchedChain=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId) != null} isAttestKey=${parsedParameters.isAttestKey()}" }
|
||||
|
||||
if (parsedParameters.isImportKey()) {
|
||||
val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
if (retainedChain == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, no retained chain, skip" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, SERVING RETAINED CHAIN (detection vector!)" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations,
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: in importedKeys set, skip" }
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId")
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
|
||||
)
|
||||
val keyData =
|
||||
CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
keyId.alias,
|
||||
null,
|
||||
parsedParameters,
|
||||
response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
|
||||
) ?: throw Exception("Failed to create overriding attest key pair.")
|
||||
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(
|
||||
response.metadata,
|
||||
keyData.second.toTypedArray(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.getOrThrow()
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations,
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val newNspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
|
||||
response.metadata.key?.let { it.nspace = newNspace }
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[keyId] =
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo(
|
||||
keyData.first,
|
||||
null,
|
||||
newNspace,
|
||||
response,
|
||||
parsedParameters,
|
||||
)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
|
||||
|
||||
// Snapshot metadata bytes for the same reason as the
|
||||
// primary doSoftwareKeyGen path — loss-less restore
|
||||
// after reboot.
|
||||
val metadataBytesForPersist = response.metadata?.let { md ->
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
val parcel = android.os.Parcel.obtain()
|
||||
try {
|
||||
md.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
|
||||
parcel.marshall()
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
parcel.recycle()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
}
|
||||
GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
|
||||
keyId = keyId,
|
||||
keyPair = keyData.first,
|
||||
secretKey = null,
|
||||
nspace = newNspace,
|
||||
securityLevel = response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
|
||||
certChain = keyData.second,
|
||||
algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
|
||||
keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
|
||||
ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
|
||||
purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
|
||||
digests = parsedParameters.digest,
|
||||
isAttestationKey = true,
|
||||
metadataBytes = metadataBytesForPersist,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
|
||||
|
||||
if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
|
||||
val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
|
||||
if (cachedChain != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Using cached patched certificate chain for $keyId."
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain = cachedChain
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain =
|
||||
AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
|
||||
.getOrThrow()
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
|
||||
response.metadata.authorizations,
|
||||
callingUid,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.onFailure {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify hardware KeyEntryResponse.",
|
||||
it,
|
||||
|
||||
if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
|
||||
val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
|
||||
|
||||
val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
|
||||
if (cachedChain != null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] Using cached patched certificate chain for $keyId."
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain = cachedChain
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Live patch fallback for keys created before simulator started
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
|
||||
)
|
||||
finalChain = AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain).getOrThrow()
|
||||
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to patch certificate chain.", e)
|
||||
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Resolves the owner [KeyIdentifier] a grant/ungrant call targets. APP/alias keys map
|
||||
* directly; KEY_ID keys are looked up by nspace (mirrors the deleteKey resolver). Returns
|
||||
* null for anything not addressable, so callers fall through to the real keystore2.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun resolveOwnerKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
|
||||
when {
|
||||
descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor.nspace)
|
||||
?.let { info ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
|
||||
.firstOrNull { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
|
||||
?.key
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
val generatedKeyInfo =
|
||||
when (descriptor.domain) {
|
||||
Domain.KEY_ID ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
|
||||
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
|
||||
)
|
||||
Domain.APP ->
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)]
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
|
||||
// Patch-mode key (cached in teeResponses, not generatedKeys): the real keystore2 applies
|
||||
// the update, so drop our stale cached chain. Otherwise getKeyEntry replays the
|
||||
// pre-update generated attestation (duck STALE_TEE_RESPONSE_AFTER_KEY_ID_UPDATE).
|
||||
when (descriptor.domain) {
|
||||
Domain.KEY_ID ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponseByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor.nspace)
|
||||
Domain.APP ->
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponse(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it))
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
descriptor.alias?.let {
|
||||
val kid = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)
|
||||
userUpdatedKeys.add(kid)
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[TRACE] updateSubcomponent $kid: not generated key, added to userUpdatedKeys" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor?.nspace)
|
||||
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]")
|
||||
val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
|
||||
|
||||
-108
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
|
||||
|
||||
import android.os.IBinder
|
||||
import android.os.Parcel
|
||||
import android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.Domain
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Intercepts the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder so our synthetic key
|
||||
* state follows the same lifecycle events the platform applies to real keys.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is a pure side-effect hook: every handled transaction mutates only our own synthetic state
|
||||
* and then returns [TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost], so the real keystore2 still performs the
|
||||
* real operation. We never fabricate a maintenance reply, so real key lifecycle is never disturbed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Mounted via `register()` from [Keystore2Interceptor.onInterceptorReady]; the maintenance binder is
|
||||
* hosted by the same keystore2 process, so the already-injected native hook reaches it too.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
|
||||
private val stubClass = IKeystoreMaintenance.Stub::class.java
|
||||
|
||||
private val CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "clearNamespace")
|
||||
private val DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "deleteAllKeys")
|
||||
private val MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "migrateKeyNamespace")
|
||||
|
||||
/** Only the lifecycle transactions we mirror; unresolved codes (-1) are dropped. */
|
||||
val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
|
||||
listOf(
|
||||
CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.filter { it != -1 }
|
||||
.toIntArray()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onPreTransact(
|
||||
txId: Long,
|
||||
target: IBinder,
|
||||
code: Int,
|
||||
flags: Int,
|
||||
callingUid: Int,
|
||||
callingPid: Int,
|
||||
data: Parcel,
|
||||
): TransactionResult {
|
||||
when (code) {
|
||||
CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleClearNamespace(data)
|
||||
DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearAllGeneratedKeys("maintenance.deleteAllKeys")
|
||||
MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data, callingUid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Always let the real keystore2 perform the real lifecycle operation.
|
||||
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun handleClearNamespace(data: Parcel) {
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val domain = data.readInt()
|
||||
val nspace = data.readLong()
|
||||
// Only Domain.APP namespaces map to our per-uid synthetic keys; nspace is the app uid.
|
||||
if (domain == Domain.APP) {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearNamespaceKeys(nspace.toInt())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data: Parcel, callingUid: Int) {
|
||||
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
|
||||
val source = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
|
||||
val destination = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
|
||||
val srcId = resolveSyntheticKeyId(source, callingUid) ?: return
|
||||
if (!KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(srcId)) return // not ours
|
||||
|
||||
val dstId = resolveDestinationKeyId(destination, callingUid)
|
||||
if (dstId == null) {
|
||||
// Migrated out of our trackable (Domain.APP/alias) space -> drop our shadow so reads
|
||||
// fall through to the real keystore2, which now owns it at the new namespace.
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(srcId)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.migrateGeneratedKey(srcId, dstId)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Resolves a synthetic owner key from a source descriptor (Domain.APP alias or KEY_ID). */
|
||||
private fun resolveSyntheticKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
|
||||
when {
|
||||
descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
|
||||
descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
|
||||
.firstOrNull { it.key.uid == callingUid && it.value.nspace == descriptor.nspace }
|
||||
?.key
|
||||
else -> null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Destination must be an addressable Domain.APP alias for us to keep tracking the key. */
|
||||
private fun resolveDestinationKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? {
|
||||
val alias = descriptor.alias ?: return null
|
||||
if (descriptor.domain != Domain.APP) return null
|
||||
val uid = if (descriptor.nspace > 0) descriptor.nspace.toInt() else callingUid
|
||||
return KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
-20
@@ -407,9 +407,8 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
|
||||
return KeyMintAttestation(
|
||||
keySize = this.keySize,
|
||||
algorithm = this.algorithm,
|
||||
ecCurve = 0,
|
||||
ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
|
||||
ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
|
||||
origin = null,
|
||||
blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
|
||||
padding = listOf<Int>(),
|
||||
purpose = this.purpose,
|
||||
@@ -431,24 +430,6 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
|
||||
manufacturer = null,
|
||||
model = null,
|
||||
secondImei = null,
|
||||
activeDateTime = null,
|
||||
originationExpireDateTime = null,
|
||||
usageExpireDateTime = null,
|
||||
usageCountLimit = null,
|
||||
callerNonce = null,
|
||||
nonce = null,
|
||||
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
|
||||
includeUniqueId = null,
|
||||
rollbackResistance = null,
|
||||
earlyBootOnly = null,
|
||||
allowWhileOnBody = null,
|
||||
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
|
||||
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
|
||||
noAuthRequired = null,
|
||||
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
|
||||
maxBootLevel = null,
|
||||
minMacLength = null,
|
||||
rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
|
||||
startPastAlias: String?,
|
||||
): List<KeyDescriptor> {
|
||||
return KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys
|
||||
.filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias > startPastAlias) }
|
||||
.filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias < startPastAlias) }
|
||||
.map { keyId ->
|
||||
KeyDescriptor().apply {
|
||||
this.domain = Domain.APP
|
||||
|
||||
-74
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
|
||||
object AuthorizeCreate {
|
||||
|
||||
fun check(
|
||||
keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
|
||||
opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
|
||||
): Int? {
|
||||
if (keyParams == null) return null
|
||||
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
|
||||
// Algorithm-level rejection runs before purpose-list check (AOSP HAL behavior)
|
||||
return checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, purpose)
|
||||
?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, purpose, rawOpParams)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
val algo = keyParams.algorithm
|
||||
if ((algo == Algorithm.EC || algo == Algorithm.RSA) &&
|
||||
(purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (algo == Algorithm.RSA && purpose == KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
|
||||
if (purpose !in keyParams.purpose)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
|
||||
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
|
||||
if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
|
||||
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
|
||||
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
|
||||
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkCallerNonce(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int, rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?): Int? {
|
||||
if (purpose != KeyPurpose.SIGN && purpose != KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) return null
|
||||
if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
|
||||
if (rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true)
|
||||
return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+10
-128
@@ -29,47 +29,13 @@ data class PersistedKeyData(
|
||||
val ecCurve: Int,
|
||||
val purposes: List<Int>,
|
||||
val digests: List<Int>,
|
||||
/** PKCS#8-encoded private key for asymmetric records, empty for symmetric. */
|
||||
val privateKeyBytes: ByteArray,
|
||||
val certChainBytes: List<ByteArray>,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Byte-identical KeyMetadata parcel snapshot. Restoring authorizations
|
||||
* directly from these bytes preserves tag count, order, and exact
|
||||
* security-level annotations across reboots — the kind of structural
|
||||
* details apps fingerprint to decide whether the alias is still
|
||||
* "the same key".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val metadataBytes: ByteArray,
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Raw secret material for symmetric records (AES, HMAC, 3DES). Empty
|
||||
* for asymmetric. Critical for AndroidX security crypto MasterKey
|
||||
* (AES-GCM-256) — without this every reboot regenerates a fresh AES
|
||||
* key and EncryptedSharedPreferences becomes undecryptable, which is
|
||||
* what banking apps interpret as session expiry and force a relogin.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
val symmetricKeyBytes: ByteArray,
|
||||
val symmetricAlgorithm: String,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Single source of truth for the on-disk format. Bump this every time
|
||||
* the layout changes; older numbers are silently skipped on read so
|
||||
* stale dev artifacts and pre-fix upstream files can't be partially
|
||||
* rehydrated into broken in-memory state.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* History:
|
||||
* 1 — original upstream layout (no metadata snapshot, no symmetric
|
||||
* block; restored keys lose authorization tags and AES master
|
||||
* keys altogether — apps relying on persisted keystore state
|
||||
* across reboots get logged out)
|
||||
* 2 — transitional dev-only format that added metadata but still
|
||||
* missed the symmetric block; never shipped
|
||||
* 3 — current: byte-identical KeyMetadata snapshot + raw symmetric
|
||||
* key material so AES/HMAC keys survive reboots
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 3
|
||||
private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 1
|
||||
private val PERSISTENCE_DIR = File(CONFIG_PATH, "persistent_keys")
|
||||
|
||||
// Per-filename locks to prevent concurrent writes to the same key file
|
||||
@@ -81,8 +47,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
|
||||
fun save(
|
||||
keyId: KeyIdentifier,
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair?,
|
||||
secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair,
|
||||
nspace: Long,
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
certChain: List<Certificate>,
|
||||
@@ -92,11 +57,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
purposes: List<Int>,
|
||||
digests: List<Int>,
|
||||
isAttestationKey: Boolean,
|
||||
metadataBytes: ByteArray? = null,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
require(keyPair != null || secretKey != null) {
|
||||
"Either keyPair or secretKey must be provided"
|
||||
}
|
||||
val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
|
||||
val lock = getLockForKey(filename)
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Acquiring lock for $filename")
|
||||
@@ -126,8 +87,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
out.writeInt(digests.size)
|
||||
digests.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
|
||||
|
||||
// Asymmetric key block (empty for symmetric-only).
|
||||
val pkBytes = keyPair?.private?.encoded ?: ByteArray(0)
|
||||
val pkBytes = keyPair.private.encoded
|
||||
out.writeInt(pkBytes.size)
|
||||
out.write(pkBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -137,23 +97,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
out.writeInt(encoded.size)
|
||||
out.write(encoded)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Metadata snapshot (always present, may be empty
|
||||
// if the live KeyMetadata could not be marshalled).
|
||||
val mdBytes = metadataBytes ?: ByteArray(0)
|
||||
out.writeInt(mdBytes.size)
|
||||
if (mdBytes.isNotEmpty()) out.write(mdBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
// Symmetric key block (empty for asymmetric keys).
|
||||
if (secretKey != null) {
|
||||
val skBytes = secretKey.encoded
|
||||
out.writeUTF(secretKey.algorithm)
|
||||
out.writeInt(skBytes.size)
|
||||
out.write(skBytes)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
out.writeUTF("")
|
||||
out.writeInt(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
tmpFile.delete()
|
||||
@@ -186,7 +129,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
|
||||
if (file.exists()) {
|
||||
if (file.delete()) {
|
||||
fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
|
||||
@@ -216,7 +158,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
if (file.delete()) count++
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fileLocks.clear()
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
|
||||
}.onFailure { e ->
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e)
|
||||
@@ -246,17 +187,8 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(file))).use { input ->
|
||||
val version = input.readInt()
|
||||
if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
|
||||
// Old upstream files (v1) and dev-only intermediate
|
||||
// files (v2) are missing the metadata snapshot
|
||||
// and/or symmetric key block — restoring them
|
||||
// would put broken state in memory (apps relying
|
||||
// on those records get logged out). Skip and let
|
||||
// the next generateKey re-create cleanly with the
|
||||
// new format. Affected apps re-login once after
|
||||
// upgrade, then never again.
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"Skipping ${file.name}: legacy format version $version. " +
|
||||
"It will be replaced on next generateKey for this alias."
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning(
|
||||
"Skipping ${file.name}: unknown format version $version"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return@runCatching
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -278,7 +210,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
|
||||
val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
|
||||
val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
|
||||
if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
|
||||
input.readFully(pkBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
|
||||
val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
|
||||
@@ -288,17 +220,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
certBytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
|
||||
val metadataBytes = ByteArray(metaLen).also {
|
||||
if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
|
||||
val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
|
||||
val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also {
|
||||
if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (storedSecLevel == securityLevel) {
|
||||
result.add(
|
||||
PersistedKeyData(
|
||||
@@ -314,9 +235,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
digests = digests,
|
||||
privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
|
||||
certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
|
||||
metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
|
||||
symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
|
||||
symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -372,7 +290,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(existing))).use { input ->
|
||||
val version = input.readInt()
|
||||
if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: legacy format version $version for $keyId, will not re-persist (next generateKey replaces it)")
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: unknown format version $version for $keyId")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
readPersistedKeyData(input)
|
||||
@@ -383,29 +301,9 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyPair = generatedKeyInfo.keyPair
|
||||
val secretKey = generatedKeyInfo.secretKey
|
||||
if (keyPair == null && secretKey == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: no key material for $keyId")
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Serialize the live KeyMetadata (now contains the user-installed cert
|
||||
// chain via updateSubcomponent) so the next boot restores byte-identical
|
||||
// metadata. KeyMetadata is binder-free, so marshall() is safe here.
|
||||
val metadataBytes = runCatching {
|
||||
android.os.Parcel.obtain().let { parcel ->
|
||||
try {
|
||||
metadata.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
|
||||
parcel.marshall()
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
parcel.recycle()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}.getOrNull()
|
||||
save(
|
||||
keyId = keyId,
|
||||
keyPair = keyPair,
|
||||
secretKey = secretKey,
|
||||
keyPair = generatedKeyInfo.keyPair,
|
||||
nspace = generatedKeyInfo.nspace,
|
||||
securityLevel = secLevel,
|
||||
certChain = newChain.toList(),
|
||||
@@ -415,7 +313,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
purposes = persisted.purposes,
|
||||
digests = persisted.digests,
|
||||
isAttestationKey = persisted.isAttestationKey,
|
||||
metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
|
||||
)
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Re-persisted key $keyId with updated cert chain")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -432,8 +329,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
return digest.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) } + ".bin"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reads all fields after the version int has already been consumed
|
||||
// and validated by the caller.
|
||||
// Reads all fields after version has already been consumed
|
||||
private fun readPersistedKeyData(input: DataInputStream): PersistedKeyData {
|
||||
val secLevel = input.readInt()
|
||||
val uid = input.readInt()
|
||||
@@ -452,7 +348,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
|
||||
val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
|
||||
val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
|
||||
if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
|
||||
input.readFully(pkBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
|
||||
val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
|
||||
@@ -462,17 +358,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
certBytes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
|
||||
val metadataBytes = ByteArray(metaLen).also {
|
||||
if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
|
||||
val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
|
||||
val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also {
|
||||
if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return PersistedKeyData(
|
||||
uid = uid,
|
||||
alias = alias,
|
||||
@@ -486,9 +371,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
|
||||
digests = digests,
|
||||
privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
|
||||
certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
|
||||
metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
|
||||
symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
|
||||
symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+179
-1121
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
-8
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils
|
||||
class OperationInterceptor(
|
||||
private val original: IKeystoreOperation,
|
||||
private val backdoor: IBinder,
|
||||
private val isAead: Boolean,
|
||||
) : BinderInterceptor() {
|
||||
|
||||
override fun onPreTransact(
|
||||
@@ -28,10 +27,6 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
|
||||
val methodName = transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code"
|
||||
logTransaction(txId, methodName, callingUid, callingPid, true)
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION && !isAead) {
|
||||
return InterceptorUtils.createServiceSpecificErrorReply(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (code == FINISH_TRANSACTION || code == ABORT_TRANSACTION) {
|
||||
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.removeOperationInterceptor(target, backdoor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -49,9 +44,6 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
|
||||
private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
|
||||
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
|
||||
|
||||
val INTERCEPTED_CODES =
|
||||
intArrayOf(UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION, FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
|
||||
|
||||
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
|
||||
IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class
|
||||
.java
|
||||
|
||||
+48
-302
@@ -3,15 +3,10 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
|
||||
import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
|
||||
import android.os.RemoteException
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
|
||||
import android.system.keystore2.KeyParameters
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPair
|
||||
import java.security.Signature
|
||||
import java.security.SignatureException
|
||||
@@ -20,16 +15,16 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
|
||||
private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
|
||||
|
||||
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
|
||||
|
||||
fun abort()
|
||||
fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? = null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
|
||||
private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
|
||||
val digest =
|
||||
@@ -39,18 +34,16 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
|
||||
else -> "NONE"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return when (params.algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> {
|
||||
val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
|
||||
if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA"
|
||||
val keyAlgo =
|
||||
when (params.algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw IllegalArgumentException(
|
||||
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
|
||||
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
|
||||
@@ -59,32 +52,30 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
|
||||
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
|
||||
throw IllegalArgumentException(
|
||||
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val blockMode =
|
||||
when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
|
||||
BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
|
||||
BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
|
||||
BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
|
||||
BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
|
||||
else -> "ECB"
|
||||
else -> "ECB" // Default for RSA
|
||||
}
|
||||
val padding =
|
||||
when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
|
||||
PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
|
||||
PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
|
||||
else -> "NoPadding"
|
||||
else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Signing.
|
||||
private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val signature: Signature =
|
||||
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
@@ -104,6 +95,7 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Verification.
|
||||
private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val signature: Signature =
|
||||
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
@@ -117,353 +109,107 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
|
||||
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data != null) update(data)
|
||||
if (signature == null) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature to verify is null")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (signature == null) throw SignatureException("Signature to verify is null")
|
||||
if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature verification failed")
|
||||
// Throwing an exception is how Keystore signals verification failure.
|
||||
throw SignatureException("Signature verification failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A successful verification returns no data.
