chore(release): v6.0.1-307

The 2026-07-08 public-release history scrub (0f1143a) rewrote history
and dropped `git rev-list --count` below the build number already
shipped to testers (298), so post-scrub builds (291, 294) read as
downgrades. Add a floor offset so versionCode clears 298 and stays
monotonic across the rewrite: the current count maps to 300, and each
later commit still increments by one.

.gitattributes

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-# Ensure shell scripts always have LF line endings, even on Windows.
-# These get packaged into flashable zips and run on Android devices.
-*.sh text eol=lf
-module/daemon text eol=lf

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -149,3 +149,21 @@ jobs:
         env:
           VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+
+      - name: Bump update.json
+        run: |
+          COUNT=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
+          RELEASE_NAME=$(basename zips/*Release*.zip)
+          ZIP_URL="https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/download/${VER}/${RELEASE_NAME}"
+          jq ".versionCode = $COUNT | .zipUrl = \"$ZIP_URL\"" module/update.json > /tmp/update.json
+          mv /tmp/update.json module/update.json
+          git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+          git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
+          git add module/update.json
+          git diff --cached --quiet || {
+            git commit -m "chore(release): bump update.json to $VER [skip ci]"
+            git push origin HEAD:main
+          }
+        env:
+          VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

.gitignore

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-out
-.gradle
-.kotlin
-app/build
-build
-native-certgen/target
-app/src/main/jniLibs

README.md

@@ -1,259 +1,160 @@
 <p align="center">
-  <h1 align="center">🔐 TEESimulator</h1>
-  <p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
-  <p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
+  <h1 align="center">TEESimulator-RS</h1>
+  <p align="center"><b>Pass hardware security checks on a rooted Android phone</b></p>
   <p align="center">
-    <a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
+    <a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
+    <a href="https://t.me/superpowers9"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?logo=telegram" alt="Telegram"></a>
   </p>
 </p>
 
 ---
 
 > [!NOTE]
-> **This is a personal fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** with additional hardening, native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and anti-detection features. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
+> This is a fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator). It adds certificate generation written in Rust, generated keys that survive reboots, and attestation behavior that matches stock Android. See the upstream repo for the original project.
 
----
+## What it does
 
-## 🧬 What is TEESimulator?
+Some Android apps refuse to run on a rooted phone. They ask the phone to prove it still has a genuine security chip, a check called hardware attestation. A rooted phone normally fails that check.
 
-TEESimulator is a **complete software simulation** of Android's hardware-backed [Trusted Execution Environment](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation). Instead of patching certificates from the real TEE after the fact, TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level and generates entire certificate chains from scratch — signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions, indistinguishable from hardware-generated keys.
+TEESimulator makes it pass. Android runs a system process named `keystore2` that answers these proof requests. TEESimulator sits in front of `keystore2`, watches for the requests apps make to create keys and read their certificates, and builds the proof itself: a full chain of certificates signed by your `keybox.xml`. To the app, the phone looks genuine.
 
-The result: **apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate, unmodified device** — even on rooted hardware with an unlocked bootloader.
+It replaces TrickyStore and its forks completely. It reads config from the same files, so you can switch without moving anything, but the internals are rewritten: certificates are generated in Rust, keys are saved across reboots, and each app gets its own limit on how fast it can request hardware-backed keys.
 
-> **This is not TrickyStore.** TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the architecture is fundamentally different: native Rust certificate generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and a multi-layer defense against detector apps.
-
----
-
-## 🔥 Why TEESimulator?
-
-🔐 **Native Cert Generation** — v4.0 generates X.509 certificate chains in Rust with `ring` and manual DER encoding. No BouncyCastle overhead, no Java crypto quirks, byte-perfect issuer chain linkage.
-
-🎯 **Binder-Level Interception** — Hooks `ioctl()` on `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside the `keystore2` process. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions before the HAL ever sees them.
-
-🛡️ **Detector Resistant** — Per-UID rate limiting blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding. Oversized challenges rejected with real KeyMint error codes. Chain consistency verified byte-for-byte.
-
-💾 **Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. Apps that store attestation keys (banking, biometrics) don't break after a restart.
-
-🔧 **Drop-In Replacement** — Same config paths as TrickyStore (`/data/adb/tricky_store/`). Swap the module ZIP, keep your keybox and target list.
-
----
-
-## ✨ Features
-
-**Core Attestation Engine**
-- [x] **Full certificate chain generation** — leaf + intermediates + root, signed by your keybox
-- [x] **Native Rust certgen** — `libcertgen.so` built with `ring`, `rsa`, and manual DER assembly
-- [x] **BouncyCastle fallback** — unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519) fall back to Java
-- [x] **ASN.1 attestation extensions** — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 with all AOSP-specified tags
-- [x] **Multi-keybox support** — different keybox files per app group via `target.txt`
-
-**Interception Layer**
-- [x] **Binder ioctl hook** — `lsplt` PLT hook on `libc.so` inside `keystore2` process
-- [x] **generateKey / importKey / getKeyEntry** — all three transaction types intercepted
-- [x] **256KB native payload cap** — oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly
-- [x] **Challenge validation** — rejects >128-byte attestation challenges with `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH`
-
-**Hardening**
-- [x] **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst window, software fallback on overflow
-- [x] **importKey eviction guard** — retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import cache attacks
-- [x] **Key persistence** — file-backed storage with file-level locking, survives reboots and keybox rotations
-- [x] **Global exception handler** — uncaught exceptions logged, daemon stays alive
-
-**Configuration**
-- [x] **Live config reload** — `FileObserver` watches all config files, changes apply immediately
-- [x] **Security patch spoofing** — per-package `system`, `vendor`, `boot` patch levels with dynamic templates
-- [x] **Lifecycle scripts** — KSU Action button clears key cache, uninstall removes all traces
-
----
-
-## 📋 Requirements
+## Requirements
 
 > [!IMPORTANT]
-> TEESimulator requires root access and a valid `keybox.xml` for hardware-level attestation results. Without a keybox, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware attestation checks.
+> You need a valid `keybox.xml`. This is the file used to sign the proof. Without it, TEESimulator can only produce software-only certificates, which strict apps reject.
 
-**You need:**
-1. Android 10 or above
-2. A supported root manager (KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch)
-3. A hardware-backed `keybox.xml` placed at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
+1. Android 10 or newer
+2. A root manager: KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch
+3. A `keybox.xml` file at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
 
----
+## Quick start
 
-## 📱 Compatibility
+1. Download the latest ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases).
+2. Install it with your root manager, then reboot.
+3. Put your `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`.
+4. List the apps you want to cover in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`.
+5. Check that it works with Play Integrity or the Key Attestation Demo app.
 
-### Root Managers
+## How it works
 
-| Manager | Status | Notes |
-|---|---|---|
-| KernelSU | ✅ Tested | Full support including Action button and lifecycle scripts |
-| Magisk | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
-| APatch | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
-
-### Tested Devices
-
-| Device | Android | TEE | Status |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| Redmi 14C (2409BRN2CA) | 14 (SDK 34) | Beanpod KeyMaster | ✅ Daily driver |
-
-> Tested against DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, and Key Attestation Demo. If you test on a different device, [open an issue](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/issues) with your results.
-
----
-
-## 🚀 Quick Start
-
-1. **Download** the latest release ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases)
-2. **Install** via your root manager (KSU / Magisk / APatch) and reboot
-3. **Place your keybox** at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
-4. **Configure targets** in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
-5. **Verify** — check Play Integrity or run Key Attestation Demo
-
-TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing config files are compatible.
-
----
-
-## 🔨 Building from Source
-
-The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
-
-**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
-cd TEESimulator
-./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
+```
+   App
+    |  asks the phone to prove it has real security hardware
+    v
++----------------------------------------------------+
+| keystore2  (the Android process that answers)      |
+|                                                    |
+|   ioctl  <- TEESimulator hooks the call here       |
+|     |                                              |
+|     v                                              |
+|   builds a certificate chain and signs it          |
+|   with your keybox.xml                             |
++----------------------------------------------------+
+    |  the signed chain goes back to the app
+    v
+   App  ->  sees a genuine, hardware-backed device
 ```
 
-Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
+**Certificate generation in Rust.** A native library, `libcertgen.so`, builds the X.509 certificate chains in Rust with the `ring` crypto library, encoding the bytes by hand in DER, the standard certificate format. Three key types fall outside `ring`'s support (the P-224, P-521, and Curve25519 curves); for those it falls back to Java's BouncyCastle.
 
-To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
+**Hooking keystore2.** Inside the `keystore2` process, TEESimulator redirects `ioctl`, the low-level system call Android uses to pass messages between processes. It does this with `lsplt`, a hooking library. From there it can read and answer three kinds of request: creating a key, importing a key, and fetching a key's certificate.
 
----
+**Matching stock Android.** The output matches what a real device produces. Keys that are not attested get self-signed certificates. The fields inside the attestation record keep the same order. Fields that only exist on certain Android versions appear only on those versions. The same usage checks run before a key is used.
 
-## ⚙️ Configuration
+**Keys that survive reboots.** Generated keys are written to disk and stay valid after a restart. File locking stops two writers from corrupting the store.
 
-All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
-
-### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
-
-This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key and a hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. TEESimulator signs all generated certificates with this key, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<AndroidAttestation>
-    <Keybox DeviceID="...">
-        <Key algorithm="ecdsa|rsa">
-            <PrivateKey format="pem">...</PrivateKey>
-            <CertificateChain>...</CertificateChain>
-        </Key>
-    </Keybox>
-</AndroidAttestation>
-```
+**Per-app rate limit.** Each app may request at most 2 hardware-backed keys per 30 seconds, and only 2 at a time. Past that, it receives a software-only certificate.
 
-### Target Packages (`target.txt`)
+## Configuration
 
-Controls which apps get intercepted and what simulation mode to use.
+All config files live in `/data/adb/tricky_store/`. TEESimulator reloads them the moment you save, so a reboot is not needed.
 
-#### Mode Suffixes
+### target.txt
 
-*   **`!` → Force Generation** — Creates a complete software-based virtual key. Full TEE simulation.
-*   **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking** — Real TEE key generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and patched.
-*   **No symbol → Automatic** — Module selects the best mode for your device.
+Lists the apps TEESimulator handles, one package name per line. A suffix sets how each app is handled.
 
-#### Multi-Keybox
+| Suffix | What it does |
+|--------|--------------|
+| `!` | Always make a software key |
+| `?` | Keep the real hardware key, patch only its certificate |
+| none | Decide automatically |
 
-Specify different keybox files for different app groups. Apps listed after a `[filename.xml]` line use that keybox. Apps before any declaration use the default `keybox.xml`.
+To use more than one keybox, add a `[filename.xml]` header above the apps that should use that file:
 
 ```
-# Default keybox
 com.google.android.gms!
 io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?
 
-# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps
 [aosp_keybox.xml]
 com.google.android.gsf
-
-# Another keybox
-[demo_keybox.xml]
-org.matrix.demo
 ```
 
-### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)
+### security_patch.txt
 
-Configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` reported in attestation certificates. This only affects attestation data — it does not change actual system properties.
+Sets the security patch dates reported in the attestation certificates. Global defaults go at the top. Override them for one app with a `[package.name]` header.
 
-#### Global and Per-Package
-
-Settings at the top of the file are global defaults. Add `[package.name]` to override for specific apps.
-
-#### Keys
-
-| Key | Scope |
-|---|---|
+| Key | What it sets |
+|-----|--------------|
 | `system` | OS patch level |
 | `vendor` | Vendor patch level |
-| `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
-| `all` | Shorthand — sets all three at once |
+| `boot` | Boot and kernel patch level |
+| `all` | All three at once |
 
-#### Special Keywords
-
-| Keyword | Effect |
-|---|---|
-| `today` | Current date, dynamically resolved on each attestation |
-| `YYYY-MM-DD` templates | Semi-dynamic — `YYYY-MM-05` resolves to the 5th of the current month |
-| `no` | Omit this patch level tag entirely from the attestation |
-| `device_default` | Use the device's real hardware value |
-| `prop` | Read from `ro.build.version.security_patch` (matches what detectors see via getprop) |
-
-#### Example
+Accepted values: `today`, a `YYYY-MM-DD` template, `no` to omit the field, `device_default`, or `prop` to read the value from a system property.
 
 ```
-# Global — default for all apps
 system=YYYY-MM-05
 vendor=device_default
 boot=no
 