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
|
||||
private class CipherPrimitive(
|
||||
cryptoKey: java.security.Key,
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
private val opMode: Int,
|
||||
) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
|
||||
private val cipher: Cipher =
|
||||
Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
|
||||
val nonce = params.nonce
|
||||
if (nonce != null && isAead) {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))
|
||||
} else if (nonce != null) {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec(nonce))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
init(opMode, cryptoKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
val key = if (opMode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) keyPair.public else keyPair.private
|
||||
init(opMode, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
|
||||
if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
|
||||
if (data != null) cipher.update(data) else null
|
||||
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
|
||||
if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
|
||||
|
||||
override fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? {
|
||||
val iv = cipher.iv ?: return null
|
||||
return arrayOf(
|
||||
KeyParameter().apply {
|
||||
tag = Tag.NONCE
|
||||
value = KeyParameterValue.blob(iv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
|
||||
private val agreement: javax.crypto.KeyAgreement =
|
||||
javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH").apply { init(keyPair.private) }
|
||||
|
||||
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = null
|
||||
|
||||
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
if (data == null)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
|
||||
"Peer public key required for key agreement",
|
||||
)
|
||||
val peerKey =
|
||||
java.security.KeyFactory.getInstance("EC")
|
||||
.generatePublic(java.security.spec.X509EncodedKeySpec(data))
|
||||
agreement.doPhase(peerKey, true)
|
||||
return agreement.generateSecret()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override fun abort() {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
class SoftwareOperation(
|
||||
private val txId: Long,
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair?,
|
||||
secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
|
||||
* delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class SoftwareOperation(private val txId: Long, keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) {
|
||||
// This now holds the specific strategy object (Signer, Verifier, etc.)
|
||||
private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
|
||||
@Volatile var finalized = false
|
||||
private set
|
||||
|
||||
var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null
|
||||
|
||||
val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
|
||||
get() {
|
||||
val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
|
||||
if (params.isEmpty()) return null
|
||||
return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
init {
|
||||
// The "Strategy" pattern: choose the implementation based on the purpose.
|
||||
// For simplicity, we only consider the first purpose listed.
|
||||
val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
|
||||
val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
|
||||
|
||||
if (purpose == null) {
|
||||
// Defensive: if params somehow restored without a PURPOSE tag
|
||||
// (corrupt v2 metadata, mismatched authorizations array on load,
|
||||
// or future format drift) the original code crashed with NPE
|
||||
// because Signer/Verifier/Cipher all dereference keyPair!!
|
||||
// before checking purpose. Surface a clean keystore error
|
||||
// instead so callers see a normal-looking operation failure
|
||||
// they can recover from rather than the process appearing to
|
||||
// silently corrupt their session.
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning(
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Purpose missing on restored key " +
|
||||
"(authorizations=${params.purpose}, keyPair=${if (keyPair != null) "present" else "null"}, " +
|
||||
"secretKey=${if (secretKey != null) "present" else "null"}). " +
|
||||
"Returning unsupportedPurpose."
|
||||
)
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
|
||||
"Restored key has no PURPOSE authorization",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
primitive =
|
||||
when (purpose) {
|
||||
KeyPurpose.SIGN -> {
|
||||
val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] SIGN requested but keyPair is null",
|
||||
)
|
||||
Signer(kp, params)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> {
|
||||
val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] VERIFY requested but keyPair is null",
|
||||
)
|
||||
Verifier(kp, params)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
|
||||
val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair?.public
|
||||
?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] ENCRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.public",
|
||||
)
|
||||
CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
|
||||
val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair?.private
|
||||
?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] DECRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.private",
|
||||
)
|
||||
CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> {
|
||||
val kp = keyPair ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
|
||||
"[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] AGREE_KEY requested but keyPair is null",
|
||||
)
|
||||
KeyAgreementPrimitive(kp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
KeyPurpose.SIGN -> Signer(keyPair, params)
|
||||
KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> Verifier(keyPair, params)
|
||||
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
|
||||
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
|
||||
"Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
|
||||
)
|
||||
throw UnsupportedOperationException("Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkActive() {
|
||||
if (finalized) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)")
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})")
|
||||
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() ENTRY inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0} primitive=${primitive::class.simpleName}")
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(aadInput)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY (unexpected for non-AEAD)")
|
||||
} catch (throwable: Throwable) {
|
||||
val top = throwable.stackTrace.firstOrNull()?.toString() ?: "<no-frame>"
|
||||
val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() THREW class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message} top=$top")
|
||||
throw throwable
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(data)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
return primitive.update(data)
|
||||
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
|
||||
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
checkActive()
|
||||
checkInputLength(data)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
|
||||
val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
|
||||
if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
|
||||
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
|
||||
val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
|
||||
if (delayMs > 0) LockSupport.parkNanos(delayMs * 1_000_000)
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
onFinishCallback?.invoke()
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
|
||||
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
|
||||
// Re-throw the exception so the binder can report it to the client.
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun abort() {
|
||||
finalized = true
|
||||
primitive.abort()
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
|
||||
is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
|
||||
is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
|
||||
is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
|
||||
is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
|
||||
else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
companion object {
|
||||
private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
|
||||
val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val unknownError: Int by lazy {
|
||||
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null)
|
||||
}.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
|
||||
fallback
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** The Binder interface for our [SoftwareOperation]. */
|
||||
class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
|
||||
IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() ENTRY callingUid=${android.os.Binder.getCallingUid()} size=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}")
|
||||
try {
|
||||
operation.updateAad(aadInput)
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY")
|
||||
} catch (throwable: Throwable) {
|
||||
val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() PROPAGATING class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message}")
|
||||
throw throwable
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return operation.update(input)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return operation.finish(input, signature)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Synchronized
|
||||
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
|
||||
override fun abort() {
|
||||
operation.abort()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,86 +1,41 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
|
||||
|
||||
import android.util.Log
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.BuildConfig
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* A centralized logging utility for the TEESimulator application. This object provides a consistent
|
||||
* logging tag and format for all application logs, making it easier to filter and debug in Logcat.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Includes a rate limiter that caps logd syscalls during binder stress to prevent thread pool
|
||||
* contention. The first [RATE_LIMIT_BURST] messages per [RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS] window are logged
|
||||
* normally; subsequent messages are suppressed and a summary is emitted when the window resets.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object SystemLogger {
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
|
||||
// The tag used for all log messages from this application.
|
||||
private const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
|
||||
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
|
||||
|
||||
// Rate limiter: allow BURST messages per WINDOW, then suppress until window resets.
|
||||
private const val RATE_LIMIT_BURST = 15
|
||||
private const val RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 1000L
|
||||
private val windowStart = AtomicLong(System.currentTimeMillis())
|
||||
private val windowCount = AtomicInteger(0)
|
||||
private val suppressedCount = AtomicInteger(0)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Returns true if this message should be emitted. Resets the window if expired
|
||||
* and emits a suppression summary for the previous window.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@PublishedApi internal fun acquireLogPermit(): Boolean {
|
||||
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
|
||||
val start = windowStart.get()
|
||||
if (now - start > RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS) {
|
||||
// Window expired: reset and emit suppression summary if needed.
|
||||
if (windowStart.compareAndSet(start, now)) {
|
||||
val suppressed = suppressedCount.getAndSet(0)
|
||||
windowCount.set(1) // this call counts as #1 in the new window
|
||||
if (suppressed > 0) {
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, "[rate-limit] suppressed $suppressed log messages in previous window")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
val count = windowCount.incrementAndGet()
|
||||
if (count <= RATE_LIMIT_BURST) return true
|
||||
suppressedCount.incrementAndGet()
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
private val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun debug(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.d(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy debug: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun debug(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.d(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs an informational message. Use this to report major application lifecycle events.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun info(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy info: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun info(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.i(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a warning message. Warnings are never rate-limited.
|
||||
* Logs a warning message. Use this to report unexpected but non-fatal issues.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
* @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun warning(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
|
||||
if (throwable != null) {
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +46,11 @@ object SystemLogger {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs an error message. Errors are never rate-limited.
|
||||
* Logs an error message. Use this to report fatal errors or exceptions that disrupt
|
||||
* functionality.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
* @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun error(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
|
||||
if (throwable != null) {
|
||||
@@ -104,22 +63,11 @@ object SystemLogger {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Logs a verbose message. This level is for highly detailed logs that are generally not needed
|
||||
* unless tracking a very specific issue.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param message The message to log.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun verbose(message: String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.v(TAG, message)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Lazy verbose: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
|
||||
inline fun verbose(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
|
||||
Log.v(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
inline fun trace(message: () -> String) {
|
||||
if (!isDebugBuild) return
|
||||
Log.w(TAG, message())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import java.math.BigInteger
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPair
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
|
||||
import java.security.cert.Certificate
|
||||
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
|
||||
import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
|
||||
import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
|
||||
import java.util.Date
|
||||
@@ -35,8 +36,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
*/
|
||||
object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
|
||||
private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Generates a software-based cryptographic key pair.
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -50,10 +49,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "EC" to ECGenParameterSpec(params.ecCurveName)
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA ->
|
||||
"RSA" to
|
||||
RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(
|
||||
params.keySize,
|
||||
params.rsaPublicExponent ?: RSAKeyGenParameterSpec.F4,
|
||||
)
|
||||
RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(params.keySize, params.rsaPublicExponent)
|
||||
else ->
|
||||
throw IllegalArgumentException(
|
||||
"Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
|
||||
@@ -92,38 +88,33 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
"Attestation challenge exceeds length limit (${challenge.size} > ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge + no attestKey = self-signed, depth 1
|
||||
if (challenge == null && attestKeyAlias == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.trace { "[certgen] no-challenge key: self-signed, depth=1, purposes=${params.purpose}" }
|
||||
return listOf(buildSelfSignedCertificate(subjectKeyPair, params))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
|
||||
|
||||
val attestKeyInfo =
|
||||
// Determine the signing key and issuer. If an attestKey is provided, use it.
|
||||
// Otherwise, fall back to the root key from the keybox.
|
||||
val (signingKey, issuer) =
|
||||
if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
|
||||
getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)
|
||||
} else null
|
||||
|
||||
val (signingKey, issuer) = attestKeyInfo
|
||||
?.let { it.first to it.second }
|
||||
?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
|
||||
getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
|
||||
?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the new leaf certificate with the simulated attestation.
|
||||
val leafCert =
|
||||
buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
|
||||
if (attestKeyInfo != null) {
|
||||
// If not self-attesting, the chain is just the leaf. Otherwise, append the keybox
|
||||
// chain.
|
||||
if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
|
||||
listOf(leafCert)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", it) }
|
||||
.getOrNull()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +128,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
return runCatching {
|
||||
SystemLogger.info(
|
||||
"Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -153,12 +144,11 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
"Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'."
|
||||
)
|
||||
Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
|
||||
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
|
||||
throw e
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
.onFailure {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrNull()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
|
||||
@@ -173,10 +163,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
|
||||
?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
|
||||
-75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
|
||||
"No attestation key for algorithm $algorithmName in $keyboxFile",
|
||||
)
|
||||
?: throw Exception("Could not load keybox for UID $uid and algorithm $algorithmName")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */
|
||||
@@ -226,16 +213,17 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
uid: Int,
|
||||
securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
|
||||
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
|
||||
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android KeyStore Key")
|
||||
val leafNotAfter =
|
||||
(signingKeyPair.public as? X509Certificate)?.notAfter
|
||||
?: Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 31536000000L)
|
||||
|
||||
val builder =
|
||||
JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
|
||||
issuer,
|
||||
params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
|
||||
notBefore,
|
||||
notAfter,
|
||||
params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(),
|
||||
params.certificateNotAfter ?: leafNotAfter,
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
subjectKeyPair.public,
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -245,17 +233,16 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(
|
||||
AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Add our custom, simulated attestation extension.
|
||||
builder.addExtension(
|
||||
AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val signerAlgorithm =
|
||||
when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) {
|
||||
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}")
|
||||
when (params.algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val contentSigner =
|
||||
JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
|
||||
@@ -264,39 +251,4 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
|
||||
|
||||
return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:452-478, ta/src/cert.rs:111-114
|
||||
private fun buildSelfSignedCertificate(
|
||||
keyPair: KeyPair,
|
||||
params: KeyMintAttestation,
|
||||
): Certificate {
|
||||
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
|
||||
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
|
||||
|
||||
val builder = JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
|
||||
notBefore,
|
||||
notAfter,
|
||||
subject,
|
||||
keyPair.public,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
val keyUsageBits = buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(params.purpose)
|
||||
if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
|
||||
builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val signerAlgorithm = when (keyPair.private.algorithm) {
|
||||
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
|
||||
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported key: ${keyPair.private.algorithm}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val contentSigner = JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
|
||||
.setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
|
||||
.build(keyPair.private)
|
||||
|
||||
return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
|
||||
|
||||
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
|
||||
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
|
||||
import java.nio.ByteOrder
|
||||
import java.security.KeyFactory
|
||||
import java.security.KeyPair
|
||||
import java.security.cert.Certificate
|
||||
import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
|
||||
import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
data class CertGenConfig(
|
||||
val algorithm: Int,
|
||||
val keySize: Int,
|
||||
val ecCurve: Int,
|
||||
val rsaPublicExponent: Long,
|
||||
val attestationChallenge: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val purposes: IntArray,
|
||||
val digests: IntArray,
|
||||
val certSerial: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val certSubject: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val certNotBefore: Long,
|
||||
val certNotAfter: Long,
|
||||
val keyboxPrivateKey: ByteArray,
|
||||
val keyboxCertChain: ByteArray,
|
||||
val securityLevel: Int,
|
||||
val attestVersion: Int,
|
||||
val keymasterVersion: Int,
|
||||
val osVersion: Int,
|
||||
val osPatchLevel: Int,
|
||||
val vendorPatchLevel: Int,
|
||||
val bootPatchLevel: Int,
|
||||
val bootKey: ByteArray,
|
||||
val bootHash: ByteArray,
|
||||
val creationDatetime: Long,
|
||||
val attestationApplicationId: ByteArray,
|
||||
val moduleHash: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idBrand: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idDevice: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idProduct: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idSerial: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idImei: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idMeid: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idManufacturer: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idModel: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val idSecondImei: ByteArray?,
|
||||
val activeDatetime: Long = -1L,
|
||||
val originationExpireDatetime: Long = -1L,
|
||||
val usageExpireDatetime: Long = -1L,
|
||||
val usageCountLimit: Int = -1,
|
||||
val callerNonce: Boolean = false,
|
||||
val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean = false,
|
||||
val noAuthRequired: Boolean = true,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
object NativeCertGen {
|
||||
|
||||
private const val LOG_DIR = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs"
|
||||
|
||||
@Volatile
|
||||
var isAvailable: Boolean = false
|
||||
private set
|
||||
|
||||
fun initialize(libraryPath: String) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
System.load(libraryPath)
|
||||
initLogging(false, LOG_DIR)
|
||||
isAvailable = true
|
||||
SystemLogger.info("NativeCertGen: loaded libcertgen.so successfully")
|
||||
} catch (e: UnsatisfiedLinkError) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("NativeCertGen: failed to load libcertgen.so, falling back to BouncyCastle", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
external fun generateAttestedKeyPair(config: CertGenConfig): ByteArray?
|
||||
|
||||
private external fun initLogging(verbose: Boolean, logDir: String): Boolean
|
||||
|
||||
private external fun dumpLogs(): String?
|
||||
|
||||
fun dump(): String? = if (isAvailable) dumpLogs() else null
|
||||
|
||||
fun parseNativeResult(bytes: ByteArray): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>> {
|
||||
val buf = ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes).order(ByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN)
|
||||
|
||||
val pkLen = buf.getInt()
|
||||
if (pkLen < 0 || pkLen > buf.remaining()) {
|
||||
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid private key length: $pkLen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
|
||||
buf.get(pkBytes)
|
||||
|
||||
val numCerts = buf.getInt()
|
||||
if (numCerts < 0 || numCerts > buf.remaining()) {
|
||||
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert count: $numCerts")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val certs = mutableListOf<Certificate>()
|
||||
val certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509")
|
||||
repeat(numCerts) {
|
||||
val certLen = buf.getInt()
|
||||
if (certLen < 0 || certLen > buf.remaining()) {
|
||||
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert length: $certLen")
|
||||
}
|
||||
val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
|
||||
buf.get(certBytes)
|
||||
certs.add(certFactory.generateCertificate(ByteArrayInputStream(certBytes)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (certs.isEmpty()) {
|
||||
throw IllegalStateException("No certificates in native result")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val algorithmName = when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
|
||||
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "EC"
|
||||
"RSA" -> "RSA"
|
||||
else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
|
||||
}
|
||||
val keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance(algorithmName)
|
||||
val privateKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(pkBytes))
|
||||
val publicKey = certs[0].publicKey
|
||||
return Pair(KeyPair(publicKey, privateKey), certs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,9 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
|
||||
|
||||
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
|
||||
import android.os.Build
|
||||
import android.os.SystemProperties
|
||||
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
|
||||
import java.io.File
|
||||
import java.io.FileInputStream
|
||||
import java.security.MessageDigest
|
||||
import java.time.LocalDate
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
|
||||
@@ -12,6 +11,7 @@ import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
|
||||
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSet
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
@@ -90,33 +90,27 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
|
||||
expectedSize: Int,
|
||||
): ByteArray {
|
||||
// 1. Attempt to get the value from the system property.
|
||||
getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Fallback to the value from a cached TEE attestation.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
attestationValueProvider()?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it) // Persist for consistency
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
return it
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. As a final fallback, generate a random value.
|
||||
return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
|
||||
setProperty(propertyName, it)
|
||||
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -163,55 +157,10 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
internal fun setProperty(name: String, value: String) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("Setting system property '$name' to: $value")
|
||||
val command = arrayOf("resetprop", name, value)
|
||||
val process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command)
|
||||
val exitCode = process.waitFor()
|
||||
|
||||
if (exitCode != 0) {
|
||||
val errorOutput = process.errorStream.bufferedReader().readText()
|
||||
SystemLogger.error(
|
||||
"resetprop for '$name' failed with exit code $exitCode: $errorOutput"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to set '$name' property via resetprop.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Generates a cryptographically random byte array of a specified length. */
|
||||
private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
|
||||
ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }
|
||||
|
||||
private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
|
||||
|
||||
private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
|
||||
"ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
|
||||
else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fileForProperty(propertyName).writeBytes(bytes)
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist $propertyName to file.", e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun readFromFile(propertyName: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
val file = fileForProperty(propertyName)
|
||||
if (!file.exists()) return null
|
||||
val bytes = file.readBytes()
|
||||
if (bytes.size == expectedSize) bytes else null
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to read $propertyName from file.", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Patch Level Properties ---
|
||||
|
||||
fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int {
|
||||
@@ -345,9 +294,7 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
6 -> { // YYYYMM
|
||||
val year = normalized.substring(0, 4).toInt()
|
||||
val month = normalized.substring(4, 6).toInt()
|
||||
// Synthesizing day=01 from YYYY-MM disagrees with real device bulletins;
|
||||
// propagate null so callers fall back to a YYYY-MM-DD source.
|
||||
if (isLong) null else year * 100 + month
|
||||
if (isLong) year * 10000 + month * 100 + 1 else year * 100 + month
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> null
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -395,26 +342,20 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Retrieves the attestation version for the given security level. The value follows the device
|
||||
* OS: cached attestation data wins, then attestVersionMap[SDK_INT], then 400 as last resort.
|
||||
* A static StrongBox=300 floor would force a major-version mismatch with the TEE chain on
|
||||
* Android 16 devices that report keymaster 400 across both security levels.
|
||||
* Retrieves the attestation version based on security level and OS version. StrongBox (level 2)
|
||||
* requires version 300.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param securityLevel The security level of the attestation (1 for TEE, 2 for StrongBox).
|
||||
* @return The appropriate attestation version number.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun getAttestVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
|
||||
val cached = DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
|
||||
val version = cached
|
||||
// StrongBox security level requires an attestation version of at least 300.