-# Override for GMS
 [com.google.android.gms]
-system=2024-10-01
-
-# Custom config for a demo app
-[org.matrix.demo]
-all=2025-09-15
-boot=device_default
+system=2025-10-01
 ```
 
----
+### boot_props_mode
 
-## 💬 Community
+Controls global `ro.boot.*` property spoofing. Values: `auto` (default), `force`, or `disable`.
+
+In `auto`, Oplus-family devices (OnePlus/OPPO/realme/Oplus) skip boot-state prop spoofing to avoid conflicts with vendor TEE services such as ultrasonic fingerprint calibration. Create `/data/adb/tricky_store/boot_props_mode` with `force` to restore the old behavior, or `disable` to turn it off on any device.
+
+## Building from source
+
+You need JDK 21, the Android SDK and NDK 29, Rust (stable) with the `aarch64-linux-android` target, and `cargo-ndk`.
+
+```bash
+git clone --recursive https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS.git
+cd TEESimulator-RS
+./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
+```
+
+The ZIPs land in `out/`. Gradle runs `cargo ndk` for you to cross-compile `libcertgen.so`. To build on CI instead, push to `main` or run Actions > Build > Run workflow.
+
+## Compatibility
+
+| Root manager | Status |
+|---|---|
+| KernelSU | Tested, including the Action button and lifecycle scripts |
+| Magisk | Supported |
+| APatch | Supported |
+
+## Community
 
 <p align="center">
   <a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/⚡_JOIN_THE_GRID-SuperPowers_Telegram-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=cyan&labelColor=0d1117&color=00d4ff" alt="Telegram">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/SuperPowers_Telegram-Join-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
   </a>
 </p>
 
----
+## Credits
 
-## 🙏 Credits
+- [JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator) for the original TEESimulator and its interception design
+- [ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring) for the Rust cryptography
+- [fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524) for contributions and collaboration
+- [huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares) for collaboration and testing
 
-- **[JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** — original author of TEESimulator and the interception architecture
-- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
-- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
-- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
-- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
-- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
-- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester
+## License
 
----
-
-## 📄 License
-
-This project is licensed under the [GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
-
----
-
-<p align="center">
-  <b>🔐 Because the best attestation is the one the TEE never generated.</b>
-</p>
+[GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE)

app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import com.android.build.api.artifact.SingleArtifact
 import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
 import javax.inject.Inject
 import org.gradle.process.ExecOperations
+import org.jetbrains.kotlin.gradle.dsl.JvmTarget
 
 plugins {
     alias(libs.plugins.android.application)
@@ -27,9 +28,16 @@ abstract class GitExecutor @Inject constructor(private val execOperations: ExecO
 // Instantiate the helper class using Gradle's object factory
 val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
 
-val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
+// versionCode = git commit count + floor offset. The 2026-07-08 public-release
+// history scrub (0f1143a) rewrote history and dropped the raw commit count below
+// the build number already shipped to testers (298), so post-scrub counts read as
+// downgrades. The floor offset lifts versionCode back above that peak and keeps it
+// monotonic across the rewrite; each later commit still bumps it by one.
+val versionCodeFloorOffset = 5
+val gitCommitCount =
+    gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt() + versionCodeFloorOffset
 val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
-val verName = "v5.1.1"
+val verName = "v6.0.1"
 
 android {
     namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
@@ -65,6 +73,8 @@ android {
     }
 }
 
+kotlin { compilerOptions { jvmTarget.set(JvmTarget.JVM_21) } }
+
 dependencies {
     compileOnly(project(":stub"))
     compileOnly(libs.annotation)
@@ -72,26 +82,35 @@ dependencies {
 }
 
 // --- Rust native cert gen build task ---
-val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
-    group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
-    description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
+val buildRustCertgen by
+    tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
+        group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
+        description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
 
-    workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
+        workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
 
-    commandLine(
-        "cargo", "ndk",
-        "-t", "arm64-v8a",
-        "-o", rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs").absolutePath,
-        "build", "--release"
-    )
+        commandLine(
+            "cargo",
+            "ndk",
+            "-t",
+            "arm64-v8a",
+            "-o",
+            rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs").absolutePath,
+            "build",
+            "--release",
+        )
 
-    inputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/src"))
-    inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.toml"))
-    inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.lock"))
-    outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))
+        inputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/src"))
+        inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.toml"))
+        inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.lock"))
+        outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))
 
-    environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
-}
+        environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
+        environment(
+            "PATH",
+            "${System.getProperty("user.home")}/.cargo/bin:${System.getenv("PATH") ?: ""}",
+        )
+    }
 
 // AGP auto-detects jniLibs/ as an input to mergeJniLibFolders — wire the dependency
 tasks.configureEach {
@@ -100,6 +119,35 @@ tasks.configureEach {
     }
 }
 
+// Auto-rewrite module/update.json on every packaging build so versionCode and
+// zipUrl track gitCommitCount automatically, matching module.prop.
+val refreshUpdateJson by
+    tasks.registering {
+        group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
+        description = "Rewrite module/update.json to match current verName and gitCommitCount."
+
+        val updateJsonFile = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("module/update.json")
+        val capturedVerName = verName
+        val capturedCount = gitCommitCount
+
+        inputs.property("verName", capturedVerName)
+        inputs.property("gitCommitCount", capturedCount)
+        outputs.file(updateJsonFile)
+
+        doLast {
+            val fullVer = "$capturedVerName-$capturedCount"
+            updateJsonFile.writeText(
+                """{
+  "version": "$fullVer",
+  "versionCode": $capturedCount,
+  "zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/$fullVer/TEESimulator-RS-$fullVer-Release.zip",
+  "changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
+}
+"""
+            )
+        }
+    }
+
 androidComponents {
     onVariants(selector().all()) { variant ->
         val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() }
@@ -121,9 +169,10 @@ androidComponents {
                     dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
                 } else {
                     dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
+                    dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
                 }
-                dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
                 dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
+                dependsOn(refreshUpdateJson)
 
                 if (isDebug) {
                     from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) {
@@ -140,19 +189,27 @@ androidComponents {
                     }
                 }
 
-                from(
-                    project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
+                val nativeLibsDir =
+                    if (isDebug) {
+                        "intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib"
+                    } else {
                         "intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
-                    )
-                ) {
+                    }
+                from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) {
                     into("lib")
-                    include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
+                    include(
+                        "**/libinject.so",
+                        "**/libTEESimulator.so",
+                        "**/libsupervisor.so",
+                        "**/libcertgen.so",
+                    )
                 }
 
                 // Now, copy and process the files from 'module' directory.
                 val sourceModuleDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("module")
                 from(sourceModuleDir) {
                     exclude("module.prop") // Exclude the template file.
+                    exclude("diag.sh") // Debug-only diagnostic plane; included for debug below.
                 }
 
                 // Copy and filter the module.prop template separately.
@@ -165,8 +222,25 @@ androidComponents {
                     )
                 }
 
+                if (isDebug) {
+                    from(sourceModuleDir) { include("diag.sh") }
+                }
+
                 // The destination for all the above 'from' operations.
                 into(tempModuleDir)
+
+                if (isDebug) {
+                    doLast {
+                        // Debug-only: grant the keystore + soterserver (platform_app) domains
+                        // external-storage access for the per-UID NDJSON sink. diag.sh (shipped
+                        // only in debug) carries the shell side of the diagnostic plane.
+                        tempModuleDir.get().asFile.resolve("sepolicy.rule")
+                            .appendText(
+                                "\nallow keystore media_rw_data_file { dir file } *" +
+                                    "\nallow platform_app media_rw_data_file { dir file } *\n",
+                            )
+                    }
+                }
             }
 
         // Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory.

app/src/main/cpp/binder_interceptor.cpp

@@ -235,20 +235,15 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
     struct RegistrationEntry {
         wp<IBinder> target;
         sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
-        // Transaction codes to intercept. Empty = intercept all (legacy behavior).
         std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
     };
 
-    // Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
     mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
     std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;
 
 public:
     BinderInterceptor() = default;
 
-    // Checks if a specific Binder+code combination should be intercepted.
-    // Returns true if the binder is registered AND the code is in its filter
-    // (or the filter is empty, meaning intercept everything).
     bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
         std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
         auto it = registry_.find(target);
@@ -359,7 +354,9 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
     if (!txn_data || txn_data->target.ptr == 0)
         return;
 
-    // Skip system transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) to avoid latency detectors
+    // AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
+    // System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
+    // Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
     if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
         return;
 
@@ -406,7 +403,10 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
         uint64_t tx_id = ++g_transaction_id_counter;
         info.transaction_id = tx_id;
 
-        LOGV("[Hook] Hijacking Transaction %" PRIu64 " (Code: %u)", tx_id, txn_data->code);
+        // tx_id is the same counter handed to the Kotlin interceptor, and sender_euid is the
+        // calling app; together they correlate this native hijack with that UID's per-UID file.
+        LOGV("[Hook] Hijacking Transaction %" PRIu64 " (Code: %u, uid=%u)", tx_id, txn_data->code,
+             txn_data->sender_euid);
 
         // Rewrite the destination to our Stub
         txn_data->target.ptr = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(g_stub_instance->getWeakRefs());
@@ -431,44 +431,29 @@ void processBinderReadBuffer(const binder_write_read &bwr) {
     uintptr_t ptr = bwr.read_buffer;
     uintptr_t end = ptr + bwr.read_consumed;
 
-    LOGV("[Hook] Processing Read Buffer: Size=%llu, Consumed=%llu", bwr.read_size, bwr.read_consumed);
-
     while (ptr < end) {
-        // Ensure we can read at least the command header
         if (end - ptr < sizeof(uint32_t))
             break;
 
         uint32_t cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(ptr);
         ptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
-
-        // Calculate payload size from the ioctl command code
         size_t cmd_size = _IOC_SIZE(cmd);
 
-        // Log the command using our generated to-string function
-        LOGV("[Driver -> User] Command: %s (0x%x), DataSize: %zu", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd), cmd, cmd_size);
-
-        // Safety check: ensure the command's data does not exceed the buffer
         if (ptr + cmd_size > end) {
-            LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overflow detected while parsing command %s", getBinderReturnCommandName(cmd));
+            LOGE("[Hook] Buffer overrun parsing command 0x%x", cmd);
             break;
         }
 
-        // We are primarily interested in BR_TRANSACTION commands to intercept
-        if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
-            binder_transaction_data *txn = nullptr;
-
+        if (__builtin_expect(cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX, 0)) {
+            binder_transaction_data *txn;
             if (cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX) {
-                // The data is wrapped in a secctx struct
-                auto *wrapper = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr);
-                txn = &wrapper->transaction_data;
+                txn = &reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data_secctx *>(ptr)->transaction_data;
             } else {
                 txn = reinterpret_cast<binder_transaction_data *>(ptr);
             }
-
             inspectAndRewriteTransaction(txn);
         }
 
-        // Advance pointer to the next command
         ptr += cmd_size;
     }
 }
@@ -488,13 +473,17 @@ int intercepted_ioctl(int fd, int request, ...) {
     // 1. Call original kernel ioctl to let the driver do its work
     int result = g_original_ioctl(fd, request, arg);
 
-    // 2. After the call returns, check if it was a BINDER_WRITE_READ and if it succeeded
     if (result >= 0 && request == BINDER_WRITE_READ && arg != nullptr) {
         const auto *bwr = static_cast<const binder_write_read *>(arg);
-
-        // We only care about data read FROM the driver (i.e., incoming commands)
-        if (bwr->read_consumed > 0) {
-            processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
+        // Fast reject: only enter the parser if the buffer could contain a BR_TRANSACTION.
+        // Pings, ref ops, and looper management never produce BR_TRANSACTION, so scanning
+        // their buffers is pure overhead (~2-5us per ioctl in debug builds).
+        if (bwr->read_consumed >= sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+            uint32_t first_cmd = *reinterpret_cast<const uint32_t *>(bwr->read_buffer);
+            if (first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION || first_cmd == BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX
+                || bwr->read_consumed > sizeof(uint32_t) + _IOC_SIZE(first_cmd)) {
+                processBinderReadBuffer(*bwr);
+            }
         }
     }
 
@@ -537,14 +526,11 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
     if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
         return BAD_VALUE;
 
-    // We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
     if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
         LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
         return BAD_TYPE;
     }
 
-    // Read optional transaction code filter. If present: int32 count + count * uint32 codes.
-    // If absent or count <= 0: intercept all transaction codes (legacy behavior).
     std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
     int32_t code_count = 0;
     if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
@@ -612,8 +598,15 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
     Parcel pre_req, pre_resp;
     writeTransactionData(pre_req, tx_id, target, code, flags, request);
 
-    if (callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp) != OK) {
-        LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed. Forwarding original call.", tx_id);
+    status_t pre_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPreTransact, pre_req, &pre_resp);
+    if (pre_status != OK) {
+        // Block when interceptor is dead to prevent privacy leak to third-party apps
+        if (callback->pingBinder() != OK) {
+            LOGE("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Interceptor DEAD. Blocking to prevent attestation leak.", tx_id);
+            result = DEAD_OBJECT;
+            return true;
+        }
+        LOGW("[TX_ID: %" PRIu64 "] Pre-transaction callback failed (not dead). Forwarding.", tx_id);
         return false;
     }
 
@@ -667,7 +660,8 @@ bool BinderInterceptor::processInterceptedTransaction(uint64_t tx_id, sp<BBinder
         VALIDATE_STATUS(tx_id, post_req.appendFrom(reply, 0, reply_size));
     }
 
-    if (callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp) == OK) {
+    status_t post_status = callback->transact(intercept::kPostTransact, post_req, &post_resp);
+    if (post_status == OK) {
         int32_t post_action = post_resp.readInt32();
         if (post_action == intercept::kActionOverrideReply && reply) {
             result = post_resp.readInt32(); // Read new status

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/App.kt

@@ -8,10 +8,12 @@ import android.os.Build
 import android.os.Looper
 import java.security.Security
 import org.bouncycastle.jce.provider.BouncyCastleProvider
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.BootStateManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.AbstractKeystoreInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeystoreInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.soter.SoterProcessSupervisor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
@@ -23,8 +25,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
 object App {
     // The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
     private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
-    // The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
-    private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L
 
     /**
      * The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
@@ -40,11 +40,19 @@ object App {
         }
 
         try {
-            prepareEnvironment()
+            val systemContext = prepareEnvironment()
+
+            // Spoof boot-state props before any hook attaches, so keystore2's
+            // cached snapshot reflects the spoofed values.
+            BootStateManager.apply()
+
+            // Load the package configuration.
+            ConfigurationManager.initialize()
+
             // Initialize and start the appropriate keystore interceptors.
             initializeInterceptors()
 
-            ConfigurationManager.initialize()
+            // Set up the device's boot key and hash, which are crucial for attestation.
             AndroidDeviceUtils.setupBootKeyAndHash()
 
             // Android ships with a stripped-down Bouncy Castle provider under the name "BC".
@@ -55,6 +63,10 @@ object App {
 
             NativeCertGen.initialize("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/libcertgen.so")
 
+            // Mount the SOTER forge on the on-demand soterserver process. The supervisor
+            // binds and (re)injects on its own thread, returning at once so it never blocks the loop.
+            SoterProcessSupervisor.start(systemContext)
+
             // This starts the message queue processing. It blocks here indefinitely
             // processing messages until Looper.myLooper().quit() is called.
             Looper.loop()
@@ -65,7 +77,7 @@ object App {
     }
 
     /** Initializes the necessary Android framework internals to satisfy KeyStore requirements. */
-    private fun prepareEnvironment() {
+    private fun prepareEnvironment(): Context {
         // 1. Prepare Main Looper
         if (Looper.getMainLooper() == null) {
             @Suppress("deprecation") Looper.prepareMainLooper()
@@ -74,8 +86,10 @@ object App {
         // 2. Initialize ActivityThread for the current process
         val activityThread = ActivityThread.systemMain()
 
-        // 3. Get the system context
-        val systemContext = activityThread.getSystemContext()
+        // 3. Get the system context. The stub declares getSystemContext(): ContextImpl
+        //    (a bare class), so cast to the Context it really is at runtime for the wiring.
+        @Suppress("CAST_NEVER_SUCCEEDS")
+        val systemContext = activityThread.getSystemContext() as Context
 
         // 4. Create a dummy Application object and attach the context
         val app = Application()
@@ -90,6 +104,8 @@ object App {
             ActivityThread::class.java.getDeclaredField("mInitialApplication")
         mInitialApplicationField.isAccessible = true
         mInitialApplicationField.set(activityThread, app)
+
+        return systemContext
     }
 
     /**

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationBuilder.kt

@@ -43,11 +43,13 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
         securityLevel: Int,
     ): Extension {
         val keyDescription = buildKeyDescription(params, uid, securityLevel)
-        var formattedString =
-            keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
-                AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
-            }
-        SystemLogger.verbose("Forged attestation data: ${formattedString}")
+        SystemLogger.verbose {
+            val formattedString =
+                keyDescription.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+                    AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
+                }
+            "Forged attestation data: $formattedString"
+        }
         return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, DEROctetString(keyDescription.encoded))
     }
 
@@ -115,6 +117,9 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
             }
 
         val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(uid)
+        SystemLogger.info(
+            "Attestation patch levels for uid=$uid: os=$osPatch, vendor=$vendorPatch, boot=$bootPatch"
+        )
         properties[AttestationConstants.TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL] =
             if (bootPatch != DO_NOT_REPORT) {
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -129,7 +134,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
         return properties
     }
 
-    /** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
     private fun buildKeyDescription(
         params: KeyMintAttestation,
         uid: Int,
@@ -148,15 +152,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
 
         val fields =
             arrayOf(
-                ASN1Integer(
-                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
-                ), // attestationVersion
-                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
-                ASN1Integer(
-                    AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
-                ), // keymasterVersion
-                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
-                DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
+                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
+                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
+                ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
+                ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
+                DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)),
                 DEROctetString(uniqueId),
                 softwareEnforced,
                 teeEnforced,
@@ -164,37 +164,24 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
         return DERSequence(fields)
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Computes the unique ID per the KeyMint HAL spec:
-     * HMAC-SHA256(T || C || R, HBK) truncated to 128 bits.
-     *
-     * T = temporal counter (creationTime / 2592000000, i.e. 30-day periods since epoch)
-     * C = DER-encoded ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID
-     * R = 0x00 (no factory reset since ID rotation)
-     * HBK = device-unique secret generated once during module installation
-     */
     private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
         val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
-
         val message =
             ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
                 .putLong(temporalCounter)
                 .put(aaidDer)
-                .put(0x00) // RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = false
+                .put(0x00)
                 .array()
-
         val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
         mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
         return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
     }
 
-    /** Device-unique key seed, generated once at module installation. */
     private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
         val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
         if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
             file.readBytes()
         } else {
-            // Fallback: generate in-memory (won't persist across reboots)
             SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
             ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
         }
@@ -277,9 +264,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                 DERTaggedObject(
                     true,
                     AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
-                    DERSet(
-                        params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()
-                    ),
+                    DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
                 )
             )
         }
@@ -462,7 +447,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
             )
         )
 
-        // ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is only included when an attestation challenge is present.
         if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
             list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -472,6 +456,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                 )
             )
         }
+
         if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
             list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -482,11 +467,16 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
             )
         }
 
-        // Keystore2-enforced tags belong in softwareEnforced, not teeEnforced.
-        // The HAL does not enforce these; keystore2's authorize_create handles them.
+        if (params.callerNonce == true) {
+            list.add(DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE))
+        }
         params.activeDateTime?.let {
             list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
+                DERTaggedObject(
+                    true,
+                    AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME,
+                    ASN1Integer(it.time),
+                )
             )
         }
         params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
@@ -516,11 +506,6 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
                 )
             )
         }
-        if (params.callerNonce == true) {
-            list.add(
-                DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_CALLER_NONCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
-            )
-        }
         if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
             list.add(
                 DERTaggedObject(
@@ -559,15 +544,9 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
      */
     @Throws(Throwable::class)
     internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
-        // AOSP keystore_attestation_id.cpp: gather_attestation_application_id()
-        // uses a hardcoded identity for AID_SYSTEM (1000) and AID_ROOT (0):
-        //   packageName = "AndroidSystem", versionCode = 1, no signing digests.
         val appUid = uid % 100000
         if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
-            return buildApplicationIdDer(
-                listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L),
-                emptySet(),
-            )
+            return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
         }
 
         val pm =

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationConstants.kt

@@ -95,5 +95,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {
 
     // --- Other Constants ---
     // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
-    const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
+    const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/AttestationPatcher.kt

@@ -2,8 +2,15 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
 import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
 import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
+import java.security.PrivateKey
+import java.security.PublicKey
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
+import java.security.interfaces.ECPrivateKey
+import java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey
+import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey
+import java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey
+import java.util.Date
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.*
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x509.Extension
 import org.bouncycastle.cert.X509CertificateHolder
@@ -36,7 +43,12 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
      * @return A new, cryptographically valid, patched certificate chain. Returns the original chain
      *   on any failure.
      */
-    fun patchCertificateChain(originalChain: Array<Certificate>?, uid: Int): Array<Certificate> {
+    fun patchCertificateChain(
+        originalChain: Array<Certificate>?,
+        uid: Int,
+        notBefore: Date? = null,
+        notAfter: Date? = null,
+    ): Array<Certificate> {
         if (originalChain.isNullOrEmpty()) {
             SystemLogger.error("Attempted to patch a null or empty certificate chain for UID $uid.")
             return originalChain ?: emptyArray()
@@ -61,8 +73,9 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
                         originalLeafHolder,
                         parsedAttestation,
                         keybox,
-                        originalLeaf.sigAlgName,
                         uid,
+                        notBefore,
+                        notAfter,
                     )
 
                 // 4. Construct the NEW, VALID chain by prepending the patched leaf to the keybox's
@@ -83,25 +96,12 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
             }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Helper to normalize algorithm names for Bouncy Castle. Old Android versions might reports
-     * "SHA256WITHECDSA", but Bouncy Castle expects "SHA256withECDSA".
-     */
-    private fun normalizeSignatureAlgorithm(algoName: String): String {
-        // 1. Force uppercase to handle "sha256withecdsa"
-        // 2. Replace "WITH" with "with" to satisfy Bouncy Castle's naming convention
-        return algoName.uppercase().replace("WITH", "with")
-    }
-
     /**
      * Creates a new leaf certificate with a modified attestation extension.
      *
      * @param originalLeafHolder A Bouncy Castle holder for the original leaf certificate.
      * @param parsedAttestation The parsed components of the original attestation.
      * @param keybox The KeyBox containing the new issuer certificate and signing key.
-     * @param sigAlgName The signature algorithm name (e.g., "SHA256withECDSA") from the original
-     *   certificate. This is required to ensure the new certificate is signed using a compatible
-     *   algorithm.
      * @param uid The UID of the application requesting the certificate.
      * @return A new [Certificate] object.
      */
@@ -109,19 +109,28 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
         originalLeafHolder: X509CertificateHolder,
         parsedAttestation: ParsedAttestation,
         keybox: KeyBox,
-        sigAlgName: String,
         uid: Int,
+        notBefore: Date? = null,
+        notAfter: Date? = null,
     ): Certificate {
         // The issuer of our new leaf is the subject of the first certificate in our custom keybox
         // chain.
         val newIssuer = X509CertificateHolder(keybox.certificates[0].encoded).subject
 
+        val effectiveNotBefore = notBefore ?: originalLeafHolder.notBefore
+        val effectiveNotAfter = notAfter ?: originalLeafHolder.notAfter
+        if (notBefore != null || notAfter != null) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "Overriding cert dates: notBefore=${effectiveNotBefore} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notBefore}), notAfter=${effectiveNotAfter} (was ${originalLeafHolder.notAfter})"
+            )
+        }
+
         val builder =
             X509v3CertificateBuilder(
                 newIssuer,
                 originalLeafHolder.serialNumber,
-                originalLeafHolder.notBefore,
-                originalLeafHolder.notAfter,
+                effectiveNotBefore,
+                effectiveNotAfter,
                 originalLeafHolder.subject,
                 originalLeafHolder.subjectPublicKeyInfo,
             )
@@ -136,9 +145,12 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
             )
         }
 
-        // Sign the newly built certificate with the private key from our keybox.
+        // Sign the new leaf with the keybox key. The signature algorithm must match THAT key, not
+        // the original leaf's: when an RSA leaf is re-rooted under an EC-only keybox, this signs
+        // with ECDSA. The RSA subject public key is untouched and the chain still verifies to the
+        // keybox root.
         val signer =
-            JcaContentSignerBuilder(normalizeSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlgName))
+            JcaContentSignerBuilder(signatureAlgorithmFor(keybox.keyPair.private))
                 .setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
                 .build(keybox.keyPair.private)
         val newCertificate = JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(signer))
@@ -146,7 +158,7 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
         // Log the signature of the newly created certificate to observe its non-deterministic
         // nature.
         val signatureBytes = (newCertificate as X509Certificate).signature
-        SystemLogger.verbose("Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}")
+        SystemLogger.verbose { "Signature of patched leaf cert: ${signatureBytes.toHex()}" }
 
         return newCertificate
     }
@@ -160,8 +172,8 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
      *     1. A simple key type like "RSA" or "EC".
      *     2. A full JCA signature algorithm name like "SHA256withRSA".
      *
-     * @return The [KeyBox] containing the appropriate key pair for signing.
-     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if no matching KeyBox can be found for the derived key type.
+     * @return The algorithm-matching [KeyBox] when present, otherwise any available key (fail-safe).
+     * @throws IllegalArgumentException only if the keybox file contains no usable signing key.
      */
     private fun getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm(uid: Int, algorithm: String): KeyBox {
         val keyboxFile = ConfigurationManager.getKeyboxFileForUid(uid)
@@ -176,12 +188,37 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
                 else -> algorithm // If no match, assume it's already a simple key type string.
             }
 
-        return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, keyType)
+        val matching = KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, keyType)
+        if (matching != null) return matching
+
+        // Fail-safe: no algorithm-matching key (e.g. an EC-only Google keybox asked to re-root an
+        // RSA leaf). Fall back to any available key instead of throwing -- a throw here aborts the
+        // patch and the caller hands back the device's REAL, unlocked attestation. Re-signing under
+        // the available key keeps the chain rooted at the keybox with our forged, locked Root of
+        // Trust; a leaf's signature algorithm is independent of its subject key, so an RSA subject
+        // key signs validly under an EC keybox key.
+        return KeyBoxManager.getAnyAttestationKey(keyboxFile)?.also {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "No '$keyType' attestation key in $keyboxFile for UID $uid; re-signing under the " +
+                    "available keybox key to avoid leaking the device's real attestation."
+            )
+        }
             ?: throw IllegalArgumentException(
-                "No keybox found for UID $uid and algorithm '$keyType' (derived from input '$algorithm') in file $keyboxFile"
+                "No usable attestation key for UID $uid in file $keyboxFile (requested '$keyType')"
             )
     }
 
+    /** SHA-256 signature algorithm name matching the keybox signing key's type. */
+    private fun signatureAlgorithmFor(signingKey: PrivateKey): String =
+        when (signingKey) {
+            is ECPrivateKey -> "SHA256withECDSA"
+            is RSAPrivateKey -> "SHA256withRSA"
+            else ->
+                throw IllegalArgumentException(
+                    "Unsupported keybox signing key type: ${signingKey.algorithm}"
+                )
+        }
+
     /** Recursively formats an ASN1Primitive into a concise, readable string. */
     fun formatAsn1Primitive(obj: ASN1Encodable?): String {
         val primitive = obj?.toASN1Primitive()
@@ -216,6 +253,157 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
         }
     }
 
+    /** Reverse map of attestation tag number to its symbolic name, e.g. 704 -> "ROOT_OF_TRUST". */
+    private val attestTagNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
+        AttestationConstants::class
+            .java
+            .fields
+            .filter { it.name.startsWith("TAG_") && it.type == Int::class.java }
+            .associate { (it.get(null) as Int) to it.name.removePrefix("TAG_") }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Renders the full key-attestation extension of [cert] as a single structured line for the
+     * diagnostic dossier, or null when the certificate carries no attestation extension. This is the
+     * ground-truth view of what we actually emitted, so any divergence from a genuine TEE surfaces
+     * directly as a differing field rather than having to be guessed.
+     */
+    fun formatAttestationExtension(cert: X509Certificate): String? {
+        val rawExtension = cert.getExtensionValue(ATTESTATION_OID.id) ?: return null
+        return runCatching {
+                val keyDescriptionDer = ASN1OctetString.getInstance(rawExtension).octets
+                formatKeyDescription(ASN1Sequence.getInstance(keyDescriptionDer))
+            }
+            .getOrElse { "<unparseable attestation extension: ${it.message}>" }
+    }
+
+    /** Renders the identity fields of every certificate in a returned chain for the dossier. */
+    fun formatCertChain(chain: List<Certificate>): String =
+        chain
+            .mapIndexed { index, cert ->
+                val x509 = cert as? X509Certificate ?: return@mapIndexed "[$index] <non-X509>"
+                "[$index] subject=${x509.subjectX500Principal.name} " +
+                    "issuer=${x509.issuerX500Principal.name} " +
+                    "serial=${x509.serialNumber.toString(16)} " +
+                    "notBefore=${x509.notBefore} notAfter=${x509.notAfter}"
+            }
+            .joinToString(separator = " ; ")
+
+    /**
+     * Verifies every certificate in [chain] against its issuer and renders the outcome for the
+     * dossier. The forged chain is [leaf] + keybox certs, so edge 0<-1 proves the leaf was signed by
+     * the key matching the issuer cert and later edges test the keybox's own chain. For an RSA issuer
+     * it also reports signature-bytes vs modulus-bytes: a signature longer than the modulus is the
+     * exact DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE the app's verifier throws, so the offending edge is
+     * identifiable from the log alone.
+     */
+    fun formatChainVerification(chain: List<Certificate>): String {
+        if (chain.size < 2) return "<single cert; nothing to chain-verify>"
+        return (0 until chain.size - 1).joinToString(separator = " ; ") { i ->
+            val child = chain[i] as? X509Certificate ?: return@joinToString "[$i]<non-X509>"
+            val parent =
+                chain[i + 1] as? X509Certificate ?: return@joinToString "[$i]<parent non-X509>"
+            val outcome =
+                runCatching {
+                        child.verify(parent.publicKey)
+                        "OK"
+                    }
+                    .getOrElse { "FAIL(${it.javaClass.simpleName}: ${it.message?.take(80)})" }
+            val rsaSizes =
+                (parent.publicKey as? RSAPublicKey)?.let {
+                    val sigBytes = child.signature.size
+                    val modBytes = (it.modulus.bitLength() + 7) / 8
+                    " sig=${sigBytes}B mod=${modBytes}B" + if (sigBytes > modBytes) " OVERSIZE" else ""
+                } ?: ""
+            "[$i]${describeKey(child.publicKey)}<-[${i + 1}]${describeKey(parent.publicKey)}:" +
+                "$outcome$rsaSizes"