|
||||
if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) {
|
||||
return 300
|
||||
}
|
||||
return DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
|
||||
?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
|
||||
?: 400 // Default to a recent version
|
||||
val source = when {
|
||||
cached != null -> "cache"
|
||||
attestVersionMap.containsKey(Build.VERSION.SDK_INT) -> "map"
|
||||
else -> "default"
|
||||
}
|
||||
SystemLogger.debug("attestVersion=$version source=$source securityLevel=$securityLevel")
|
||||
return version
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
@@ -423,178 +364,59 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
|
||||
* @param securityLevel The security level, used to determine the correct attestation version.
|
||||
* @return The appropriate Keymaster or KeyMint version number.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
|
||||
fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
|
||||
val attestVersion = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
|
||||
return if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---
|
||||
|
||||
// Minimal protobuf parser for apex_manifest.pb (field 1: name, field 2: version)
|
||||
private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
|
||||
var pos = 0
|
||||
|
||||
fun parse(): Pair<String, Long>? {
|
||||
var name: String? = null
|
||||
var version: Long? = null
|
||||
|
||||
while (pos < data.size) {
|
||||
val tag = readVarint()
|
||||
val fieldNum = tag ushr 3
|
||||
val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()
|
||||
|
||||
when (fieldNum) {
|
||||
1L -> {
|
||||
val length = readVarint().toInt()
|
||||
if (pos + length > data.size) return null
|
||||
name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
|
||||
pos += length
|
||||
}
|
||||
2L -> {
|
||||
version = readVarint()
|
||||
}
|
||||
else -> skipField(wireType)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return if (name != null && version != null) {
|
||||
name to version
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun readVarint(): Long {
|
||||
var value = 0L
|
||||
var shift = 0
|
||||
while (pos < data.size) {
|
||||
val b = data[pos++].toInt()
|
||||
value = value or ((b and 0x7F).toLong() shl shift)
|
||||
if ((b and 0x80) == 0) return value
|
||||
shift += 7
|
||||
}
|
||||
return value
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
|
||||
when (wireType) {
|
||||
0 -> readVarint()
|
||||
1 -> pos += 8
|
||||
2 -> {
|
||||
val len = readVarint().toInt()
|
||||
pos += len
|
||||
}
|
||||
5 -> pos += 4
|
||||
else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
|
||||
val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
|
||||
val apexRoot = File("/apex")
|
||||
|
||||
if (!apexRoot.exists() || !apexRoot.isDirectory) {
|
||||
return@lazy emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file ->
|
||||
if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach
|
||||
val name = file.name
|
||||
|
||||
if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach
|
||||
if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach
|
||||
if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach
|
||||
|
||||
val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
|
||||
if (manifestFile.exists()) {
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
val bytes = FileInputStream(manifestFile).use { it.readBytes() }
|
||||
val parser = MinimalApexManifestParser(bytes)
|
||||
parser.parse()?.let { (pkgName, version) -> results.add(pkgName to version) }
|
||||
}
|
||||
runCatching {
|
||||
val pm = ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
|
||||
val packages =
|
||||
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
|
||||
pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX.toLong(), 0)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
|
||||
pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX, 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
packages?.list.orEmpty().map { it.packageName to it.longVersionCode }
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to get APEX package information.", it)
|
||||
emptyList()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
results.distinctBy { it.first }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
|
||||
DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
|
||||
?: runCatching {
|
||||
data class ModuleEntry(
|
||||
val nameEncoded: ByteArray,
|
||||
val fullEncoded: ByteArray,
|
||||
)
|
||||
// TODO: figure out the correct calculation
|
||||
val moduleSequences = ASN1EncodableVector()
|
||||
|
||||
val modules =
|
||||
apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) ->
|
||||
val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
|
||||
val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode)
|
||||
// 1. Create a DERSequence for each module.
|
||||
apexInfos.forEach { (packageName, versionCode) ->
|
||||
val moduleVector = ASN1EncodableVector()
|
||||
// Use explicit UTF-8 encoding for the package name.
|
||||
moduleVector.add(DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)))
|
||||
moduleVector.add(ASN1Integer(versionCode))
|
||||
moduleSequences.add(DERSequence(moduleVector))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val vec = ASN1EncodableVector()
|
||||
vec.add(nameOctet)
|
||||
vec.add(versionInt)
|
||||
val sequence = DERSequence(vec)
|
||||
// 2. Create a DERSet. Bouncy Castle will automatically handle
|
||||
// the sorting based on the DER-encoded value of each sequence.
|
||||
val modulesSet = DERSet(moduleSequences)
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP sorts by encoded name only, not full sequence
|
||||
ModuleEntry(
|
||||
nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
|
||||
fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 3. Get the final DER-encoded byte array of the SET.
|
||||
val encodedModules = modulesSet.encoded
|
||||
|
||||
val sortedModules =
|
||||
modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 ->
|
||||
compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
|
||||
sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
|
||||
val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()
|
||||
|
||||
// Wrap in DER SET tag manually — DERSet() re-sorts by full encoding
|
||||
val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)
|
||||
|
||||
MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
|
||||
// 4. Compute the SHA-256 hash.
|
||||
MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(encodedModules)
|
||||
}
|
||||
.getOrElse {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it)
|
||||
ByteArray(32)
|
||||
ByteArray(32) // Return empty hash on failure
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
|
||||
val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
|
||||
for (i in 0 until length) {
|
||||
val byteA = a[i].toInt() and 0xFF
|
||||
val byteB = b[i].toInt() and 0xFF
|
||||
if (byteA != byteB) {
|
||||
return byteA - byteB
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return a.size - b.size
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
|
||||
val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
|
||||
out.write(0x31)
|
||||
writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
|
||||
out.write(payload)
|
||||
return out.toByteArray()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
|
||||
if (length < 128) {
|
||||
out.write(length)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
var size = length
|
||||
val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
|
||||
while (size > 0) {
|
||||
bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
|
||||
size = size ushr 8
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
|
||||
for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
|
||||
out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
|
||||
|
||||
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
|
||||
import android.content.Context
|
||||
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
|
||||
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
|
||||
|
||||
object AndroidPermissionUtils {
|
||||
|
||||
@SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
|
||||
private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
|
||||
return try {
|
||||
// 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
|
||||
val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
|
||||
val currentActivityThreadMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
|
||||
currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
|
||||
|
||||
if (activityThread == null) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null")
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Try to get the application context
|
||||
val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
|
||||
getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
|
||||
|
||||
if (application != null) return application
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in system_server)
|
||||
val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
|
||||
getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
|
||||
getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
|
||||
|
||||
} catch (e: Exception) {
|
||||
SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
|
||||
null
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Core permission check.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
|
||||
val context = getGlobalContext() ?: run {
|
||||
SystemLogger.warning("AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely.")
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
|
||||
return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
|
||||
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
|
||||
|
||||
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
|
||||
import java.security.SecureRandom
|
||||
import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
|
||||
import kotlin.math.abs
|
||||
import kotlin.math.exp
|
||||
import kotlin.math.ln
|
||||
import kotlin.math.max
|
||||
|
||||
object TeeLatencySimulator {
|
||||
|
||||
private val rng = SecureRandom()
|
||||
|
||||
private val sessionBiasMs: Double by lazy { rng.nextGaussian() * 5.0 }
|
||||
private val coldPenaltyMs: Double by lazy { abs(rng.nextGaussian() * 12.0) }
|
||||
|
||||
@Volatile private var firstCall = true
|
||||
|
||||
fun simulateGenerateKeyDelay(algorithm: Int, elapsedNanos: Long) {
|
||||
val elapsedMs = elapsedNanos / 1_000_000.0
|
||||
val targetMs = sampleTotalDelay(algorithm)
|
||||
val remainingMs = targetMs - elapsedMs
|
||||
|
||||
if (remainingMs > 1.0) {
|
||||
LockSupport.parkNanos((remainingMs * 1_000_000).toLong())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun sampleTotalDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
|
||||
val base = sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm)
|
||||
val transit = sampleExponential(2.5)
|
||||
val jitter = (rng.nextGaussian() * 2.5).coerceIn(-8.0, 12.0)
|
||||
|
||||
var cold = 0.0
|
||||
if (firstCall) {
|
||||
firstCall = false
|
||||
cold = coldPenaltyMs
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
|
||||
val (mu, sigma) =
|
||||
when (algorithm) {
|
||||
Algorithm.EC -> ln(60.0) to 0.08
|
||||
Algorithm.RSA -> ln(70.0) to 0.08
|
||||
Algorithm.AES -> ln(35.0) to 0.10
|
||||
else -> ln(40.0) to 0.10
|
||||
}
|
||||
return sampleLogNormal(mu, sigma)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun sampleLogNormal(mu: Double, sigma: Double): Double {
|
||||
return exp(mu + sigma * rng.nextGaussian())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun sampleExponential(mean: Double): Double {
|
||||
var u = rng.nextDouble()
|
||||
while (u == 0.0) u = rng.nextDouble()
|
||||
return -mean * ln(u)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+19
-36
@@ -2,45 +2,28 @@
|
||||
MODDIR=${0%/*}
|
||||
CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store
|
||||
|
||||
. "$MODDIR/action_i18n.sh"
|
||||
|
||||
echo " ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
|
||||
echo " ⚠️ $(_msg confirm_header)"
|
||||
echo " ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
echo " $(_msg confirm_warning_1)"
|
||||
echo " $(_msg confirm_warning_2)"
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
echo " 🔊 $(_msg confirm_vol_up)"
|
||||
echo " 🔉 $(_msg confirm_vol_down)"
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
|
||||
confirm() {
|
||||
# Sample getevent in 1s bursts; a piped stream block-buffers and misses
|
||||
# a single key-press before the timeout.
|
||||
deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + 10 ))
|
||||
while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
|
||||
events=$(/system/bin/timeout 1 /system/bin/getevent -l 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
case "$events" in
|
||||
*KEY_VOLUMEUP*) return 0 ;;
|
||||
*KEY_VOLUMEDOWN*) return 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ! confirm; then
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
echo " ❌ $(_msg confirm_cancelled)"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "============================================"
|
||||
echo " TEESimulator — Key Storage Maintenance"
|
||||
echo "============================================"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then
|
||||
KEY_COUNT=$(find "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" -name "*.bin" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
|
||||
STORAGE_SIZE=$(du -sh "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" 2>/dev/null | cut -f1)
|
||||
|
||||
echo " Cached keys found : $KEY_COUNT"
|
||||
echo " Storage used : $STORAGE_SIZE"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
echo " ✅ $(_msg confirm_cleared)"
|
||||
|
||||
echo " [OK] All cached attestation keys purged"
|
||||
echo " [OK] Fresh keys will generate on next request"
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo " "
|
||||
echo " ℹ️ $(_msg confirm_not_found)"
|
||||
echo " No persistent key storage found"
|
||||
echo " Nothing to clear"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "============================================"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
|
||||
ACTION_LANG="en"
|
||||
_detect_lang() {
|
||||
local raw
|
||||
raw=$(getprop persist.sys.locale 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
[ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.product.locale 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
[ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.system.locale 2>/dev/null)
|
||||
local code=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | sed 's/_/-/g')
|
||||
case "$code" in
|
||||
zh-Hans*|zh-CN*) code="zh-CN" ;;
|
||||
zh-Hant*|zh-TW*|zh-HK*) code="zh-TW" ;;
|
||||
pt-BR*) code="pt-BR" ;;
|
||||
pt*) code="pt-BR" ;;
|
||||
es-ES*|es*) code="es-ES" ;;
|
||||
*-*) code="${code%%-*}" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
case "$code" in
|
||||
ar|az|bn|de|el|es-ES|fa|fr|id|it|ja|ko|pl|pt-BR|ru|th|tl|tr|uk|vi|zh-CN|zh-TW) ACTION_LANG="$code" ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
}
|
||||
_detect_lang
|
||||
|
||||
_msg() {
|
||||
case "$ACTION_LANG" in
|
||||
zh-CN) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "清除持久化密钥存储" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "这将删除所有缓存的证明密钥。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "使用证明的应用将在下次使用时重新注册。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "音量+ = 确认清除" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "音量- = 取消（10秒后默认）" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "已取消 - 密钥已保留" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "持久化密钥存储已清除" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "未找到持久化密钥存储" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
zh-TW) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "清除持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "這將刪除所有快取的證明金鑰。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "使用證明的應用程式將在下次使用時重新註冊。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "音量+ = 確認清除" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "音量- = 取消（10秒後預設）" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "已取消 - 金鑰已保留" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "持久化金鑰儲存已清除" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "未找到持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
ja) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "永続キーストレージを消去" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "キャッシュされた証明キーをすべて削除します。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "証明を使用するアプリは次回使用時に再登録されます。" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "音量+ = 消去を確認" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "音量- = キャンセル（10秒後デフォルト）" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "キャンセルされました - キーは保持されます" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "永続キーストレージを消去しました" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "永続キーストレージが見つかりません" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
ko) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "영구 키 저장소 지우기" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "캐시된 모든 증명 키를 삭제합니다." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "증명을 사용하는 앱은 다음 사용 시 재등록됩니다." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "볼륨+ = 지우기 확인" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "볼륨- = 취소 (10초 후 기본값)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "취소됨 - 키 유지됨" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "영구 키 저장소가 지워졌습니다" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "영구 키 저장소를 찾을 수 없습니다" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
ru) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Очистить постоянное хранилище ключей" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Это удалит все кэшированные ключи аттестации." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Приложения, использующие аттестацию, перерегистрируются при следующем использовании." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Громкость+ = Подтвердить очистку" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Громкость- = Отмена (по умолчанию через 10с)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Отменено - ключи сохранены" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей очищено" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей не найдено" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
de) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Persistenten Schlüsselspeicher löschen" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Dies löscht alle zwischengespeicherten Attestierungsschlüssel." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Apps mit Attestierung registrieren sich bei der nächsten Nutzung neu." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Laut+ = Löschen bestätigen" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Leise- = Abbrechen (Standard nach 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Abgebrochen - Schlüssel beibehalten" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gelöscht" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Kein persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gefunden" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
fr) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Effacer le stockage de clés persistant" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Ceci supprime toutes les clés d'attestation en cache." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Les apps utilisant l'attestation se réinscriront à la prochaine utilisation." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Confirmer l'effacement" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Annuler (par défaut après 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Annulé - clés conservées" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Stockage de clés persistant effacé" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Aucun stockage de clés persistant trouvé" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
es-ES) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Borrar almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Esto elimina todas las claves de atestación en caché." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Las apps que usan atestación se volverán a registrar en el próximo uso." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Confirmar borrado" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Cancelar (predeterminado tras 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Cancelado - claves conservadas" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Almacenamiento persistente de claves borrado" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "No se encontró almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
pt-BR) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Limpar armazenamento persistente de chaves" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Isso exclui todas as chaves de atestação em cache." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Apps que usam atestação serão re-registrados no próximo uso." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Confirmar limpeza" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Cancelar (padrão após 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Cancelado - chaves preservadas" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Armazenamento persistente de chaves limpo" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Nenhum armazenamento persistente de chaves encontrado" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
it) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Cancella archivio chiavi persistente" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Questo elimina tutte le chiavi di attestazione in cache." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Le app che usano l'attestazione si re-registreranno al prossimo utilizzo." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Conferma cancellazione" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Annulla (predefinito dopo 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Annullato - chiavi conservate" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Archivio chiavi persistente cancellato" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Nessun archivio chiavi persistente trovato" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
tr) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Kalıcı Anahtar Deposunu Temizle" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Bu, önbelleğe alınmış tüm doğrulama anahtarlarını siler." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Doğrulama kullanan uygulamalar bir sonraki kullanımda yeniden kaydolacak." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Ses+ = Temizlemeyi onayla" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Ses- = İptal (10sn sonra varsayılan)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "İptal edildi - anahtarlar korundu" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu temizlendi" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu bulunamadı" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
id) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Hapus Penyimpanan Kunci Persisten" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Ini menghapus semua kunci atestasi yang di-cache." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Aplikasi yang menggunakan atestasi akan mendaftar ulang saat digunakan." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Konfirmasi hapus" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Batal (default setelah 10 detik)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Dibatalkan - kunci dipertahankan" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten dihapus" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten tidak ditemukan" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
vi) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Thao tác này xóa tất cả khóa chứng thực được lưu cache." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Các ứng dụng dùng chứng thực sẽ đăng ký lại khi sử dụng tiếp theo." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Xác nhận xóa" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Hủy (mặc định sau 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Đã hủy - giữ nguyên khóa" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Đã xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Không tìm thấy lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
ar) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "يؤدي هذا إلى حذف جميع مفاتيح التصديق المخزنة مؤقتاً." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "التطبيقات التي تستخدم التصديق ستعيد التسجيل في الاستخدام التالي." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "رفع الصوت = تأكيد المسح" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "خفض الصوت = إلغاء (افتراضي بعد 10 ثوانٍ)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "تم الإلغاء - تم الاحتفاظ بالمفاتيح" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "تم مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "لم يتم العثور على تخزين مفاتيح دائم" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
th) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "การดำเนินการนี้จะลบคีย์การรับรองที่แคชไว้ทั้งหมด" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "แอปที่ใช้การรับรองจะลงทะเบียนใหม่ในการใช้งานครั้งถัดไป" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "เพิ่มเสียง = ยืนยันการล้าง" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "ลดเสียง = ยกเลิก (ค่าเริ่มต้นหลัง 10 วินาที)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "ยกเลิกแล้ว - คีย์ยังคงอยู่" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวรแล้ว" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "ไม่พบที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
uk) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Очистити постійне сховище ключів" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Це видаляє всі кешовані ключі атестації." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Програми, що використовують атестацію, повторно зареєструються при наступному використанні." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Гучність+ = Підтвердити очищення" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Гучність- = Скасувати (за замовчуванням через 10с)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Скасовано - ключі збережено" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Постійне сховище ключів очищено" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Постійне сховище ключів не знайдено" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
pl) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Wyczyść trwały magazyn kluczy" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "To usuwa wszystkie buforowane klucze atestacji." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Aplikacje używające atestacji zarejestrują się ponownie przy następnym użyciu." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Głośność+ = Potwierdź czyszczenie" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Głośność- = Anuluj (domyślnie po 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Anulowano - klucze zachowane" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Trwały magazyn kluczy wyczyszczony" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Nie znaleziono trwałego magazynu kluczy" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
az) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Davamlı Açar Yaddaşını Təmizlə" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Bu, keşlənmiş bütün təsdiqləmə açarlarını silir." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Təsdiqləmədən istifadə edən tətbiqlər növbəti istifadədə yenidən qeydiyyatdan keçəcək." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Səs+ = Təmizləməni təsdiqlə" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Səs- = Ləğv et (10 saniyə sonra defolt)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Ləğv edildi - açarlar saxlanıldı" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı təmizləndi" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı tapılmadı" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
bn) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করুন" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "এটি সমস্ত ক্যাশড অ্যাটেস্টেশন কী মুছে ফেলে।" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "অ্যাটেস্টেশন ব্যবহারকারী অ্যাপগুলি পরবর্তী ব্যবহারে পুনরায় নিবন্ধন করবে।" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "ভলিউম+ = পরিষ্কার নিশ্চিত করুন" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "ভলিউম- = বাতিল (১০ সেকেন্ডে ডিফল্ট)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "বাতিল করা হয়েছে - কী সংরক্ষিত" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করা হয়েছে" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "কোনো স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পাওয়া যায়নি" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
el) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Εκκαθάριση Μόνιμου Αποθηκευτικού Χώρου Κλειδιών" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Διαγράφει όλα τα προσωρινά αποθηκευμένα κλειδιά πιστοποίησης." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Οι εφαρμογές που χρησιμοποιούν πιστοποίηση θα επανεγγραφούν στην επόμενη χρήση." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Ένταση+ = Επιβεβαίωση εκκαθάρισης" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Ένταση- = Ακύρωση (προεπιλογή μετά από 10 δευτ)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Ακυρώθηκε - τα κλειδιά διατηρήθηκαν" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Ο μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών εκκαθαρίστηκε" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Δεν βρέθηκε μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
fa) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "پاک کردن ذخیرهسازی دائمی کلید" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "این کار همه کلیدهای تأیید کششده را حذف میکند." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "برنامههای استفادهکننده از تأیید در استفاده بعدی دوباره ثبتنام میکنند." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "صدا+ = تأیید پاک کردن" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "صدا- = لغو (پیشفرض پس از ۱۰ ثانیه)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "لغو شد - کلیدها حفظ شدند" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "ذخیرهسازی دائمی کلید پاک شد" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "ذخیرهسازی دائمی کلید یافت نشد" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
tl) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Burahin ang Persistent Key Storage" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "Buburahin nito ang lahat ng naka-cache na attestation keys." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Magre-rehistro muli ang mga app na gumagamit ng attestation sa susunod na paggamit." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Kumpirmahin ang pagbura" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Kanselahin (default pagkatapos ng 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Nakansela - napanatili ang mga key" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Nabura ang persistent key storage" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "Walang nahanap na persistent key storage" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
*) case "$1" in
|
||||
confirm_header) echo "Clear Persistent Key Storage" ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_1) echo "This deletes all cached attestation keys." ;;
|
||||
confirm_warning_2) echo "Apps using attestation will re-enroll on next use." ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_up) echo "Vol+ = Confirm clear" ;;
|
||||
confirm_vol_down) echo "Vol- = Cancel (default after 10s)" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cancelled) echo "Cancelled - keys preserved" ;;
|
||||
confirm_cleared) echo "Persistent key storage cleared" ;;
|
||||
confirm_not_found) echo "No persistent key storage found" ;;
|
||||
esac ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
}
|
||||
+28
-306
@@ -1,321 +1,43 @@
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-251
|
||||
## TEESimulator v3.2: Anti-Detection Hardening & Key Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
14 commits since v6.0.0-235. Clears the remaining Duck Detector grant-domain rows (incl. the Android 16 OnePlus report), restores Google Wallet and fingerprint compatibility, and removes the in-module patch-level/bulletin resolvers. Test device (SDK 35) TEE tamper score 28 → 8.