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Per-cert key type/size, subject, issuer, and signature length, for reconstructing the chain a
+     * caller verifies. The signature length reveals the signer's key size, so a 4096-bit signature
+     * landing on a 2048-bit issuer (DATA_TOO_LARGE) is visible without the certificate bytes.
+     */
+    fun formatChainKeys(chain: List<Certificate>): String =
+        chain
+            .mapIndexed { index, cert ->
+                val x509 = cert as? X509Certificate ?: return@mapIndexed "[$index]<non-X509>"
+                "[$index]${describeKey(x509.publicKey)} " +
+                    "subj=${x509.subjectX500Principal.name} " +
+                    "iss=${x509.issuerX500Principal.name} " +
+                    "sigLen=${x509.signature.size}B"
+            }
+            .joinToString(separator = " ; ")
+
+    private fun describeKey(key: PublicKey): String =
+        when (key) {
+            is RSAPublicKey -> "RSA${key.modulus.bitLength()}"
+            is ECPublicKey -> "EC${key.params.curve.field.fieldSize}"
+            else -> key.algorithm
+        }
+
+    private fun formatKeyDescription(seq: ASN1Sequence): String {
+        val fields = seq.toArray()
+        return "attestVer=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_ATTESTATION_VERSION_INDEX])} " +
+            "attestSecLvl=${formatSecurityLevel(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_ATTESTATION_SECURITY_LEVEL_INDEX])} " +
+            "kmVer=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_KEYMINT_VERSION_INDEX])} " +
+            "kmSecLvl=${formatSecurityLevel(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_KEYMINT_SECURITY_LEVEL_INDEX])} " +
+            "challenge=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_INDEX])} " +
+            "uniqueId=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_UNIQUE_ID_INDEX])} " +
+            "sw=${formatAuthorizationList(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_SOFTWARE_ENFORCED_INDEX])} " +
+            "tee=${formatAuthorizationList(fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX])}"
+    }
+
+    private fun formatSecurityLevel(obj: ASN1Encodable): String {
+        val level = (obj.toASN1Primitive() as? ASN1Enumerated)?.value?.toInt()
+        val name =
+            when (level) {
+                0 -> "Software"
+                1 -> "TEE"
+                2 -> "StrongBox"
+                else -> "?"
+            }
+        return "$level($name)"
+    }
+
+    private fun formatAuthorizationList(obj: ASN1Encodable): String {
+        val seq = obj.toASN1Primitive() as? ASN1Sequence ?: return formatAsn1Primitive(obj)
+        return seq
+            .map { element ->
+                val tagged = element as? ASN1TaggedObject ?: return@map formatAsn1Primitive(element)
+                val name = attestTagNames[tagged.tagNo] ?: "TAG"
+                val value =
+                    if (tagged.tagNo == AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST)
+                        formatRootOfTrust(tagged.baseObject)
+                    else formatAsn1Primitive(tagged.baseObject)
+                "${tagged.tagNo}($name)=$value"
+            }
+            .joinToString(prefix = "[", postfix = "]", separator = ", ")
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Decodes the Root of Trust sub-sequence explicitly — it is the field a detector most often uses
+     * to unmask a simulated TEE (a random verifiedBootKey, an unexpected verifiedBootState, or a
+     * deviceLocked that disagrees with the bootloader all live here).
+     */
+    private fun formatRootOfTrust(obj: ASN1Encodable): String {
+        val fields = (obj.toASN1Primitive() as? ASN1Sequence)?.toArray() ?: return formatAsn1Primitive(obj)
+        val state = fields.getOrNull(AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_STATE_INDEX)
+        val stateName =
+            when ((state?.toASN1Primitive() as? ASN1Enumerated)?.value?.toInt()) {
+                0 -> "Verified"
+                1 -> "SelfSigned"
+                2 -> "Unverified"
+                3 -> "Failed"
+                else -> "?"
+            }
+        return "[bootKey=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields.getOrNull(AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_KEY_INDEX))}, " +
+            "deviceLocked=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields.getOrNull(AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_DEVICE_LOCKED_INDEX))}, " +
+            "verifiedBootState=${formatAsn1Primitive(state)}($stateName), " +
+            "bootHash=${formatAsn1Primitive(fields.getOrNull(AttestationConstants.ROOT_OF_TRUST_VERIFIED_BOOT_HASH_INDEX))}]"
+    }
+
     // Function to check if a given ASN1Sequence contains the Root of Trust tag.
     private fun sequenceContainsRootOfTrust(seq: ASN1Encodable): Boolean {
         if (seq !is ASN1Sequence) return false
@@ -268,8 +456,11 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
     private fun createPatchedAttestationExtension(parsed: ParsedAttestation, uid: Int): Extension {
         val (allFields, teeEnforcedMap, originalRootOfTrust) = parsed
 
-        var formattedString = allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
-        SystemLogger.verbose("Original attestation data: ${formattedString}")
+        SystemLogger.verbose {
+            val formattedString =
+                allFields.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+            "Original attestation data: $formattedString"
+        }
 
         // Build the new Root of Trust and add/replace it in the map.
         val newRootOfTrust = AttestationBuilder.buildRootOfTrust(originalRootOfTrust)
@@ -296,8 +487,11 @@ object AttestationPatcher {
 
         allFields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_TEE_ENFORCED_INDEX] = sortedTeeEnforced
         val patchedSequence = DERSequence(allFields)
-        formattedString = patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
-        SystemLogger.verbose("Patched  attestation data: ${formattedString}")
+        SystemLogger.verbose {
+            val formattedString =
+                patchedSequence.joinToString(separator = ", ") { formatAsn1Primitive(it) }
+            "Patched  attestation data: $formattedString"
+        }
         val patchedOctets = DEROctetString(patchedSequence)
 
         return Extension(ATTESTATION_OID, false, patchedOctets)

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/DeviceAttestationService.kt

@@ -1,8 +1,17 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
 import android.annotation.SuppressLint
+import android.security.KeyStoreException
+import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
+import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
+import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
 import java.security.KeyStore
+import java.security.SecureRandom
 import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
+import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
+import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1ObjectIdentifier
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1OctetString
@@ -11,6 +20,7 @@ import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1TaggedObject
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.x509.Extension
 import org.bouncycastle.cert.X509CertificateHolder
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.toHex
 
 /**
@@ -52,14 +62,185 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
         val bootPatchLevel: Int?,
     )
 
+    // A unique alias for the key used to perform the TEE functionality check.
     private const val TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS = "TEESimulator_AttestationCheck"
 
+    /**
+     * Lazily determines if the device's TEE is functional by attempting to generate an
+     * attestation-backed key pair. The result is cached.
+     */
+    val isTeeFunctional: Boolean by lazy { checkTeeFunctionality() }
+
+    // Per (algorithm, security-level) attestation-capability verdicts, keyed by probe-key alias.
+    // A device may attest one algorithm or security level yet lack a provisioned attestation key
+    // for another (e.g. a TEE that attests RSA over a StrongBox that cannot), so each pair is
+    // probed and cached on its own.
+    private data class ProbeSpec(
+        val algorithm: String,
+        val strongBox: Boolean,
+        val keyAlias: String,
+    )
+
+    private val rsaTeeProbe =
+        ProbeSpec(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA, false, "TEESimulator_RsaAttestCheck")
+    private val rsaStrongBoxProbe =
+        ProbeSpec(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA, true, "TEESimulator_RsaAttestCheckSb")
+    private val ecTeeProbe =
+        ProbeSpec(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, false, "TEESimulator_EcAttestCheck")
+    private val ecStrongBoxProbe =
+        ProbeSpec(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, true, "TEESimulator_EcAttestCheckSb")
+
+    private val attestableVerdicts = ConcurrentHashMap<String, Boolean>()
+    private val attestProbesInFlight = ConcurrentHashMap<String, AtomicBoolean>()
+
+    /**
+     * Whether the real hardware can attest an RSA key at the requested security level. AUTO dispatch
+     * reads this to forge RSA attestation only where the hardware genuinely cannot serve it.
+     *
+     * Only a definitive verdict is cached: a successful probe, or a permanent keystore failure. A
+     * transient or unrecognized failure leaves the verdict unset and reports attestable, so dispatch
+     * PATCHes the genuine chain and re-probes next read — a one-off keystore hiccup can never freeze
+     * the device into forging an attestation it could serve.
+     */
+    fun isRsaAttestable(strongBox: Boolean): Boolean =
+        isHardwareAttestable(if (strongBox) rsaStrongBoxProbe else rsaTeeProbe)
+
+    /** Whether the real hardware can attest an EC key at the requested security level. */
+    fun isEcAttestable(strongBox: Boolean): Boolean =
+        isHardwareAttestable(if (strongBox) ecStrongBoxProbe else ecTeeProbe)
+
+    private fun isHardwareAttestable(probe: ProbeSpec): Boolean {
+        attestableVerdicts[probe.keyAlias]?.let { return it }
+        val probeInFlight =
+            attestProbesInFlight.computeIfAbsent(probe.keyAlias) { AtomicBoolean(false) }
+        if (probeInFlight.compareAndSet(false, true)) {
+            try {
+                probeAttestability(probe)?.let { attestableVerdicts[probe.keyAlias] = it }
+            } finally {
+                probeInFlight.set(false)
+            }
+        }
+        return attestableVerdicts[probe.keyAlias] ?: true
+    }
+
     /**
      * Lazily fetches and parses attestation data from a genuinely generated certificate. The result
      * is cached. Returns null if the TEE is not functional or parsing fails.
      */
     val CachedAttestationData: AttestationData? by lazy { fetchAttestationData() }
 
+    /**
+     * Checks if the TEE is working correctly by generating a key in the Android Keystore with an
+     * attestation challenge.
+     *
+     * @return `true` if a key with attestation was generated successfully, `false` otherwise.
+     */
+    private fun checkTeeFunctionality(): Boolean {
+        SystemLogger.info("Performing TEE functionality check...")
+        return try {
+            val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
+            val keyPairGenerator =
+                KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC, "AndroidKeyStore")
+
+            // A random challenge is required for attestation.
+            val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
+
+            val spec =
+                KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
+                    .setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
+                    .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
+                    .setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                    .build()
+
+            keyPairGenerator.initialize(spec)
+            keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
+
+            SystemLogger.info("TEE functionality check successful.")
+            true
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("TEE functionality check failed.", e)
+            false
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Probes whether the real hardware can attest a key matching [probe] by generating one with an
+     * attestation challenge at the probe's algorithm and security level. Mirrors
+     * [checkTeeFunctionality]; the request runs as the module UID, so it is skipped by interception
+     * and reaches genuine hardware rather than the forge path.
+     *
+     * @return `true` if attestation succeeded, `false` only on a confirmed attestation-keys-
+     *   unavailable failure, or `null` on a transient or unrecognized failure where the caller
+     *   fails open and re-probes.
+     */
+    private fun probeAttestability(probe: ProbeSpec): Boolean? {
+        val label = "${probe.algorithm} attestation (strongBox=${probe.strongBox})"
+        SystemLogger.info("Performing $label capability check...")
+        return try {
+            val keyPairGenerator =
+                KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(probe.algorithm, "AndroidKeyStore")
+
+            val challenge = ByteArray(16).apply { SecureRandom().nextBytes(this) }
+
+            val builder =
+                KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(probe.keyAlias, KeyProperties.PURPOSE_SIGN)
+                    .setDigests(KeyProperties.DIGEST_SHA256)
+                    .setAttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                    .setIsStrongBoxBacked(probe.strongBox)
+            if (probe.algorithm == KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_RSA) {
+                builder
+                    .setAlgorithmParameterSpec(RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(2048, RSAKeyGenParameterSpec.F4))
+                    .setSignaturePaddings(KeyProperties.SIGNATURE_PADDING_RSA_PKCS1)
+            } else {
+                builder.setAlgorithmParameterSpec(ECGenParameterSpec("secp256r1"))
+            }
+
+            keyPairGenerator.initialize(builder.build())
+            keyPairGenerator.generateKeyPair()
+
+            SystemLogger.info("$label capability check successful.")
+            true
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            if (isAttestationUnavailable(e)) {
+                SystemLogger.info("$label unsupported by hardware; AUTO will forge attestation.")
+                false
+            } else {
+                SystemLogger.warning(
+                    "$label capability check failed transiently; treating as capable.",
+                    e,
+                )
+                null
+            }
+        } finally {
+            deleteProbeKey(probe.keyAlias)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Whether [error] definitively means the hardware cannot attest the probed key: a permanent
+     * [KeyStoreException] from the keystore. Transient failures and non-keystore errors return
+     * `false`, so the caller fails open and re-probes rather than caching a guess. The probe runs a
+     * fixed, valid spec as root, so its only permanent keystore failure mode is missing attestation
+     * support; [KeyStoreException.isTransientFailure] draws the transient/permanent line.
+     */
+    private fun isAttestationUnavailable(error: Throwable): Boolean {
+        var cause: Throwable? = error
+        while (cause != null) {
+            val keyStoreError = cause as? KeyStoreException
+            if (keyStoreError != null) return !keyStoreError.isTransientFailure
+            cause = cause.cause
+        }
+        return false
+    }
+
+    private fun deleteProbeKey(keyAlias: String) {
+        try {
+            KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }.deleteEntry(keyAlias)
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete attestation probe key.", e)
+        }
+    }
+
     /**
      * Retrieves the attestation certificate generated during the TEE check. The key entry is
      * deleted after retrieval to clean up.
@@ -67,6 +248,8 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
      * @return The leaf `X509Certificate` containing the attestation, or `null` if unavailable.
      */
     private fun getAttestationCertificate(): X509Certificate? {
+        if (!isTeeFunctional) return null
+
         return try {
             val keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore").apply { load(null) }
             val certChain = keyStore.getCertificateChain(TEE_CHECK_KEY_ALIAS)
@@ -100,19 +283,24 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
 
             // The extension's value is an ASN.1 sequence.
             val keyDescriptionSeq = ASN1Sequence.getInstance(extension.extnValue.octets)
-            var formattedString =
-                keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
-                    AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
-                }
-            SystemLogger.verbose("Cached attestation data: ${formattedString}")
+            SystemLogger.verbose {
+                val formattedString =
+                    keyDescriptionSeq.joinToString(separator = ", ") {
+                        AttestationPatcher.formatAsn1Primitive(it)
+                    }
+                "Cached attestation data: $formattedString"
+            }
             val fields = keyDescriptionSeq.toArray()
 
-            val attestVersion =
+            val deviceAttestVersion =
                 ASN1Integer.getInstance(
                         fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_ATTESTATION_VERSION_INDEX]
                     )
                     .positiveValue
                     .toInt()
+            // The device KeyMint HAL can report a version below its OS's AOSP value (100 on an A16
+            // where BAKLAVA mandates 400); cache the AOSP value so the forge matches an updated device.
+            val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.aospAttestVersion ?: deviceAttestVersion
             val keymasterVersion =
                 ASN1Integer.getInstance(
                         fields[AttestationConstants.KEY_DESCRIPTION_KEYMINT_VERSION_INDEX]
@@ -206,7 +394,7 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
             }
 
             SystemLogger.info(
-                "Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
+                "Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$deviceAttestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
             )
             return AttestationData(
                 moduleHash,

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/attestation/KeyMintAttestation.kt

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
 
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
 import java.math.BigInteger
 import java.util.Date
 import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
@@ -16,12 +17,11 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 // Reference:
 // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/key_parameter.rs
 data class KeyMintAttestation(
+    val keySize: Int,
     val algorithm: Int,
     val ecCurve: Int?,
     val ecCurveName: String,
-    val keySize: Int,
     val origin: Int?,
-    val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
     val blockMode: List<Int>,
     val padding: List<Int>,
     val purpose: List<Int>,
@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
     val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
     val model: ByteArray?,
     val secondImei: ByteArray?,
-    // Enforcement tags
     val activeDateTime: Date?,
     val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
     val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
     val usageCountLimit: Int?,
     val callerNonce: Boolean?,
+    val nonce: ByteArray?,
     val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
     val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
     val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
@@ -54,22 +54,22 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
     val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
     val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
     val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
+    val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
     val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
     val maxBootLevel: Int?,
     val minMacLength: Int?,
+    val macLength: Int? = null,
     val rsaOaepMgfDigest: List<Int>,
 ) {
     /** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */
     constructor(
         params: Array<KeyParameter>
     ) : this(
+        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
+
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
         algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
 
-        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
-        // For EC keys, derive keySize from EC_CURVE when KEY_SIZE is absent.
-        keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
-
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
         ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
         ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
@@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
         origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),
 
-        // AOSP: [key_param(tag = NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, field = BoolValue)]
-        noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
-
         // AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
         blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),
 
@@ -121,13 +118,12 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
         manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
         model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
         secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
-
-        // Enforcement tags
         activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
         originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
         usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
         usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
         callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
+        nonce = params.findBlob(Tag.NONCE),
         unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
         includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
         rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
@@ -135,30 +131,25 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
         allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
         trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
         trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
+        noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
         maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
         maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
         minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
+        macLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MAC_LENGTH),
         rsaOaepMgfDigest = params.findAllDigests(Tag.RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST),
     ) {
         // Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes.
         params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
     }
 
-    fun isAttestKey(): Boolean {
-        return purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
-    }
+    fun isAttestKey(): Boolean = purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
 
-    fun isImportKey(): Boolean {
-        return origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
-    }
+    fun isImportKey(): Boolean =
+        origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
 }
 
 // --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---
 
-/** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
-private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
-    if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
-
 /** Maps to AOSP field = Integer */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findInteger(tag: Int): Int? =
     this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.integer
@@ -191,7 +182,7 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBlob(tag: Int): ByteArray? =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllBlockMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
     this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.blockMode }
 
-/** Maps to AOSP field = PaddingMode (Repeated) */
+/** Maps to AOSP field = BlockMode (Repeated) */
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllPaddingMode(tag: Int): List<Int> =
     this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.paddingMode }
 
@@ -203,7 +194,9 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
     this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
 
-/** Derives keySize from EC_CURVE tag when KEY_SIZE is not explicitly provided. */
+private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
+    if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
+
 private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
     val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
     return when (curveId) {

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/config/BootStateManager.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.config
+
+import android.os.SystemProperties
+import java.io.File
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
+
+object BootStateManager {
+    private const val CONFIG_PATH = "/data/adb/tricky_store"
+    private const val BOOT_PROPS_MODE_FILE = "boot_props_mode"
+
+    private enum class BootPropsMode {
+        AUTO,
+        FORCE,
+        DISABLE,
+    }
+
+    private val targets =
+        linkedMapOf(
+            "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" to "green",
+            "ro.boot.flash.locked" to "1",
+            "ro.boot.veritymode" to "enforcing",
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state" to "locked",
+        )
+
+    private val fillIfAbsent =
+        linkedMapOf(
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.invalidate_on_error" to "yes",
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.avb_version" to "1.2",
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.hash_alg" to "sha256",
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.size" to "11904",
+        )
+
+    fun apply() {
+        val mode = readBootPropsMode()
+        when (mode) {
+            BootPropsMode.DISABLE -> {
+                SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: disabled by $BOOT_PROPS_MODE_FILE")
+                return
+            }
+            BootPropsMode.AUTO -> {
+                if (isOplusFamilyDevice()) {
+                    SystemLogger.warning(
+                        "BootStateManager: skipping boot-state prop spoofing on Oplus-family device in auto mode"
+                    )
+                    return
+                }
+            }
+            BootPropsMode.FORCE -> {
+                SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: force-enabled by $BOOT_PROPS_MODE_FILE")
+            }
+        }
+
+        for ((name, target) in targets) {
+            val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
+            if (current.isEmpty()) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name absent on this device, skip")
+                continue
+            }
+            if (current == target) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already $target, skip")
+                continue
+            }
+            SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: setting $name=$target (was: '$current')")
+            AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, target)
+        }
+        for ((name, value) in fillIfAbsent) {
+            val current = SystemProperties.get(name, "")
+            if (current.isNotEmpty()) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("BootStateManager: $name already '$current', skip")
+                continue
+            }
+            SystemLogger.info("BootStateManager: filling absent $name=$value")
+            AndroidDeviceUtils.setProperty(name, value)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun shouldSpoofBootProps(): Boolean =
+        when (readBootPropsMode()) {
+            BootPropsMode.DISABLE -> false
+            BootPropsMode.AUTO -> !isOplusFamilyDevice()
+            BootPropsMode.FORCE -> true
+        }
+
+    private fun readBootPropsMode(): BootPropsMode {
+        val file = File(CONFIG_PATH, BOOT_PROPS_MODE_FILE)
+        if (!file.exists()) return BootPropsMode.AUTO
+
+        val raw =
+            runCatching { file.readText().trim().lowercase() }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.warning("BootStateManager: failed to read ${file.absolutePath}", it)
+                    return BootPropsMode.AUTO
+                }
+
+        return when (raw) {
+            "1", "true", "on", "enable", "enabled", "force" -> BootPropsMode.FORCE
+            "0", "false", "off", "disable", "disabled", "none" -> BootPropsMode.DISABLE
+            else -> BootPropsMode.AUTO
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun isOplusFamilyDevice(): Boolean {
+        val props =
+            listOf(
+                "ro.product.manufacturer",
+                "ro.product.brand",
+                "ro.product.vendor.manufacturer",
+                "ro.product.vendor.brand",
+                "ro.product.odm.manufacturer",
+                "ro.product.odm.brand",
+                "ro.boot.hardware.sku",
+                "ro.boot.project_name",
+            )
+
+        val joined =
+            props.joinToString(separator = " ") { name ->
+                SystemProperties.get(name, "")
+            }.lowercase()
+
+        return listOf("oneplus", "oplus", "oppo", "realme").any { joined.contains(it) }
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/config/ConfigurationManager.kt

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.ServiceManager
 import java.io.File
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
 
@@ -65,7 +66,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         // Initial load of all configuration files.
         loadTargetPackages(File(configRoot, TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE))
         loadPatchLevelConfig(File(configRoot, PATCH_LEVEL_FILE))
-
         // Start watching for any subsequent file changes.
         ConfigObserver.startWatching()
         SystemLogger.info("Configuration initialized and file observer started.")
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         return packages.firstNotNullOfOrNull { pkg -> packageKeyboxes[pkg] } ?: DEFAULT_KEYBOX_FILE
     }
 
-    /** Determines if the certificate for a given UID needs to be patched. */
     fun shouldPatch(uid: Int): Boolean {
         val mode = getPackageModeForUid(uid)
         return mode == Mode.PATCH || mode == Mode.AUTO
@@ -92,13 +91,20 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
     /** Determines if a new certificate needs to be generated for a given UID. */
     fun shouldGenerate(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.GENERATE
 
-    /** Determines if no operation is needed for a given UID. */
     fun shouldSkipUid(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == null
 
-    /** Determines if the UID is in AUTO mode (no explicit ! or ? suffix). */
-    fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean = getPackageModeForUid(uid) == Mode.AUTO
+    fun isAutoMode(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        for (pkg in getPackagesForUid(uid)) {
+            when (packageModes[pkg]) {
+                Mode.GENERATE,
+                Mode.PATCH -> return false
+                Mode.AUTO -> return true
+                null -> continue
+            }
+        }
+        return false
+    }
 
-    /** Resolves the operating mode for a given UID based on its packages and the TEE status. */
     private fun getPackageModeForUid(uid: Int): Mode? {
         val packages = getPackagesForUid(uid)
         if (packages.isEmpty()) return null
@@ -107,7 +113,9 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
             when (packageModes[pkg]) {
                 Mode.GENERATE -> return Mode.GENERATE
                 Mode.PATCH -> return Mode.PATCH
-                Mode.AUTO -> return Mode.AUTO
+                Mode.AUTO ->
+                    return if (DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional) Mode.PATCH
+                    else Mode.GENERATE
                 null -> continue
             }
         }
@@ -156,25 +164,24 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                     return@forEach
                 }
 
-                val mode: Mode
-                val rawPkg: String
                 when {
+                    // Suffix '!' means force GENERATE mode.
                     trimmedLine.endsWith("!") -> {
-                        mode = Mode.GENERATE
-                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
+                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("!").trim()
+                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.GENERATE
+                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
                     }
+                    // Suffix '?' means force PATCH mode.
                     trimmedLine.endsWith("?") -> {
-                        mode = Mode.PATCH
-                        rawPkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
+                        val pkg = trimmedLine.removeSuffix("?").trim()
+                        newModes[pkg] = Mode.PATCH
+                        newKeyboxes[pkg] = currentKeybox
                     }
                     else -> {
-                        mode = Mode.AUTO
-                        rawPkg = trimmedLine
+                        newModes[trimmedLine] = Mode.AUTO
+                        newKeyboxes[trimmedLine] = currentKeybox
                     }
                 }
-
-                newModes[rawPkg] = mode
-                newKeyboxes[rawPkg] = currentKeybox
             }
 
             // Atomically update the configuration maps.
@@ -250,14 +257,18 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                 )
             }
 
+            // Parse global and per-package configurations.
             var newGlobalLevel = parseLines(contextLines[""])
-            contextLines.remove("")
-
-            // system=prop means all components should derive from device props
+            // TrickyAddon writes Pixel bulletin dates for boot/vendor but system=prop
+            // resolves to the real device prop — force boot/vendor through the same path
+            // to prevent cross-component date mismatches on non-Pixel devices.
             if (newGlobalLevel?.system.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true)) {
-                SystemLogger.info("system=prop: forcing boot/vendor to derive from device props")
+                SystemLogger.info(
+                    "system=prop: forcing boot/vendor to derive from device props (were: boot=${newGlobalLevel?.boot}, vendor=${newGlobalLevel?.vendor})"
+                )
                 newGlobalLevel = newGlobalLevel?.copy(boot = "prop", vendor = "prop")
             }
+            contextLines.remove("") // Remove global context to iterate over packages next
 
             for ((pkg, lines) in contextLines) {
                 parseLines(lines)?.let { newPackageLevels[pkg] = it }
@@ -287,10 +298,12 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
 
             val file = if (event != DELETE) File(configRoot, path) else null
             when (path) {
-                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE -> file?.let { loadTargetPackages(it) }
-                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE was deleted.")
-                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE -> file?.let { loadPatchLevelConfig(it) }
-                    ?: SystemLogger.warning("$PATCH_LEVEL_FILE was deleted.")
+                TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE ->
+                    file?.let { loadTargetPackages(it) }
+                        ?: SystemLogger.warning("$TARGET_PACKAGES_FILE was deleted.")
+                PATCH_LEVEL_FILE ->
+                    file?.let { loadPatchLevelConfig(it) }
+                        ?: SystemLogger.warning("$PATCH_LEVEL_FILE was deleted.")
                 // Any change to an XML file is assumed to be a keybox.
                 // The cache in KeyBoxManager will handle reloading it on its next use.
                 else ->
@@ -300,10 +313,15 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
                         )
                         KeyBoxManager.invalidateCache(path)
                         if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
-                            // Clear cached keys possibly containing old certificates
+                            // Drop only the patched cert chains so the next
+                            // attestation request re-signs with the new keybox.
+                            // Do NOT drop generatedKeys — that would destroy
+                            // every alias/private key in memory and on disk,
+                            // logging users out of any app that pinned a
+                            // persisted keystore alias.
                             org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
                                 .KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
-                                .clearAllGeneratedKeys("updating $file")
+                                .invalidatePatchedChains("updating $file")
                         }
                     }
             }
@@ -333,8 +351,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         return iPackageManager
     }
 
-    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
-    /** Checks a SELinux permission for a caller identified by PID against the keystore context. */
     fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
         return try {
             val callerCtx =
@@ -347,7 +363,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         }
     }
 
-    /** Checks if any package belonging to the UID holds the given permission. */
     fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
         val userId = uid / 100000
         return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
@@ -359,7 +374,6 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
         }
     }
 
-    /** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
     fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
         return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
             try {

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/core/BinderInterceptor.kt

@@ -110,16 +110,20 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
      */
     final override fun onTransact(code: Int, data: Parcel, reply: Parcel?, flags: Int): Boolean {
         val txId = data.readLong()
-        val result = try {
-            when (code) {
-                PRE_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePreTransact(txId, data)
-                POST_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePostTransact(txId, data)
-                else -> return super.onTransact(code, data, reply, flags)
+        val result =
+            try {
+                when (code) {
+                    PRE_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePreTransact(txId, data)
+                    POST_TRANSACT_CODE -> handlePostTransact(txId, data)
+                    else -> return super.onTransact(code, data, reply, flags)
+                }
+            } catch (e: Throwable) {
+                SystemLogger.error(
+                    "[TX_ID: $txId] Interceptor exception, falling through to HAL",
+                    e,
+                )
+                TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
             }
-        } catch (e: Throwable) {
-            SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Interceptor exception, falling through to HAL", e)
-            TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-        }
         writeResultToReply(result, reply!!)
         return true
     }
@@ -220,7 +224,11 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
         }
     }
 
-    /** Helper function for consistent logging of intercepted transactions. */
+    /**
+     * Logs an intercepted transaction. For a targeted UID every transaction — whether we intercept
+     * or merely observe it — is recorded on that UID's own diagnostic plane, so its keystore
+     * timeline reads cleanly end to end. Untargeted UIDs get a single terse, rate-limited line.
+     */
     protected fun logTransaction(
         txId: Long,
         methodName: String,
@@ -228,15 +236,14 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
         callingPid: Int,
         skipPost: Boolean = false,
     ) {
-        val isIntercepting = !skipPost && !ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)
-        val action = if (isIntercepting) "Intercept" else "Observe"
-        val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
-        val message =
-            "[TX_ID: $txId] $action $methodName for packages=[$packages] (uid=$callingUid, pid=$callingPid)"
-        if (isIntercepting) {
-            SystemLogger.debug(message)
-        } else {
-            SystemLogger.verbose(message)
+        if (SystemLogger.isUidLogged(callingUid)) {
+            val action = if (skipPost) "observe" else "intercept"
+            SystemLogger.uidLog(callingUid, txId, "tx", "$methodName action=$action pid=$callingPid")
+            return
+        }
+        SystemLogger.verbose {
+            val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
+            "[TX_ID: $txId] Observe $methodName for packages=[$packages] (uid=$callingUid, pid=$callingPid)"
         }
     }
 
@@ -293,29 +300,31 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
             }
         }
 
-        /**
-         * Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service.
-         *
-         * @param filteredCodes If non-empty, only these transaction codes will be intercepted at
-         *   the native level. All other codes pass through without the round-trip to Java.
-         */
         fun register(
             backdoor: IBinder,
             target: IBinder,
             interceptor: BinderInterceptor,
             filteredCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf(),
-        ) {
+        ): Boolean {
             val data = Parcel.obtain()
             val reply = Parcel.obtain()
-            try {
+            return try {
                 data.writeStrongBinder(target)
                 data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor)
                 data.writeInt(filteredCodes.size)
                 for (code in filteredCodes) data.writeInt(code)
-                backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
-                SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)")
+                val ok = backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
+                if (ok) {
+                    SystemLogger.info(
+                        "Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)"
+                    )
+                } else {
+                    SystemLogger.error("Register transact returned false for target: $target")
+                }
+                ok
             } catch (e: Exception) {
                 SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e)
+                false
             } finally {
                 data.recycle()
                 reply.recycle()

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/AbstractKeystoreInterceptor.kt

@@ -68,13 +68,8 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
         }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Transaction codes this interceptor needs to handle at the native level. Override in
-     * subclasses to filter; empty means intercept everything (legacy behavior).
-     */
     protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()
 
-    /** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
     private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
         keystoreService = service
         SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/InterceptorUtils.kt

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import android.os.Parcelable
 import android.security.KeyStore
 import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse
 import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+import java.nio.ByteOrder
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
@@ -19,13 +21,36 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
 
     private const val EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC = -8
 
-    fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
-        val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
-            writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
-            writeString(null)
-            writeInt(0)
-            writeInt(errorCode)
+    private const val FLAT_STRIDE_HEADER = 12
+    private const val MAX_AUTH_COUNT = 256
+    private const val SENTINEL_MODTIME = 4_294_967_297L
+    private const val HIGH_MODTIME = 4_999_999_999L
+
+    private fun synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode: Int): String =
+        when (errorCode) {
+            2 -> "Error::Rc(SYSTEM_ERROR)"
+            4 -> "Error::Rc(PERMISSION_DENIED)"
+            6 -> "Error::Rc(VALUE_CORRUPTED)"
+            7 -> "Error::Rc(KEY_NOT_FOUND)"
+            10 -> "Error::Rc(BACKEND_BUSY)"
+            -3 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)"
+            -6 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE)"
+            -7 -> "Error::Km(INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM)"
+            -29 -> "Error::Km(TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)"
+            -49 -> "Error::Km(UNSUPPORTED_TAG)"
+            -75 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH)"
+            -76 -> "Error::Km(INVALID_TAG)"
+            else -> if (errorCode > 0) "Error::Rc($errorCode)" else "Error::Km($errorCode)"
         }
+
+    fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val parcel =
+            Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
+                writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
+                writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
+                writeInt(errorCode)
+            }
         return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
@@ -95,16 +120,26 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
         return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
+    /** Correlates a captured reply parcel to the app that triggered it, for [createTypedObjectReply]. */
+    data class ReplyDiagnostic(val uid: Int, val txId: Long?, val event: String)
+
     /** Creates an `OverrideReply` parcel containing a Parcelable object. */
     fun <T : Parcelable?> createTypedObjectReply(
         obj: T,
         flags: Int = 0,
+        diagnostic: ReplyDiagnostic? = null,
     ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
         val parcel =
             Parcel.obtain().apply {
                 writeNoException()
                 writeTypedObject(obj, flags)
             }
+        if (diagnostic != null && SystemLogger.isUidLogged(diagnostic.uid)) {
+            val savedPos = parcel.dataPosition()
+            val wire = parcel.marshall()
+            parcel.setDataPosition(savedPos)
+            SystemLogger.uidLogRaw(diagnostic.uid, diagnostic.txId, diagnostic.event, "len=${wire.size}", wire)
+        }
         return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
     }
 
@@ -130,28 +165,29 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
         return exception != null
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Creates an `OverrideReply` that writes a `ServiceSpecificException` with the given error
-     * code via EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC.
-     */
     fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
         errorCode: Int
-    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
-        val parcel =
-            Parcel.obtain().apply {
-                writeException(android.os.ServiceSpecificException(errorCode))
-            }
-        return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
+    ): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply = createErrorReply(errorCode)
+
+    fun normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply: Parcel): Parcel? {
+        reply.setDataPosition(0)
+        if (reply.readInt() != EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC) {
+            reply.setDataPosition(0)
+            return null
+        }
+        // Advance position past message and stack header to reach errorCode.
+        reply.readString()
+        reply.readInt()
+        val errorCode = reply.readInt()
+        reply.setDataPosition(0)
+        return Parcel.obtain().apply {
+            writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
+            writeString(synthesizeSseMessage(errorCode))
+            writeInt(0)
+            writeInt(errorCode)
+        }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Patches the system-level authorization values (OS_PATCHLEVEL, VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
-     * BOOT_PATCHLEVEL) in an authorization array to match the configured patch levels for the
-     * given calling UID. Each authorization's original [Authorization.securityLevel] is preserved.
-     *
-     * When a patch level is configured as "no" ([AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT]), the original
-     * hardware value is kept as-is.
-     */
     fun patchAuthorizations(
         authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
         callingUid: Int,
@@ -162,8 +198,8 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
         val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
         val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
 
-        return authorizations
-            .map { auth ->
+        val patched =
+            authorizations.map { auth ->
                 val replacement =
                     when (auth.keyParameter.tag) {
                         Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL ->
@@ -189,5 +225,101 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
                 }
             }
             .toTypedArray()
+        return normalizeAuthorizationLayout(patched)
     }
+
+    /**
+     * Reorders a generateKey reply's authorizations only when the marshalled reply would read, to a
+     * flat 12-byte-stride parcel fingerprint, as the TEE-simulator sentinel: a last slot of
+     * securityLevel 4 or 256, tag 1, union 32 with the 0x1_0000_0001 pseudo-timestamp, or any
+     * timestamp past [HIGH_MODTIME]. Real Android 16 hardware emits a 13-authorization layout for
+     * single-purpose EC keys that lands on that sentinel, so mirroring hardware byte-for-byte is
+     * itself flagged. Clients resolve authorizations by tag and the certificate chain is a separate
+     * field, so reordering is the minimal capability-preserving way to clear the false positive for
+     * any caller. Already-clean replies are returned unchanged.
+     */
+    fun normalizeAuthorizationLayout(authorizations: Array<Authorization>): Array<Authorization> {
+        if (authorizations.size < 2) return authorizations
+        if (!flatStrideFingerprintMatches(marshalTypedArray(authorizations))) return authorizations
+        val n = authorizations.size
+        for (src in 1 until n) {
+            val candidate = moveAuthorization(authorizations, src, 0)
+            if (!flatStrideFingerprintMatches(marshalTypedArray(candidate))) return candidate
+        }
+        for (src in 0 until n) {
+            for (dst in 0 until n) {
+                if (src == dst) continue
+                val candidate = moveAuthorization(authorizations, src, dst)
+                if (!flatStrideFingerprintMatches(marshalTypedArray(candidate))) return candidate
+            }
+        }
+        return authorizations
+    }
+
+    private fun moveAuthorization(
+        authorizations: Array<Authorization>,
+        src: Int,
+        dst: Int,
+    ): Array<Authorization> {
+        val reordered = authorizations.toMutableList()
+        reordered.add(dst, reordered.removeAt(src))
+        return reordered.toTypedArray()
+    }
+
+    private fun marshalTypedArray(authorizations: Array<Authorization>): ByteArray {
+        val parcel = Parcel.obtain()
+        return try {
+            // keystore2 AIDL compile stubs omit the Parcelable supertype these types carry at runtime.
+            parcel.writeTypedArray(authorizations.map { it as Parcelable }.toTypedArray(), 0)
+            parcel.marshall()
+        } finally {
+            parcel.recycle()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun flatStrideFingerprintMatches(marshalled: ByteArray): Boolean =
+        runCatching {
+            val parcel = ByteBuffer.wrap(marshalled).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+            val count = parcel.getInt(0)
+            if (count !in 1..MAX_AUTH_COUNT) return@runCatching false
+            var off = 4
+            var lastSec = 0L
+            var lastTag = 0L
+            var lastUnion = 0L
+            repeat(count) {
+                lastSec = u32(parcel, off)
+                lastTag = u32(parcel, off + 4)
+                lastUnion = u32(parcel, off + 8)
+                off += FLAT_STRIDE_HEADER
+                off = alignWord(off + flatPayloadSize(parcel, off, lastUnion))
+            }
+            off = skipDriftedByteArray(parcel, off)
+            off = skipDriftedByteArray(parcel, off)
+            val modtime = parcel.getLong(alignWord(off))
+            val unknownUnion = lastUnion !in 0..14
+            modtime > HIGH_MODTIME ||
+                (modtime == SENTINEL_MODTIME &&
+                    (lastSec == 4L || lastSec == 256L) &&
+                    lastTag == 1L &&
+                    lastUnion == 32L &&
+                    unknownUnion)
+        }.getOrDefault(false)
+
+    private fun flatPayloadSize(parcel: ByteBuffer, off: Int, union: Long): Int =
+        when {
+            union in 1..11 -> 4
+            union == 12L || union == 13L -> 8
+            union == 14L -> alignWord(off + 4 + parcel.getInt(off)) - off
+            else -> 0
+        }
+
+    private fun skipDriftedByteArray(parcel: ByteBuffer, off: Int): Int {
+        if (parcel.getInt(off) == 0) return off + 4
+        val lengthPos = off + 4
+        return alignWord(lengthPos + 4 + parcel.getInt(lengthPos))
+    }
+
+    private fun u32(parcel: ByteBuffer, off: Int): Long = parcel.getInt(off).toLong() and 0xFFFFFFFFL
+
+    private fun alignWord(off: Int): Int = (off + 3) and 3.inv()
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/Keystore2Interceptor.kt

@@ -5,19 +5,20 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.IBinder
 import android.os.Parcel
+import android.os.ServiceManager
 import android.system.keystore2.Domain
-import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreSecurityLevel
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
 import java.security.SecureRandom
 import java.security.cert.Certificate
-import java.util.Collections
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.AttestationDossier
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
@@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         else null
     private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
         InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
-    private val GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION =
-        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getSecurityLevel")
+    private val GRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "grant")
+    private val UNGRANT_TRANSACTION = InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "ungrant")
 
     private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
         stubBinderClass.declaredFields
@@ -61,19 +62,23 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
     }
 
+    private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
+    private const val RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED = 6
+    private const val KEY_PERMISSION_GET_INFO = 0x4
+    private const val KEY_PERMISSION_UPDATE = 0x80
+
+    // KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess() became a public app API in Android 16 (API 36). Before that,
+    // grant was a hidden API and SELinux denied untrusted_app, so a synthetic-key grant must answer
+    // PERMISSION_DENIED pre-36 and a coherent virtualized grant on 36+.
+    private const val GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK = 36
+    private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
     private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
-    private val deletedSoftwareKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
 
-    // Backdoor binder for registering new interceptors at runtime.
-    private var backdoorBinder: IBinder? = null
-
-    // Per-security-level interceptor instances, keyed by SecurityLevel constant.
-    private val securityLevelInterceptors = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor>()
-
-    // Identity set of SecurityLevel binders already registered with the native hook,
-    // tracked by System.identityHashCode to avoid re-registering the same BBinder.
-    private val registeredSecurityLevelBinders: MutableSet<Int> =
-        Collections.newSetFromMap(ConcurrentHashMap())
+    fun forgetDeletedKey(keyId: KeyIdentifier) {
+        if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("Cleared deletion marker for ${keyId.alias}")
+        }
+    }
 
     override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
     override val processName = "keystore2"
@@ -87,7 +92,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                 LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
                 LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
                 GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
-                GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION,
+                GRANT_TRANSACTION,
+                UNGRANT_TRANSACTION,
             )
             .toIntArray()
     }
@@ -97,9 +103,32 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
      * security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
      */
     override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
-        backdoorBinder = backdoor
         val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
         setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
+        setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor)
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Hooks the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder, which is hosted by the
+     * same process, so synthetic key state follows real key-lifecycle events. Best-effort: if the
+     * service is absent the synthetic plane simply forgoes lifecycle parity.
+     */
+    private fun setupMaintenanceInterceptor(backdoor: IBinder) {
+        runCatching {
+                ServiceManager.getService("android.security.maintenance")?.let { maintenance ->
+                    SystemLogger.info("Found maintenance binder. Registering interceptor...")
+                    register(
+                        backdoor,
+                        maintenance,
+                        Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor,
+                        Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor.interceptedCodes,
+                    )
+                }
+                    ?: SystemLogger.warning(
+                        "Maintenance binder not found; skipping lifecycle parity."
+                    )
+            }
+            .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept maintenance binder.", it) }
     }
 
     private fun setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(service: IKeystoreService, backdoor: IBinder) {
@@ -109,11 +138,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                     val interceptor =
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
-                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT] = interceptor
-                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+                    register(
                         backdoor,
                         tee.asBinder(),
                         interceptor,
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
                     )
                     interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                 }
@@ -126,11 +155,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
                     val interceptor =
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
-                    securityLevelInterceptors[SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX] = interceptor
-                    registerSecurityLevelBinder(
+                    register(
                         backdoor,
                         strongbox.asBinder(),
                         interceptor,
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
                     )
                     interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
                 }
@@ -138,30 +167,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept StrongBox SecurityLevel.", it) }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Registers an interceptor for a SecurityLevel binder, tracking the binder identity
-     * to avoid duplicate registrations when keystore2 returns the same BBinder.
-     */
-    private fun registerSecurityLevelBinder(
-        backdoor: IBinder,
-        binder: IBinder,
-        interceptor: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor,
-    ) {
-        val identity = System.identityHashCode(binder)
-        if (registeredSecurityLevelBinders.add(identity)) {
-            register(
-                backdoor,
-                binder,
-                interceptor,
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
-            )
-        } else {
-            SystemLogger.debug(
-                "SecurityLevel binder $binder (identity=$identity) already registered, skipping."
-            )
-        }
-    }
-
     override fun onPreTransact(
         txId: Long,
         target: IBinder,
@@ -184,9 +189,23 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
 
             if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
                 return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-            } else {
-                return TransactionResult.Continue
             }
+
+            return runCatching {
+                    val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
+                    if (ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)) {
+                        TransactionResult.Continue
+                    } else {
+                        TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+                    }
+                }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.error(
+                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to parse parameters for ${transactionNames[code]!!}",
+                        it,
+                    )
+                    TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+                }
         } else if (
             code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION ||
                 code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION ||
@@ -194,30 +213,70 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         ) {
             logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
 
-            if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
-                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
-
-            if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION)
+            if (code == UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION) {
+                if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
+                    return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
                 return handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid, data)
+            }
 
             data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
             val descriptor =
                 data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
                     ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
 
+            // Domain.GRANT read (Android 16+ KeyStoreManager grant). Served for ANY grantee uid —
+            // including isolated services (bindIsolatedService) with no package mapping — so
+            // resolve
+            // it before the package-scoped skip; caller-binding in resolveGrant() is the real
+            // access
+            // gate. On Android <= 15 no grants are ever issued (grant() denies), so softwareGrants
+            // is
+            // empty and this falls through to the real keystore2.
+            if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION && descriptor.domain == Domain.GRANT) {
+                val grant =
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.resolveGrant(descriptor.nspace, callingUid)
+                if (grant == null) {
+                    // Ours but wrong caller -> KEY_NOT_FOUND (caller-binding); not ours -> real
+                    // keystore2.
+                    return if (
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.softwareGrants.containsKey(
+                            descriptor.nspace
+                        )
+                    )
+                        InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+                    else TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+                }
+                if ((grant.accessVector and KEY_PERMISSION_GET_INFO) == 0) {
+                    return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
+                }
+                val response =
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(grant.ownerKeyId)
+                        ?: return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+                // Same object the owner read returns -> coherent chain across planes.
+                return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
+            }
+
+            // generateKey force-forges attest/device-id keys even for skipped UIDs; getKeyEntry
+            // must serve them back or the framework's attestKeyAlias lookup gets KEY_NOT_FOUND.
+            if (code != GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION && ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
+                return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+
             if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
-                // Handle delete by alias (APP domain) or nspace (KEY_ID domain).
                 val keyId =
                     if (descriptor.alias != null) {
                         KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
                     } else if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
-                            callingUid, descriptor.nspace
-                        )?.let { info ->
-                            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
-                                .find { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
-                                ?.key
-                        }
+                                callingUid,
+                                descriptor.nspace,
+                            )
+                            ?.let { info ->
+                                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
+                                    .find {
+                                        it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid
+                                    }
+                                    ?.key
+                            }
                     } else null
 
                 if (keyId != null) {
@@ -236,33 +295,127 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             }
 
             if (descriptor.alias == null) {
+                if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
+                    // The probe pipeline (and some AOSP callers) switch follow-up
+                    // operations to KEY_ID semantics after generateKey returns a
+                    // KEY_ID descriptor. Without this branch, our software keys
+                    // are invisible to KEY_ID-based getKeyEntry calls and the
+                    // request falls through to the real keystore2 daemon, which
+                    // legitimately responds with KEY_NOT_FOUND. Duck Detector's
+                    // TimingSideChannelProbe captures that exception during its
+                    // warmup phase and surfaces it as
+                    // "Captured private binder exception during timing skip".
+                    // Resolving by KEY_ID and returning the cached response keeps
+                    // the call on the happy path, eliminating the warmup signal.
+                    val info =
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
+                            callingUid,
+                            descriptor.nspace,
+                        )
+                    if (info?.response != null) {
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found generated response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
+                        )
+                        logServedChain(callingUid, txId, "keyid:${descriptor.nspace}", info.response)
+                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(info.response)
+                    }
+                    val teeResp =
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findTeeResponseByKeyId(
+                            callingUid,
+                            descriptor.nspace,
+                        )
+                    if (teeResp != null) {
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Found TEE response via KEY_ID nspace=${descriptor.nspace}"
+                        )
+                        logServedChain(callingUid, txId, "keyid:${descriptor.nspace}", teeResp)
+                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(teeResp)
+                    }
+                }
+                // Domain.GRANT is handled earlier (before the package-scoped skip); an alias-less
+                // read reaching here is KEY_ID or unknown, so it falls through to the real
+                // keystore2.
                 return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
             }
             val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
 
-            if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(7) // KEY_NOT_FOUND
+            val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
+            if (response == null) {
+                if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
+                    SystemLogger.info(
+                        "[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}"
+                    )
+                    return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+                }
+                // Owned keys were served above; for a skipped UID a non-owned key must still skip
+                // post-processing so we never patch an un-targeted app's real key.
+                return if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
+                    TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+                else TransactionResult.Continue
             }
 
-            val response =
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
-                    ?: return TransactionResult.Continue
-
             if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
                 SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
 
             SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Found generated response for ${descriptor.alias}:")
             response.metadata?.authorizations?.forEach {
-                KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it.keyParameter)
+                KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(callingUid, txId, it.keyParameter)
             }
+            logServedChain(callingUid, txId, descriptor.alias, response)
             return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
-        } else if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
-            // Pass through to post-hook so we can register interceptors for newly-created
-            // SecurityLevel binders. keystore2 may create a new BBinder per call, so the
-            // initial registration in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors might not cover all
-            // binder instances that clients receive.
-            logTransaction(txId, "getSecurityLevel", callingUid, callingPid)
-            return TransactionResult.Continue
+        } else if (code == GRANT_TRANSACTION) {
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "grant", callingUid, callingPid)
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val key =
+                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            val granteeUid = data.readInt()
+            val accessVector = data.readInt()
+            // Synthetic (generatedKeys) AND patch-mode (teeResponses) keys are ours; both must
+            // grant
+            // coherently so the Domain.GRANT readback returns the same chain the owner read
+            // returns.
+            // Real hardware keys fall through to the real keystore2, which applies the same SELinux
+            // gate the platform would.
+            val ownerKeyId =
+                resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)?.takeIf {
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it)
+                } ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            // Version-gated to mirror the real TEE 1:1. Pre-Android-16, grant was a hidden API and
+            // SELinux denied untrusted_app, so keystore2 returns PERMISSION_DENIED. Android 16
+            // (API 36) exposes KeyStoreManager.grantKeyAccess(), so an app grants its own key:
+            // issue a coherent, caller-bound, access-vector-carrying grant whose Domain.GRANT read
+            // returns the owner's chain.
+            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
+                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
+            }
+            val grantId =
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.issueGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid, accessVector)
+            val reply =
+                KeyDescriptor().apply {
+                    domain = Domain.GRANT
+                    nspace = grantId
+                    alias = null
+                    blob = null
+                }
+            return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(reply)
+        } else if (code == UNGRANT_TRANSACTION) {
+            logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code] ?: "ungrant", callingUid, callingPid)
+            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
+            val key =
+                data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+                    ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            val granteeUid = data.readInt()
+            val ownerKeyId =
+                resolveOwnerKeyId(key, callingUid)?.takeIf {
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.ownsKeyResponse(it)
+                } ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            // Same version gate as grant(): denied pre-36, revoke the virtualized grant on 36+.
+            if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < GRANT_PUBLIC_API_SDK) {
+                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
+            }
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.revokeGrant(ownerKeyId, granteeUid)
+            return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
         } else {
             logTransaction(
                 txId,
@@ -288,11 +441,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         reply: Parcel?,
         resultCode: Int,
     ): TransactionResult {
-        if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
-            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-
-        if (code == GET_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRANSACTION) {
-            return handlePostGetSecurityLevel(txId, data, reply)
+        if (target != keystoreService || reply == null) return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+        if (InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply)) {
+            val normalized = InterceptorUtils.normalizeServiceSpecificReply(reply)
+            return if (normalized != null) TransactionResult.OverrideReply(normalized)
+            else TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
         }
 
         if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
@@ -304,10 +457,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                             it.uid == callingUid
                         }
                     val totalCount = hardwareCount + softwareCount
-                    val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
-                        writeNoException()
-                        writeInt(totalCount)
-                    }
+                    val parcel =
+                        Parcel.obtain().apply {
+                            writeNoException()
+                            writeInt(totalCount)
+                        }
                     TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
                 }
                 .getOrElse {
@@ -318,12 +472,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
 
             return runCatching {
-                    val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
-                    val params =
-                        ListEntriesHandler.cacheParameters(txId, data, isBatchMode)
-                            ?: throw Exception("Abort updating entries for invalid parameters.")
                     val updatedKeyDescriptors =
-                        ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, params, reply)
+                        ListEntriesHandler.injectGeneratedKeys(txId, callingUid, reply)
                     InterceptorUtils.createTypedArrayReply(updatedKeyDescriptors)
                 }
                 .getOrElse {
@@ -353,9 +503,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                     val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
                     val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
 
-                    // Skip patching for keys whose certs were explicitly set via updateSubcomponent.
                     if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
-                        SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
+                        SystemLogger.trace {
+                            "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: userUpdated=true, skipping patch"
+                        }
+                        SystemLogger.debug(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId."
+                        )
                         return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
                     }
 
@@ -365,13 +519,51 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                             authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
                         )
 
-                    if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey() &&
-                        !KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)
-                    ) {
+                    SystemLogger.trace {
+                        "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: isImport=${parsedParameters.isImportKey()} origin=${parsedParameters.origin} inImportedKeys=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)} hasPatchedChain=${KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId) != null} isAttestKey=${parsedParameters.isAttestKey()}"
+                    }
+
+                    if (parsedParameters.isImportKey()) {
+                        val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
+                        if (retainedChain == null) {
+                            SystemLogger.trace {
+                                "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, no retained chain, skip"
+                            }
+                            SystemLogger.info(
+                                "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation)."
+                            )
+                            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                        }
+                        SystemLogger.trace {
+                            "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: imported, SERVING RETAINED CHAIN (detection vector!)"
+                        }
+                        SystemLogger.info(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId"
+                        )
+                        CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain)
+                            .getOrThrow()
+                        response.metadata.authorizations =
+                            InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
+                                response.metadata.authorizations,
+                                callingUid,
+                            )
+                        return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
+                    }
+
+                    if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
+                        SystemLogger.trace {
+                            "[TRACE-$txId] getKeyEntry $keyId: in importedKeys set, skip"
+                        }
+                        SystemLogger.debug(
+                            "[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId"
+                        )
+                        return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
+                    }
+
+                    if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
                         SystemLogger.warning(
                             "[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
                         )
-                        // Attest keys that are not under our control should be overriden.
                         val keyData =
                             CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
                                 callingUid,
@@ -392,23 +584,55 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                                 callingUid,
                             )
 
-                        val key = response.metadata.key!!
-                        key.nspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
+                        val newNspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
+                        response.metadata.key?.let { it.nspace = newNspace }
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[keyId] =
                             KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo(
                                 keyData.first,
                                 null,
-                                key.nspace,
+                                newNspace,
                                 response,
                                 parsedParameters,
                             )
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
+
+                        // Snapshot metadata bytes for the same reason as the
+                        // primary doSoftwareKeyGen path — loss-less restore
+                        // after reboot.
+                        val metadataBytesForPersist =
+                            response.metadata?.let { md ->
+                                runCatching {
+                                        val parcel = android.os.Parcel.obtain()
+                                        try {
+                                            md.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
+                                            parcel.marshall()
+                                        } finally {
+                                            parcel.recycle()
+                                        }
+                                    }
+                                    .getOrNull()
+                            }
+                        GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
+                            keyId = keyId,
+                            keyPair = keyData.first,
+                            secretKey = null,
+                            nspace = newNspace,
+                            securityLevel = response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
+                            certChain = keyData.second,
+                            algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
+                            keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
+                            ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
+                            purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
+                            digests = parsedParameters.digest,
+                            isAttestationKey = true,
+                            metadataBytes = metadataBytesForPersist,
+                        )
+
                         return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
                     }
 
                     val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
 
-                    // Check if we should perform attestation patch.
                     if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
                         SystemLogger.info(
                             "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