|
||||
|
||||
### Detection coverage
|
||||
- Grant plane virtualized: owner read and cross-app `Domain.GRANT` read return one identical chain. 6 RED rows cleared. (28 → 18)
|
||||
- Generate-mode fingerprint: dropped 2 surplus authorizations (both patchlevels), USER_ID moved to SOFTWARE to mirror a captured device. (18 → 8)
|
||||
- Android 16 grant: patch-mode keys now served on the grant plane, so owner and grant reads match — fixes CHAIN_SPLIT.
|
||||
- Grant gated to SDK ≥ 36: Android 15 answers PERMISSION_DENIED, no synthetic over-capability.
|
||||
- Stale-chain eviction: import and updateSubcomponent drop the cached attestation; no pre-mutation chain replays.
|
||||
- Lifecycle coherence: clearNamespace / deleteAllKeys / migrateKeyNamespace mirror synthetic key and grant state — defeats delete-then-read probes.
|
||||
- Device-ID attestation mirrors the real TEE: returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS where silicon can't attest, instead of forging it.
|
||||
|
||||
### App compatibility
|
||||
- Google Wallet: INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID stripped (not rejected) when the caller lacks the permission; card binding works. (PR #27)
|
||||
- Fingerprint / vendor keys: KEY_ID miss skips the post-handler, so real HAL operations are no longer wrapped and broken. (PR #26)
|
||||
|
||||
### Removed
|
||||
- PatchLevelManager — auto-resolved the security-patch date from an installed PlayIntegrityFix module (with hot-reload) and applied it to props.
|
||||
- BulletinPoller — scheduled security-bulletin refresh.
|
||||
|
||||
### Other
|
||||
- Release builds purge stale `teesim-*.bin` diagnostics from `/data/local/tmp` at boot.
|
||||
- Vol-key confirmation rewritten to 1s `getevent` bursts (piped stream missed single presses on Magisk).
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified
|
||||
- SDK 35, Xiaomi 23106RN0DA: tamper 28 → 8; generate-mode signal gone; 4 grant rows UNAVAILABLE (correct for Android 15); no regressions.
|
||||
- Android 16 grant fix built but unconfirmed on SDK 36 — needs an affected OnePlus user to confirm the grant rows clear.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-235
|
||||
|
||||
11 commits since v6.0.0-224. Duck Detector generate-mode fingerprint cleared. Shizuku-routed BYO attestation fixed. Vol-key confirmation restored on Magisk.
|
||||
|
||||
### Detection Coverage
|
||||
- Duck Detector "TEE Simulator generate-mode fingerprint" cleared. `toAuthorizations` reordered to AOSP keymint reference order; KEY_SIZE moves from auth#4 to auth#2, breaking the byte-224 anchor the probe relied on. 0/31 matches on fresh self-probes (was 15/36).
|
||||
- `persist.logd.size` variants blanked at boot via `service.sh`. Removes a logd-tuning side-channel.
|
||||
|
||||
### BYO & Shizuku Routing
|
||||
- Shizuku-routed BYO attestation no longer fails with `-49 UNSUPPORTED_TAG`. `shouldSkipUid` moved into `handleGenerateKey`, evaluated after BYO parameters are parsed.
|
||||
- `createOperation` parallel fix: outer UID gate removed; the cache-or-forward lookup is the sole gate. BYO keys created under Shizuku UID can now be used for signing under the same UID.
|
||||
- `forceGenerate` simplified: any attest-key or BYO request routes to software unconditionally.
|
||||
- BYO attest-key miss returns the full keybox chain instead of a malformed depth-1 chain.
|
||||
- AUTO TEE race dispatch removed. Resolution uses `DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional` only.
|
||||
- Symmetric gen rejects `attestationKey != null` early with `INVALID_ARGUMENT`. Unsupported-algorithm branch returns `-38` instead of `-49`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Action Button
|
||||
- Vol+ / Vol- confirmation restored on Magisk. Streaming `getevent -lq` matched inline against `KEY_VOLUMEUP DOWN` / `KEY_VOLUMEDOWN DOWN`, wrapped in `/system/bin/timeout 10`. The prior polled approach timed out on six-events-per-keypress kernels.
|
||||
|
||||
### Verified
|
||||
- Android 15 (SDK 35), daemon PID 1466.
|
||||
- Cross-device confirmation pending on OnePlus PKX110 and Samsung SM-S928B.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-224
|
||||
|
||||
59 commits since v6.0.0-162. Self-sufficient spoofing infrastructure, Duck Detector TamperScore-4 cleared on Xiaomi A16, persistent symmetric key storage (PR #22), 22-language action button hardening.
|
||||
|
||||
### Detection Coverage
|
||||
- Duck Detector TimingSideChannelProbe cleared on Xiaomi A16 (SDK 35). Timing ratio dropped 1.555x to 1.055x, verdict WARNING to CLEAR. Threshold is > 1.1x.
|
||||
- `KEY_ID` resolved from `teeResponses` instead of synthesized, matching real KeyMint binder behavior.
|
||||
- Non-attested key cache mirrors attested path for byte-level metadata parity.
|
||||
- `KEY_SIZE` emitted for EC keys; omitted when `ecCurve` is present, matching AOSP attestation_record.h.
|
||||
- SSE messages synthesized canonically on non-AEAD `updateAad`; passthrough shape normalized.
|
||||
- StrongBox attest version no longer hardcoded; resolved from device context.
|
||||
- TEE op latency floor enforced to defeat micro-timing probes.
|
||||
- Attest key resolution restored to nspace-aware lookup after revert/restore cycle.
|
||||
|
||||
### Self-Sufficient Spoofing
|
||||
- `PatchLevelManager` resolves OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels via PIF without external bulletin fetch.
|
||||
- `BulletinPoller` refreshes bulletin data on a schedule, isolated from boot path via umbrella `try/catch`.
|
||||
- Bootloader-lock props pushed via `resetprop` at boot; absent vbmeta complement props filled; `vbmeta.device_state` included.
|
||||
- PIF hot-reload via `FileObserver`; empty source files skipped; future patch dates bounded by `MAX_FUTURE_DAYS`.
|
||||
- Default `security_patch.txt` dropped at install time.
|
||||
- `sepolicy.rule` allows UDP egress for DNS resolution.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Persistence (PR #22)
|
||||
- Symmetric keys persist across reboots with byte-identical metadata.
|
||||
- Keybox edits no longer wipe stored keys.
|
||||
- Delete marker dropped on key regeneration to prevent stale state.
|
||||
- Defensive symmetric fallback path with clean error codes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Reliability
|
||||
- `atomicWrite` preserves `[pkg]` sections; errors guarded in `updateTo`.
|
||||
- `applyToProps` serialized against concurrent callers.
|
||||
- `pollOnce` wrapped in umbrella `try/catch`; `BulletinPoller.start` failure isolated from spoofer init.
|
||||
- Spoofer ordering fixed: runs before keystore hook to prevent attest-time prop drift.
|
||||
- `isAutoMode` reads raw package mode; `system=prop` passive default respected.
|
||||
- `mergedContents` propagates read errors instead of swallowing them.
|
||||
- Date regex validation on `currentPatch`; YYYY-MM input skips day synthesis.
|
||||
- Global key-assignment check requires `=` delimiter (no more partial matches).
|
||||
- `validation_rejected` status emitted on invalid spoof input.
|
||||
|
||||
### Action Button UX
|
||||
- Vol+ required to clear `persistent_keys`. Vol- cancels. 10-second timeout defaults to cancel.
|
||||
- Confirmation localized in 22 languages: ar, az, bn, de, el, es-ES, fa, fr, id, it, ja, ko, pl, pt-BR, ru, th, tl, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW.
|
||||
- Every echoed string resolves through `_msg()` against device locale.
|
||||
|
||||
### Build & Ops
|
||||
- Kotlin `jvmTarget` raised to JVM 21.
|
||||
- Gradle auto-rewrites `module/update.json` on packaging.
|
||||
- `scripts/package.sh` locates user-local cargo; rust task receives cargo bin path.
|
||||
- Verified on Xiaomi Android 16 (SDK 35) `v6.0.0-224-Release`. Daemon alive PID 1392. Pending cross-device confirm on OnePlus PKX110 (qcom sun) and Samsung SM-S928B (pineapple).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0
|
||||
|
||||
Repository consolidation release. All tee-rebuild work merged as the new main branch.
|
||||
|
||||
### AOSP Self-Signed Cert Compliance
|
||||
- No-challenge keys now generate self-signed certs (subject == issuer, depth 1), matching AOSP `ta/src/keys.rs:451-478`
|
||||
- Both Kotlin (BouncyCastle) and Rust (native-certgen) paths corrected
|
||||
- Eliminates attestation behavioral probes that detect keybox issuer on non-attested keys
|
||||
|
||||
### Stability
|
||||
- Binder stress crash hardening for concurrent generateKey calls
|
||||
- AUTO mode TEE race for consistent attestation on devices with working G10
|
||||
- Oversized transactions routed to software gen instead of crashing
|
||||
- Operation-time params (BLOCK_MODE, PADDING, DIGEST) passed through to CipherPrimitive
|
||||
|
||||
### Banking App Compatibility
|
||||
- Bare `target.txt` entries now default to AUTO mode, resolved at config level to PATCH (working TEE) or GENERATE (broken TEE)
|
||||
- Fixes BHIM and similar banking apps that require TEE-backed attestation keys
|
||||
- Restores v5.0 behavior where AUTO was resolved before the interceptor dispatch, avoiding the non-deterministic `raceTeePatch` path
|
||||
|
||||
### Infrastructure
|
||||
- Version scheme changed to semver (v6.0.0)
|
||||
- Repository moved to TEESimulator-RS as canonical source
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v5.0: AOSP Compliance Overhaul
|
||||
|
||||
Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157 analysis, layered on top of our StrongBox hardening and native cert gen architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attestation Extension Alignment
|
||||
- 17 enforcement tags added to KeyMintAttestation (ACTIVE_DATETIME, ORIGINATION_EXPIRE, USAGE_EXPIRE, USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, CALLER_NONCE, UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, MAX_BOOT_LEVEL, MIN_MAC_LENGTH, RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST)
|
||||
- BLOCK_MODE encoded as SET OF INTEGER per AOSP attestation_record.h
|
||||
- Version-guarded tags (RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST >=100, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE >=3, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY >=4)
|
||||
- INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID computed via HMAC-SHA256 per KeyMint HAL spec using device HBK
|
||||
- AAID gated on attestation challenge presence
|
||||
- Certificate validity defaults aligned with AOSP (epoch notBefore, 9999-12-31 notAfter)
|
||||
|
||||
### Binder Infrastructure
|
||||
- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI for non-intercepted codes
|
||||
- getNumberOfEntries includes software-generated key count
|
||||
- deleteKey resolves KEY_ID domain via generatedKeys lookup
|
||||
- patchAuthorizations for OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels in authorization arrays
|
||||
|
||||
### Software Operation AOSP Conformance
|
||||
- updateAad on non-AEAD operations returns INVALID_TAG (-76), matching AOSP operation.rs
|
||||
- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes
|
||||
- GCM IV returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations
|
||||
- SoftwareOperationBinder methods @Synchronized, matching AOSP Mutex per operation
|
||||
- authorize_create enforcement: PURPOSE validation, algorithm-purpose compatibility, temporal constraints, CALLER_NONCE prohibition, WRAP_KEY rejection
|
||||
|
||||
### Security and Configuration
|
||||
- SELinux permission checks via /proc/pid/attr/current
|
||||
- Per-UID permission verification through IPackageManager.checkPermission
|
||||
- Imported key tracking prevents stale attest-key overrides in getKeyEntry
|
||||
- nspace consistency fix in attest-key override path
|
||||
- TeeLatencySimulator with log-normal distribution matching real hardware profiles
|
||||
- Device-unique HBK seed generated on install (32 bytes from /dev/random)
|
||||
|
||||
### Preserved from v4.8
|
||||
- StrongBox op limits (4 concurrent max, TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS rejection)
|
||||
- LRU operation pruning per security level
|
||||
- Hardware keygen rate limiting (2/30s sliding window, 2 concurrent cap)
|
||||
- Native Rust cert generation with BouncyCastle fallback
|
||||
- Key persistence across reboots
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8.1: StrongBox Op Rejection Fix
|
||||
|
||||
- **StrongBox op limit gate fix** — `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8: StrongBox Hardening & LRU Pruning
|
||||
|
||||
Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped from 32 to 8.
|
||||
|
||||
- **LRU operation pruning** — Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
|
||||
- **StrongBox param guard** — Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
|
||||
- **StrongBox timing** — Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
|
||||
- **StrongBox op limit** — Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
|
||||
- **ECDSA algorithm alias** — Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
|
||||
- **createOperation domain handling** — Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
|
||||
- **Permission guards** — Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v4.7: Operation & Attestation Fixes
|
||||
|
||||
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [Key Attestation](https://github.com/nickel-lang/nickel) on OnePlus (Android 16) and Xiaomi Redmi 14C (Android 14).
|
||||
|
||||
- **PADDING encoding** — Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
|
||||
- **Operation error-path conformance** — Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
|
||||
- **updateAad support** — Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
|
||||
- **Algorithm inference** — `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator-RS v4.6: Rebrand & Detection Fix
|
||||
|
||||
- **RTT normalization rework** — Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
|
||||
- **Cross-algorithm attestation** — Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
|
||||
- **Device ID attestation** — Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
|
||||
- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS** — Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
|
||||
- **CI streamlined** — Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.5: Detection Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) (23-check attestation validator). All keystore-level checks now pass.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Key deletion consistency** — After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
|
||||
- **generateKey timing normalization** — Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
|
||||
- **Delete cleanup scope** — `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.4: AOSP Conformance
|
||||
|
||||
- **Binder error reply format** — Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
|
||||
- **Key enumeration** — Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
|
||||
- **KeyMetadata fields** — Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
|
||||
- **Parcel handling** — hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.3: Performance & Reliability
|
||||
|
||||
- **Debug log gating** — `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
|
||||
- **Supervisor backoff** — Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
|
||||
- **Process priority** — Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
|
||||
- **Map eviction** — Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
|
||||
- **CI pipeline** — Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.2: Detection Evasion Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes 6 detection vectors flagged by attestation validator apps.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attestation Policy Enforcement
|
||||
|
||||
Replicate AOSP keystore2's `add_required_parameters()` validation that our software keygen path was bypassing:
|
||||
|
||||
- **CREATION_DATETIME** — Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
|
||||
- **Device ID attestation** — Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
|
||||
- **Error reply format** — Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
|
||||
|
||||
### Certificate Fix
|
||||
|
||||
Leaf certificate Subject CN corrected from "Android KeyStore Key" to "Android Keystore Key" (lowercase s), matching AOSP `KeyGenParameterSpec.java:282`. Both Kotlin and Rust paths.
|
||||
|
||||
### Binder Timing
|
||||
|
||||
Skip interception for system transaction codes (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) above LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION. Eliminates the JNI round-trip that inflated binder ping ratio to 3.85x (detector threshold: 3.0x).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.1: Boot Identity Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
Bugfix release. The vbmeta boot key digest was randomizing on every reboot, producing a different RootOfTrust in attestation certificates each boot.
|
||||
|
||||
On devices where the kernel doesn't set `ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest`, the fallback chain hit random generation every boot because `resetprop` overrides for `ro.boot.*` props don't survive reboots. Added file-based persistence (`boot_hash.bin`, `boot_key.bin`) between the TEE cache and random fallback. Once determined, boot identity values persist across reboots.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified on Redmi 14C: second boot reads from persistent file instead of regenerating.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## TEESimulator v4.0: Native Rust Cert Generation
|
||||
|
||||
Major release. Certificate chain generation rebuilt from the ground up in Rust, replacing the BouncyCastle Java path for EC and RSA keys. Hardened against every known detector app.
|
||||
|
||||
### Native Cert Generation
|
||||
|
||||
The headline feature. `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 certificate chains using `ring` (EC-P256/P384) and `rsa` (RSA-2048/4096) with manual DER assembly. No more BouncyCastle quirks — issuer/subject DN bytes are injected directly from the keybox, ensuring byte-perfect chain linkage. BouncyCastle remains as fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
|
||||
This release hardens TEESimulator against active attestation probing by detector apps (DuckDetector, Luna, GarfieldHan) while introducing persistent key storage that survives daemon restarts and reboots.
|
||||
|
||||
### Anti-Detection Hardening
|
||||
|
||||
- **Challenge validation** — Oversized attestation challenges (>128 bytes) now return `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH (-21)`, matching real KeyMint behavior. Previously accepted silently — DuckDetector exploited this.
|
||||
- **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst, 2 concurrent max. Overflow falls back to software certs. Blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding that starves GMS.
|
||||
- **importKey eviction guard** — Retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import attacks that evict cached attestation data.
|
||||
- **256KB native payload cap** — Oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly instead of stalling threads.
|
||||
- **Alias size rejection** — Oversized key aliases rejected before they hit the binder buffer.
|
||||
* **Per-UID Hardware Keygen Rate Limiter**: Caps hardware key generation at 2 per 30-second window with 2 max concurrent requests per UID. Overflow requests fall back to software certificate generation, preventing binder thread starvation from flood attacks.
|
||||
* **importKey Eviction Defense**: Retains patched attestation chains when `importKey` overwrites an attested alias. Blocks the generate-then-import attack vector used by GarfieldHan and similar detectors.
|
||||
* **Native Binder Payload Cap**: Bypasses interception for payloads exceeding 256KB, preventing thread starvation from oversized binder transactions.
|
||||
* **Oversized Alias Rejection**: Rejects aliases that would exhaust the binder buffer, closing another flooding vector.