@@ -416,8 +640,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                         return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
                     }
 
-                    // First, try to retrieve the already-patched chain from our cache to ensure
-                    // consistency.
                     val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
 
                     val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
@@ -427,16 +649,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                         )
                         finalChain = cachedChain
                     } else {
-                        // If no chain is cached (e.g., key existed before simulator started),
-                        // perform a live patch as a fallback. This may still be detectable.
                         SystemLogger.info(
                             "[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
                         )
                         finalChain =
                             AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
-
                         KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
-                        SystemLogger.debug("Cached patched certificate chain for $keyId.")
                     }
 
                     CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
@@ -447,6 +665,10 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
                             callingUid,
                         )
 
+                    // PATCH decode point: the patched chain actually served back to the app on
+                    // getKeyEntry — the ground truth a patch-mode detector reads.
+                    AttestationDossier.log(callingUid, txId, "PATCH", finalChain.asList())
+
                     return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
                 }
                 .onFailure {
@@ -460,12 +682,85 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
         return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Resolves the owner [KeyIdentifier] a grant/ungrant call targets. APP/alias keys map directly;
+     * KEY_ID keys are looked up by nspace (mirrors the deleteKey resolver). Returns null for
+     * anything not addressable, so callers fall through to the real keystore2.
+     */
+    private fun resolveOwnerKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
+        when {
+            descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
+            descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
+                        callingUid,
+                        descriptor.nspace,
+                    )
+                    ?.let { info ->
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
+                            .firstOrNull {
+                                it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid
+                            }
+                            ?.key
+                    }
+            else -> null
+        }
+
+    /**
+     * Records the certificate chain actually served back to [uid] on a getKeyEntry, keyed by
+     * [alias]. The app reassembles its final chain from these served chains (the leaf alias plus
+     * the attest-key alias), so logging each one with key sizes and a per-edge verification makes a
+     * verification failure in the app's combined chain reproducible from the log, not inferred.
+     */
+    private fun logServedChain(uid: Int, txId: Long, alias: String, response: KeyEntryResponse?) {
+        if (response == null || !SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val chain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)?.asList() ?: return
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "served", "alias=$alias depth=${chain.size}")
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "served-keys", AttestationPatcher.formatChainKeys(chain))
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "served-verify", AttestationPatcher.formatChainVerification(chain))
+    }
+
     private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
         data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
-        val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
-            ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+        val descriptor =
+            data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
+                ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+
+        if (descriptor.domain == Domain.GRANT) {
+            val grant =
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.resolveGrant(descriptor.nspace, callingUid)
+            if (grant == null) {
+                return if (
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.softwareGrants.containsKey(descriptor.nspace)
+                )
+                    InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+                else TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+            }
+            if ((grant.accessVector and KEY_PERMISSION_UPDATE) == 0) {
+                return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_PERMISSION_DENIED)
+            }
+
+            val generatedKeyInfo =
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[grant.ownerKeyId]
+            val response =
+                generatedKeyInfo?.response
+                    ?: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(grant.ownerKeyId)
+                    ?: return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+            return updateResponseSubcomponent(
+                response = response,
+                publicCert = data.createByteArray(),
+                certificateChain = data.createByteArray(),
+                persist = {
+                    if (generatedKeyInfo != null) {
+                        GeneratedKeyPersistence.rePersistIfNeeded(
+                            grant.ownerKeyId.uid,
+                            generatedKeyInfo,
+                        )
+                    }
+                },
+                label = "grant[${descriptor.nspace}] -> ${grant.ownerKeyId}",
+            )
+        }
 
-        // Resolve by nspace (KEY_ID) or alias (APP), same as createOperation.
         val generatedKeyInfo =
             when (descriptor.domain) {
                 Domain.KEY_ID ->
@@ -481,85 +776,63 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
             }
 
         if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
-            // Hardware key: mark so getKeyEntry skips cert re-patching.
-            descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
+            // Patch-mode key (cached in teeResponses, not generatedKeys): the real keystore2
+            // applies
+            // the update, so drop our stale cached chain. Otherwise getKeyEntry replays the
+            // pre-update generated attestation (duck STALE_TEE_RESPONSE_AFTER_KEY_ID_UPDATE).
+            when (descriptor.domain) {
+                Domain.KEY_ID ->
+                    KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponseByKeyId(
+                        callingUid,
+                        descriptor.nspace,
+                    )
+                Domain.APP ->
+                    descriptor.alias?.let {
+                        KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.evictTeeResponse(
+                            KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)
+                        )
+                    }
+                else -> {}
+            }
+            descriptor.alias?.let {
+                val kid = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)
+                userUpdatedKeys.add(kid)
+                SystemLogger.trace {
+                    "[TRACE] updateSubcomponent $kid: not generated key, added to userUpdatedKeys"
+                }
+            }
             return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
         }
 
-        SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]")
-        val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
-        val publicCert = data.createByteArray()
-        val certificateChain = data.createByteArray()
+        return updateResponseSubcomponent(
+            response = generatedKeyInfo.response,
+            publicCert = data.createByteArray(),
+            certificateChain = data.createByteArray(),
+            persist = {
+                GeneratedKeyPersistence.rePersistIfNeeded(callingUid, generatedKeyInfo)
+            },
+            label = "key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]",
+        )
+    }
 
+    private fun updateResponseSubcomponent(
+        response: KeyEntryResponse,
+        publicCert: ByteArray?,
+        certificateChain: ByteArray?,
+        persist: () -> Unit,
+        label: String,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with $label")
+        val metadata = response.metadata
         metadata.certificate = publicCert
         metadata.certificateChain = certificateChain
+
+        persist()
+
         SystemLogger.verbose(
             "Key updated with sizes: [publicCert, certificateChain] = [${publicCert?.size}, ${certificateChain?.size}]"
         )
 
         return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
     }
-
-    /**
-     * Intercepts the reply from getSecurityLevel to dynamically register our interceptor
-     * for the returned IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
-     *
-     * keystore2 may create a new BBinder for each getSecurityLevel call, so the binder
-     * registered during initial setup (in setupSecurityLevelInterceptors) might not be the
-     * same one that client apps receive. By intercepting every getSecurityLevel reply, we
-     * ensure that all SecurityLevel binders are covered.
-     */
-    private fun handlePostGetSecurityLevel(
-        txId: Long,
-        data: Parcel,
-        reply: Parcel,
-    ): TransactionResult {
-        val backdoor = backdoorBinder
-        if (backdoor == null) {
-            SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] post-getSecurityLevel: backdoor not available")
-            return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-        }
-
-        return runCatching {
-            // Read the security level argument from the original request.
-            data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
-            val requestedLevel = data.readInt()
-
-            // hasException already consumed the exception header from the reply.
-            // Next item is the IKeystoreSecurityLevel binder.
-            val secLevelBinder = reply.readStrongBinder()
-            if (secLevelBinder == null) {
-                SystemLogger.verbose(
-                    "[TX_ID: $txId] getSecurityLevel($requestedLevel) returned null binder"
-                )
-                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-            }
-
-            // Only intercept TEE and StrongBox security levels.
-            if (requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT &&
-                requestedLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX
-            ) {
-                return@runCatching TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-            }
-
-            // Get or create the interceptor for this security level. The interceptor may not
-            // exist yet if the initial setupSecurityLevelInterceptors call failed for this level.
-            val interceptor = securityLevelInterceptors.getOrPut(requestedLevel) {
-                val secLevelInterface =
-                    IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub.asInterface(secLevelBinder)
-                SystemLogger.info(
-                    "[TX_ID: $txId] Late-creating interceptor for security level $requestedLevel"
-                )
-                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(secLevelInterface, requestedLevel).also {
-                    it.loadPersistedKeys()
-                }
-            }
-
-            registerSecurityLevelBinder(backdoor, secLevelBinder, interceptor)
-            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-        }.getOrElse {
-            SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to process post-getSecurityLevel.", it)
-            TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
-        }
-    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
+
+import android.os.IBinder
+import android.os.Parcel
+import android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance
+import android.system.keystore2.Domain
+import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
+
+/**
+ * Intercepts the keystore2 daemon's `android.security.maintenance` binder so our synthetic key
+ * state follows the same lifecycle events the platform applies to real keys.
+ *
+ * This is a pure side-effect hook: every handled transaction mutates only our own synthetic state
+ * and then returns [TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost], so the real keystore2 still performs
+ * the real operation. We never fabricate a maintenance reply, so real key lifecycle is never
+ * disturbed.
+ *
+ * Mounted via `register()` from [Keystore2Interceptor.onInterceptorReady]; the maintenance binder
+ * is hosted by the same keystore2 process, so the already-injected native hook reaches it too.
+ */
+object Keystore2MaintenanceInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
+    private val stubClass = IKeystoreMaintenance.Stub::class.java
+
+    private val CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "clearNamespace")
+    private val DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "deleteAllKeys")
+    private val MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION =
+        InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubClass, "migrateKeyNamespace")
+
+    /** Only the lifecycle transactions we mirror; unresolved codes (-1) are dropped. */
+    val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
+        listOf(
+                CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
+                DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION,
+                MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION,
+            )
+            .filter { it != -1 }
+            .toIntArray()
+    }
+
+    override fun onPreTransact(
+        txId: Long,
+        target: IBinder,
+        code: Int,
+        flags: Int,
+        callingUid: Int,
+        callingPid: Int,
+        data: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        when (code) {
+            CLEAR_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleClearNamespace(data)
+            DELETE_ALL_KEYS_TRANSACTION ->
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearAllGeneratedKeys("maintenance.deleteAllKeys")
+            MIGRATE_KEY_NAMESPACE_TRANSACTION -> handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data, callingUid)
+        }
+        // Always let the real keystore2 perform the real lifecycle operation.
+        return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+    }
+
+    private fun handleClearNamespace(data: Parcel) {
+        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
+        val domain = data.readInt()
+        val nspace = data.readLong()
+        // Only Domain.APP namespaces map to our per-uid synthetic keys; nspace is the app uid.
+        if (domain == Domain.APP) {
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.clearNamespaceKeys(nspace.toInt())
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun handleMigrateKeyNamespace(data: Parcel, callingUid: Int) {
+        data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreMaintenance.DESCRIPTOR)
+        val source = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
+        val destination = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) ?: return
+        val srcId = resolveSyntheticKeyId(source, callingUid) ?: return
+        if (!KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(srcId)) return // not ours
+
+        val dstId = resolveDestinationKeyId(destination, callingUid)
+        if (dstId == null) {
+            // Migrated out of our trackable (Domain.APP/alias) space -> drop our shadow so reads
+            // fall through to the real keystore2, which now owns it at the new namespace.
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(srcId)
+        } else {
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.migrateGeneratedKey(srcId, dstId)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** Resolves a synthetic owner key from a source descriptor (Domain.APP alias or KEY_ID). */
+    private fun resolveSyntheticKeyId(descriptor: KeyDescriptor, callingUid: Int): KeyIdentifier? =
+        when {
+            descriptor.alias != null -> KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
+            descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID ->
+                KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
+                    .firstOrNull {
+                        it.key.uid == callingUid && it.value.nspace == descriptor.nspace
+                    }
+                    ?.key
+            else -> null
+        }
+
+    /** Destination must be an addressable Domain.APP alias for us to keep tracking the key. */
+    private fun resolveDestinationKeyId(
+        descriptor: KeyDescriptor,
+        callingUid: Int,
+    ): KeyIdentifier? {
+        val alias = descriptor.alias ?: return null
+        if (descriptor.domain != Domain.APP) return null
+        val uid = if (descriptor.nspace > 0) descriptor.nspace.toInt() else callingUid
+        return KeyIdentifier(uid, alias)
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/KeystoreInterceptor.kt

@@ -399,18 +399,17 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
 
     /**
      * Converts the legacy parameters into the modern [KeyMintAttestation] data structure, which is
-     * required by [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
+     * required by the refactored [AttestationBuilder] and [CertificateGenerator].
      */
     fun toKeyMintAttestation(): KeyMintAttestation {
         // This conversion acts as a bridge, allowing our new generic components
         // to be used by the legacy interceptor.
         return KeyMintAttestation(
-            algorithm = this.algorithm,
-            ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
-            ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
             keySize = this.keySize,
-            origin = null, // Not needed to build attestaion
-            noAuthRequired = null,
+            algorithm = this.algorithm,
+            ecCurve = 0,
+            ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
+            origin = null,
             blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
             padding = listOf<Int>(),
             purpose = this.purpose,
@@ -437,6 +436,7 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
             usageExpireDateTime = null,
             usageCountLimit = null,
             callerNonce = null,
+            nonce = null,
             unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
             includeUniqueId = null,
             rollbackResistance = null,
@@ -444,6 +444,7 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
             allowWhileOnBody = null,
             trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
             trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
+            noAuthRequired = null,
             maxUsesPerBoot = null,
             maxBootLevel = null,
             minMacLength = null,

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/ListEntriesHandler.kt

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import android.system.keystore2.Domain
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
 import java.util.TreeMap
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 
@@ -21,6 +22,15 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
     // Estimate for maximum size of a Binder response in bytes.
     private const val RESPONSE_SIZE_LIMIT = 358400
 
+    // Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
+    private data class ListEntriesParams(
+        val domain: Int,
+        val namespace: Long,
+        val startPastAlias: String?,
+    )
+
+    private val pendingParams = ConcurrentHashMap<Long, ListEntriesParams>()
+
     // Based on AOSP function `estimate_safe_amount_to_return` in utils.rs.
     private fun estimateSafeAmountToReturn(
         keyDescriptors: Array<KeyDescriptor>,
@@ -50,7 +60,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
     }
 
     // Parse and store parameters for later use (in post-transaction).
-    fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): ListEntriesParams? {
+    fun cacheParameters(txId: Long, data: Parcel, isBatchMode: Boolean): Boolean {
         data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
 
         val domain = data.readInt()
@@ -61,21 +71,20 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
         // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
         // Note that all generated keys belong to Domain::APP.
         if (domain == Domain.APP) {
-            val params = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
-            SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached $params.")
-            return params
+            pendingParams[txId] = ListEntriesParams(domain, namespace, startPastAlias)
+            SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Cached ${pendingParams[txId]}.")
+            return true
         }
 
-        return null
+        return false
     }
 
     // Merge software-backed keys with hardware-backed keys in the reply parcel.
-    fun injectGeneratedKeys(
-        txId: Long,
-        callingUid: Int,
-        params: ListEntriesParams,
-        reply: Parcel,
-    ): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
+    fun injectGeneratedKeys(txId: Long, callingUid: Int, reply: Parcel): Array<KeyDescriptor> {
+        val params =
+            pendingParams.remove(txId)
+                ?: throw IllegalStateException("No params found for listing entries")
+
         // By default we use the calling uid as namespace if domain is Domain::APP.
         // The namespace parameter is thus ignored for non-privileged applications.
         // See AOSP function `get_key_descriptor_for_lookup` in service.rs.
@@ -131,6 +140,3 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
             }
     }
 }
-
-// Parameters of AOSP function `list_key_entries` in utils.rs.
-data class ListEntriesParams(val domain: Int, val namespace: Long, val startPastAlias: String?)

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/AuthorizeCreate.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
+
+object AuthorizeCreate {
+
+    fun check(
+        keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
+        opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
+        rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
+    ): Int? {
+        if (keyParams == null) return null
+        val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
+        // Algorithm-level rejection runs before purpose-list check (AOSP HAL behavior)
+        return checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
+            ?: checkPurpose(keyParams, purpose)
+            ?: checkOperationAuthorizations(keyParams, opParams)
+            ?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, purpose)
+            ?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, purpose, rawOpParams)
+    }
+
+    private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
+        val algo = keyParams.algorithm
+        if (
+            (algo == Algorithm.EC || algo == Algorithm.RSA) &&
+                (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT)
+        ) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
+        }
+        if (algo == Algorithm.RSA && purpose == KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY)
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
+        return null
+    }
+
+    private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
+        if (purpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY) return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
+        if (purpose !in keyParams.purpose) return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
+        return null
+    }
+
+    private fun checkOperationAuthorizations(
+        keyParams: KeyMintAttestation,
+        opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
+    ): Int? {
+        if (opParams.blockMode.any { it !in keyParams.blockMode }) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleBlockMode
+        }
+        if (opParams.padding.any { it !in keyParams.padding }) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePaddingMode
+        }
+        if (opParams.digest.any { it !in keyParams.digest }) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleDigest
+        }
+        if (opParams.rsaOaepMgfDigest.any { it !in keyParams.rsaOaepMgfDigest }) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleDigest
+        }
+
+        if (keyParams.algorithm == Algorithm.AES && opParams.blockMode.contains(BlockMode.GCM)) {
+            val requestedMacLength = opParams.minMacLength
+            val keyMinMacLength = keyParams.minMacLength
+            if (
+                requestedMacLength != null &&
+                    keyMinMacLength != null &&
+                    requestedMacLength < keyMinMacLength
+            ) {
+                return KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidMacLength
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (
+            keyParams.algorithm == Algorithm.RSA &&
+                opParams.padding.contains(PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP) &&
+                opParams.digest.isEmpty()
+        ) {
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleDigest
+        }
+
+        return null
+    }
+
+    private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, purpose: Int): Int? {
+        val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
+
+        keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
+            if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
+        }
+
+        keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
+            if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
+                if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
+            }
+        }
+
+        keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
+            if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
+                if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
+            }
+        }
+
+        return null
+    }
+
+    private fun checkCallerNonce(
+        keyParams: KeyMintAttestation,
+        purpose: Int,
+        rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?,
+    ): Int? {
+        if (purpose != KeyPurpose.SIGN && purpose != KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) return null
+        if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
+        if (rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true)
+            return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
+        return null
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/GeneratedKeyPersistence.kt

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
-
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
 
 data class PersistedKeyData(
     val uid: Int,
@@ -29,13 +29,40 @@ data class PersistedKeyData(
     val ecCurve: Int,
     val purposes: List<Int>,
     val digests: List<Int>,
+    /** PKCS#8-encoded private key for asymmetric records, empty for symmetric. */
     val privateKeyBytes: ByteArray,
     val certChainBytes: List<ByteArray>,
+    /**
+     * Byte-identical KeyMetadata parcel snapshot. Restoring authorizations directly from these
+     * bytes preserves tag count, order, and exact security-level annotations across reboots — the
+     * kind of structural details apps fingerprint to decide whether the alias is still "the same
+     * key".
+     */
+    val metadataBytes: ByteArray,
+    /**
+     * Raw secret material for symmetric records (AES, HMAC, 3DES). Empty for asymmetric. Critical
+     * for AndroidX security crypto MasterKey (AES-GCM-256) — without this every reboot regenerates
+     * a fresh AES key and EncryptedSharedPreferences becomes undecryptable, which is what banking
+     * apps interpret as session expiry and force a relogin.
+     */
+    val symmetricKeyBytes: ByteArray,
+    val symmetricAlgorithm: String,
 )
 
 object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
 
-    private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 1
+    /**
+     * Single source of truth for the on-disk format. Bump this every time the layout changes; older
+     * numbers are silently skipped on read so stale dev artifacts and pre-fix upstream files can't
+     * be partially rehydrated into broken in-memory state.
+     *
+     * History: 1 — original upstream layout (no metadata snapshot, no symmetric block; restored
+     * keys lose authorization tags and AES master keys altogether — apps relying on persisted
+     * keystore state across reboots get logged out) 2 — transitional dev-only format that added
+     * metadata but still missed the symmetric block; never shipped 3 — current: byte-identical
+     * KeyMetadata snapshot + raw symmetric key material so AES/HMAC keys survive reboots
+     */
+    private const val FORMAT_VERSION = 3
     private val PERSISTENCE_DIR = File(CONFIG_PATH, "persistent_keys")
 
     // Per-filename locks to prevent concurrent writes to the same key file
@@ -47,7 +74,8 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
 
     fun save(
         keyId: KeyIdentifier,
-        keyPair: KeyPair,
+        keyPair: KeyPair?,
+        secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
         nspace: Long,
         securityLevel: Int,
         certChain: List<Certificate>,
@@ -57,7 +85,11 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
         purposes: List<Int>,
         digests: List<Int>,
         isAttestationKey: Boolean,
+        metadataBytes: ByteArray? = null,
     ) {
+        require(keyPair != null || secretKey != null) {
+            "Either keyPair or secretKey must be provided"
+        }
         val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
         val lock = getLockForKey(filename)
         SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Acquiring lock for $filename")
@@ -65,59 +97,80 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
         try {
             SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Lock acquired for $filename")
             runCatching {
-                PERSISTENCE_DIR.mkdirs()
-                val finalFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
-                val tmpFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, "$filename.tmp")
+                    PERSISTENCE_DIR.mkdirs()
+                    val finalFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
+                    val tmpFile = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, "$filename.tmp")
 
-                try {
-                    DataOutputStream(BufferedOutputStream(FileOutputStream(tmpFile))).use { out ->
-                        out.writeInt(FORMAT_VERSION)
-                        out.writeInt(securityLevel)
-                        out.writeInt(keyId.uid)
-                        out.writeUTF(keyId.alias)
-                        out.writeLong(nspace)
-                        out.writeBoolean(isAttestationKey)
-                        out.writeInt(algorithm)
-                        out.writeInt(keySize)
-                        out.writeInt(ecCurve)
+                    try {
+                        DataOutputStream(BufferedOutputStream(FileOutputStream(tmpFile))).use { out
+                            ->
+                            out.writeInt(FORMAT_VERSION)
+                            out.writeInt(securityLevel)
+                            out.writeInt(keyId.uid)
+                            out.writeUTF(keyId.alias)
+                            out.writeLong(nspace)
+                            out.writeBoolean(isAttestationKey)
+                            out.writeInt(algorithm)
+                            out.writeInt(keySize)
+                            out.writeInt(ecCurve)
 
-                        out.writeInt(purposes.size)
-                        purposes.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
+                            out.writeInt(purposes.size)
+                            purposes.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
 
-                        out.writeInt(digests.size)
-                        digests.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
+                            out.writeInt(digests.size)
+                            digests.forEach { out.writeInt(it) }
 
-                        val pkBytes = keyPair.private.encoded
-                        out.writeInt(pkBytes.size)
-                        out.write(pkBytes)
+                            // Asymmetric key block (empty for symmetric-only).
+                            val pkBytes = keyPair?.private?.encoded ?: ByteArray(0)
+                            out.writeInt(pkBytes.size)
+                            out.write(pkBytes)
 
-                        out.writeInt(certChain.size)
-                        certChain.forEach { cert ->
-                            val encoded = cert.encoded
-                            out.writeInt(encoded.size)
-                            out.write(encoded)
+                            out.writeInt(certChain.size)
+                            certChain.forEach { cert ->
+                                val encoded = cert.encoded
+                                out.writeInt(encoded.size)
+                                out.write(encoded)
+                            }
+
+                            // Metadata snapshot (always present, may be empty
+                            // if the live KeyMetadata could not be marshalled).
+                            val mdBytes = metadataBytes ?: ByteArray(0)
+                            out.writeInt(mdBytes.size)
+                            if (mdBytes.isNotEmpty()) out.write(mdBytes)
+
+                            // Symmetric key block (empty for asymmetric keys).
+                            if (secretKey != null) {
+                                val skBytes = secretKey.encoded
+                                out.writeUTF(secretKey.algorithm)
+                                out.writeInt(skBytes.size)
+                                out.write(skBytes)
+                            } else {
+                                out.writeUTF("")
+                                out.writeInt(0)
+                            }
                         }
+                    } catch (e: Exception) {
+                        tmpFile.delete()
+                        throw e
                     }
-                } catch (e: Exception) {
-                    tmpFile.delete()
-                    throw e
-                }
 
-                // Atomic rename — if this fails the tmp is left behind and cleaned on next deleteAll
-                if (!tmpFile.renameTo(finalFile)) {
-                    tmpFile.delete()
-                    throw IllegalStateException("Failed to atomically rename $tmpFile -> $finalFile")
-                }
+                    // Atomic rename — if this fails the tmp is left behind and cleaned on next
+                    // deleteAll
+                    if (!tmpFile.renameTo(finalFile)) {
+                        tmpFile.delete()
+                        throw IllegalStateException(
+                            "Failed to atomically rename $tmpFile -> $finalFile"
+                        )
+                    }
 
-                // Verify write succeeded - catches disk-full or filesystem errors
-                if (!finalFile.exists() || finalFile.length() < 20) {
-                    throw IOException("File write verification failed - possible disk full")
-                }
+                    // Verify write succeeded - catches disk-full or filesystem errors
+                    if (!finalFile.exists() || finalFile.length() < 20) {
+                        throw IOException("File write verification failed - possible disk full")
+                    }
 
-                SystemLogger.debug("Persisted key: $keyId")
-            }.onFailure { e ->
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist key $keyId", e)
-            }
+                    SystemLogger.debug("Persisted key: $keyId")
+                }
+                .onFailure { e -> SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist key $keyId", e) }
         } finally {
             lock.unlock()
             SystemLogger.debug("[Persistence] Lock released for $filename")
@@ -126,44 +179,42 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
 
     fun delete(keyId: KeyIdentifier) {
         runCatching {
-            val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
-            if (file.exists()) {
-                if (file.delete()) {
-                    fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
-                    SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
+                val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
+                if (file.exists()) {
+                    if (file.delete()) {
+                        fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
+                        SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
+                    } else {
+                        SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
+                    }
                 } else {
-                    SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
+                    SystemLogger.debug("No persisted file to delete for: $keyId")
                 }
-            } else {
-                SystemLogger.debug("No persisted file to delete for: $keyId")
             }
-        }.onFailure { e ->
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete persisted key $keyId", e)
-        }
+            .onFailure { e -> SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete persisted key $keyId", e) }
     }
 
     fun deleteAll() {
         runCatching {
-            if (!PERSISTENCE_DIR.exists()) {
-                SystemLogger.debug("No persistent_keys directory, nothing to delete")
-                return
-            }
-            val files = PERSISTENCE_DIR.listFiles()
-            if (files == null) {
-                SystemLogger.warning("Cannot list persistent_keys directory")
-                return
-            }
-            var count = 0
-            files.forEach { file ->
-                if (file.name.endsWith(".bin") || file.name.endsWith(".tmp")) {
-                    if (file.delete()) count++
+                if (!PERSISTENCE_DIR.exists()) {
+                    SystemLogger.debug("No persistent_keys directory, nothing to delete")
+                    return
                 }
+                val files = PERSISTENCE_DIR.listFiles()
+                if (files == null) {
+                    SystemLogger.warning("Cannot list persistent_keys directory")
+                    return
+                }
+                var count = 0
+                files.forEach { file ->
+                    if (file.name.endsWith(".bin") || file.name.endsWith(".tmp")) {
+                        if (file.delete()) count++
+                    }
+                }
+                fileLocks.clear()
+                SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
             }
-            fileLocks.clear()
-            SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
-        }.onFailure { e ->
-            SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e)
-        }
+            .onFailure { e -> SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e) }
     }
 
     fun loadAll(securityLevel: Int): List<PersistedKeyData> {
@@ -186,78 +237,257 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
 
         for (file in files) {
             runCatching {
-                DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(file))).use { input ->
-                    val version = input.readInt()
-                    if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
-                        SystemLogger.warning(
-                            "Skipping ${file.name}: unknown format version $version"
-                        )
-                        return@runCatching
-                    }
-
-                    val storedSecLevel = input.readInt()
-                    val uid = input.readInt()
-                    val alias = input.readUTF()
-                    val nspace = input.readLong()
-                    val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
-                    val algo = input.readInt()
-                    val kSize = input.readInt()
-                    val curve = input.readInt()
-
-                    val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
-                    val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
-
-                    val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
-                    val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
-
-                    val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
-                    val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
-                    input.readFully(pkBytes)
-
-                    val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
-                    val certChainBytes = (0 until certCount).map {
-                        val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
-                        val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
-                        input.readFully(certBytes)
-                        certBytes
-                    }
-
-                    if (storedSecLevel == securityLevel) {
-                        result.add(
-                            PersistedKeyData(
-                                uid = uid,
-                                alias = alias,
-                                nspace = nspace,
-                                securityLevel = storedSecLevel,
-                                isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
-                                algorithm = algo,
-                                keySize = kSize,
-                                ecCurve = curve,
-                                purposes = purposes,
-                                digests = digests,
-                                privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
-                                certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
+                    DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(file))).use { input ->
+                        val version = input.readInt()
+                        if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
+                            // Old upstream files (v1) and dev-only intermediate
+                            // files (v2) are missing the metadata snapshot