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Patch Consistency
|
||||
|
||||
* **Three-Way Patch Level Alignment**: When `system=prop` in `security_patch.txt`, boot and vendor patch levels are forced to `prop` as well. All three ASN.1 attestation tags (706/718/719) now resolve via `SystemProperties.get()` to match what detector apps see through `getprop`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Key Persistence
|
||||
|
||||
Generated keys now survive reboots. File-backed storage with file-level locking, preserved across keybox rotations. Banking and biometric apps that cache attestation keys no longer break after restart.
|
||||
* **Generated Key Persistence Layer**: Keys from `generateKey` are persisted to disk in binary format with version headers and atomic writes (tmp + rename).
|
||||
* **Automatic Restoration**: Persisted keys are restored on daemon startup without re-attestation.
|
||||
* **Keybox Rotation Survival**: Generated keys survive keybox.xml changes — only PATCH-mode cert chains are invalidated.
|
||||
* **File-Level Locking**: Concurrent read/write access to persisted keys is serialized to prevent corruption.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attestation Fixes
|
||||
### Process Reliability
|
||||
|
||||
- Null out all-zero `verifiedBootHash` from TEE cache (fingerprinting vector)
|
||||
- Correct `module_hash` field to match AOSP Keystore2 format
|
||||
- Override pre-existing attest keys instead of skipping them
|
||||
- Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks in keybox parsing
|
||||
- Security patch consistency — `system=prop` forces boot/vendor to match
|
||||
* **Fork-Based Supervisor Daemon**: Replaces the restart loop with a native fork-based supervisor for near-instant recovery.
|
||||
* **Attestation Leak Blocking**: Returns `DEAD_OBJECT` to callers when the interceptor service is unavailable, preventing unpatched attestation from leaking through.
|
||||
* **Global Exception Handler**: Catches uncaught exceptions and triggers clean daemon restart instead of silent death.
|
||||
* **FileObserver NPE Fix**: Prevents crash when config files are deleted while being observed.
|
||||
|
||||
### Upstream Cherry-Picks
|
||||
|
||||
* **KeyUsage per HAL spec** (#119): Correct certificate KeyUsage based on KeyPurpose.
|
||||
* **Reference leak fix** (#122): Resolve strong reference leak and warnings in binder interception.
|
||||
|
||||
### Module Lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
- Supervisor daemon keeps the interceptor alive
|
||||
- KSU Action button clears persistent key cache
|
||||
- Clean uninstall removes all traces (persistent keys, TEE status, daemon)
|
||||
* **`action.sh`**: Purge persistent key storage via KSU Manager Action button. Shows key count and storage size before clearing.
|
||||
* **`uninstall.sh`**: Clean module removal — kills daemon, removes generated data, preserves `target.txt`, `keybox.xml`, and `security_patch.txt`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Stability
|
||||
### PKI Fixes
|
||||
|
||||
- FileObserver NPE on config deletion fixed
|
||||
- Global uncaught exception handler — daemon stays alive on unexpected errors
|
||||
- PEM parsing hardened against malformed keybox files
|
||||
* Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks before parsing.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tested Against
|
||||
|
||||
DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, Key Attestation Demo — all passing on Redmi 14C (Android 14, Beanpod KeyMaster, KSU).
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-21
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Version Info ---
|
||||
VERSION=$(grep_prop version "${TMPDIR}/module.prop")
|
||||
ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator-RS $VERSION"
|
||||
ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator $VERSION"
|
||||
ui_print ""
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Architecture Handling ---
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ install_file() {
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Installation ---
|
||||
ui_print "- Extracting module files"
|
||||
for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh action_i18n.sh uninstall.sh; do
|
||||
for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh uninstall.sh; do
|
||||
install_file "$file" "$MODPATH"
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ ui_print "- Extracting $ARCH libraries"
|
||||
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libTEESimulator.so" "$MODPATH"
|
||||
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libinject.so" "$MODPATH"
|
||||
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH"
|
||||
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libcertgen.so" "$MODPATH"
|
||||
ui_print ""
|
||||
|
||||
mv "$MODPATH/libinject.so" "$MODPATH/inject"
|
||||
@@ -91,21 +90,3 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
|
||||
ui_print "- Adding default target scope"
|
||||
install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" ]; then
|
||||
ui_print "- Adding default security patch config (mirror device props)"
|
||||
printf '%s\n' \
|
||||
'# TEESimulator default: mirror live device props.' \
|
||||
'# system=prop reads ro.build.version.security_patch at cert-gen time;' \
|
||||
'# boot and vendor are auto-forced to prop too (ConfigurationManager.kt:253-256).' \
|
||||
'# Override with explicit YYYY-MM-DD dates if you want active spoofing.' \
|
||||
'system=prop' > "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
|
||||
chmod 644 "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then
|
||||
ui_print "- Generating device-unique hardware-bound key seed"
|
||||
head -c 32 /dev/random > "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-2
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
id=tricky_store
|
||||
name=TEESimulator-RS
|
||||
name=TEESimulator
|
||||
version=${REPLACEMEVER}
|
||||
versionCode=${REPLACEMEVERCODE}
|
||||
author=JingMatrix, Enginex0
|
||||
description=Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation
|
||||
updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/update.json
|
||||
updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/update.json
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +1,2 @@
|
||||
allow keystore {adb_data_file shell_data_file} file *
|
||||
allow crash_dump keystore process *
|
||||
|
||||
allow ksu self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
|
||||
allow ksu node:tcp_socket node_bind
|
||||
allow ksu port:tcp_socket name_connect
|
||||
allow magisk self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
|
||||
allow magisk node:tcp_socket node_bind
|
||||
allow magisk port:tcp_socket name_connect
|
||||
|
||||
allow ksu self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
|
||||
allow ksu node:udp_socket node_bind
|
||||
allow ksu port:udp_socket name_connect
|
||||
allow magisk self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
|
||||
allow magisk node:udp_socket node_bind
|
||||
allow magisk port:udp_socket name_connect
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,14 +3,3 @@ cd $MODDIR
|
||||
|
||||
# Fork-based supervisor for instant restart
|
||||
./supervisor ./daemon "$MODDIR" &
|
||||
|
||||
# Clear logd size persist properties once boot completes
|
||||
(
|
||||
until [ "$(getprop sys.boot_completed)" = "1" ]; do
|
||||
sleep 1
|
||||
done
|
||||
setprop persist.logd.size ""
|
||||
setprop persist.logd.size.crash ""
|
||||
setprop persist.logd.size.system ""
|
||||
setprop persist.logd.size.main ""
|
||||
) &
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,5 +9,3 @@ done
|
||||
|
||||
rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
|
||||
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
|
||||
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_hash.bin" "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_key.bin"
|
||||
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt.next" "$CONFIG_DIR/last_bulletin_fetch.json"
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-4
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"version": "v6.0.1-251",
|
||||
"versionCode": 251,
|
||||
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/v6.0.1-251/TEESimulator-RS-v6.0.1-251-Release.zip",
|
||||
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
|
||||
"version": "v3.2",
|
||||
"versionCode": 82,
|
||||
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v3.2/TEESimulator-v3.2-82-Release.zip",
|
||||
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[target.aarch64-linux-android]
|
||||
linker = "aarch64-linux-android29-clang"
|
||||
|
||||
[target.armv7-linux-androideabi]
|
||||
linker = "armv7a-linux-androideabi29-clang"
|
||||
|
||||
[target.i686-linux-android]
|
||||
linker = "i686-linux-android29-clang"
|
||||
|
||||
[target.x86_64-linux-android]
|
||||
linker = "x86_64-linux-android29-clang"
|
||||
Generated
-1166
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[package]
|
||||
name = "certgen"
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
edition = "2021"
|
||||
publish = false
|
||||
|
||||
[lib]
|
||||
crate-type = ["cdylib"]
|
||||
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
jni = { version = "0.21.1", default-features = false }
|
||||
ring = "0.17.14"
|
||||
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
|
||||
pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["alloc"] }
|
||||
rand = "0.8"
|
||||
der = { version = "0.7.10", features = ["alloc", "oid"] }
|
||||
const-oid = "0.9.6"
|
||||
x509-cert = { version = "0.2.5", features = ["pem"] }
|
||||
time = { version = "0.3", features = ["std"] }
|
||||
anyhow = "1.0"
|
||||
tracing = "0.1"
|
||||
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
|
||||
libc = "0.2"
|
||||
zip = { version = "2.2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
|
||||
serde_json = "1.0"
|
||||
|
||||
[profile.release]
|
||||
opt-level = "z"
|
||||
lto = true
|
||||
codegen-units = 1
|
||||
strip = "symbols"
|
||||
panic = "abort"
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
|
||||
[toolchain]
|
||||
channel = "stable"
|
||||
targets = [
|
||||
"aarch64-linux-android",
|
||||
"armv7-linux-androideabi",
|
||||
"i686-linux-android",
|
||||
"x86_64-linux-android",
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -1,721 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use crate::error::Result;
|
||||
use crate::types::CertGenParams;
|
||||
|
||||
const DO_NOT_REPORT: i32 = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn build_attestation_extension(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let sw = build_software_enforced(params)?;
|
||||
let tee = build_tee_enforced(params)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut inner = Vec::new();
|
||||
// attestationVersion — INTEGER
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.attest_version as i64));
|
||||
// attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
|
||||
// keymintVersion — INTEGER
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.keymaster_version as i64));
|
||||
// keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
|
||||
// attestationChallenge — OCTET STRING
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(
|
||||
params.attestation_challenge.as_deref().unwrap_or(&[]),
|
||||
));
|
||||
// uniqueId — OCTET STRING (always empty)
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&[]));
|
||||
// softwareEnforced
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&sw);
|
||||
// teeEnforced
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&tee);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(enc_sequence(&inner))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_software_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 303: CALLER_NONCE — NULL (presence = true)
|
||||
if params.caller_nonce {
|
||||
fields.push((303, enc_null()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 400: ACTIVE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
|
||||
if params.active_datetime >= 0 {
|
||||
fields.push((400, enc_integer(params.active_datetime)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 401: ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
|
||||
if params.origination_expire_datetime >= 0 {
|
||||
fields.push((401, enc_integer(params.origination_expire_datetime)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 402: USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
|
||||
if params.usage_expire_datetime >= 0 {
|
||||
fields.push((402, enc_integer(params.usage_expire_datetime)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 405: USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT — INTEGER
|
||||
if params.usage_count_limit >= 0 {
|
||||
fields.push((405, enc_integer(params.usage_count_limit as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 509: UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED — NULL
|
||||
if params.unlocked_device_required {
|
||||
fields.push((509, enc_null()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 701: CREATION_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
|
||||
fields.push((701, enc_integer(params.creation_datetime)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 709: ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID — OCTET STRING
|
||||
// The bytes are already the DER-encoded AttestationApplicationId wrapped in OCTET STRING
|
||||
// by the Kotlin layer. We wrap them in an EXPLICIT tag.
|
||||
if !params.attestation_application_id.is_empty() {
|
||||
fields.push((709, enc_octet_string(¶ms.attestation_application_id)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 724: MODULE_HASH — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 400)
|
||||
if params.attest_version >= 400 {
|
||||
if let Some(ref hash) = params.module_hash {
|
||||
fields.push((724, enc_octet_string(hash)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_tee_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 1: PURPOSE — SET OF INTEGER
|
||||
if !params.purposes.is_empty() {
|
||||
fields.push((1, build_set_of_integer(¶ms.purposes)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 2: ALGORITHM — INTEGER
|
||||
fields.push((2, enc_integer(params.algorithm as i32 as i64)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 3: KEY_SIZE — INTEGER
|
||||
fields.push((3, enc_integer(params.key_size as i64)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 5: DIGEST — SET OF INTEGER
|
||||
if !params.digests.is_empty() {
|
||||
fields.push((5, build_set_of_integer(¶ms.digests)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 10: EC_CURVE — INTEGER (only for EC keys)
|
||||
if let Some(curve) = params.ec_curve {
|
||||
fields.push((10, enc_integer(curve as i32 as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 503: NO_AUTH_REQUIRED — NULL (conditional)
|
||||
if params.no_auth_required {
|
||||
fields.push((503, enc_null()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 702: ORIGIN — INTEGER 0 (GENERATED)
|
||||
fields.push((702, enc_integer(0)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 704: ROOT_OF_TRUST — SEQUENCE
|
||||
fields.push((704, build_root_of_trust(params)));
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 705: OS_VERSION — INTEGER
|
||||
if params.os_version != DO_NOT_REPORT {
|
||||
fields.push((705, enc_integer(params.os_version as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 706: OS_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
|
||||
if params.os_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
|
||||
fields.push((706, enc_integer(params.os_patch_level as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tags 710-717: ATTESTATION_ID_* — OCTET STRING (optional)
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_brand {
|
||||
fields.push((710, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_device {
|
||||
fields.push((711, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_product {
|
||||
fields.push((712, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_serial {
|
||||
fields.push((713, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_imei {
|
||||
fields.push((714, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_meid {
|
||||
fields.push((715, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_manufacturer {
|
||||
fields.push((716, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_model {
|
||||
fields.push((717, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 718: VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
|
||||
if params.vendor_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
|
||||
fields.push((718, enc_integer(params.vendor_patch_level as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 719: BOOT_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
|
||||
if params.boot_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
|
||||
fields.push((719, enc_integer(params.boot_patch_level as i64)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tag 723: ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 300)
|
||||
if params.attest_version >= 300 {
|
||||
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_second_imei {
|
||||
fields.push((723, enc_octet_string(v)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_root_of_trust(params: &CertGenParams) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut inner = Vec::new();
|
||||
// verifiedBootKey — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(¶ms.boot_key));
|
||||
// deviceLocked — BOOLEAN TRUE (0xFF, not 0x01)
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_boolean(true));
|
||||
// verifiedBootState — ENUMERATED 0 (Verified), not INTEGER
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(0));
|
||||
// verifiedBootHash — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(¶ms.boot_hash));
|
||||
enc_sequence(&inner)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_authorization_list(fields: &mut Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
fields.sort_by_key(|(tag, _)| *tag);
|
||||
let mut inner = Vec::new();
|
||||
for (tag, value) in fields.iter() {
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_explicit_tag(*tag, value));
|
||||
}
|
||||
enc_sequence(&inner)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_set_of_integer(values: &[i32]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER SET OF: elements sorted by encoded byte value
|
||||
let mut encoded: Vec<Vec<u8>> = values.iter().map(|v| enc_integer(*v as i64)).collect();
|
||||
encoded.sort();
|
||||
let mut inner = Vec::new();
|
||||
for e in &encoded {
|
||||
inner.extend_from_slice(e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
enc_set(&inner)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- DER primitives ---
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_length(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
if len < 0x80 {
|
||||
vec![len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFF {
|
||||
vec![0x81, len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFFFF {
|
||||
vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
|
||||
vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
0x84,
|
||||
(len >> 24) as u8,
|
||||
(len >> 16) as u8,
|
||||
(len >> 8) as u8,
|
||||
len as u8,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_integer(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER INTEGER: tag 0x02, minimal two's complement big-endian
|
||||
let bytes = integer_bytes(value);
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x02];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn integer_bytes(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
if value == 0 {
|
||||
return vec![0x00];
|
||||
}
|
||||
let raw = value.to_be_bytes();
|
||||
// Find first significant byte
|
||||
let mut start = 0;
|
||||
if value > 0 {
|
||||
while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0x00 {
|
||||
start += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If high bit set, need leading 0x00 to keep positive
|
||||
if raw[start] & 0x80 != 0 {
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x00];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0xFF {
|
||||
start += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// If high bit clear, need leading 0xFF to keep negative
|
||||
if raw[start] & 0x80 == 0 {
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0xFF];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
raw[start..].to_vec()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_enumerated(value: i32) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER ENUMERATED: tag 0x0A, same value encoding as INTEGER
|
||||
let bytes = integer_bytes(value as i64);
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x0A];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_octet_string(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x04];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(data.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(data);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_null() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
vec![0x05, 0x00]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_boolean(value: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER BOOLEAN: TRUE = 0xFF, FALSE = 0x00
|
||||
vec![0x01, 0x01, if value { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_sequence(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x30];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(contents);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_set(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut out = vec![0x31];
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(contents);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_explicit_tag(tag_number: u32, inner: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// EXPLICIT context-specific constructed tag
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::new();
|
||||
if tag_number < 31 {
|
||||
// Short form: single byte 0xA0 | tag_number
|
||||
out.push(0xA0 | tag_number as u8);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Long form: 0xBF followed by base-128 encoding of tag number
|
||||
out.push(0xBF);
|
||||
enc_base128_tag(&mut out, tag_number);
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(inner.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(inner);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn enc_base128_tag(out: &mut Vec<u8>, tag: u32) {
|
||||
// Base-128 with continuation bits: MSB first, bit 7 set on all but last byte
|
||||
let mut digits = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut val = tag;
|
||||
digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8);
|
||||
val >>= 7;
|
||||
while val > 0 {
|
||||
digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8 | 0x80);
|
||||
val >>= 7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Written MSB first
|
||||
for b in digits.iter().rev() {
|
||||
out.push(*b);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve};
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_integer_zero() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(0), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_integer_small_positive() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(3), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(127), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x7F]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_integer_needs_leading_zero() {
|
||||
// 128 = 0x80, high bit set so needs 0x00 prefix
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(128), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(256), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_integer_multi_byte() {
|
||||
// 140000 = 0x02_22_E0
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_integer(140000), vec![0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x22, 0xE0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_integer_large() {
|
||||
// 20250301 = 0x01_34_FE_BD
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
enc_integer(20250301),
|
||||
vec![0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x34, 0xFE, 0xBD]
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_enumerated() {
|
||||
// SecurityLevel TEE = 1
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(1), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x01]);
|
||||
// VerifiedBootState Verified = 0
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(0), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_boolean_true() {
|
||||
// DER: TRUE = 0xFF
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_boolean(true), vec![0x01, 0x01, 0xFF]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_null() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_null(), vec![0x05, 0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_octet_string_empty() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(enc_octet_string(&[]), vec![0x04, 0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_short() {
|
||||
// Tag 1 wrapping INTEGER 2: A1 03 02 01 02
|
||||
let inner = enc_integer(2);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(1, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(tagged, vec![0xA1, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_10() {
|
||||
// Tag 10: 0xAA
|
||||
let inner = enc_integer(1);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(10, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(tagged[0], 0xAA);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_503() {
|
||||
// Tag 503: 0xBF 0x83 0x77
|
||||
// 503 = 3*128 + 119 => 0x83 0x77
|
||||
let inner = enc_null();
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(503, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x83, 0x77]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_704() {
|
||||
// Tag 704: 0xBF 0x85 0x40
|
||||
// 704 = 5*128 + 64 => 0x85 0x40
|
||||
let inner = enc_sequence(&[]);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(704, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x40]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_718() {
|
||||
// Tag 718: 0xBF 0x85 0x4E
|
||||
let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(718, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4E]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_719() {
|
||||
// Tag 719: 0xBF 0x85 0x4F
|
||||
let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(719, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4F]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_701() {
|
||||
// Tag 701: 0xBF 0x85 0x3D
|
||||
let inner = enc_integer(1000);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(701, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x3D]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_709() {
|
||||
// Tag 709: 0xBF 0x85 0x45
|
||||
let inner = enc_octet_string(&[0x01]);
|
||||
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(709, &inner);
|
||||
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x45]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_build_set_of_integer_sorted() {
|
||||
// SET OF INTEGER must sort by encoded bytes
|
||||
let result = build_set_of_integer(&[3, 2]);
|
||||
// Expect sorted: INTEGER 2 before INTEGER 3
|
||||
let expected = enc_set(&[0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, expected);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_root_of_trust_structure() {
|
||||
let params = make_test_params();
|
||||
let rot = build_root_of_trust(¶ms);
|
||||
// Should be a SEQUENCE (0x30)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot[0], 0x30);
|
||||
// Find BOOLEAN TRUE inside
|
||||
let rot_inner = &rot[2..]; // skip tag+length
|
||||
// First: OCTET STRING (32 bytes boot key)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[0], 0x04);
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[1], 0x20); // 32 bytes
|
||||
// After boot key (34 bytes): BOOLEAN TRUE
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[34], 0x01); // BOOLEAN tag
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[35], 0x01); // length 1
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[36], 0xFF); // TRUE = 0xFF
|
||||
// Then ENUMERATED 0 (verifiedBootState)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[37], 0x0A); // ENUMERATED tag, not 0x02
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[38], 0x01);
|
||||
assert_eq!(rot_inner[39], 0x00);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_do_not_report_omits_fields() {
|
||||
let mut params = make_test_params();
|
||||
params.os_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
|
||||
params.vendor_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
|
||||
params.boot_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
|
||||
let tee = build_tee_enforced(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
let hex = hex_string(&tee);
|
||||
// Tags 706, 718, 719 should not appear
|
||||
// Tag 706 = BF 85 42, 718 = BF 85 4E, 719 = BF 85 4F
|
||||
assert!(!hex.contains("bf8542"), "os_patch_level should be omitted");
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!hex.contains("bf854e"),
|
||||
"vendor_patch_level should be omitted"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
!hex.contains("bf854f"),
|
||||
"boot_patch_level should be omitted"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_key_description_security_level_is_enumerated() {
|
||||
let params = make_test_params();
|
||||
let ext = build_attestation_extension(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
// KeyDescription is a SEQUENCE: 0x30 ...
|
||||
assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
|
||||
// Skip SEQUENCE tag + length to get to inner fields
|
||||
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&ext);
|
||||
// Field 0: attestationVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
|
||||
assert_eq!(inner[0], 0x02);
|
||||
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(inner);
|
||||
// Field 1: attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "attestationSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
|
||||
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
|
||||
// Field 2: keymintVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x02);
|
||||
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
|
||||
// Field 3: keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
|
||||
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "keymintSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_authorization_list_sorted_by_tag() {
|
||||
let params = make_test_params();
|
||||
let tee = build_tee_enforced(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&tee);
|
||||
let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
|
||||
let mut sorted = tags.clone();
|
||||
sorted.sort();
|
||||
assert_eq!(tags, sorted, "AuthorizationList fields must be sorted by tag number");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enforcement_tags_in_software_enforced() {
|
||||
let mut params = make_test_params();
|
||||
params.usage_count_limit = 3;
|
||||
params.unlocked_device_required = true;
|
||||
params.caller_nonce = true;
|
||||
params.active_datetime = 1709913600000;
|
||||
let sw = build_software_enforced(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&sw);
|
||||
let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
|
||||
assert!(tags.contains(&303), "CALLER_NONCE (303) must be in softwareEnforced");
|
||||
assert!(tags.contains(&400), "ACTIVE_DATETIME (400) must be in softwareEnforced");
|
||||
assert!(tags.contains(&405), "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT (405) must be in softwareEnforced");
|
||||
assert!(tags.contains(&509), "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED (509) must be in softwareEnforced");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_no_auth_required_conditional() {
|
||||
let mut params = make_test_params();
|
||||
params.no_auth_required = false;
|
||||
let tee = build_tee_enforced(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&tee);
|
||||
let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
|
||||
assert!(!tags.contains(&503), "NO_AUTH_REQUIRED (503) must be absent when false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_enforcement_tags_omitted_when_unset() {
|
||||
let params = make_test_params();
|
||||
let sw = build_software_enforced(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&sw);
|
||||
let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
|
||||
assert!(!tags.contains(&303), "CALLER_NONCE should be absent when false");
|
||||
assert!(!tags.contains(&400), "ACTIVE_DATETIME should be absent when -1");
|
||||
assert!(!tags.contains(&405), "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT should be absent when -1");
|
||||
assert!(!tags.contains(&509), "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED should be absent when false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_full_extension_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let params = make_test_params();
|
||||
let ext = build_attestation_extension(¶ms).unwrap();
|
||||
// Must be valid DER: starts with SEQUENCE tag
|
||||
assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
|
||||
// Length must account for all inner bytes
|
||||
let (header_len, total_content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(&ext);
|
||||
assert_eq!(ext.len(), header_len + total_content_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- test helpers ---
|
||||
|
||||
fn make_test_params() -> CertGenParams {
|
||||
CertGenParams {
|
||||
algorithm: Algorithm::Ec,
|
||||
key_size: 256,
|
||||
ec_curve: Some(EcCurve::P256),
|
||||
rsa_public_exponent: 0,
|
||||
attestation_challenge: Some(vec![0xAB; 32]),
|
||||
purposes: vec![2, 3],
|
||||
digests: vec![4],
|
||||
cert_serial: None,
|
||||
cert_subject: None,
|
||||
cert_not_before: -1,
|
||||
cert_not_after: -1,
|
||||
keybox_private_key: vec![],
|
||||
keybox_cert_chain: vec![],
|
||||
security_level: 1,
|
||||
attest_version: 200,
|
||||
keymaster_version: 200,
|
||||
os_version: 140000,
|
||||
os_patch_level: 202503,
|
||||
vendor_patch_level: 20250301,
|
||||
boot_patch_level: 20250301,
|
||||
boot_key: vec![0x01; 32],
|
||||
boot_hash: vec![0x02; 32],
|
||||
creation_datetime: 1709913600000,
|
||||
attestation_application_id: vec![0xDE, 0xAD],
|
||||
module_hash: None,
|
||||
id_brand: None,
|
||||
id_device: None,
|
||||
id_product: None,
|
||||
id_serial: None,
|
||||
id_imei: None,
|
||||
id_meid: None,
|
||||
id_manufacturer: None,
|
||||
id_model: None,
|
||||
id_second_imei: None,
|
||||
active_datetime: -1,
|
||||
origination_expire_datetime: -1,
|
||||
usage_expire_datetime: -1,
|
||||
usage_count_limit: -1,
|
||||
caller_nonce: false,
|
||||
unlocked_device_required: false,
|
||||
no_auth_required: true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn hex_string(data: &[u8]) -> String {
|
||||
data.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn skip_tlv_header(data: &[u8]) -> &[u8] {
|
||||
let (header_len, _) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
|
||||
&data[header_len..]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn skip_one_tlv(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, &[u8]) {
|
||||
let (header_len, content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
|
||||
let total = header_len + content_len;
|
||||
(total, &data[total..])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn parse_tlv_lengths(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, usize) {
|
||||
// Returns (header_bytes, content_bytes)
|
||||
let tag_len = tag_byte_len(data);
|
||||
let len_start = tag_len;
|
||||
if data[len_start] < 0x80 {
|
||||
(len_start + 1, data[len_start] as usize)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let num_len_bytes = (data[len_start] & 0x7F) as usize;
|
||||
let mut content_len = 0usize;
|
||||
for i in 0..num_len_bytes {
|
||||
content_len = (content_len << 8) | data[len_start + 1 + i] as usize;
|
||||
}
|
||||
(len_start + 1 + num_len_bytes, content_len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn tag_byte_len(data: &[u8]) -> usize {
|
||||
if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
|
||||
1
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let mut i = 1;
|
||||
while data[i] & 0x80 != 0 {
|
||||
i += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
i + 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_tag_numbers(mut data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u32> {
|
||||
let mut tags = Vec::new();
|
||||
while !data.is_empty() {
|
||||
let tag = read_tag_number(data);
|
||||
tags.push(tag);
|
||||
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(data);
|
||||
data = rest;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tags
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn read_tag_number(data: &[u8]) -> u32 {
|
||||
if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
|
||||
(data[0] & 0x1F) as u32
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let mut val = 0u32;
|
||||
let mut i = 1;
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
val = (val << 7) | (data[i] & 0x7F) as u32;
|
||||
if data[i] & 0x80 == 0 {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
i += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
val
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,582 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
|
||||
use crate::keybox::ParsedKeybox;
|
||||
use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, GeneratedKeyPair};
|
||||
|
||||
use time::OffsetDateTime;
|
||||
|
||||
const ATTESTATION_OID: &[u64] = &[1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 1, 17];
|
||||
|
||||
// Signature algorithm OIDs
|
||||
const OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2];
|
||||
const OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3];
|
||||
const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
|
||||
|
||||
// Extension OIDs
|
||||
const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];
|
||||
|
||||
// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge = self-signed leaf, chain depth 1
|
||||
pub fn build_self_signed_cert(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
|
||||
let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
|
||||
serial.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
vec![1u8]
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
|
||||
subject.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
|
||||
let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
|
||||
// No keybox fallback available; use far-future (year 9999)
|
||||
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(253402300799)
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365 * 30))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let extensions_der = build_extensions(None, ¶ms.purposes)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
|
||||
let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
|
||||
let validity_der = encode_validity(¬_before, ¬_after);
|
||||
let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
|
||||
|
||||
// issuer == subject (self-signed, per AOSP ta/src/cert.rs:111-114)
|
||||
let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&version_der,
|
||||
&serial_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&subject_dn_der,
|
||||
&validity_der,
|
||||
&subject_dn_der,
|
||||
&spki_der,
|
||||
&extensions_tagged,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&tbs_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&signature_bit_string,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(vec![cert_der])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn build_certificate_chain(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
let leaf_der = build_leaf_cert(key_pair, attestation_ext_der, keybox, params)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut chain = Vec::with_capacity(1 + keybox.cert_chain_ders.len());
|
||||
chain.push(leaf_der);
|
||||
for cert_der in &keybox.cert_chain_ders {
|
||||
chain.push(cert_der.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(chain)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_leaf_cert(
|
||||
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
|
||||
attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
|
||||
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
|
||||
params: &CertGenParams,
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
|
||||
let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Serial number
|
||||
let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
|
||||
serial.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
vec![1u8]
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Subject DN
|
||||
let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
|
||||
subject.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Validity
|
||||
let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
|
||||
let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
|
||||
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(keybox.leaf_not_after)
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, ¶ms.purposes)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// TBS Certificate
|
||||
let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
|
||||
let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
|
||||
let validity_der = encode_validity(¬_before, ¬_after);
|
||||
let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
|
||||
|
||||
let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&version_der,
|
||||
&serial_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&keybox.issuer_dn_der, // RAW bytes — no re-encoding
|
||||
&validity_der,
|
||||
&subject_dn_der,
|
||||
&spki_der,
|
||||
&extensions_tagged,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign the TBS
|
||||
let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
|
||||
let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
// Final certificate: SEQUENCE { TBS, sigAlgorithm, signature }
|
||||
let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&tbs_der,
|
||||
&sig_alg_der,
|
||||
&signature_bit_string,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(cert_der)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn sign_tbs(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
match algorithm {
|
||||
Algorithm::Ec => sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
|
||||
Algorithm::Rsa => sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
// Determine EC curve from the signing key's PKCS8 AlgorithmIdentifier
|
||||
let alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let key_pair = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(alg, signing_key_der, &ring::rand::SystemRandom::new())
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
|
||||
let sig = key_pair.sign(&rng, tbs_der)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC sign: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(sig.as_ref().to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn detect_ec_signing_algorithm(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<&'static ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm> {
|
||||
use der::Decode;
|
||||
let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
|
||||
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
|
||||
let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
|
||||
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
if params_oid == p256_oid {
|
||||
Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING)
|
||||
} else if params_oid == p384_oid {
|
||||
Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve OID: {params_oid}")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
|
||||
use rsa::signature::{SignatureEncoding, SignerMut};
|
||||
use rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey;
|
||||
use rsa::sha2::Sha256;
|
||||
|
||||
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(signing_key_der)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut signing_key = SigningKey::<Sha256>::new(private_key);
|
||||
let signature = signing_key.sign(tbs_der);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(signature.to_vec())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
match algorithm {
|
||||
Algorithm::Ec => {
|
||||
let ring_alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
|
||||
// Determine OID from the algorithm used
|
||||
let oid = if std::ptr::eq(ring_alg, &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING) {
|
||||
OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA
|
||||
};
|
||||
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(oid);
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
Algorithm::Rsa => {
|
||||
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA);
|
||||
let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &null_der]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_spki_from_pkcs8(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
use der::Decode;
|
||||
|
||||
let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse for SPKI: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Reconstruct SPKI from AlgorithmIdentifier + public key
|
||||
// For EC: derive public key from private key via ring
|
||||
// For RSA: derive from rsa crate
|
||||
let alg_id_oid = info.algorithm.oid;
|
||||
let ec_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.2.1".parse()
|
||||
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
if alg_id_oid == ec_oid {
|
||||
extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der, &info)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8], info: &pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
use ring::signature::KeyPair as _;
|
||||
let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
|
||||
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
|
||||
let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
|
||||
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (ring_alg, curve_oid_der): (&ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm, Vec<u8>) = if params_oid == p256_oid {
|
||||
(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7]))
|
||||
} else if params_oid == p384_oid {
|
||||
(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 3, 132, 0, 34]))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve: {params_oid}")));
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let kp = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(
|
||||
ring_alg,
|
||||
pkcs8_der,
|
||||
&ring::rand::SystemRandom::new(),
|
||||
).map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
let ec_kp = kp.public_key().as_ref().to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
// SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (public key) }
|
||||
// AlgorithmIdentifier = SEQUENCE { ecPublicKey OID, curve OID }
|
||||
let ec_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1]);
|
||||
let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&ec_oid_der, &curve_oid_der]);
|
||||
let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&ec_kp);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
|
||||
|
||||
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(pkcs8_der)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let public_key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from(&private_key);
|
||||
|
||||
// Encode RSA public key as DER: SEQUENCE { n INTEGER, e INTEGER }
|
||||
use rsa::traits::PublicKeyParts;
|
||||
let n_bytes = public_key.n().to_bytes_be();
|
||||
let e_bytes = public_key.e().to_bytes_be();
|
||||
let rsa_pub_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
|
||||
&encode_der_integer(&n_bytes),
|
||||
&encode_der_integer(&e_bytes),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
// SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (DER-encoded RSAPublicKey) }
|
||||
let rsa_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1]);
|
||||
let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
|
||||
let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&rsa_oid_der, &null_der]);
|
||||
let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&rsa_pub_der);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>, purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
|
||||
|
||||
let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
|
||||
if ku_byte != 0 {
|
||||
let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
|
||||
extensions.push(ku_ext);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(attest_der) = attestation_ext_der {
|
||||
let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attest_der);
|
||||
extensions.push(attest_ext);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_extension(oid_der: &[u8], critical: bool, value_der: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(value_der);
|
||||
if critical {
|
||||
let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
|
||||
encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &value_octet_string])
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER BIT STRING: minimal encoding requires trimming trailing zero bits
|
||||
let unused_bits = ku_byte.trailing_zeros().min(7) as u8;
|
||||
|
||||
// BIT STRING = tag (0x03) + length(2) + unused_bits + byte
|
||||
let bit_string = vec![0x03, 0x02, unused_bits, ku_byte];
|
||||
|
||||
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_KEY_USAGE);
|
||||
let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(&bit_string);
|
||||
let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
|
||||
|
||||
encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// KeyUsage BIT STRING byte layout (RFC 5280):
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 7 = digitalSignature (0x80)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 6 = nonRepudiation (0x40)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 5 = keyEncipherment (0x20)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 4 = dataEncipherment (0x10)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 3 = keyAgreement (0x08)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 2 = keyCertSign (0x04)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 1 = cRLSign (0x02)
|
||||
// byte[0] bit 0 = encipherOnly (0x01)
|
||||
// byte[1] bit 7 = decipherOnly (0x80)
|
||||
fn map_key_usage_byte(purposes: &[i32]) -> u8 {
|
||||
let mut bits: u8 = 0;
|
||||
for &purpose in purposes {
|
||||
match purpose {
|
||||
2 => bits |= 0x80, // SIGN -> digitalSignature
|
||||
1 => bits |= 0x10, // DECRYPT -> dataEncipherment
|
||||
5 => bits |= 0x20, // WRAP_KEY -> keyEncipherment
|
||||
6 => bits |= 0x08, // AGREE_KEY -> keyAgreement
|
||||
7 => bits |= 0x04, // ATTEST_KEY -> keyCertSign
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
bits
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_validity(not_before: &OffsetDateTime, not_after: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let nb = encode_time(not_before);
|
||||
let na = encode_time(not_after);
|
||||
encode_der_sequence(&[&nb, &na])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_time(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let year = dt.year();
|
||||
if (1950..2050).contains(&year) {
|
||||
encode_utctime(dt)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_gentime(dt)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_utctime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
|
||||
let year = dt.year() % 100;
|
||||
let s = format!(
|
||||
"{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
|
||||
year, dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
|
||||
out.push(0x17); // UTCTime tag
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_gentime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
|
||||
let s = format!(
|
||||
"{:04}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
|
||||
dt.year(), dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
|
||||
out.push(0x18); // GeneralizedTime tag
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_simple_cn_dn(cn: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// Name = SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
|
||||
// RDN = SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
|
||||
// ATV = SEQUENCE { OID, UTF8String }
|
||||
let cn_oid = encode_der_oid(&[2, 5, 4, 3]);
|
||||
let cn_value = encode_der_utf8string(cn);
|
||||
let atv = encode_der_sequence(&[&cn_oid, &cn_value]);
|
||||
let rdn = encode_der_set(&[&atv]);
|
||||
encode_der_sequence(&[&rdn])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn timestamp_to_datetime(ts: i64) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
|
||||
if ts == -1 {
|
||||
return Ok(OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
|
||||
}
|
||||
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(ts / 1000)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("invalid timestamp {ts}: {e}")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// DER encoding primitives
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_length_bytes(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
if len < 0x80 {
|
||||
vec![len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFF {
|
||||
vec![0x81, len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFFFF {
|
||||
vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
|
||||
} else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
|
||||
vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
vec![0x84, (len >> 24) as u8, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_tag_length_value(tag: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 4 + content.len());
|
||||
out.push(tag);
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(content.len()));
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(content);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_sequence(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
|
||||
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
|
||||
for item in items {
|
||||
content.extend_from_slice(item);
|
||||
}
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_sequence_of(items: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
|
||||
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
|
||||
for item in items {
|
||||
content.extend_from_slice(item);
|
||||
}
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_set(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
|
||||
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
|
||||
for item in items {
|
||||
content.extend_from_slice(item);
|
||||
}
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x31, &content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_explicit_tag(tag_num: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0xA0 | tag_num, content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_integer(value: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// DER INTEGER must have minimal encoding and leading 0x00 if high bit set
|
||||
if value.is_empty() {
|
||||
return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &[0x00]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Strip leading zeros (but keep at least one byte)
|
||||
let mut start = 0;
|
||||
while start < value.len() - 1 && value[start] == 0 {
|
||||
start += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let trimmed = &value[start..];
|
||||
|
||||
// Add leading 0x00 if high bit is set (positive integer)
|
||||
if trimmed[0] & 0x80 != 0 {
|
||||
let mut padded = Vec::with_capacity(1 + trimmed.len());
|
||||
padded.push(0x00);
|
||||
padded.extend_from_slice(trimmed);
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &padded)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, trimmed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_bit_string(bits: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
// BIT STRING: tag 0x03, length, unused_bits (0), content
|
||||
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(1 + bits.len());
|
||||
content.push(0x00); // 0 unused bits
|
||||
content.extend_from_slice(bits);
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x03, &content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_octet_string(content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x04, content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_utf8string(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x0C, s.as_bytes())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_boolean(val: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x01, &[if val { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_der_oid(components: &[u64]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
if components.len() < 2 {
|
||||
return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &[]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut content = Vec::new();
|
||||
// First two components encoded as 40 * c[0] + c[1]
|
||||
content.push((components[0] * 40 + components[1]) as u8);
|
||||
|
||||
for &c in &components[2..] {
|
||||
encode_oid_subidentifier(&mut content, c);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &content)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn encode_oid_subidentifier(buf: &mut Vec<u8>, mut value: u64) {
|
||||
if value == 0 {
|
||||
buf.push(0);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Encode in base-128 with continuation bits
|
||||
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
|
||||
while value > 0 {
|
||||