+                            // and/or symmetric key block — restoring them
+                            // would put broken state in memory (apps relying
+                            // on those records get logged out). Skip and let
+                            // the next generateKey re-create cleanly with the
+                            // new format. Affected apps re-login once after
+                            // upgrade, then never again.
+                            SystemLogger.info(
+                                "Skipping ${file.name}: legacy format version $version. " +
+                                    "It will be replaced on next generateKey for this alias."
                             )
-                        )
+                            return@runCatching
+                        }
+
+                        val storedSecLevel = input.readInt()
+                        val uid = input.readInt()
+                        val alias = input.readUTF()
+                        val nspace = input.readLong()
+                        val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
+                        val algo = input.readInt()
+                        val kSize = input.readInt()
+                        val curve = input.readInt()
+
+                        val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
+                        val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+                        val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
+                        val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+                        val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
+                        val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
+                        if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
+
+                        val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
+                        val certChainBytes =
+                            (0 until certCount).map {
+                                val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
+                                val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
+                                input.readFully(certBytes)
+                                certBytes
+                            }
+
+                        val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
+                        val metadataBytes =
+                            ByteArray(metaLen).also { if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it) }
+
+                        val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
+                        val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
+                        val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also { if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it) }
+
+                        if (storedSecLevel == securityLevel) {
+                            result.add(
+                                PersistedKeyData(
+                                    uid = uid,
+                                    alias = alias,
+                                    nspace = nspace,
+                                    securityLevel = storedSecLevel,
+                                    isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
+                                    algorithm = algo,
+                                    keySize = kSize,
+                                    ecCurve = curve,
+                                    purposes = purposes,
+                                    digests = digests,
+                                    privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
+                                    certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
+                                    metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
+                                    symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
+                                    symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
+                                )
+                            )
+                        }
                     }
                 }
-            }.onFailure { e ->
-                SystemLogger.warning("Skipping corrupted persisted key file: ${file.name}", e)
-            }
+                .onFailure { e ->
+                    SystemLogger.warning("Skipping corrupted persisted key file: ${file.name}", e)
+                }
         }
 
         SystemLogger.info("Loaded ${result.size} persisted keys for security level $securityLevel")
         return result
     }
 
+    // Re-persist updates the cert chain for an already-persisted key without
+    // reconstructing authorization parameters from the response. This avoids
+    // pulling keymint Tag dependencies into this file and is correct because
+    // the only field that changes post-generation is the patched cert chain.
+    fun rePersistIfNeeded(
+        callingUid: Int,
+        generatedKeyInfo: KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo,
+    ) {
+        val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
+        if (metadata == null) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no metadata, skipping")
+            return
+        }
+        val secLevel = metadata.keySecurityLevel
+
+        val entry =
+            KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries.find { (id, info) ->
+                id.uid == callingUid && info.nspace == generatedKeyInfo.nspace
+            }
+        if (entry == null) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "rePersist: key not found in map for uid=$callingUid nspace=${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}"
+            )
+            return
+        }
+
+        val keyId = entry.key
+        val filename = keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)
+        val existing = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, filename)
+
+        if (!existing.exists()) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("rePersist: no existing file for $keyId, skipping")
+            return
+        }
+
+        val newChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(metadata)
+        if (newChain == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: could not extract cert chain for $keyId")
+            return
+        }
+
+        val persisted =
+            runCatching {
+                    DataInputStream(BufferedInputStream(FileInputStream(existing))).use { input ->
+                        val version = input.readInt()
+                        if (version != FORMAT_VERSION) {
+                            SystemLogger.warning(
+                                "rePersist: legacy format version $version for $keyId, will not re-persist (next generateKey replaces it)"
+                            )
+                            return
+                        }
+                        readPersistedKeyData(input)
+                    }
+                }
+                .getOrNull()
+        if (persisted == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: failed to read existing data for $keyId")
+            return
+        }
+
+        val keyPair = generatedKeyInfo.keyPair
+        val secretKey = generatedKeyInfo.secretKey
+        if (keyPair == null && secretKey == null) {
+            SystemLogger.warning("rePersist: no key material for $keyId")
+            return
+        }
+        // Serialize the live KeyMetadata (now contains the user-installed cert
+        // chain via updateSubcomponent) so the next boot restores byte-identical
+        // metadata. KeyMetadata is binder-free, so marshall() is safe here.
+        val metadataBytes =
+            runCatching {
+                    android.os.Parcel.obtain().let { parcel ->
+                        try {
+                            metadata.writeToParcel(parcel, 0)
+                            parcel.marshall()
+                        } finally {
+                            parcel.recycle()
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                .getOrNull()
+        save(
+            keyId = keyId,
+            keyPair = keyPair,
+            secretKey = secretKey,
+            nspace = generatedKeyInfo.nspace,
+            securityLevel = secLevel,
+            certChain = newChain.toList(),
+            algorithm = persisted.algorithm,
+            keySize = persisted.keySize,
+            ecCurve = persisted.ecCurve,
+            purposes = persisted.purposes,
+            digests = persisted.digests,
+            isAttestationKey = persisted.isAttestationKey,
+            metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
+        )
+        SystemLogger.debug("Re-persisted key $keyId with updated cert chain")
+    }
+
+    // Corrupted binary files can have arbitrary length fields — cap allocations
     private fun requireBounds(value: Int, max: Int, name: String): Int {
         require(value in 0..max) { "$name out of bounds: $value (max $max)" }
         return value
     }
 
     private fun keyFileName(uid: Int, alias: String): String {
-        val digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
-            .digest("$uid:$alias".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
+        val digest =
+            MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest("$uid:$alias".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
         return digest.joinToString("") { "%02x".format(it) } + ".bin"
     }
+
+    // Reads all fields after the version int has already been consumed
+    // and validated by the caller.
+    private fun readPersistedKeyData(input: DataInputStream): PersistedKeyData {
+        val secLevel = input.readInt()
+        val uid = input.readInt()
+        val alias = input.readUTF()
+        val nspace = input.readLong()
+        val isAttestKey = input.readBoolean()
+        val algo = input.readInt()
+        val kSize = input.readInt()
+        val curve = input.readInt()
+
+        val purposeCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "purposeCount")
+        val purposes = (0 until purposeCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+        val digestCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 64, "digestCount")
+        val digests = (0 until digestCount).map { input.readInt() }
+
+        val pkLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "pkLen")
+        val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
+        if (pkLen > 0) input.readFully(pkBytes)
+
+        val certCount = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 10, "certCount")
+        val certChainBytes =
+            (0 until certCount).map {
+                val certLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 65536, "certLen")
+                val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
+                input.readFully(certBytes)
+                certBytes
+            }
+
+        val metaLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 256 * 1024, "metaLen")
+        val metadataBytes = ByteArray(metaLen).also { if (metaLen > 0) input.readFully(it) }
+
+        val skAlgo = input.readUTF()
+        val skLen = requireBounds(input.readInt(), 8192, "skLen")
+        val skBytes = ByteArray(skLen).also { if (skLen > 0) input.readFully(it) }
+
+        return PersistedKeyData(
+            uid = uid,
+            alias = alias,
+            nspace = nspace,
+            securityLevel = secLevel,
+            isAttestationKey = isAttestKey,
+            algorithm = algo,
+            keySize = kSize,
+            ecCurve = curve,
+            purposes = purposes,
+            digests = digests,
+            privateKeyBytes = pkBytes,
+            certChainBytes = certChainBytes,
+            metadataBytes = metadataBytes,
+            symmetricKeyBytes = skBytes,
+            symmetricAlgorithm = skAlgo,
+        )
+    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/OperationInterceptor.kt

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils
 class OperationInterceptor(
     private val original: IKeystoreOperation,
     private val backdoor: IBinder,
+    private val isAead: Boolean,
 ) : BinderInterceptor() {
 
     override fun onPreTransact(
@@ -27,6 +28,17 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
         val methodName = transactionNames[code] ?: "unknown code=$code"
         logTransaction(txId, methodName, callingUid, callingPid, true)
 
+        // Mirror SoftwareOperation's vendor gate: a real-key op must answer non-AEAD updateAad
+        // exactly as the forged-key path does. Samsung and Xiaomi-MTK TEEs accept it; rejecting
+        // here while the forged path accepts diverges the two and fingerprints the injection.
+        if (code == UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION && !isAead) {
+            return if (VendorQuirks.nonAeadUpdateAadSucceeds()) {
+                InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
+            } else {
+                InterceptorUtils.createServiceSpecificErrorReply(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
+            }
+        }
+
         if (code == FINISH_TRANSACTION || code == ABORT_TRANSACTION) {
             KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.removeOperationInterceptor(target, backdoor)
         }
@@ -44,8 +56,8 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
         private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
             InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
 
-        /** Only intercept finish/abort for cleanup. Other ops pass through without round-trip. */
-        val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
+        val INTERCEPTED_CODES =
+            intArrayOf(UPDATE_AAD_TRANSACTION, FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
 
         private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
             IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/keystore/shim/SoftwareOperation.kt

@@ -8,50 +8,54 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
-import android.os.RemoteException
+import android.os.Build
 import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
+import android.os.SystemProperties
 import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
 import android.system.keystore2.KeyParameters
 import java.security.KeyPair
 import java.security.Signature
 import java.security.SignatureException
 import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
-import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException
 import javax.crypto.Cipher
-import javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
 
-internal object KeystoreErrorCode {
-    val INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28) }
-    val VERIFICATION_FAILED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30) }
-    val UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -2) }
-    val INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -3) }
-    val INVALID_ARGUMENT: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38) }
-    val INVALID_TAG: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -40) }
-    val INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21) }
-    val INCOMPATIBLE_KEY: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31) }
-    val INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18) }
-    val KEY_EXPIRED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -25) }
-    val KEY_NOT_YET_VALID: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -24) }
-    val CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55) }
-    val UNKNOWN_ERROR: Int by lazy { resolve("ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000) }
-    val SYSTEM_ERROR: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "SYSTEM_ERROR", 4, keystore = true) }
-    val TOO_MUCH_DATA: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21, keystore = true) }
-    val PERMISSION_DENIED: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "PERMISSION_DENIED", 6, keystore = true) }
-    val KEY_NOT_FOUND: Int by lazy { resolve("ResponseCode", "KEY_NOT_FOUND", 7, keystore = true) }
+/**
+ * Mirrors the per-vendor TEE quirk that Duck Detector's OperationErrorPathProbe checks: real
+ * Samsung and Xiaomi-MTK TrustZone return success for updateAad on a non-AEAD operation, while
+ * every other vendor rejects it with a service-specific INVALID_TAG. The module reads the same
+ * device-identity fields the probe reads, so a forged software operation answers exactly as that
+ * vendor's real TEE would.
+ */
+internal object VendorQuirks {
+    private val UPDATE_AAD_ALLOWS_SUCCESS = setOf("samsung")
+    private val XIAOMI_BRANDS = setOf("xiaomi", "redmi", "poco")
 
-    private fun resolve(enumName: String, field: String, fallback: Int, keystore: Boolean = false): Int {
-        val pkg = if (keystore) "android.system.keystore2" else "android.hardware.security.keymint"
-        return runCatching { Class.forName("$pkg.$enumName").getField(field).getInt(null) }
-            .getOrDefault(fallback)
+    fun nonAeadUpdateAadSucceeds(): Boolean {
+        val manufacturer = Build.MANUFACTURER.lowercase()
+        val brand = Build.BRAND.lowercase()
+        if (manufacturer in UPDATE_AAD_ALLOWS_SUCCESS || brand in UPDATE_AAD_ALLOWS_SUCCESS) {
+            return true
+        }
+        if (manufacturer != "xiaomi" && brand !in XIAOMI_BRANDS) return false
+        return isMediaTek()
+    }
+
+    private fun isMediaTek(): Boolean {
+        val roHardware = SystemProperties.get("ro.hardware", "")
+        return roHardware.startsWith("mt") || Build.HARDWARE.startsWith("mt", ignoreCase = true)
     }
 }
 
-// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
 private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
-    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?)
+    fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        // Real Samsung / Xiaomi-MTK TEEs accept updateAad on non-AEAD ops; others reject it.
+        if (!VendorQuirks.nonAeadUpdateAadSucceeds()) {
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
+        }
+    }
 
     fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
 
@@ -59,11 +63,9 @@ private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
 
     fun abort()
 
-    /** Returns parameters from the begin phase (e.g. GCM nonce), or null if none. */
     fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? = null
 }
 
-// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
 private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
     fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
         val digest =
@@ -73,17 +75,18 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
                 Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
                 else -> "NONE"
             }
-        val keyAlgo =
-            when (params.algorithm) {
-                Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
-                Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
-                else ->
-                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
-                        "Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
-                    )
+        return when (params.algorithm) {
+            Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA"
+            Algorithm.RSA -> {
+                val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
+                if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA"
             }
-        return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
+            else ->
+                throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                    KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
+                    "Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
+                )
+        }
     }
 
     fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
@@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
                 Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
                 else ->
                     throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
+                        KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
                         "Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
                     )
             }
@@ -110,24 +113,38 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
                 PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
                 PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
                 PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
+                PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
                 PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
-                else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
+                else -> "NoPadding"
             }
         return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
     }
+
+    fun mapOaepDigest(digest: Int?): String =
+        when (digest) {
+            Digest.SHA1 -> "SHA-1"
+            Digest.SHA_2_224 -> "SHA-224"
+            Digest.SHA_2_256 -> "SHA-256"
+            Digest.SHA_2_384 -> "SHA-384"
+            Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA-512"
+            else -> "SHA-256"
+        }
+
+    fun mapMacAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String =
+        when (params.digest.firstOrNull()) {
+            Digest.SHA_2_256 -> "HmacSHA256"
+            Digest.SHA_2_384 -> "HmacSHA384"
+            Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "HmacSHA512"
+            else -> "HmacSHA256"
+        }
 }
 
-// Concrete implementation for Signing.
 private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
     private val signature: Signature =
         Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
             initSign(keyPair.private)
         }
 
-    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
-        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
-    }
-
     override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
         if (data != null) signature.update(data)
         return null
@@ -141,17 +158,12 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
     override fun abort() {}
 }
 
-// Concrete implementation for Verification.
 private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
     private val signature: Signature =
         Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
             initVerify(keyPair.public)
         }
 
-    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
-        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
-    }
-
     override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
         if (data != null) signature.update(data)
         return null
@@ -159,15 +171,16 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
 
     override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
         if (data != null) update(data)
-        if (signature == null)
+        if (signature == null) {
             throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+                KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed,
                 "Signature to verify is null",
             )
+        }
         if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
             throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED,
-                "Signature/MAC verification failed",
+                KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed,
+                "Signature verification failed",
             )
         }
         return null
@@ -176,21 +189,53 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
     override fun abort() {}
 }
 
-// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
 private class CipherPrimitive(
     cryptoKey: java.security.Key,
     params: KeyMintAttestation,
     private val opMode: Int,
+    txId: Long,
 ) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
     private val cipher: Cipher =
         Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
-            init(opMode, cryptoKey)
+            val nonce = params.nonce
+            if (nonce != null && isAead) {
+                init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec(128, nonce))
+            } else if (nonce != null) {
+                init(opMode, cryptoKey, javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec(nonce))
+            } else if (params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP) {
+                val mainDigest = JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapOaepDigest(params.digest.firstOrNull())
+                val mgfDigest =
+                    params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.firstOrNull()?.let {
+                        JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapOaepDigest(it)
+                    } ?: mainDigest
+                init(
+                    opMode,
+                    cryptoKey,
+                    javax.crypto.spec.OAEPParameterSpec(
+                        mainDigest,
+                        "MGF1",
+                        java.security.spec.MGF1ParameterSpec(mgfDigest),
+                        javax.crypto.spec.PSource.PSpecified.DEFAULT,
+                    ),
+                )
+                SystemLogger.debug {
+                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] oaep-op main=$mainDigest mgf=$mgfDigest " +
+                        "mode=${if (opMode == Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE) "decrypt" else "encrypt"}"
+                }
+            } else {
+                init(opMode, cryptoKey)
+            }
         }
-    private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
 
-    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
-        if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
-        if (data != null) cipher.updateAAD(data)
+    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        if (!isAead) {
+            if (!VendorQuirks.nonAeadUpdateAadSucceeds()) {
+                throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
+            }
+            return
+        }
+        if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
     }
 
     override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
@@ -199,9 +244,6 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
     override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
         if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
 
-    override fun abort() {}
-
-    /** Returns the cipher IV as a NONCE parameter for GCM operations. */
     override fun getBeginParameters(): Array<KeyParameter>? {
         val iv = cipher.iv ?: return null
         return arrayOf(
@@ -211,23 +253,20 @@ private class CipherPrimitive(
             }
         )
     }
+
+    override fun abort() {}
 }
 
-// Concrete implementation for ECDH Key Agreement.
 private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
     private val agreement: javax.crypto.KeyAgreement =
         javax.crypto.KeyAgreement.getInstance("ECDH").apply { init(keyPair.private) }
 
-    override fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
-        throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_TAG)
-    }
-
     override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = null
 
     override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
         if (data == null)
             throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT,
+                KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
                 "Peer public key required for key agreement",
             )
         val peerKey =
@@ -240,53 +279,67 @@ private class KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair: KeyPair) : CryptoPrimitive {
     override fun abort() {}
 }
 
-/**
- * A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
- * delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
- *
- * Tracks operation lifecycle: once [finish] or [abort] is called, subsequent calls throw
- * [ServiceSpecificException] with [KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE].
- */
+private class MacPrimitive(
+    secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey,
+    private val params: KeyMintAttestation,
+    private val txId: Long,
+) : CryptoPrimitive {
+    private val mac: javax.crypto.Mac =
+        javax.crypto.Mac.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapMacAlgorithm(params)).apply {
+            init(secretKey)
+        }
+
+    override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data != null) mac.update(data)
+        return null
+    }
+
+    override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        if (data != null) mac.update(data)
+        val full = mac.doFinal()
+        // Tag.MAC_LENGTH is optional on the AndroidKeyStore Mac SPI; default to the
+        // full digest length so real Mac use keeps working when it is omitted.
+        val tagBytes = (params.macLength ?: (full.size * 8)) / 8
+        val tag = full.copyOf(tagBytes)
+        if (params.purpose.firstOrNull() == KeyPurpose.VERIFY) {
+            if (signature == null) {
+                throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                    KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed,
+                    "MAC to verify is null",
+                )
+            }
+            if (!java.security.MessageDigest.isEqual(tag, signature)) {
+                throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                    KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed,
+                    "MAC verification failed",
+                )
+            }
+            return null
+        }
+        SystemLogger.debug {
+            "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] hmac-op digest=${params.digest.firstOrNull()} " +
+                "macLen=${params.macLength} tag=${tag.size}B result=ok"
+        }
+        return tag
+    }
+
+    override fun abort() {}
+}
+
 class SoftwareOperation(
     private val txId: Long,
     keyPair: KeyPair?,
     secretKey: javax.crypto.SecretKey?,
     params: KeyMintAttestation,
     private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
-    var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null,
 ) {
     private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
-
-    @Volatile var isFinalized = false
+    @Volatile
+    var finalized = false
         private set
 
-    init {
-        val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
-        val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
-        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
+    var onFinishCallback: (() -> Unit)? = null
 
-        primitive =
-            when (purpose) {
-                KeyPurpose.SIGN -> Signer(keyPair!!, params)
-                KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> Verifier(keyPair!!, params)
-                KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
-                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.public
-                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
-                    val key: java.security.Key = secretKey ?: keyPair!!.private
-                    CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
-                }
-                KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeyAgreementPrimitive(keyPair!!)
-                else ->
-                    throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                        KeystoreErrorCode.UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE,
-                        "Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
-                    )
-            }
-    }
-
-    /** Parameters produced during begin (e.g. GCM nonce), to populate CreateOperationResponse. */
     val beginParameters: KeyParameters?
         get() {
             val params = primitive.getBeginParameters() ?: return null
@@ -294,37 +347,153 @@ class SoftwareOperation(
             return KeyParameters().apply { keyParameter = params }
         }
 
-    private fun checkActive() {
-        if (isFinalized)
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(
-                KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE,
-                "Operation already finalized.",
+    init {
+        val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
+        val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
+        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
+
+        if (purpose == null) {
+            // Defensive: if params somehow restored without a PURPOSE tag
+            // (corrupt v2 metadata, mismatched authorizations array on load,
+            // or future format drift) the original code crashed with NPE
+            // because Signer/Verifier/Cipher all dereference keyPair!!
+            // before checking purpose. Surface a clean keystore error
+            // instead so callers see a normal-looking operation failure
+            // they can recover from rather than the process appearing to
+            // silently corrupt their session.
+            SystemLogger.warning(
+                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Purpose missing on restored key " +
+                    "(authorizations=${params.purpose}, keyPair=${if (keyPair != null) "present" else "null"}, " +
+                    "secretKey=${if (secretKey != null) "present" else "null"}). " +
+                    "Returning unsupportedPurpose."
             )
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
+                "Restored key has no PURPOSE authorization",
+            )
+        }
+
+        primitive =
+            if (params.algorithm == Algorithm.HMAC) {
+                // An HMAC key is symmetric (secretKey set, keyPair null), so it must
+                // not fall through to the purpose-keyed Signer/Verifier paths, which
+                // require a keyPair. secretKey is populated at HMAC keygen and restore,
+                // so the throw is a defensive floor, not a live path.
+                MacPrimitive(
+                    secretKey
+                        ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                            KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
+                            "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] HMAC op but secretKey null",
+                        ),
+                    params,
+                    txId,
+                )
+            } else {
+                when (purpose) {
+                    KeyPurpose.SIGN -> {
+                        val kp =
+                            keyPair
+                                ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                                    KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
+                                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] SIGN requested but keyPair is null",
+                                )
+                        Signer(kp, params)
+                    }
+                    KeyPurpose.VERIFY -> {
+                        val kp =
+                            keyPair
+                                ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                                    KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
+                                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] VERIFY requested but keyPair is null",
+                                )
+                        Verifier(kp, params)
+                    }
+                    KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> {
+                        val key: java.security.Key =
+                            secretKey
+                                ?: keyPair?.public
+                                ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                                    KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
+                                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] ENCRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.public",
+                                )
+                        CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, txId)
+                    }
+                    KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> {
+                        val key: java.security.Key =
+                            secretKey
+                                ?: keyPair?.private
+                                ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                                    KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
+                                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] DECRYPT requires either secretKey or keyPair.private",
+                                )
+                        CipherPrimitive(key, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, txId)
+                    }
+                    KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> {
+                        val kp =
+                            keyPair
+                                ?: throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                                    KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument,
+                                    "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] AGREE_KEY requested but keyPair is null",
+                                )
+                        KeyAgreementPrimitive(kp)
+                    }
+                    else ->
+                        throw ServiceSpecificException(
+                            KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
+                            "Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
+                        )
+                }
+            }
     }
 
-    fun updateAad(data: ByteArray?) {
+    private fun checkActive() {
+        if (finalized) {
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)"
+            )
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
+        if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})"
+            )
+            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        SystemLogger.info(
+            "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() ENTRY inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0} primitive=${primitive::class.simpleName}"
+        )
         checkActive()
+        checkInputLength(aadInput)
         try {
-            primitive.updateAad(data)
-        } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
-            isFinalized = true
-            throw e
-        } catch (e: Exception) {
-            isFinalized = true
-            SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to updateAad.", e)
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR, e.message)
+            primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY (unexpected for non-AEAD)"
+            )
+        } catch (throwable: Throwable) {
+            val top = throwable.stackTrace.firstOrNull()?.toString() ?: "<no-frame>"
+            val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() THREW class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message} top=$top"
+            )
+            throw throwable
         }
     }
 
     fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
         checkActive()
+        checkInputLength(data)
         try {
             return primitive.update(data)
         } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
-            isFinalized = true
             throw e
         } catch (e: Exception) {
-            isFinalized = true
             SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
             throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
         }
@@ -332,84 +501,164 @@ class SoftwareOperation(
 
     fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
         checkActive()
-        val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
+        checkInputLength(data)
         try {
+            val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
             val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
-            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
             if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
                 val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
                 val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
                 if (delayMs > 0) LockSupport.parkNanos(delayMs * 1_000_000)
             }
+            finalized = true
             onFinishCallback?.invoke()
+            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
             return result
         } catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
             throw e
         } catch (e: Exception) {
             SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
             throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
-        } finally {
-            isFinalized = true
         }
     }
 
-    private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
-        is ServiceSpecificException -> e
-        is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.VERIFICATION_FAILED, e.message)
-        is BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT, e.message)
-        is IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, e.message)
-        is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.INCOMPATIBLE_KEY, e.message)
-        else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.UNKNOWN_ERROR, e.message)
-    }
-
     fun abort() {
-        checkActive()
-        isFinalized = true
+        finalized = true
         primitive.abort()
         SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
     }
-}
 
-/** Binder interface for [SoftwareOperation]. Synchronized and input-length validated. */
-class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
-    IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
-
-    private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
-        if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA)
-            throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCode.TOO_MUCH_DATA)
-    }
-
-    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
-    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
-        synchronized(this) {
-            checkInputLength(aadInput)
-            operation.updateAad(aadInput)
+    private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException =
+        when (e) {
+            is SignatureException ->
+                ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
+            is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException ->
+                ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
+            is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException ->
+                ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
+            is java.security.InvalidKeyException ->
+                ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
+            else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
         }
-    }
-
-    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
-    override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