bytes.push((value & 0x7F) as u8);
|
||||
value >>= 7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
bytes.reverse();
|
||||
|
||||
// Set high bit on all but the last byte
|
||||
for i in 0..bytes.len() - 1 {
|
||||
bytes[i] |= 0x80;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use std::fmt;
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum CertGenError {
|
||||
Jni(String),
|
||||
NullParam(&'static str),
|
||||
UnsupportedAlgorithm(i32),
|
||||
UnsupportedEcCurve(i32),
|
||||
KeyGenFailed(String),
|
||||
CertBuildFailed(String),
|
||||
KeyboxParseFailed(String),
|
||||
AttestationBuildFailed(String),
|
||||
DerError(der::Error),
|
||||
EmptyKeyboxChain,
|
||||
ChallengeTooLong(usize),
|
||||
InvalidParameter(String),
|
||||
SigningFailed(String),
|
||||
SerializationFailed(String),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl fmt::Display for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
Self::Jni(msg) => write!(f, "JNI error: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::NullParam(name) => write!(f, "null required parameter: {}", name),
|
||||
Self::UnsupportedAlgorithm(v) => write!(f, "unsupported algorithm: {}", v),
|
||||
Self::UnsupportedEcCurve(v) => write!(f, "unsupported EC curve: {}", v),
|
||||
Self::KeyGenFailed(msg) => write!(f, "key generation failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::CertBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "certificate build failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::KeyboxParseFailed(msg) => write!(f, "keybox parse failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::AttestationBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "attestation build failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::DerError(e) => write!(f, "DER error: {}", e),
|
||||
Self::EmptyKeyboxChain => write!(f, "keybox certificate chain is empty"),
|
||||
Self::ChallengeTooLong(len) => write!(f, "attestation challenge too long: {} bytes (max 128)", len),
|
||||
Self::InvalidParameter(msg) => write!(f, "invalid parameter: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::SigningFailed(msg) => write!(f, "signing failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
Self::SerializationFailed(msg) => write!(f, "serialization failed: {}", msg),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl std::error::Error for CertGenError {}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<jni::errors::Error> for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn from(e: jni::errors::Error) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::Jni(e.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<der::Error> for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn from(e: der::Error) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::DerError(e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<ring::error::Unspecified> for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn from(e: ring::error::Unspecified) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<ring::error::KeyRejected> for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn from(e: ring::error::KeyRejected) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<rsa::Error> for CertGenError {
|
||||
fn from(e: rsa::Error) -> Self {
|
||||
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, CertGenError>;
|
||||
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
|
||||
use der::{Decode, Encode};
|
||||
use x509_cert::Certificate;
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct ParsedKeybox {
|
||||
pub signing_key_der: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub issuer_dn_der: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub cert_chain_ders: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub leaf_not_after: i64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn parse_keybox(cert_chain_bytes: &[u8], private_key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<ParsedKeybox> {
|
||||
let certs = split_der_certificates(cert_chain_bytes)?;
|
||||
if certs.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates found".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let leaf = Certificate::from_der(&certs[0])
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("leaf cert parse: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let issuer_dn_der = leaf.tbs_certificate.subject.to_der()
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("subject DN encode: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let not_after = leaf.tbs_certificate.validity.not_after;
|
||||
let leaf_not_after = not_after.to_unix_duration().as_secs() as i64;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ParsedKeybox {
|
||||
signing_key_der: private_key_bytes.to_vec(),
|
||||
issuer_dn_der,
|
||||
cert_chain_ders: certs,
|
||||
leaf_not_after,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn split_der_certificates(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
let mut certs = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut offset = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
while offset < data.len() {
|
||||
if data[offset] != 0x30 {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
|
||||
format!("expected SEQUENCE tag 0x30 at offset {offset}, got 0x{:02x}", data[offset])
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let (content_len, header_len) = parse_der_length(&data[offset + 1..])?;
|
||||
let total_len = 1 + header_len + content_len;
|
||||
|
||||
if offset + total_len > data.len() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
|
||||
format!("cert at offset {offset} extends beyond buffer: need {total_len}, have {}", data.len() - offset)
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certs.push(data[offset..offset + total_len].to_vec());
|
||||
offset += total_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if certs.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates in chain".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(certs)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Returns (content_length, number_of_length_bytes_consumed)
|
||||
fn parse_der_length(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(usize, usize)> {
|
||||
if data.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated DER length".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let first = data[0];
|
||||
|
||||
if first < 0x80 {
|
||||
// Short form: length is the byte itself
|
||||
return Ok((first as usize, 1));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Long form: low 7 bits = number of subsequent length bytes
|
||||
let num_bytes = (first & 0x7f) as usize;
|
||||
if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
|
||||
format!("unsupported DER length encoding: 0x{first:02x}")
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if 1 + num_bytes > data.len() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated multi-byte DER length".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut len: usize = 0;
|
||||
for i in 0..num_bytes {
|
||||
len = (len << 8) | (data[1 + i] as usize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((len, 1 + num_bytes))
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
|
||||
use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve, GeneratedKeyPair};
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn generate_key_pair(
|
||||
algorithm: Algorithm,
|
||||
key_size: u32,
|
||||
ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
|
||||
rsa_public_exponent: u64,
|
||||
) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
|
||||
match algorithm {
|
||||
Algorithm::Ec => {
|
||||
let curve = ec_curve.ok_or_else(|| CertGenError::InvalidParameter("ec_curve required for EC".into()))?;
|
||||
generate_ec_key_pair(curve)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Algorithm::Rsa => generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size, rsa_public_exponent),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_ec_key_pair(curve: EcCurve) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
|
||||
let alg = match curve {
|
||||
EcCurve::P256 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING,
|
||||
EcCurve::P384 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING,
|
||||
_ => return Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(curve as i32)),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
|
||||
let pkcs8_doc = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::generate_pkcs8(alg, &rng)?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
|
||||
private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_doc.as_ref().to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size: u32, rsa_public_exponent: u64) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
|
||||
use pkcs8::EncodePrivateKey;
|
||||
|
||||
if !matches!(key_size, 2048 | 3072 | 4096) {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::InvalidParameter(
|
||||
format!("RSA key size must be 2048, 3072, or 4096; got {key_size}")
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let exp = if rsa_public_exponent == 0 {
|
||||
rsa::BigUint::from(65537u64)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
rsa::BigUint::from(rsa_public_exponent)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
|
||||
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::new_with_exp(&mut rng, key_size as usize, &exp)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let pkcs8_der = private_key.to_pkcs8_der()
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SerializationFailed(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
|
||||
private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_der.as_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#![deny(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
|
||||
|
||||
mod error;
|
||||
mod types;
|
||||
mod keygen;
|
||||
pub mod keybox;
|
||||
pub mod attestation;
|
||||
pub mod certbuilder;
|
||||
pub mod logging;
|
||||
|
||||
use jni::objects::{JByteArray, JClass, JIntArray, JObject, JString};
|
||||
use jni::sys::{jboolean, jbyteArray, jstring};
|
||||
use jni::JNIEnv;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
|
||||
use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, EcCurve};
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// JNI entry: generateAttestedKeyPair
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#[no_mangle]
|
||||
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_generateAttestedKeyPair(
|
||||
mut env: JNIEnv,
|
||||
_class: JClass,
|
||||
config: JObject,
|
||||
) -> jbyteArray {
|
||||
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
|
||||
generate_attested_inner(&mut env, &config)
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
|
||||
Ok(Err(e)) => {
|
||||
tracing::error!(%e, "generateAttestedKeyPair failed");
|
||||
let _ = env.throw_new(
|
||||
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
|
||||
format!("NativeCertGen: {e}"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
std::ptr::null_mut()
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
tracing::error!("generateAttestedKeyPair panicked");
|
||||
let _ = env.throw_new(
|
||||
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
|
||||
"NativeCertGen: internal panic",
|
||||
);
|
||||
std::ptr::null_mut()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteArray> {
|
||||
let params = extract_config(env, config)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let key_pair = keygen::generate_key_pair(
|
||||
params.algorithm,
|
||||
params.key_size,
|
||||
params.ec_curve,
|
||||
params.rsa_public_exponent,
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(¶ms.keybox_cert_chain, ¶ms.keybox_private_key)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let cert_chain = if params.attestation_challenge.is_some() {
|
||||
let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(¶ms)?;
|
||||
certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(&key_pair, Some(&attest_ext), &keybox, ¶ms)?
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
tracing::info!("no attestation challenge, generating self-signed cert (depth 1)");
|
||||
certbuilder::build_self_signed_cert(&key_pair, ¶ms)?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);
|
||||
|
||||
let out = env.byte_array_from_slice(&blob)?;
|
||||
Ok(out.into_raw())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// JNI entry: initLogging
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#[no_mangle]
|
||||
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_initLogging(
|
||||
mut env: JNIEnv,
|
||||
_class: JClass,
|
||||
verbose: jboolean,
|
||||
log_dir: JString,
|
||||
) -> jboolean {
|
||||
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
|
||||
init_logging_inner(&mut env, verbose, &log_dir)
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(Ok(())) => 1,
|
||||
Ok(Err(e)) => {
|
||||
let _ = env.throw_new(
|
||||
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
|
||||
format!("NativeCertGen initLogging: {e}"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
0
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
let _ = env.throw_new(
|
||||
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
|
||||
"NativeCertGen initLogging: internal panic",
|
||||
);
|
||||
0
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn init_logging_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, verbose: jboolean, log_dir: &JString) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let dir: String = env.get_string(log_dir)?.into();
|
||||
logging::init(verbose != 0, &dir, 2, 3)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("logging init failed: {e}")))?;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// JNI entry: dumpLogs
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#[no_mangle]
|
||||
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_dumpLogs(
|
||||
mut env: JNIEnv,
|
||||
_class: JClass,
|
||||
) -> jstring {
|
||||
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
|
||||
dump_logs_inner(&mut env)
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
|
||||
Ok(Err(e)) => {
|
||||
tracing::error!(%e, "dumpLogs failed");
|
||||
std::ptr::null_mut()
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
tracing::error!("dumpLogs panicked");
|
||||
std::ptr::null_mut()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn dump_logs_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv) -> Result<jstring> {
|
||||
logging::dump::execute_dump()
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("dump failed: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Read the dump path written by execute_dump
|
||||
let path = std::fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path")
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("read dump path: {e}")))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let jpath = env.new_string(&path)?;
|
||||
Ok(jpath.into_raw())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Config extraction from Java CertGenConfig object
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
fn extract_config(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<CertGenParams> {
|
||||
let algorithm = get_int(env, config, "algorithm")?;
|
||||
let key_size = get_int(env, config, "keySize")?;
|
||||
let ec_curve_raw = get_int(env, config, "ecCurve")?;
|
||||
let rsa_pub_exp = get_long(env, config, "rsaPublicExponent")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let cert_not_before = get_long(env, config, "certNotBefore")?;
|
||||
let cert_not_after = get_long(env, config, "certNotAfter")?;
|
||||
let security_level = get_int(env, config, "securityLevel")?;
|
||||
let attest_version = get_int(env, config, "attestVersion")?;
|
||||
let keymaster_version = get_int(env, config, "keymasterVersion")?;
|
||||
let os_version = get_int(env, config, "osVersion")?;
|
||||
let os_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "osPatchLevel")?;
|
||||
let vendor_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "vendorPatchLevel")?;
|
||||
let boot_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "bootPatchLevel")?;
|
||||
let creation_datetime = get_long(env, config, "creationDatetime")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let attestation_challenge = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "attestationChallenge")?;
|
||||
let purposes = get_int_array(env, config, "purposes")?;
|
||||
let digests = get_int_array(env, config, "digests")?;
|
||||
let cert_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSerial")?;
|
||||
let cert_subject = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSubject")?;
|
||||
let keybox_private_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxPrivateKey")?;
|
||||
let keybox_cert_chain = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxCertChain")?;
|
||||
let boot_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootKey")?;
|
||||
let boot_hash = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootHash")?;
|
||||
let attestation_app_id = get_byte_array(env, config, "attestationApplicationId")?;
|
||||
let module_hash = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "moduleHash")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let id_brand = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idBrand")?;
|
||||
let id_device = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idDevice")?;
|
||||
let id_product = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idProduct")?;
|
||||
let id_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSerial")?;
|
||||
let id_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idImei")?;
|
||||
let id_meid = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idMeid")?;
|
||||
let id_manufacturer = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idManufacturer")?;
|
||||
let id_model = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idModel")?;
|
||||
let id_second_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSecondImei")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let active_datetime = get_long(env, config, "activeDatetime")?;
|
||||
let origination_expire_datetime = get_long(env, config, "originationExpireDatetime")?;
|
||||
let usage_expire_datetime = get_long(env, config, "usageExpireDatetime")?;
|
||||
let usage_count_limit = get_int(env, config, "usageCountLimit")?;
|
||||
let caller_nonce = get_boolean(env, config, "callerNonce")?;
|
||||
let unlocked_device_required = get_boolean(env, config, "unlockedDeviceRequired")?;
|
||||
let no_auth_required = get_boolean(env, config, "noAuthRequired")?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(CertGenParams {
|
||||
algorithm: Algorithm::try_from(algorithm)?,
|
||||
key_size: key_size as u32,
|
||||
ec_curve: if algorithm == 3 {
|
||||
Some(EcCurve::try_from(ec_curve_raw)?)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
},
|
||||
rsa_public_exponent: rsa_pub_exp as u64,
|
||||
attestation_challenge,
|
||||
purposes,
|
||||
digests,
|
||||
cert_serial,
|
||||
cert_subject,
|
||||
cert_not_before,
|
||||
cert_not_after,
|
||||
keybox_private_key,
|
||||
keybox_cert_chain,
|
||||
security_level,
|
||||
attest_version,
|
||||
keymaster_version,
|
||||
os_version,
|
||||
os_patch_level,
|
||||
vendor_patch_level,
|
||||
boot_patch_level,
|
||||
boot_key,
|
||||
boot_hash,
|
||||
creation_datetime,
|
||||
attestation_application_id: attestation_app_id,
|
||||
module_hash,
|
||||
id_brand,
|
||||
id_device,
|
||||
id_product,
|
||||
id_serial,
|
||||
id_imei,
|
||||
id_meid,
|
||||
id_manufacturer,
|
||||
id_model,
|
||||
id_second_imei,
|
||||
active_datetime,
|
||||
origination_expire_datetime,
|
||||
usage_expire_datetime,
|
||||
usage_count_limit,
|
||||
caller_nonce,
|
||||
unlocked_device_required,
|
||||
no_auth_required,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// JNI field accessor helpers — called 35+ times, justifies the abstraction
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_int(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i32> {
|
||||
Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "I")?.i()?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_long(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i64> {
|
||||
Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "J")?.j()?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_boolean(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<bool> {
|
||||
Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "Z")?.z()?)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_byte_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &'static str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
|
||||
if field.is_null() {
|
||||
return Err(CertGenError::NullParam(name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
|
||||
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
|
||||
env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
|
||||
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
|
||||
Ok(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_nullable_byte_array(
|
||||
env: &mut JNIEnv,
|
||||
obj: &JObject,
|
||||
name: &str,
|
||||
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
|
||||
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
|
||||
if field.is_null() {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
|
||||
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
|
||||
env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
|
||||
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
|
||||
Ok(Some(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn get_int_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<Vec<i32>> {
|
||||
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[I")?.l()?;
|
||||
if field.is_null() {
|
||||
return Ok(vec![]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let arr: JIntArray = field.into();
|
||||
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0i32; len as usize];
|
||||
env.get_int_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
|
||||
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
|
||||
Ok(buf)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Binary result assembly (doc 09 section 4.1)
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
fn assemble_result(private_key: &[u8], cert_chain: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let total = 4 + private_key.len()
|
||||
+ 4
|
||||
+ cert_chain.iter().map(|c| 4 + c.len()).sum::<usize>();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(total);
|
||||
|
||||
// Private key segment
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(&(private_key.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(private_key);
|
||||
|
||||
// Cert count
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert_chain.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
|
||||
// Each cert: length-prefixed DER
|
||||
for cert in cert_chain {
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
buf.extend_from_slice(cert);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
buf
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use std::fs::{self, File};
|
||||
use std::io::{Read, Write};
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
use std::process::Command;
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
|
||||
const DUMP_DIR: &str = "/sdcard/Download";
|
||||
const LOCK_PATH: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_lock";
|
||||
const DUMP_PATH_FILE: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path";
|
||||
const LOG_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs";
|
||||
const BASE_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store";
|
||||
const LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
struct FlockGuard {
|
||||
_file: File,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl FlockGuard {
|
||||
fn acquire() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
if let Some(parent) = Path::new(LOCK_PATH).parent() {
|
||||
fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let file = File::create(LOCK_PATH)?;
|
||||
let fd = {
|
||||
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
|
||||
file.as_raw_fd()
|
||||
};
|
||||
let ret = unsafe { libc::flock(fd, libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) };
|
||||
if ret != 0 {
|
||||
return Err("dump already in progress".into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(Self { _file: file })
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Drop for FlockGuard {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
// flock released automatically when file descriptor closes
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn random_name(len: usize) -> String {
|
||||
use rand::Rng;
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
|
||||
(0..len)
|
||||
.map(|_| {
|
||||
let idx = rng.gen_range(0..36u8);
|
||||
if idx < 10 {
|
||||
(b'0' + idx) as char
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(b'a' + idx - 10) as char
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn collect_logcat(tag: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let output = Command::new("logcat")
|
||||
.args(["-d", "-s", tag])
|
||||
.output();
|
||||
|
||||
match output {
|
||||
Ok(o) => {
|
||||
let mut data = o.stdout;
|
||||
data.truncate(LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT);
|
||||
data
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn collect_device_info() -> String {
|
||||
let mut info = String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
if let Ok(output) = Command::new("uname").arg("-a").output() {
|
||||
info.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"uname={}\n",
|
||||
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (key, prop) in [
|
||||
("device", "ro.product.device"),
|
||||
("build", "ro.build.display.id"),
|
||||
("android", "ro.build.version.release"),
|
||||
] {
|
||||
if let Ok(output) = Command::new("getprop").arg(prop).output() {
|
||||
info.push_str(&format!(
|
||||
"{}={}\n",
|
||||
key,
|
||||
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
|
||||
));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// KSU version
|
||||
if let Ok(ver) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/ksu/version") {
|
||||
info.push_str(&format!("ksu={}\n", ver.trim()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Module version from module.prop
|
||||
if let Ok(prop) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/module.prop") {
|
||||
for line in prop.lines() {
|
||||
if let Some(ver) = line.strip_prefix("version=") {
|
||||
info.push_str(&format!("module={}\n", ver.trim()));
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
info
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn read_file_bytes(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
let mut buf = Vec::new();
|
||||
File::open(path).ok()?.read_to_end(&mut buf).ok()?;
|
||||
Some(buf)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn epoch_millis() -> u64 {
|
||||
SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn execute_dump() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
let _lock = FlockGuard::acquire()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(DUMP_DIR);
|
||||
let zip_name = format!("{}.zip", random_name(8));
|
||||
let zip_path = format!("{}/{}", DUMP_DIR, zip_name);
|
||||
|
||||
let zip_file = File::create(&zip_path)?;
|
||||
let mut zip = zip::ZipWriter::new(zip_file);
|
||||
let options =
|
||||
zip::write::SimpleFileOptions::default().compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut file_count = 0u32;
|
||||
|
||||
// Log files
|
||||
let log_files = [
|
||||
"certgen.log",
|
||||
"certgen.log.1",
|
||||
"certgen.log.2",
|
||||
"certgen.log.3",
|
||||
"certgen.log.4",
|
||||
];
|
||||
for name in &log_files {
|
||||
let path = format!("{}/{}", LOG_DIR, name);
|
||||
if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
|
||||
zip.start_file(*name, options)?;
|
||||
zip.write_all(&data)?;
|
||||
file_count += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Logcat
|
||||
let logcat = collect_logcat("TEESimulator");
|
||||
if !logcat.is_empty() {
|
||||
zip.start_file("logcat-teesimulator.log", options)?;
|
||||
zip.write_all(&logcat)?;
|
||||
file_count += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Config files
|
||||
for name in ["tee_status.txt", "security_patch.txt"] {
|
||||
let path = format!("{}/{}", BASE_DIR, name);
|
||||
if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
|
||||
zip.start_file(name, options)?;
|
||||
zip.write_all(&data)?;
|
||||
file_count += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Device info
|
||||
let device_info = collect_device_info();
|
||||
if !device_info.is_empty() {
|
||||
zip.start_file("device-info.txt", options)?;
|
||||
zip.write_all(device_info.as_bytes())?;
|
||||
file_count += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Manifest
|
||||
let manifest = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"timestamp": epoch_millis(),
|
||||
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
|
||||
"files": file_count,
|
||||
});
|
||||
zip.start_file("manifest.json", options)?;
|
||||
zip.write_all(manifest.to_string().as_bytes())?;
|
||||
|
||||
zip.finish()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let zip_size = fs::metadata(&zip_path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
fs::write(DUMP_PATH_FILE, &zip_path)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let result = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"zip": zip_path,
|
||||
"size": zip_size,
|
||||
"files": file_count + 1, // +1 for manifest
|
||||
});
|
||||
println!("{}", result);
|
||||
|
||||
tracing::info!(path = %zip_path, size = zip_size, "diagnostic dump created");
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
|
||||
use std::io::Write;
|
||||
use std::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
|
||||
use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
|
||||
use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
|
||||
use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
|
||||
|
||||
const KMSG_PATH: &str = "/dev/kmsg";
|
||||
const TAG: &str = "TEESimulator";
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct KmsgLayer {
|
||||
writer: Mutex<Option<File>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl KmsgLayer {
|
||||
pub fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
let file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(KMSG_PATH).ok();
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
writer: Mutex::new(file),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn syslog_priority(level: &Level) -> u8 {
|
||||
match *level {
|
||||
Level::ERROR => 3,
|
||||
Level::WARN => 4,
|
||||
Level::INFO => 6,
|
||||
Level::DEBUG | Level::TRACE => 7,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct MessageVisitor {
|
||||
message: String,
|
||||
fields: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl MessageVisitor {
|
||||
fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
message: String::new(),
|
||||
fields: String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Visit for MessageVisitor {
|
||||
fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
|
||||
if field.name() == "message" {
|
||||
let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
|
||||
// Strip surrounding debug quotes if present
|
||||
self.message = raw
|
||||
.strip_prefix('"')
|
||||
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
|
||||
.unwrap_or(&raw)
|
||||
.to_string();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if !self.fields.is_empty() {
|
||||
self.fields.push(' ');
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for KmsgLayer {
|
||||
fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
|
||||
let mut guard = match self.writer.lock() {
|
||||
Ok(g) => g,
|
||||
Err(_) => return,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let file = match guard.as_mut() {
|
||||
Some(f) => f,
|
||||
None => return,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let priority = syslog_priority(event.metadata().level());
|
||||
let mut visitor = MessageVisitor::new();
|
||||
event.record(&mut visitor);
|
||||
|
||||
let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
|
||||
format!("<{}>{}: {}\n", priority, TAG, visitor.message)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"<{}>{}: {} {}\n",
|
||||
priority, TAG, visitor.message, visitor.fields
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let _ = file.write_all(line.as_bytes());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
mod kmsg;
|
||||
mod rotating;
|
||||
pub mod sysfs;
|
||||
pub mod dump;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt, EnvFilter};
|
||||
|
||||
const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn init(
|
||||
verbose_flag: bool,
|
||||
log_dir: &str,
|
||||
max_size_mb: u64,
|
||||
max_files: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
let verbose = verbose_flag || Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists();
|
||||
|
||||
let (max_size, max_files) = if verbose {
|
||||
(5 * 1024 * 1024, 5)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(max_size_mb * 1024 * 1024, max_files)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let level = if verbose { "trace" } else { "info" };
|
||||
let filter = EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| EnvFilter::new(level));
|
||||
|
||||
let kmsg_layer = kmsg::KmsgLayer::new();
|
||||
let rotating_layer = rotating::RotatingFileLayer::new(log_dir, max_size, max_files);
|
||||
let stderr_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr);
|
||||
|
||||
// Idempotent — second call returns Ok instead of propagating SetGlobalDefaultError
|
||||
let _ = tracing_subscriber::registry()
|
||||
.with(filter)
|
||||
.with(kmsg_layer)
|
||||
.with(rotating_layer)
|
||||
.with(stderr_layer)
|
||||
.try_init();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
|
||||
use std::io::Write;
|
||||
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
|
||||
use std::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
|
||||
use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
|
||||
use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
|
||||
use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
|
||||
|
||||
struct RotatingState {
|
||||
dir: PathBuf,
|
||||
current: Option<File>,
|
||||
current_size: u64,
|
||||
max_size: u64,
|
||||
max_files: usize,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct RotatingFileLayer {
|
||||
state: Mutex<RotatingState>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl RotatingFileLayer {
|
||||
pub fn new(dir: &str, max_size: u64, max_files: usize) -> Self {
|
||||
let dir = PathBuf::from(dir);
|
||||
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(&dir);
|
||||
let (file, size) = open_current_log(&dir);
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
state: Mutex::new(RotatingState {
|
||||
dir,
|
||||
current: file,
|
||||
current_size: size,
|
||||
max_size,
|
||||
max_files,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn open_current_log(dir: &Path) -> (Option<File>, u64) {
|
||||
let path = dir.join("certgen.log");
|
||||
let size = fs::metadata(&path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
let file = OpenOptions::new()
|
||||
.create(true)
|
||||
.append(true)
|
||||
.open(&path)
|
||||
.ok();
|
||||
(file, size)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn rotate(state: &mut RotatingState) {
|
||||
// Close current handle before renaming
|
||||
state.current.take();
|
||||
|
||||
let dir = &state.dir;
|
||||
// Delete the oldest rotated file before shifting
|
||||
let oldest = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", state.max_files));
|
||||
if oldest.exists() {
|
||||
let _ = fs::remove_file(&oldest);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Shift older files up: .{N} -> .{N+1}
|
||||
for i in (1..state.max_files).rev() {
|
||||
let from = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i));
|
||||
let to = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i + 1));
|
||||
if from.exists() {
|
||||
let _ = fs::rename(&from, &to);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Current -> .1
|
||||
let current_path = dir.join("certgen.log");
|
||||
let first_rotated = dir.join("certgen.log.1");
|
||||
if current_path.exists() {
|
||||
let _ = fs::rename(¤t_path, &first_rotated);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let (file, size) = open_current_log(dir);
|
||||
state.current = file;
|
||||
state.current_size = size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn epoch_secs() -> u64 {
|
||||
SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn level_str(level: &Level) -> &'static str {
|
||||
match *level {
|
||||
Level::ERROR => "ERROR",
|
||||
Level::WARN => "WARN",
|
||||
Level::INFO => "INFO",
|
||||
Level::DEBUG => "DEBUG",
|
||||
Level::TRACE => "TRACE",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct LogVisitor {
|
||||
message: String,
|
||||
fields: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl LogVisitor {
|
||||
fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
message: String::new(),
|
||||
fields: String::new(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Visit for LogVisitor {
|
||||
fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
|
||||
if field.name() == "message" {
|
||||
let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
|
||||
self.message = raw
|
||||
.strip_prefix('"')
|
||||
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
|
||||
.unwrap_or(&raw)
|
||||
.to_string();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if !self.fields.is_empty() {
|
||||
self.fields.push(' ');
|
||||
}
|
||||
self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for RotatingFileLayer {
|
||||
fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
|
||||
let mut state = match self.state.lock() {
|
||||
Ok(s) => s,
|
||||
Err(_) => return,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if state.current_size >= state.max_size {
|
||||
rotate(&mut state);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let file = match state.current.as_mut() {
|
||||
Some(f) => f,
|
||||
None => return,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let ts = epoch_secs();
|
||||
let lvl = level_str(event.metadata().level());
|
||||
let target = event.metadata().target();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut visitor = LogVisitor::new();
|
||||
event.record(&mut visitor);
|
||||
|
||||
let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
|
||||
format!("{} [{}] {}: {}\n", ts, lvl, target, visitor.message)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"{} [{}] {}: {} {}\n",
|
||||
ts, lvl, target, visitor.message, visitor.fields
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if file.write_all(line.as_bytes()).is_ok() {
|
||||
state.current_size += line.len() as u64;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use std::fs;
|
||||
use std::path::Path;
|
||||
|
||||
const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn is_verbose() -> bool {
|
||||
Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn set_verbose_marker(enabled: bool) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
if enabled {
|
||||
if let Some(parent) = Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).parent() {
|
||||
fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
fs::write(VERBOSE_MARKER, "")?;
|
||||
} else if Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists() {
|
||||
fs::remove_file(VERBOSE_MARKER)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn enable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
set_verbose_marker(true)?;
|
||||
tracing::info!("verbose logging enabled via marker file");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn disable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
set_verbose_marker(false)?;
|
||||
tracing::info!("verbose logging disabled, marker file removed");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn status() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
|
||||
let state = if is_verbose() { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
|
||||
tracing::info!(verbose = state, "verbose marker status");
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
|
||||
use crate::error::CertGenError;
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
#[repr(i32)]
|
||||
pub enum Algorithm {
|
||||
Rsa = 1,
|
||||
Ec = 3,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<i32> for Algorithm {
|
||||
type Error = CertGenError;
|
||||
fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
match value {
|
||||
1 => Ok(Self::Rsa),
|
||||
3 => Ok(Self::Ec),
|
||||
_ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(value)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
|
||||
#[repr(i32)]
|
||||
pub enum EcCurve {
|
||||
P224 = 0,
|
||||
P256 = 1,
|
||||
P384 = 2,
|
||||
P521 = 3,
|
||||
Curve25519 = 4,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TryFrom<i32> for EcCurve {
|
||||
type Error = CertGenError;
|
||||
fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
match value {
|
||||
0 => Ok(Self::P224),
|
||||
1 => Ok(Self::P256),
|
||||
2 => Ok(Self::P384),
|
||||
3 => Ok(Self::P521),
|
||||
4 => Ok(Self::Curve25519),
|
||||
_ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(value)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct CertGenParams {
|
||||
pub algorithm: Algorithm,
|
||||
pub key_size: u32,
|
||||
pub ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
|
||||
pub rsa_public_exponent: u64,
|
||||
|
||||
pub attestation_challenge: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub purposes: Vec<i32>,
|
||||
pub digests: Vec<i32>,
|
||||
|
||||
pub cert_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub cert_subject: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub cert_not_before: i64,
|
||||
pub cert_not_after: i64,
|
||||
|
||||
pub keybox_private_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub keybox_cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
|
||||
pub security_level: i32,
|
||||
pub attest_version: i32,
|
||||
pub keymaster_version: i32,
|
||||
|
||||
pub os_version: i32,
|
||||
pub os_patch_level: i32,
|
||||
pub vendor_patch_level: i32,
|
||||
pub boot_patch_level: i32,
|
||||
|
||||
pub boot_key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub boot_hash: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
|
||||
pub creation_datetime: i64,
|
||||
pub attestation_application_id: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
pub module_hash: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
|
||||
pub id_brand: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_device: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_product: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_meid: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_manufacturer: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_model: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
pub id_second_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
|
||||
|
||||
pub active_datetime: i64,
|
||||
pub origination_expire_datetime: i64,
|
||||
pub usage_expire_datetime: i64,
|
||||
pub usage_count_limit: i32,
|
||||
pub caller_nonce: bool,
|
||||
pub unlocked_device_required: bool,
|
||||
pub no_auth_required: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct GeneratedKeyPair {
|
||||
pub private_key_pkcs8: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Build, package, deploy, and verify TEESimulator module ZIPs.
|
||||
# Usage: ./scripts/package.sh [flags]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Examples:
|
||||
# ./scripts/package.sh --release # build release ZIP
|
||||
# ./scripts/package.sh --all --clean # clean build, both variants
|
||||
# ./scripts/package.sh --release --deploy --reboot # build, push, install, reboot
|
||||
# ./scripts/package.sh --deploy --verify # deploy latest ZIP + verify via logcat
|
||||
# ./scripts/package.sh --rust --release # build Rust crate first, then release
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# Gradle's buildRustCertgen resolves `cargo` against the daemon's inherited PATH,
|
||||
# not the env we inject via gradle's Exec.environment(). Prepend the per-user
|
||||
# rustup install so non-login shells (CI, IDE-launched terminals, fresh tmux)
|
||||
# still find it without sourcing /etc/profile.d/cargo-path.sh.
|
||||
[ -d "$HOME/.cargo/bin" ] && PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
|
||||
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
|
||||
OUT_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/out"
|
||||
|
||||
VARIANT=""
|
||||
CLEAN=false
|
||||
DEPLOY=false
|
||||
REBOOT=false
|
||||
VERIFY=false
|
||||
BUILD_RUST=false
|
||||
CLEAR_KEYS=false
|
||||
TRACE=false
|
||||
ROOT_PROVIDER="ksu"
|
||||
|
||||
red() { printf '\033[0;31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
|
||||
green() { printf '\033[0;32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
|
||||
yellow() { printf '\033[0;33m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
|
||||
bold() { printf '\033[1m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
|
||||
|
||||
usage() {
|
||||
cat <<EOF
|
||||
Usage: $(basename "$0") [options]
|
||||
|
||||
Build variants (pick one, or --all):
|
||||
--release Build release variant (default if none specified)
|
||||
--debug Build debug variant
|
||||
--all Build both debug and release
|
||||
|
||||
Build options:
|
||||
--clean Run gradle clean before building
|
||||
--rust Build native-certgen Rust crate before Gradle
|
||||
|
||||
Deploy options:
|
||||
--deploy Push ZIP to device and install
|
||||
--reboot Reboot device after install
|
||||
--clear-keys Clear persistent_keys before deploy
|
||||
--verify Run logcat verification after deploy
|
||||
--root PROVIDER Root provider: ksu (default), magisk, apatch
|
||||
|
||||
Misc:
|
||||
-v, --verbose Print every command as it runs (set -x)
|
||||
--help Show this help
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
case "$1" in
|
||||
--release) VARIANT="release"; shift ;;
|
||||
--debug) VARIANT="debug"; shift ;;
|
||||
--all) VARIANT="all"; shift ;;
|
||||
--clean) CLEAN=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--deploy) DEPLOY=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--reboot) REBOOT=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--verify) VERIFY=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--rust) BUILD_RUST=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--clear-keys) CLEAR_KEYS=true; shift ;;
|
||||
-v|--verbose) TRACE=true; shift ;;
|
||||
--root) ROOT_PROVIDER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--help|-h) usage ;;
|
||||
*) red "Unknown flag: $1"; usage ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
[[ -z "$VARIANT" ]] && VARIANT="release"
|
||||
[[ "$TRACE" == true ]] && set -x
|
||||
|
||||
case "$ROOT_PROVIDER" in
|
||||
ksu) INSTALL_CMD="ksud module install" ;;
|
||||
magisk) INSTALL_CMD="magisk --install-module" ;;
|
||||
apatch) INSTALL_CMD="/data/adb/apd module install" ;;
|
||||
*) red "Unknown root provider: $ROOT_PROVIDER"; exit 1 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
build_rust() {
|
||||
local cargo_toml="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/Cargo.toml"
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "$cargo_toml" ]]; then
|
||||
red "native-certgen/Cargo.toml not found — skipping Rust build"
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
bold "==> Building native-certgen (aarch64)"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! command -v cargo-ndk &>/dev/null; then
|
||||
red "cargo-ndk not found. Install: cargo install cargo-ndk"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
(cd "$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen" && \
|
||||
cargo ndk -t arm64-v8a --platform 29 -- build --release)
|
||||
|
||||
local so="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/target/aarch64-linux-android/release/libcertgen.so"
|
||||
if [[ -f "$so" ]]; then
|
||||
local size
|
||||
size=$(du -h "$so" | cut -f1)
|
||||
green " libcertgen.so built ($size)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
red " libcertgen.so not found after build"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gradle_build() {
|
||||
local tasks=()
|
||||
|
||||
[[ "$CLEAN" == true ]] && tasks+=(clean)
|
||||
|
||||
case "$VARIANT" in
|
||||
release) tasks+=(zipRelease) ;;
|
||||
debug) tasks+=(zipDebug) ;;
|
||||
all) tasks+=(zipDebug zipRelease) ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
bold "==> Gradle: ${tasks[*]}"
|
||||
(cd "$PROJECT_ROOT" && ./gradlew "${tasks[@]}")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
find_latest_zip() {
|
||||
local pattern="$1"
|
||||
ls -t "$OUT_DIR"/$pattern 2>/dev/null | head -1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
deploy_zip() {
|
||||
local zip="$1"
|
||||
local name
|
||||
name=$(basename "$zip")
|
||||
|
||||
if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
|
||||
red "No ADB device connected"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$CLEAR_KEYS" == true ]]; then
|
||||
bold "==> Clearing persistent_keys"
|
||||
adb shell "rm -rf /data/adb/tricky_store/persistent_keys/*" 2>/dev/null || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
bold "==> Deploying $name"
|
||||
adb push "$zip" /data/local/tmp/module.zip
|
||||
adb shell "su -c '$INSTALL_CMD /data/local/tmp/module.zip'"
|
||||
green " Installed via $ROOT_PROVIDER"
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$REBOOT" == true ]]; then
|
||||
bold "==> Rebooting"
|
||||
adb reboot
|
||||
echo " Waiting for device..."
|
||||
adb wait-for-device
|
||||
sleep 10
|
||||
local pid
|
||||
pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
|
||||
green " Daemon alive (PID $pid)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
yellow " Daemon not yet started — check logcat"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
fi
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
verify_device() {
|
||||
bold "==> Verification"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
|
||||
red "No ADB device connected"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
local pid
|
||||
pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
|
||||
if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
|
||||
green " Daemon: running (PID $pid)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
red " Daemon: not running"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
local tee_status
|
||||
tee_status=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/tee_status.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
|
||||
echo " TEE status: $tee_status"
|
||||
|
||||
local sec_patch
|
||||
sec_patch=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
|
||||
echo " Security patch config: $(echo "$sec_patch" | head -1)"
|
||||
|
||||
local errors
|
||||
errors=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
|
||||
grep -iE "error|exception" | \
|
||||
grep -v "StrongBox\|SurfaceRuntime\|ClassLoader\|HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE" | \
|
||||
wc -l)
|
||||
if [[ "$errors" -eq 0 ]]; then
|
||||
green " Logcat errors: 0"
|
||||
else
|
||||
yellow " Logcat errors: $errors (run: adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator | grep -iE 'error|exception')"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
local throttle_events
|
||||
throttle_events=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
|
||||
grep -cE "RATE_LIMITED|CONCURRENT_LIMITED" || true)
|
||||
echo " Rate limit events: $throttle_events"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
print_summary() {
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
bold "==> Build Summary"
|
||||
|
||||
local variants=()
|
||||
case "$VARIANT" in
|
||||
release) variants=(Release) ;;
|
||||
debug) variants=(Debug) ;;
|
||||
all) variants=(Debug Release) ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
for v in "${variants[@]}"; do
|
||||
local zip
|
||||
zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${v}.zip")
|
||||
if [[ -n "$zip" ]]; then
|
||||
local size
|
||||
size=$(du -h "$zip" | cut -f1)
|
||||
green " $v: $(basename "$zip") ($size)"
|
||||
else
|
||||
red " $v: ZIP not found"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Main ---
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
bold "TEESimulator-RS package pipeline"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
[[ "$BUILD_RUST" == true ]] && build_rust
|
||||
|
||||
gradle_build
|
||||
print_summary
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$DEPLOY" == true ]]; then
|
||||
local_variant="$VARIANT"
|
||||
[[ "$local_variant" == "all" ]] && local_variant="release"
|
||||
|
||||
cap="${local_variant^}"
|
||||
zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${cap}.zip")
|
||||
if [[ -z "$zip" ]]; then
|
||||
red "No $cap ZIP found to deploy"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
deploy_zip "$zip"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
[[ "$VERIFY" == true ]] && verify_device
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
green "Done."
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dependencyResolutionManagement {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rootProject.name = "TEESimulator-RS"
|
||||
rootProject.name = "TEESimulator"
|
||||
|
||||
include(":stub")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ public interface IPackageManager {
|
||||
|
||||
ParceledListSlice<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(long flags, int userId);
|
||||
|
||||
int checkPermission(String permName, String pkgName, int userId);
|
||||
|
||||
class Stub {
|
||||
public static IPackageManager asInterface(IBinder binder) {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package android.os;
|
||||
|
||||
public class SELinux {
|
||||
public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
|
||||
String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ public class ServiceManager {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public static boolean isDeclared(String name) {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public static String[] listServices() {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package android.os;
|
||||
|
||||
public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
|
||||
public final int errorCode;
|
||||
|
||||
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
|
||||
this.errorCode = errorCode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
|
||||
super(message);
|
||||
this.errorCode = errorCode;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package android.security.maintenance;
|
||||
|
||||
import android.os.IBinder;
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Compile-time stub for the hidden keystore2 maintenance binder
|
||||
* ({@code android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance}).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* <p>This module is a {@code compileOnly} dependency, so the real framework class
|
||||
* (which carries the actual {@code TRANSACTION_*} codes) is loaded at runtime. We
|
||||
* only need the {@link #DESCRIPTOR} token to parse the transaction parcel and the
|
||||
* inner {@code Stub} class so {@code getTransactCode} can reflect the real codes.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
public interface IKeystoreMaintenance {
|
||||
String DESCRIPTOR = "android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance";
|
||||
|
||||
class Stub {
|
||||
public static IKeystoreMaintenance asInterface(IBinder b) {
|
||||
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user