-        synchronized(this) {
-            checkInputLength(input)
-            return operation.update(input)
-        }
-    }
-
-    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
-    override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
-        synchronized(this) {
-            checkInputLength(input)
-            checkInputLength(signature)
-            return operation.finish(input, signature)
-        }
-    }
-
-    @Throws(RemoteException::class)
-    override fun abort() {
-        synchronized(this) { operation.abort() }
-    }
 
     companion object {
         private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
     }
 }
+
+internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
+    val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
+    }
+
+    val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
+    }
+
+    val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
+    }
+
+    val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
+    }
+
+    val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
+    }
+
+    val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
+    }
+
+    val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
+    }
+
+    val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
+    }
+
+    val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
+    }
+
+    val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
+    }
+
+    val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
+    }
+
+    val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
+    }
+
+    val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
+    }
+
+    val unknownError: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
+    }
+
+    val incompatibleBlockMode: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE", -8)
+    }
+
+    val incompatiblePaddingMode: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE", -11)
+    }
+
+    val incompatibleDigest: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST", -13)
+    }
+
+    val invalidMacLength: Int by lazy {
+        resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_MAC_LENGTH", -57)
+    }
+
+    fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
+        runCatching { Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null) }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
+                fallback
+            }
+}
+
+class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
+    IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
+
+    @Synchronized
+    override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
+        SystemLogger.info(
+            "[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() ENTRY callingUid=${android.os.Binder.getCallingUid()} size=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}"
+        )
+        try {
+            operation.updateAad(aadInput)
+            SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() RETURNED_NORMALLY")
+        } catch (throwable: Throwable) {
+            val code = (throwable as? ServiceSpecificException)?.errorCode
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "[SoftwareOpBinder] updateAad() PROPAGATING class=${throwable::class.java.name} code=$code msg=${throwable.message}"
+            )
+            throw throwable
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Synchronized
+    override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        return operation.update(input)
+    }
+
+    @Synchronized
+    override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
+        return operation.finish(input, signature)
+    }
+
+    @Synchronized
+    override fun abort() {
+        operation.abort()
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/soter/SoterProcessSupervisor.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.soter
+
+import android.content.ComponentName
+import android.content.Context
+import android.content.Intent
+import android.content.ServiceConnection
+import android.os.Handler
+import android.os.HandlerThread
+import android.os.IBinder
+import java.util.concurrent.Executor
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+/**
+ * Keeps [SoterServiceInterceptor] mounted on the on-demand, restartable
+ * `com.tencent.soter.soterserver` process.
+ *
+ * `AbstractKeystoreInterceptor` injects `keystore2` exactly once: it is always alive and
+ * servicemanager-published, so the daemon gets its binder from `ServiceManager` and may
+ * `exitProcess` on failure. soterserver inverts both — it is Intent-bound (NOT in
+ * `ServiceManager`) and may die and respawn. This supervisor therefore *binds* the SOTER
+ * service, which both triggers its on-demand start AND yields the `ISoterService` binder
+ * (the target the native MITM registry keys on); injects `libTEESimulator.so` on every
+ * (re)start; confirms the landing with the `0xdeadbeef` backdoor handshake; then registers
+ * the forge. It re-binds — re-poking, re-injecting, re-registering — whenever the process
+ * dies, never exiting.
+ *
+ * The bind recipe (action = the interface descriptor, package, `BIND_AUTO_CREATE`) and the
+ * rebind-on-death lifecycle mirror the SOTER SDK's own `SoterCoreTreble`, so the daemon
+ * connects exactly as a real client would. Everything runs on a dedicated [HandlerThread]
+ * so it never stalls keystore init or `Looper.loop()` in [org.matrix.TEESimulator.App].
+ *
+ * Observability (the checkpoint's mandatory gate): every lifecycle event — bind, connect,
+ * inject ok/fail, handshake, respawn — is logged via [SystemLogger], debug-gated. It never
+ * gates the forge.
+ */
+object SoterProcessSupervisor {
+
+    /** soterserver hosts the package's own process (recon 2026-06-26: process == package). */
+    private const val SOTER_PACKAGE = "com.tencent.soter.soterserver"
+
+    /** Reuses the daemon's native injector + `entry`, PID-resolved by the target package. */
+    private const val INJECTION_COMMAND =
+        "exec ./inject `pidof $SOTER_PACKAGE` libTEESimulator.so entry"
+
+    private const val REBIND_DELAY_MS = 1000L
+    private const val REBIND_MAX_MS = 30_000L
+
+    private val started = AtomicBoolean(false)
+
+    /** Re-bind backoff; doubles each failed (re)bind up to [REBIND_MAX_MS], resets on a clean mount. Handler-thread-confined. */
+    private var rebindDelay = REBIND_DELAY_MS
+
+    private lateinit var context: Context
+    private lateinit var handler: Handler
+
+    /** Delivers bind callbacks onto the supervisor thread so nothing touches the main looper. */
+    private val executor = Executor { command -> handler.post(command) }
+
+    /**
+     * Starts supervising on a dedicated thread and returns immediately. Idempotent. [context]
+     * must be able to bind services (the daemon's system context); supplied by the App wiring.
+     */
+    fun start(context: Context) {
+        if (!started.compareAndSet(false, true)) return
+        this.context = context
+        handler = Handler(HandlerThread("soter-supervisor").apply { start() }.looper)
+        handler.post { bind() }
+    }
+
+    private val connection =
+        object : ServiceConnection {
+            override fun onServiceConnected(name: ComponentName?, service: IBinder?) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("SOTER service connected; mounting forge")
+                service?.let(::mount)
+            }
+
+            override fun onServiceDisconnected(name: ComponentName?) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("SOTER service disconnected (process died); rebinding")
+                scheduleRetry()
+            }
+
+            override fun onBindingDied(name: ComponentName?) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("SOTER binding died; rebinding")
+                scheduleRetry()
+            }
+
+            override fun onNullBinding(name: ComponentName?) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("SOTER onBind returned null; rebinding")
+                scheduleRetry()
+            }
+        }
+
+    private fun bind() {
+        val intent = Intent(SoterServiceInterceptor.DESCRIPTOR).setPackage(SOTER_PACKAGE)
+        val bound =
+            runCatching {
+                    context.bindService(intent, Context.BIND_AUTO_CREATE, executor, connection)
+                }
+                .getOrElse {
+                    SystemLogger.debug { "SOTER bindService threw: $it" }
+                    false
+                }
+        if (bound) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("SOTER bind requested (on-demand poke)")
+        } else {
+            SystemLogger.debug("SOTER bindService returned false; retrying")
+            scheduleRetry()
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun rebind() {
+        runCatching { context.unbindService(connection) }
+        bind()
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Re-attempts the bind after the current backoff, then widens it (capped at [REBIND_MAX_MS]).
+     * Every path that fails to leave the forge mounted routes here, so a live-but-uninjected
+     * binding is re-attempted instead of stranding the forge. A clean [mount] resets the backoff.
+     */
+    private fun scheduleRetry() {
+        val delay = rebindDelay
+        rebindDelay = (rebindDelay * 2).coerceAtMost(REBIND_MAX_MS)
+        handler.postDelayed({ rebind() }, delay)
+    }
+
+    /** Confirms injection via the `0xdeadbeef` handshake, injecting first if absent, then registers. */
+    private fun mount(soterBinder: IBinder) {
+        var backdoor = BinderInterceptor.getBackdoor(soterBinder)
+        if (backdoor == null) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("SOTER backdoor absent; injecting libTEESimulator.so")
+            if (!injectLibrary()) {
+                SystemLogger.debug("SOTER injection failed; scheduling re-bind")
+                scheduleRetry()
+                return
+            }
+            backdoor = BinderInterceptor.getBackdoor(soterBinder)
+        }
+        if (backdoor == null) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("SOTER backdoor handshake failed after injection; scheduling re-bind")
+            scheduleRetry()
+            return
+        }
+        val registered =
+            BinderInterceptor.register(
+                backdoor,
+                soterBinder,
+                SoterServiceInterceptor,
+                SoterServiceInterceptor.interceptedCodes,
+            )
+        if (!registered) {
+            SystemLogger.debug("SOTER register failed; scheduling re-bind")
+            scheduleRetry()
+            return
+        }
+        rebindDelay = REBIND_DELAY_MS
+        SystemLogger.debug("SOTER forge mounted; handshake ok")
+    }
+
+    private fun injectLibrary(): Boolean =
+        runCatching {
+                Runtime.getRuntime().exec(arrayOf("/system/bin/sh", "-c", INJECTION_COMMAND)).waitFor() == 0
+            }
+            .getOrElse {
+                SystemLogger.debug { "SOTER inject exec failed: $it" }
+                false
+            }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/interception/soter/SoterServiceInterceptor.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.soter
+
+import android.os.IBinder
+import android.os.Parcel
+import android.util.Base64
+import java.nio.ByteBuffer
+import java.nio.ByteOrder
+import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+/**
+ * Forges healthy `com.tencent.soter.soterserver.ISoterService` (Layer A: AIDL over
+ * `/dev/binder`) replies from inside the injected soterserver app process, so the SOTER
+ * capability probe (春秋 / DuckDetector `SoterCapabilityProbe`) reads `available = true`
+ * / `damaged = false` on a bootloader-unlocked device whose SOTER TA can no longer use
+ * its factory ATTK. Replaces the external SoterFixer loop + the Hail freeze.
+ *
+ * Unconditional by design: the forge decision never consults `ConfigurationManager` /
+ * `target.txt` (Phase 10 spec §Decision, gate G). It is mounted by the SOTER process
+ * supervisor (10.B/10.W) against the ISoterService binder, so `onPreTransact` only sees
+ * transactions on that binder — matching the raw transaction code is therefore enough.
+ *
+ * Diagnostics follow the module's standard three-layer capture (debug-gated, per-UID
+ * NDJSON via [SystemLogger]; see `logging/SystemLogger.kt`): a `tx` line for every
+ * transaction ([logTransaction]), the raw inbound request parcel, and the raw forged
+ * reply wire. Capture is scoped to targeted UIDs (`isUidLogged`) exactly like the
+ * keystore lane — it does NOT make the forge conditional; the forge still fires for all.
+ *
+ * Transaction codes are HARDCODED 1..13 in AIDL declaration order, NOT resolved via
+ * [org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode]: the
+ * shipped soterserver build is R8/ProGuard obfuscated — there is no `ISoterService$Stub`
+ * class and no `TRANSACTION_*` fields (recon 2026-06-26, `a$a.smali` packed-switch). The
+ * codes are fixed by Tencent's `ISoterService.aidl` and are obfuscation-independent.
+ *
+ * Scope boundary (10.A vs 10.M): the seven primitive-returning methods are fully forged
+ * here. The six parcelable-returning methods emit the correct AIDL envelope + the
+ * recon-verified `writeToParcel` field order; 10.M fills the payloads with
+ * detector-satisfying values — a framed SOTER pubkey envelope the SDK's
+ * `retrieveJsonFromExportedData` parses to a non-null `SoterPubKeyModel`, a non-zero sign
+ * session, and a 256-byte signature.
+ */
+object SoterServiceInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
+
+    /** The surviving, obfuscation-stable interface identifier (used by the 10.B/10.W mount). */
+    const val DESCRIPTOR = "com.tencent.soter.soterserver.ISoterService"
+
+    // AIDL transaction codes = FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION (1) + declaration index, verified
+    // against the obfuscated `a$a.smali` packed-switch (recon 2026-06-26). NOTE the 5/6
+    // order: removeAuthKey precedes getAuthKey in the real .aidl (the spec prose had it
+    // reversed). Comments record each method's return shape.
+    private const val TX_GENERATE_APP_SECURE_KEY = 1 // int
+    private const val TX_GET_APP_SECURE_KEY = 2 // SoterExportResult
+    private const val TX_HAS_ASK_ALREADY = 3 // boolean
+    private const val TX_GENERATE_AUTH_KEY = 4 // int
+    private const val TX_REMOVE_AUTH_KEY = 5 // int   (NOT getAuthKey)
+    private const val TX_GET_AUTH_KEY = 6 // SoterExportResult   (NOT removeAuthKey)
+    private const val TX_REMOVE_ALL_AUTH_KEY = 7 // int
+    private const val TX_HAS_AUTH_KEY = 8 // boolean
+    private const val TX_INIT_SIGH = 9 // SoterSessionResult   (sic: Tencent's spelling)
+    private const val TX_FINISH_SIGN = 10 // SoterSignResult
+    private const val TX_GET_DEVICE_ID = 11 // SoterDeviceResult
+    private const val TX_GET_VERSION = 12 // int   (real service returns 1)
+    private const val TX_GET_EXTRA_PARAM = 13 // SoterExtraParam
+
+    /** SOTER success result code (`SoterCoreResult` ERR_OK). */
+    private const val SOTER_OK = 0
+
+    /** finishSign signature length the probe expects. */
+    private const val SIGNATURE_LEN = 256
+
+    /** `cpu_id` placeholder in the export envelope; the local probe never reads its value
+     *  (the backend pins the real per-`cpu_id` ATTK, which the forge cannot satisfy). */
+    private const val CPU_ID = "0000000000000000"
+
+    /** Code -> Tencent method name, for the `tx` diagnostic line. Names from the recon decompile. */
+    private val methodNames =
+        mapOf(
+            TX_GENERATE_APP_SECURE_KEY to "generateAppSecureKey",
+            TX_GET_APP_SECURE_KEY to "getAppSecureKey",
+            TX_HAS_ASK_ALREADY to "hasAskAlready",
+            TX_GENERATE_AUTH_KEY to "generateAuthKey",
+            TX_REMOVE_AUTH_KEY to "removeAuthKey",
+            TX_GET_AUTH_KEY to "getAuthKey",
+            TX_REMOVE_ALL_AUTH_KEY to "removeAllAuthKey",
+            TX_HAS_AUTH_KEY to "hasAuthKey",
+            TX_INIT_SIGH to "initSigh",
+            TX_FINISH_SIGN to "finishSign",
+            TX_GET_DEVICE_ID to "getDeviceId",
+            TX_GET_VERSION to "getVersion",
+            TX_GET_EXTRA_PARAM to "getExtraParam",
+        )
+
+    /** The codes this interceptor forges; consumed by the supervisor's registration (10.B/10.W). */
+    val interceptedCodes: IntArray = methodNames.keys.toIntArray()
+
+    /**
+     * Payload of [SoterExportResult.exportData] for getAppSecureKey (txn 2) and getAuthKey
+     * (txn 6). The detector's capability probe gates `damaged=false` on
+     * `SoterCore.getApp/AuthKeyModel() != null`, and the SDK's `retrieveJsonFromExportedData`
+     * (`SoterCoreBase`) returns a non-null `SoterPubKeyModel` only when this exact framing
+     * parses: `[4-byte LITTLE-ENDIAN json length][UTF-8 json][signature bytes]`. A
+     * non-empty-but-unframed blob throws inside the SDK and is read as `damaged` silently.
+     * The JSON parser swallows every exception, so only the framing is load-bearing; the
+     * `pub_key` is a genuine RSA-2048 SubjectPublicKeyInfo so a probe that base64/X.509-parses
+     * the field locally still succeeds. Lazily built — keygen runs once, off the mount path.
+     */
+    private val exportBlob: ByteArray by lazy { buildExportBlob() }
+
+    /** getDeviceId (txn 11) payload — well-formed, non-empty; the probe never parses it. */
+    private val deviceIdBlob = "TEESIM-SOTER-0001".toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
+
+    /** finishSign (txn 10) signature payload — [SIGNATURE_LEN] bytes. */
+    private val signatureBlob = ByteArray(SIGNATURE_LEN)
+
+    private fun buildExportBlob(): ByteArray {
+        val pubKey =
+            runCatching {
+                    val generator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA").apply { initialize(2048) }
+                    Base64.encodeToString(generator.generateKeyPair().public.encoded, Base64.NO_WRAP)
+                }
+                .getOrDefault("")
+        val json =
+            """{"pub_key":"$pubKey","counter":0,"cpu_id":"$CPU_ID","uid":0}"""
+                .toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)
+        val lengthPrefix = ByteBuffer.allocate(4).order(ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN).putInt(json.size).array()
+        return lengthPrefix + json + signatureBlob
+    }
+
+    override fun onPreTransact(
+        txId: Long,
+        target: IBinder,
+        code: Int,
+        flags: Int,
+        callingUid: Int,
+        callingPid: Int,
+        data: Parcel,
+    ): TransactionResult {
+        val method = methodNames[code]
+        if (method == null) {
+            // Not an ISoterService method we forge — record it as observed, then pass through.
+            logTransaction(txId, "code=$code", callingUid, callingPid, skipPost = true)
+            return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+        }
+        logTransaction(txId, method, callingUid, callingPid)
+        captureRequest(callingUid, txId, method, data)
+
+        return when (code) {
+            // Primitive returns — fully forged here.
+            TX_GENERATE_APP_SECURE_KEY,
+            TX_GENERATE_AUTH_KEY,
+            TX_REMOVE_AUTH_KEY,
+            TX_REMOVE_ALL_AUTH_KEY -> forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) { writeInt(SOTER_OK) }
+            TX_GET_VERSION -> forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) { writeInt(1) }
+            TX_HAS_ASK_ALREADY,
+            TX_HAS_AUTH_KEY -> forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) { writeInt(1) } // boolean true
+
+            // Parcelable returns — correct envelope + recon field order, payloads filled (10.M).
+            TX_GET_APP_SECURE_KEY,
+            TX_GET_AUTH_KEY ->
+                forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) {
+                    writeInt(1) // non-null marker
+                    writeInt(SOTER_OK) // resultCode
+                    writeByteArray(exportBlob) // exportData — framed SOTER pubkey envelope
+                    writeInt(exportBlob.size) // exportDataLength
+                }
+            TX_INIT_SIGH ->
+                forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) {
+                    writeInt(1)
+                    writeLong(1L) // session — any non-zero satisfies the probe
+                    writeInt(SOTER_OK) // resultCode — probe requires == 0 (SoterCapabilityProbe.kt:107)
+                }
+            TX_FINISH_SIGN ->
+                forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) {
+                    writeInt(1)
+                    writeInt(SOTER_OK) // resultCode — finishSign throws on != 0
+                    writeByteArray(signatureBlob) // exportData = signature
+                    writeInt(signatureBlob.size) // exportDataLength
+                }
+            TX_GET_DEVICE_ID ->
+                forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) {
+                    writeInt(1)
+                    writeInt(SOTER_OK) // resultCode
+                    writeByteArray(deviceIdBlob) // exportData = device id
+                    writeInt(deviceIdBlob.size) // exportDataLength
+                }
+            TX_GET_EXTRA_PARAM ->
+                forgedReply(callingUid, txId, method) {
+                    writeInt(1)
+                    writeValue("optical") // SoterExtraParam.result = fingerprint sensor type
+                }
+
+            // Unreachable: method != null means code is one of the 13 above.
+            else -> TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** Snapshots the inbound request parcel to the per-UID NDJSON plane (debug + targeted only). */
+    private fun captureRequest(uid: Int, txId: Long, method: String, data: Parcel) {
+        if (!SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        runCatching { data.marshall() }
+            .onSuccess { raw ->
+                SystemLogger.uidLogRaw(uid, txId, "$method-request", "len=${raw.size}", raw)
+            }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Builds an AIDL reply (`writeNoException()` then [body]) and snapshots its wire bytes to the
+     * per-UID NDJSON plane before handing it to the native hook. Parcelable bodies write their own
+     * `writeInt(1)` non-null marker; the native hook recycles the parcel after use.
+     */
+    private fun forgedReply(
+        uid: Int,
+        txId: Long,
+        method: String,
+        body: Parcel.() -> Unit,
+    ): TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
+        val reply = Parcel.obtain()
+        reply.writeNoException()
+        reply.body()
+        if (SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) {
+            runCatching { reply.marshall() }
+                .onSuccess { raw ->
+                    SystemLogger.uidLogRaw(uid, txId, "$method-reply", "len=${raw.size}", raw)
+                }
+        }
+        return TransactionResult.OverrideReply(reply)
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/AttestationDossier.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
+
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
+import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
+import java.security.cert.Certificate
+import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
+
+/**
+ * Assembles the per-UID "attestation dossier": for a targeted app, the full decoded attestation we
+ * actually hand it, the identity of every certificate in the returned chain, and the source of each
+ * device value that fed that attestation. Emitting all three where a chain is produced turns "the
+ * app rejects us" into a field-by-field record that can be diffed against a genuine TEE.
+ */
+object AttestationDossier {
+
+    /**
+     * Records the dossier for [chain] under [uid], tagged with the [path] that produced it
+     * (`FORGE-rust`, `FORGE-bouncycastle`, or `PATCH`). No-op for untargeted UIDs and release
+     * builds; the expensive decoding is skipped entirely when the UID is out of scope.
+     */
+    fun log(uid: Int, txId: Long, path: String, chain: List<Certificate>) {
+        if (!SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val leaf = chain.firstOrNull() as? X509Certificate
+        val extension =
+            leaf?.let { AttestationPatcher.formatAttestationExtension(it) }
+                ?: "<no attestation extension>"
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "attest", "path=$path depth=${chain.size} $extension")
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "keybox", "file=${ConfigurationManager.getKeyboxFileForUid(uid)}")
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "chain", AttestationPatcher.formatCertChain(chain))
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "chain-verify", AttestationPatcher.formatChainVerification(chain))
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "props", AndroidDeviceUtils.describeSources(uid))
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Records the *shape* of the emitted authorization list — count, ordered tags, and per-auth
+     * securityLevel. This is the exact surface the duck detector's generate-mode parcel fingerprint
+     * stride-walks, so logging it readably lets a "fingerprint" detection be compared against the
+     * known genuine-TEE shape without decoding the marshalled reply offline.
+     */
+    fun logAuthShape(uid: Int, txId: Long, authorizations: Array<Authorization>?) {
+        if (!SystemLogger.isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val auths = authorizations ?: return
+        val shape = auths.joinToString(",") { "${tagName(it.keyParameter.tag)}/${it.securityLevel}" }
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "auth-shape", "n=${auths.size} [$shape]")
+    }
+
+    /** Names the authorization tags that occur in generate-mode replies; others render as numbers. */
+    private fun tagName(tag: Int): String =
+        when (tag) {
+            Tag.PURPOSE -> "PURPOSE"
+            Tag.ALGORITHM -> "ALGORITHM"
+            Tag.KEY_SIZE -> "KEY_SIZE"
+            Tag.DIGEST -> "DIGEST"
+            Tag.PADDING -> "PADDING"
+            Tag.EC_CURVE -> "EC_CURVE"
+            Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> "RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT"
+            Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "NO_AUTH_REQUIRED"
+            Tag.ORIGIN -> "ORIGIN"
+            Tag.OS_VERSION -> "OS_VERSION"
+            Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL -> "OS_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> "VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL -> "BOOT_PATCHLEVEL"
+            Tag.CREATION_DATETIME -> "CREATION_DATETIME"
+            Tag.ROOT_OF_TRUST -> "ROOT_OF_TRUST"
+            Tag.USER_ID -> "USER_ID"
+            Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT -> "USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT"
+            Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED -> "UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED"
+            Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME -> "ACTIVE_DATETIME"
+            else -> "tag${tag and 0x0FFFFFFF}"
+        }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/KeyMintParameterLogger.kt

@@ -37,22 +37,6 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
             .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
     }
 
-    val hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
-        HardwareAuthenticatorType::class
-            .java
-            .fields
-            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
-            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
-    }
-
-    val keyOriginNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
-        KeyOrigin::class
-            .java
-            .fields
-            .filter { it.type == Int::class.java }
-            .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
-    }
-
     val paddingNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
         PaddingMode::class
             .java
@@ -85,45 +69,45 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
             .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Logs a single KeyParameter in a formatted, readable way.
-     *
-     * @param param The KeyParameter to log.
-     */
+    /** Logs a single KeyParameter to the shared debug stream (used for un-scoped param dumps). */
     fun logParameter(param: KeyParameter) {
+        SystemLogger.debug("KeyParam: ${describe(param)}")
+    }
+
+    /** Logs a single KeyParameter onto a targeted UID's diagnostic plane as a `param` record. */
+    fun logParameter(uid: Int, txId: Long, param: KeyParameter) {
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, txId, "param", describe(param))
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Formats a single KeyParameter into a readable `tag | Value` string. Shared by both
+     * [logParameter] overloads so the two logging planes render parameters identically.
+     *
+     * @param param The KeyParameter to format.
+     */
+    private fun describe(param: KeyParameter): String {
         val tagName = tagNames[param.tag] ?: "UNKNOWN_TAG"
         val value = param.value
         val formattedValue: String =
             when (param.tag) {
                 Tag.ALGORITHM -> algorithmNames[value.algorithm]
                 Tag.BLOCK_MODE -> blockModeNames[value.blockMode]
-                Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
                 Tag.EC_CURVE -> ecCurveNames[value.ecCurve]
-                Tag.ORIGIN -> keyOriginNames[value.origin]
                 Tag.PADDING -> paddingNames[value.paddingMode]
                 Tag.PURPOSE -> purposeNames[value.keyPurpose]
-                Tag.USER_AUTH_TYPE ->
-                    hardwareAuthenticatorTypeNames[value.hardwareAuthenticatorType]
+                Tag.DIGEST -> digestNames[value.digest]
                 Tag.AUTH_TIMEOUT,
-                Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
                 Tag.KEY_SIZE,
-                Tag.MAC_LENGTH,
-                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
-                Tag.OS_VERSION,
-                Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL,
-                Tag.USER_ID,
-                Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL -> value.integer.toString()
+                Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH -> value.integer.toString()
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_SERIAL -> BigInteger(value.blob).toString()
                 Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME,
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER,
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE,
-                Tag.CREATION_DATETIME,
                 Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
                 Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME -> Date(value.dateTime).toString()
                 Tag.CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT -> X500Name(X500Principal(value.blob).name).toString()
-                Tag.USER_SECURE_ID,
                 Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT -> value.longInteger.toString()
-                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> value.boolValue.toString()
+                Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED -> "true"
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE,
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND,
                 Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE,
@@ -137,7 +121,7 @@ object KeyMintParameterLogger {
                 else -> "<raw>"
             } ?: "Unknown Value"
 
-        SystemLogger.debug("KeyParam: %-25s | Value: %s".format(tagName, formattedValue))
+        return "%-25s | Value: %s".format(tagName, formattedValue)
     }
 
     private fun ByteArray.toReadableString(): String {

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/logging/SystemLogger.kt

@@ -1,43 +1,95 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging
 
+import android.util.Base64
 import android.util.Log
+import java.io.BufferedWriter
+import java.io.File
+import java.io.FileWriter
+import java.time.Instant
+import java.time.ZoneId
+import java.time.format.DateTimeFormatter
+import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
+import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
+import org.json.JSONObject
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.BuildConfig
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 
 /**
  * A centralized logging utility for the TEESimulator application. This object provides a consistent
  * logging tag and format for all application logs, making it easier to filter and debug in Logcat.
+ *
+ * Includes a rate limiter that caps logd syscalls during binder stress to prevent thread pool
+ * contention. The first [RATE_LIMIT_BURST] messages per [RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS] window are logged
+ * normally; subsequent messages are suppressed and a summary is emitted when the window resets.
  */
 object SystemLogger {
-    // The tag used for all log messages from this application.
-    private const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
+    @PublishedApi internal const val TAG = "TEESimulator"
 
-    private val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
+    @PublishedApi internal val isDebugBuild = BuildConfig.DEBUG
+
+    // Rate limiter: allow BURST messages per WINDOW, then suppress until window resets.
+    private const val RATE_LIMIT_BURST = 15
+    private const val RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 1000L
+    private val windowStart = AtomicLong(System.currentTimeMillis())
+    private val windowCount = AtomicInteger(0)
+    private val suppressedCount = AtomicInteger(0)
 
     /**
-     * Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging.
-     *
-     * @param message The message to log.
+     * Returns true if this message should be emitted. Resets the window if expired and emits a
+     * suppression summary for the previous window.
      */
+    @PublishedApi
+    internal fun acquireLogPermit(): Boolean {
+        val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
+        val start = windowStart.get()
+        if (now - start > RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS) {
+            // Window expired: reset and emit suppression summary if needed.
+            if (windowStart.compareAndSet(start, now)) {
+                val suppressed = suppressedCount.getAndSet(0)
+                windowCount.set(1) // this call counts as #1 in the new window
+                if (suppressed > 0) {
+                    Log.i(
+                        TAG,
+                        "[rate-limit] suppressed $suppressed log messages in previous window",
+                    )
+                }
+                return true
+            }
+        }
+        val count = windowCount.incrementAndGet()
+        if (count <= RATE_LIMIT_BURST) return true
+        suppressedCount.incrementAndGet()
+        return false
+    }
+
+    /** Logs a debug message. Use this for fine-grained information that is useful for debugging. */
     fun debug(message: String) {
         if (!isDebugBuild) return
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
         Log.d(TAG, message)
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Logs an informational message. Use this to report major application lifecycle events.
-     *
-     * @param message The message to log.
-     */
+    /** Lazy debug: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
+    inline fun debug(message: () -> String) {
+        if (!isDebugBuild) return
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
+        Log.d(TAG, message())
+    }
+
+    /** Logs an informational message. Use this to report major application lifecycle events. */
     fun info(message: String) {
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
         Log.i(TAG, message)
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Logs a warning message. Use this to report unexpected but non-fatal issues.
-     *
-     * @param message The message to log.
-     * @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
-     */
+    /** Lazy info: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
+    inline fun info(message: () -> String) {
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
+        Log.i(TAG, message())
+    }
+
+    /** Logs a warning message. Warnings are never rate-limited. */
     fun warning(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
         if (throwable != null) {
             Log.w(TAG, message, throwable)
@@ -46,13 +98,7 @@ object SystemLogger {
         }
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Logs an error message. Use this to report fatal errors or exceptions that disrupt
-     * functionality.
-     *
-     * @param message The message to log.
-     * @param throwable An optional exception to log with the message.
-     */
+    /** Logs an error message. Errors are never rate-limited. */
     fun error(message: String, throwable: Throwable? = null) {
         if (throwable != null) {
             Log.e(TAG, message, throwable)
@@ -64,11 +110,163 @@ object SystemLogger {
     /**
      * Logs a verbose message. This level is for highly detailed logs that are generally not needed
      * unless tracking a very specific issue.
-     *
-     * @param message The message to log.
      */
     fun verbose(message: String) {
         if (!isDebugBuild) return
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
         Log.v(TAG, message)
     }
+
+    /** Lazy verbose: lambda only evaluates if message will be logged. */
+    inline fun verbose(message: () -> String) {
+        if (!isDebugBuild) return
+        if (!acquireLogPermit()) return
+        Log.v(TAG, message())
+    }
+
+    inline fun trace(message: () -> String) {
+        if (!isDebugBuild) return
+        Log.w(TAG, message())
+    }
+
+    // --- UID-keyed diagnostic plane (debug builds only) -------------------------------------
+
+    /**
+     * True when [uid] should receive deep, per-UID diagnostic logging: a debug build AND the UID is
+     * targeted in `target.txt`. This is the single scope gate for the diagnostic plane; it reuses
+     * the existing activation set, so no new configuration surface is introduced.
+     */
+    fun isUidLogged(uid: Int): Boolean = isDebugBuild && !ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(uid)
+
+    /** Resolves a UID to its primary package name for log labelling, falling back to `uid:N`. */
+    private fun label(uid: Int): String =
+        ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(uid).firstOrNull() ?: "uid:$uid"
+
+    /**
+     * Emits one structured diagnostic record for a targeted [uid]. The human form
+     * `[<pkg> tx=<txId>] <event>: <detail>` goes to logcat; the file sink receives one NDJSON object
+     * per line under that UID's own file. In-scope records bypass the global rate limiter: a
+     * targeted app's traffic is already volume-bounded, and dropping a line mid-probe would corrupt
+     * the very trace we are trying to read. No-op for untargeted UIDs and in release builds.
+     */
+    fun uidLog(uid: Int, txId: Long?, event: String, detail: String) {
+        if (!isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val correlation = txId?.let { " tx=$it" } ?: ""
+        Log.d(TAG, "[${label(uid)}$correlation] $event: $detail")
+        runCatching { uidWriter(uid).append(jsonRecord(uid, txId, event, detail, null)) }
+    }
+
+    /** Lazy [uidLog]: [detail] is only built for targeted UIDs in debug builds. */
+    inline fun uidLog(uid: Int, txId: Long?, event: String, detail: () -> String) {
+        if (!isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        uidLog(uid, txId, event, detail())
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * [uidLog] plus the exact wire bytes that produced the event, base64 (NO_WRAP) in a `raw_b64`
+     * field. This is the structured replacement for the per-call `.bin` parcel dumps: one NDJSON
+     * line on the per-UID file instead of a fresh undecodable file per transaction, with the raw
+     * parcel still recoverable for offline parsers.
+     */
+    fun uidLogRaw(uid: Int, txId: Long?, event: String, detail: String, raw: ByteArray) {
+        if (!isUidLogged(uid)) return
+        val correlation = txId?.let { " tx=$it" } ?: ""
+        Log.d(TAG, "[${label(uid)}$correlation] $event: $detail (raw ${raw.size}B)")
+        runCatching {
+            val encoded = Base64.encodeToString(raw, Base64.NO_WRAP)
+            uidWriter(uid).append(jsonRecord(uid, txId, event, detail, encoded))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * External-storage root for every debug diagnostic. `/data/media/0/TEESimulator` is the
+     * in-namespace backing path the keystore domain can reach; a normal file manager sees the same
+     * files at `/sdcard/TEESimulator`. Release builds never write here and purge it on boot
+     * (App.purgeDebugDiagnostics). The domain reaches it via a debug-only media_rw_data_file
+     * sepolicy grant, and service.sh pre-creates the directory.
+     */
+    const val DIAGNOSTIC_DIR = "/data/media/0/TEESimulator"
+
+    private val uidLogDir = File(DIAGNOSTIC_DIR)
+    private const val UID_LOG_MAX_BYTES = 4L * 1024 * 1024
+    private val uidWriters = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, UidLogFile>()
+
+    private val recordClock =
+        DateTimeFormatter.ofPattern("MM-dd HH:mm:ss.SSS").withZone(ZoneId.systemDefault())
+
+    private fun jsonRecord(
+        uid: Int,
+        txId: Long?,
+        event: String,
+        detail: String,
+        rawB64: String?,
+    ): String =
+        JSONObject()
+            .apply {
+                put("ts", recordClock.format(Instant.now()))
+                put("uid", uid)
+                put("pkg", label(uid))
+                txId?.let { put("tx", it) }
+                put("event", event)
+                put("detail", detail)
+                rawB64?.let { put("raw_b64", it) }
+            }
+            .toString()
+
+    private fun uidWriter(uid: Int): UidLogFile =
+        uidWriters.computeIfAbsent(uid) { key ->
+            UidLogFile(key, uidLogDir).also { file ->
+                val packages =
+                    ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(key).joinToString().ifEmpty { "<unresolved>" }
+                runCatching {
+                    file.append(jsonRecord(key, null, "session", "packages=[$packages]", null))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+    /**
+     * Append-only NDJSON sink for a single UID at `<logDir>/teesim-uid-<uid>.ndjson`, rotated once
+     * to `.ndjson.1` at [UID_LOG_MAX_BYTES]; one JSON object per line. Writes are synchronised
+     * because the keystore binder pool is multi-threaded, and every operation is wrapped so a
+     * logging fault can never propagate into the daemon. Created only on the debug-gated path.
+     */
+    private class UidLogFile(uid: Int, private val logDir: File) {
+        private val primary = File(logDir, "teesim-uid-$uid.ndjson")
+        private val rotated = File(logDir, "teesim-uid-$uid.ndjson.1")
+        private var writer: BufferedWriter? = null
+        private var size = 0L
+
+        @Synchronized
+        fun append(jsonLine: String) {
+            runCatching {
+                val out = writer ?: open()
+                out.write(jsonLine)
+                out.write("\n")
+                out.flush()
+                size += jsonLine.length + 1
+                if (size >= UID_LOG_MAX_BYTES) rotate()
+            }
+        }
+
+        private fun open(): BufferedWriter {
+            logDir.mkdirs()
+            val out = BufferedWriter(FileWriter(primary, /* append = */ true))
+            writer = out
+            size = primary.length()
+            return out
+        }
+
+        private fun rotate() {
+            runCatching {
+                writer?.flush()
+                writer?.close()
+            }
+            writer = null
+            runCatching {
+                if (rotated.exists()) rotated.delete()
+                primary.renameTo(rotated)
+            }
+            size = 0L
+        }
+    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/CertificateGenerator.kt

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
  */
 object CertificateGenerator {
 
-    // RFC 5280 GeneralizedTime maximum: 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (millis since epoch).
     private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
 
     /**
@@ -94,30 +93,53 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
             )
 
         return try {
-                val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
-
-                val (signingKey, issuer) =
-                    if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
-                        getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
-                            ?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
-                    } else {
-                        keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
-                    }
-
-                val leafCert =
-                    buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
-
-                if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
-                    listOf(leafCert)
-                } else {
-                    listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
+            // AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge + no attestKey = self-signed, depth 1
+            if (challenge == null && attestKeyAlias == null) {
+                SystemLogger.trace {
+                    "[certgen] no-challenge key: self-signed, depth=1, purposes=${params.purpose}"
                 }
-            } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
-                throw e
-            } catch (e: Exception) {
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
-                null
+                return listOf(buildSelfSignedCertificate(subjectKeyPair, params))
             }
+
+            val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
+
+            val wantsAttestKey =
+                attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S
+            val attestKeyInfo =
+                if (wantsAttestKey) getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias) else null
+
+            // When the caller designates an attest key, the leaf MUST be signed by it and returned
+            // alone (the caller appends the attest key's own chain). Re-rooting under the keybox
+            // here instead yields a self-rooted leaf that, concatenated with the attest key chain,
+            // double-roots and fails verification (WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE). Refuse rather than emit
+            // a
+            // broken chain.
+            if (wantsAttestKey && attestKeyInfo == null) {
+                SystemLogger.error(
+                    "Designated attest key '$attestKeyAlias' not found for uid $uid; refusing to " +
+                        "emit a keybox-rooted leaf that would break the caller's chain."
+                )
+                return null
+            }
+
+            val (signingKey, issuer) =
+                attestKeyInfo?.let { it.first to it.second }
+                    ?: (keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox))
+
+            val leafCert =
+                buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
+
+            if (attestKeyInfo != null) {
+                listOf(leafCert)
+            } else {
+                listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
+            }
+        } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
+            null
+        }
     }
 
     /**
@@ -132,27 +154,23 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
         securityLevel: Int,
     ): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
         return try {
-                SystemLogger.info(
-                    "Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
-                )
-                val newKeyPair =
-                    generateSoftwareKeyPair(params)
-                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate underlying software key pair.")
+            SystemLogger.info("Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)")
+            val newKeyPair =
+                generateSoftwareKeyPair(params)
+                    ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate underlying software key pair.")
 
-                val chain =
-                    generateCertificateChain(uid, newKeyPair, attestKeyAlias, params, securityLevel)
-                        ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate certificate chain for new key pair.")
+            val chain =
+                generateCertificateChain(uid, newKeyPair, attestKeyAlias, params, securityLevel)
+                    ?: throw Exception("Failed to generate certificate chain for new key pair.")
 
-                SystemLogger.info(
-                    "Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'."
-                )
-                Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
-            } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
-                throw e
-            } catch (e: Exception) {
-                SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
-                null
-            }
+            SystemLogger.info("Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'.")
+            Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
+        } catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
+            throw e
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
+            null
+        }
     }
 
     fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
@@ -166,11 +184,28 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
                 Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
                 else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm")
             }
-        return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
-            ?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
-                -75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
-                "No attestation key for algorithm $algorithmName in $keyboxFile",
-            )
+        // Prefer the algorithm-matching keybox, but fall back to any usable key (EC preferred) when
+        // none exists. An EC attestation key validly ECDSA-signs a leaf carrying an RSA subject key,
+        // so an EC-only keybox can still root an RSA forge. Without this fallback an RSA ATTEST_KEY
+        // request on an EC-only keybox throws -75 and the caller's chain never roots ("unknown
+        // certificate"). Mirrors the patch path's fail-safe
+        // (AttestationPatcher.getKeyboxForUidAndAlgorithm) and the RSA-leaf-under-EC-keybox handling
+        // in commit e6d5e4d.
+        val matched = KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
+        val keybox =
+            matched
+                ?: KeyBoxManager.getAnyAttestationKey(keyboxFile)
+                ?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
+                    -75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
+                    "No usable attestation key in $keyboxFile",
+                )
+        // Surface which keybox actually signs the forge, so an EC-only-keybox fallback (an RSA leaf
+        // rooted under the EC key) is visible on the per-UID plane instead of silent.
+        SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, null, "keybox-pick") {
+            "req=$algorithmName ${if (matched != null) "matched" else "fellback-to-any"} " +
+                "signer=${getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)}"
+        }
+        return keybox
     }
 
     /** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */
@@ -183,6 +218,15 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
             val certChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(keyInfo.response)
             if (!certChain.isNullOrEmpty()) {
                 val issuer = X509CertificateHolder(certChain[0].encoded).subject
+                // The leaf is signed by keyInfo.keyPair, but the caller verifies it against the
+                // public key of the chain getCertChain(attestKeyAlias) serves. A two-rooted EC chain
+                // (DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS) is exactly those two disagreeing on algorithm; log
+                // both at the signing instant so an EC attest-key run pins the mismatched edge.
+                SystemLogger.uidLog(uid, null, "attest-sign") {
+                    "alias=$attestKeyAlias signerKey=${keyInfo.keyPair?.public?.algorithm} " +
+                        "servedLeafKey=${certChain[0].publicKey.algorithm} " +
+                        "depth=${certChain.size} issuer=$issuer"
+                }
                 Pair(keyInfo.keyPair, issuer)
             } else {
                 null
@@ -223,8 +267,6 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
         securityLevel: Int,
     ): Certificate {
         val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
-
-        // Default validity: epoch to 9999-12-31T23:59:59 UTC (matches add_required_parameters).
         val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
         val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
 
@@ -243,20 +285,20 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
         if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
             builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
         }
-        // Add our custom, simulated attestation extension.
-        builder.addExtension(
-            AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
-        )
+        if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
+            builder.addExtension(
+                AttestationBuilder.buildAttestationExtension(params, uid, securityLevel)
+            )
+        }
 
-        // The signature algorithm must match the SIGNING key, not the subject key.
-        // An EC attestation key may sign an RSA subject key's certificate (or vice versa).
         val signerAlgorithm =
-            when (signingKeyPair.private) {
-                is java.security.interfaces.ECKey -> "SHA256withECDSA"
-                is java.security.interfaces.RSAKey -> "SHA256withRSA"
+            when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) {
+                "EC",
+                "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
+                "RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
                 else ->
                     throw IllegalArgumentException(
-                        "Unsupported signing key type: ${signingKeyPair.private.javaClass}"
+                        "Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}"
                     )
             }
         val contentSigner =
@@ -266,4 +308,44 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
 
         return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
     }
+
+    // AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:452-478, ta/src/cert.rs:111-114
+    private fun buildSelfSignedCertificate(
+        keyPair: KeyPair,
+        params: KeyMintAttestation,
+    ): Certificate {
+        val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
+        val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
+        val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
+
+        val builder =
+            JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
+                subject,
+                params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
+                notBefore,
+                notAfter,
+                subject,
+                keyPair.public,
+            )
+
+        val keyUsageBits = buildKeyUsageFromPurposes(params.purpose)
+        if (keyUsageBits != 0) {
+            builder.addExtension(Extension.keyUsage, true, KeyUsage(keyUsageBits))
+        }
+
+        val signerAlgorithm =
+            when (keyPair.private.algorithm) {
+                "EC",
+                "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
+                "RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
+                else ->
+                    throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported key: ${keyPair.private.algorithm}")
+            }
+        val contentSigner =
+            JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
+                .setProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
+                .build(keyPair.private)
+
+        return JcaX509CertificateConverter().getCertificate(builder.build(contentSigner))
+    }
 }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/KeyBoxManager.kt

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
 import android.security.keystore.KeyProperties
 import java.io.File
 import java.io.StringReader
+import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
 import java.security.interfaces.ECPrivateKey
 import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey
 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
@@ -53,10 +54,38 @@ object KeyBoxManager {
         // If it's not in the cache, the `getOrPut` block is executed to parse and store it.
         val keyMap =
             keyStoreCache.getOrPut(keyStoreFileName) { parseKeyStoreFile(keyStoreFileName) }
-        SystemLogger.verbose(
-            "Fetching attestation key in $keyStoreFileName with $algorithm algorithm."
-        )
-        return keyMap[algorithm]
+        val keyBox = keyMap[algorithm]
+        if (keyBox != null) {
+            // Surface attestation cert serials on every fetch so a revoked/leaked keybox is
+            // obvious from logcat alone -- Google's CRL and Duck's "mass abuse" check both match
+            // by certificate serial (lowercase hex). Logged here rather than at parse time because
+            // the parse is cached and would emit at most once per boot.
+            val serials =
+                keyBox.certificates.joinToString(", ") { cert ->
+                    (cert as? X509Certificate)?.serialNumber?.toString(16) ?: "?"
+                }
+            SystemLogger.info(
+                "Using $algorithm keybox $keyStoreFileName; attestation cert serials (hex): $serials"
+            )
+        }
+        return keyBox
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Retrieves any usable attestation key from a key store file, preferring EC.
+     *
+     * EC is the modern device-attestation key type and validly signs a leaf carrying either an EC
+     * or an RSA subject key. This is the fail-safe used when no algorithm-matching key exists, so
+     * patching can still re-root the chain under the keybox instead of leaking the device's real
+     * attestation.
+     *
+     * @param keyStoreFileName The name of the XML file (e.g., "keybox.xml").
+     * @return The preferred [KeyBox], or `null` if the file contains no usable key.
+     */
+    fun getAnyAttestationKey(keyStoreFileName: String): KeyBox? {
+        val keyMap =
+            keyStoreCache.getOrPut(keyStoreFileName) { parseKeyStoreFile(keyStoreFileName) }
+        return keyMap[KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_EC] ?: keyMap.values.firstOrNull()
     }
 
     /**

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/pki/NativeCertGen.kt

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ data class CertGenConfig(
     val callerNonce: Boolean = false,
     val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean = false,
     val noAuthRequired: Boolean = true,
+    // Diagnostic plane: the calling app UID keys the native log lines, and debugLogging mirrors the
+    // APK debug variant so the native extension dump is silent in release.
+    val uid: Int,
+    val debugLogging: Boolean,
 )
 
 object NativeCertGen {
@@ -69,7 +73,10 @@ object NativeCertGen {
             isAvailable = true
             SystemLogger.info("NativeCertGen: loaded libcertgen.so successfully")
         } catch (e: UnsatisfiedLinkError) {
-            SystemLogger.error("NativeCertGen: failed to load libcertgen.so, falling back to BouncyCastle", e)
+            SystemLogger.error(
+                "NativeCertGen: failed to load libcertgen.so, falling back to BouncyCastle",
+                e,
+            )
         }
     }
 
@@ -77,10 +84,6 @@ object NativeCertGen {
 
     private external fun initLogging(verbose: Boolean, logDir: String): Boolean
 
-    private external fun dumpLogs(): String?
-
-    fun dump(): String? = if (isAvailable) dumpLogs() else null
-
     fun parseNativeResult(bytes: ByteArray): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>> {
         val buf = ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes).order(ByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN)
 
@@ -111,11 +114,13 @@ object NativeCertGen {
             throw IllegalStateException("No certificates in native result")
         }
 
-        val algorithmName = when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
-            "EC", "ECDSA" -> "EC"
-            "RSA" -> "RSA"
-            else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
-        }
+        val algorithmName =
+            when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
+                "EC",
+                "ECDSA" -> "EC"
+                "RSA" -> "RSA"
+                else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
+            }
         val keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance(algorithmName)
         val privateKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(pkBytes))
         val publicKey = certs[0].publicKey

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/AndroidDeviceUtils.kt

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
 
-import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
 import android.os.Build
 import android.os.SystemProperties
 import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
@@ -9,13 +8,16 @@ import java.io.FileInputStream
 import java.security.MessageDigest
 import java.time.LocalDate
 import java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
+import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
 import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.BootStateManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
 import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+import org.w3c.dom.Element
 
 /**
  * Provides utility functions for accessing Android system properties and device-specific
@@ -44,6 +46,7 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                 DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.verifiedBootKey
             },
             expectedSize = 32,
+            recordSource = { bootKeySource = it },
         )
     }
 
@@ -61,9 +64,16 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                 DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.verifiedBootHash
             },
             expectedSize = 32,
+            recordSource = { bootHashSource = it },
         )
     }
 
+    // Records which fallback tier supplied bootKey/bootHash so the diagnostic dossier can flag a
+    // random-fallback value — a real verifiedBootKey that resolves to random bytes is a textbook
+    // simulated-TEE tell. Populated by initializeBootProperty on first access.
+    @Volatile private var bootKeySource: String = "uninitialized"
+    @Volatile private var bootHashSource: String = "uninitialized"
+
     /**
      * Public function to explicitly trigger the initialization of the boot key and hash. Accessing
      * these properties here ensures they are set up before they might be needed elsewhere.
@@ -76,13 +86,25 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
         SystemLogger.debug("Boot key and hash initialization complete.")
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Generic initializer for boot properties like the key and hash. It attempts to read from a
+     * system property first, then from a TEE attestation, and finally falls back to a random value
+     * if neither is available.
+     *
+     * @param propertyName The name of the system property (e.g., "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest").
+     * @param attestationValueProvider A function that supplies the value from a cached attestation.
+     * @param expectedSize The expected length of the byte array (e.g., 32 for a SHA-256 digest).
+     * @return The resulting byte array for the property.
+     */
     private fun initializeBootProperty(
         propertyName: String,
         attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
         expectedSize: Int,
+        recordSource: (String) -> Unit,
     ): ByteArray {
         getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
             SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
+            recordSource("system-prop")
             persistToFile(propertyName, it)
             return it
         }
@@ -90,7 +112,8 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
         try {
             attestationValueProvider()?.let {
                 SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
-                setProperty(propertyName, it)
+                recordSource("tee-attestation")
+                setBootProperty(propertyName, it)
                 persistToFile(propertyName, it)
                 return it
             }
@@ -100,13 +123,15 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
 
         readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
             SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
-            setProperty(propertyName, it)
+            recordSource("persistent-file")
+            setBootProperty(propertyName, it)
             return it
         }
 
         return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
             SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
-            setProperty(propertyName, it)
+            recordSource("random-fallback")
+            setBootProperty(propertyName, it)
             persistToFile(propertyName, it)
         }
     }
@@ -154,16 +179,43 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
         }
     }
 
+    private fun setBootProperty(name: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
+        if (!BootStateManager.shouldSpoofBootProps()) {
+            SystemLogger.info("Skipping system property '$name' because boot prop spoofing is disabled")
+            return
+        }
+        setProperty(name, bytes)
+    }
+
+    internal fun setProperty(name: String, value: String) {
+        try {
+            SystemLogger.debug("Setting system property '$name' to: $value")
+            val command = arrayOf("resetprop", name, value)
+            val process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command)
+            val exitCode = process.waitFor()
+
+            if (exitCode != 0) {
+                val errorOutput = process.errorStream.bufferedReader().readText()
+                SystemLogger.error(
+                    "resetprop for '$name' failed with exit code $exitCode: $errorOutput"
+                )
+            }
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Failed to set '$name' property via resetprop.", e)
+        }
+    }
+
     private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
         ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }
 
     private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
 
-    private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
-        "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
-        "ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
-        else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
-    }
+    private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File =
+        when (propertyName) {
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
+            "ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
+            else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
+        }
 
     private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
         try {
@@ -202,6 +254,23 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
         return custom ?: getRealDevicePatchLevelInt("boot", isLong = true)
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Summarises, for a targeted [uid], the device values that feed attestation and where each came
+     * from. This is what exposes attested-versus-live mismatches: a random-fallback verifiedBootKey,
+     * a patch level overridden away from the live prop, or an OS version pulled from a stale cache.
+     */
+    fun describeSources(uid: Int): String {
+        val customPatchLevel = ConfigurationManager.getPatchLevelForUid(uid) != null
+        val osVersionSource =
+            if (DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.osVersion != null) "cache" else "map"
+        return "osVersion=$osVersion(src=$osVersionSource) " +
+            "osPatch=${getPatchLevel(uid)} vendorPatch=${getVendorPatchLevelLong(uid)} " +
+            "bootPatch=${getBootPatchLevelLong(uid)} customPatchLevel=$customPatchLevel " +
+            "bootKey=${bootKey.toHex()}(src=$bootKeySource) " +
+            "bootHash=${bootHash.toHex()}(src=$bootHashSource) " +
+            "teeCacheData=${DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData != null}"
+    }
+
     /**
      * Retrieves the definitive device patch level integer for a given component. This function
      * encapsulates the entire fallback chain and guarantees a non-null return.
@@ -264,9 +333,14 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
 
         return when {
             resolvedValue.equals("device_default", ignoreCase = true) -> null
-            resolvedValue.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) -> DO_NOT_REPORT
+            // Resolve from live system prop — matches what detectors see via getprop,
+            // even when PIF has spoofed ro.build.version.security_patch via resetprop
             resolvedValue.equals("prop", ignoreCase = true) ->
-                parsePatchLevelValue(SystemProperties.get("ro.build.version.security_patch", ""), isLong)
+                parsePatchLevelValue(
+                    SystemProperties.get("ro.build.version.security_patch", ""),
+                    isLong,
+                )
+            resolvedValue.equals("no", ignoreCase = true) -> DO_NOT_REPORT
             else -> parsePatchLevelValue(resolvedValue, isLong)
         }
     }
@@ -316,7 +390,9 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                 6 -> { // YYYYMM
                     val year = normalized.substring(0, 4).toInt()
                     val month = normalized.substring(4, 6).toInt()
-                    if (isLong) year * 10000 + month * 100 + 1 else year * 100 + month
+                    // Synthesizing day=01 from YYYY-MM disagrees with real device bulletins;
+                    // propagate null so callers fall back to a YYYY-MM-DD source.
+                    if (isLong) null else year * 100 + month
                 }
                 else -> null
             }
@@ -363,40 +439,257 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
             Build.VERSION_CODES.BAKLAVA to 400, // KeyMint 4.0
         )
 
+    /** AOSP-mandated attestation version for the running OS, or null when the SDK is unmapped. */
+    internal val aospAttestVersion: Int?
+        get() = attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
+
     /**
-     * Retrieves the attestation version based on security level and OS version. StrongBox (level 2)
-     * requires version 300.
+     * Retrieves the attestation version for the given security level. A readable KeyMint VINTF
+     * declaration wins first, so local probes that compare the attested version against the
+     * device's manifest see a coherent pair. Otherwise the legacy chain applies: cached attestation
+     * data, then attestVersionMap[SDK_INT], then 400 as last resort.
      *
      * @param securityLevel The security level of the attestation (1 for TEE, 2 for StrongBox).
      * @return The appropriate attestation version number.
      */
     fun getAttestVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
-        // StrongBox security level requires an attestation version of at least 300.
-        if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) {
-            return 300
+        vintfKeyMintVersion?.let { version ->
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "attestVersion=${version.attestationVersion} source=vintf securityLevel=$securityLevel"
+            )
+            return version.attestationVersion
         }
-        return DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
-            ?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT]
-            ?: 400 // Default to a recent version
+
+        val cached = DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.attestVersion
+        val version =
+            cached ?: attestVersionMap[Build.VERSION.SDK_INT] ?: 400 // Default to a recent version
+        val source =
+            when {
+                cached != null -> "cache"
+                attestVersionMap.containsKey(Build.VERSION.SDK_INT) -> "map"
+                else -> "default"
+            }
+        SystemLogger.debug("attestVersion=$version source=$source securityLevel=$securityLevel")
+        SystemLogger.debug(
+            "vintf-version attest=$version keymaster=$version source=$source securityLevel=$securityLevel"
+        )
+        return version
     }
 
     /**
-     * Retrieves the Keymaster/KeyMint version based on the attestation version.
+     * Retrieves the Keymaster/KeyMint version. A readable KeyMint VINTF declaration is
+     * authoritative because recent local detectors compare the attested version directly against
+     * the manifest declaration.
      *
      * @param securityLevel The security level, used to determine the correct attestation version.
      * @return The appropriate Keymaster or KeyMint version number.
      */
     fun getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel: Int): Int {
-        val attestVersion = getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
-        return if (attestVersion >= 100) attestVersion else 41 // Keymaster 4.1 for older versions
+        vintfKeyMintVersion?.let { version ->
+            SystemLogger.debug(
+                "keymasterVersion=${version.keymasterVersion} source=vintf securityLevel=$securityLevel"
+            )
+            return version.keymasterVersion
+        }
+        return getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
     }
 
+    /**
+     * KeyMint/Keymaster version pair resolved from a device VINTF manifest. [attestationVersion] is
+     * the value written into the attestation record; [keymasterVersion] is the HAL version field.
+     * They coincide for AIDL KeyMint and diverge only for legacy HIDL Keymaster.
+     */
+    private data class VintfKeyMintVersion(
+        val attestationVersion: Int,
+        val keymasterVersion: Int,
+        val sourcePath: String,
+    )
+
+    /**
+     * KeyMint version derived from the device's VINTF manifests, or null when none is readable.
+     * Resolved lazily so the manifest scan happens once, off the attestation hot path.
+     */
+    private val vintfKeyMintVersion: VintfKeyMintVersion? by lazy {
+        readVintfKeyMintVersion().also { version ->
+            if (version != null) {
+                SystemLogger.info(
+                    "Using KeyMint version from VINTF: attestation=${version.attestationVersion}, " +
+                        "keymaster=${version.keymasterVersion}, source=${version.sourcePath}"
+                )
+            } else {
+                SystemLogger.debug(
+                    "No usable KeyMint VINTF declaration found; using attestation fallback"
+                )
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun readVintfKeyMintVersion(): VintfKeyMintVersion? {
+        val files = linkedMapOf<String, File>()
+
+        VINTF_MANIFEST_DIRS.forEach { path ->
+            val dir = File(path)
+            if (!dir.exists() || !dir.isDirectory) return@forEach
+            val listed =
+                runCatching {
+                        dir.listFiles { file ->
+                            file.isFile && file.name.endsWith(".xml", ignoreCase = true)
+                        }
+                    }
+                    .getOrElse { throwable ->
+                        SystemLogger.debug("Unable to list VINTF dir $path: ${throwable.message}")
+                        null
+                    }
+            listed?.forEach { file -> files[file.absolutePath] = file }
+        }
+
+        VINTF_MANIFEST_FILES.forEach { path ->
+            val file = File(path)
+            if (file.exists() && file.isFile) {
+                files[file.absolutePath] = file
+            }
+        }
+
+        return files.values
+            .flatMap { file ->
+                runCatching { parseKeyMintVersions(file) }
+                    .getOrElse { throwable ->
+                        SystemLogger.debug(
+                            "Unable to parse KeyMint VINTF ${file.absolutePath}: ${throwable.message}"
+                        )
+                        emptyList()
+                    }
+            }
+            .maxByOrNull { it.attestationVersion }
+    }
+
+    private fun parseKeyMintVersions(file: File): List<VintfKeyMintVersion> {
+        val document = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder().parse(file)
+        val root = document.documentElement ?: return emptyList()
+
+        return directChildElements(root, "hal").flatMap { hal ->
+            val halName = directChildTexts(hal, "name").firstOrNull().orEmpty()
+            val versions = directChildTexts(hal, "version")
+            val fqnames = directChildTexts(hal, "fqname")
+            val interfaces =
+                directChildElements(hal, "interface").associate { interfaceElement ->
+                    val name = directChildTexts(interfaceElement, "name").firstOrNull().orEmpty()
+                    val instances = directChildTexts(interfaceElement, "instance").toSet()
+                    name to instances
+                }
+
+            when (halName) {
+                KEYMINT_HAL_NAME ->
+                    if (hasDefaultInstance(fqnames, interfaces, KEYMINT_INTERFACE_NAME)) {
+                        versions.mapNotNull { version ->
+                            version
+                                .toIntOrNull()
+                                ?.takeIf { it > 0 }
+                                ?.let { aidlVersion ->
+                                    val attestationVersion = aidlVersion * 100
+                                    VintfKeyMintVersion(
+                                        attestationVersion = attestationVersion,
+                                        keymasterVersion = attestationVersion,
+                                        sourcePath = file.absolutePath,
+                                    )
+                                }
+                        }
+                    } else {
+                        emptyList()
+                    }
+                KEYMASTER_HAL_NAME ->
+                    if (hasDefaultInstance(fqnames, interfaces, KEYMASTER_INTERFACE_NAME)) {
+                        (versions.flatMap(::expandHidlVersions) +
+                                fqnames.mapNotNull(::versionFromFqname))
+                            .distinct()
+                            .mapNotNull { version ->
+                                expectedLegacyVersions(version)?.let { expected ->
+                                    VintfKeyMintVersion(
+                                        attestationVersion = expected.second,
+                                        keymasterVersion = expected.first,
+                                        sourcePath = file.absolutePath,
+                                    )
+                                }
+                            }
+                    } else {
+                        emptyList()
+                    }
+                else -> emptyList()
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun directChildElements(parent: Element, tagName: String): List<Element> = buildList {
+        val children = parent.childNodes
+        for (index in 0 until children.length) {
+            val child = children.item(index)
+            if (child is Element && child.tagName == tagName) {
+                add(child)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    private fun directChildTexts(parent: Element, tagName: String): List<String> =
+        directChildElements(parent, tagName)
+            .map { it.textContent.trim() }
+            .filter { it.isNotEmpty() }
+
+    private fun hasDefaultInstance(
+        fqnames: List<String>,
+        interfaces: Map<String, Set<String>>,
+        interfaceName: String,
+    ): Boolean =
+        fqnames.any { fqname ->
+            fqname.substringAfter("::", fqname).substringBefore("/") == interfaceName &&
+                fqname.substringAfter("/", "") == DEFAULT_INSTANCE
+        } || interfaces[interfaceName]?.contains(DEFAULT_INSTANCE) == true
+
+    private fun versionFromFqname(fqname: String): String? =
+        FQNAME_VERSION_REGEX.find(fqname)?.groupValues?.getOrNull(1)
+
+    private fun expectedLegacyVersions(version: String): Pair<Int, Int>? =
+        when (version) {
+            "3.0" -> 3 to 2
+            "4.0" -> 4 to 3
+            "4.1" -> 41 to 4
+            else -> null
+        }
+
+    private fun expandHidlVersions(version: String): List<String> {
+        val range = HIDL_VERSION_RANGE_REGEX.matchEntire(version) ?: return listOf(version)
+        val major = range.groupValues[1]
+        val firstMinor = range.groupValues[2].toInt()
+        val lastMinor = range.groupValues[3].toInt()
+        return (firstMinor..lastMinor).map { minor -> "$major.$minor" }
+    }
+
+    private val VINTF_MANIFEST_DIRS =
+        listOf(
+            "/system/etc/vintf/manifest",
+            "/system_ext/etc/vintf/manifest",
+            "/product/etc/vintf/manifest",
+            "/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest",
+            "/odm/etc/vintf/manifest",
+        )
+    private val VINTF_MANIFEST_FILES =
+        listOf(
+            "/system/etc/vintf/manifest.xml",
+            "/system_ext/etc/vintf/manifest.xml",
+            "/product/etc/vintf/manifest.xml",
+            "/vendor/etc/vintf/manifest.xml",
+            "/odm/etc/vintf/manifest.xml",
+        )
+    private const val KEYMINT_HAL_NAME = "android.hardware.security.keymint"
+    private const val KEYMASTER_HAL_NAME = "android.hardware.keymaster"
+    private const val KEYMINT_INTERFACE_NAME = "IKeyMintDevice"
+    private const val KEYMASTER_INTERFACE_NAME = "IKeymasterDevice"
+    private const val DEFAULT_INSTANCE = "default"
+    private val FQNAME_VERSION_REGEX = Regex("^@([0-9]+(?:\\.[0-9]+)?)::")
+    private val HIDL_VERSION_RANGE_REGEX = Regex("^([0-9]+)\\.([0-9]+)-([0-9]+)$")
+
     // --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---
 
-    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/android-latest-release:system/apex/proto/apex_manifest.proto
-    // --- Minimal Protobuf Parser for ApexManifest ---
-    // Field 1: name (string)
-    // Field 2: version (int64)
+    // Minimal protobuf parser for apex_manifest.pb (field 1: name, field 2: version)
     private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
         var pos = 0
 
@@ -410,13 +703,13 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
                 val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()
 
                 when (fieldNum) {
-                    1L -> { // name
+                    1L -> {
                         val length = readVarint().toInt()
                         if (pos + length > data.size) return null
                         name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
                         pos += length
                     }
-                    2L -> { // version
+                    2L -> {
                         version = readVarint()
                     }
                     else -> skipField(wireType)
@@ -444,19 +737,18 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
 
         private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
             when (wireType) {
-                0 -> readVarint() // Varint
-                1 -> pos += 8 // 64-bit
-                2 -> { // Length-delimited
+                0 -> readVarint()
+                1 -> pos += 8
+                2 -> {
                     val len = readVarint().toInt()
                     pos += len
                 }
-                5 -> pos += 4 // 32-bit
+                5 -> pos += 4
                 else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
             }
         }
     }
 
-    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/apex/libs/libapexutil/apexutil.cpp
     private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
         val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
         val apexRoot = File("/apex")
@@ -465,22 +757,14 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
             return@lazy emptyList()
         }
 
-        // Logic from: GetActivePackages in apexutil.cpp
         apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file ->
             if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach
             val name = file.name
 
-            // 1. Ignore "." (and implicitly "..")
             if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach
-
-            // 2. Ignore directories containing '@' (active mounts usually don't have version in
-            // path)
             if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach
-
-            // 3. Ignore "sharedlibs"
             if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach
 
-            // 4. Parse apex_manifest.pb
             val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
             if (manifestFile.exists()) {
                 runCatching {
@@ -491,68 +775,81 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
             }
         }
 
-        // Ensure uniqueness (though filesystem scan usually prevents exact dupes,
-        // strictly speaking we want to behave like a Map keyed by package name)
         results.distinctBy { it.first }
     }
 
-    // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/security/keystore2/src/maintenance.rs
     val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
         DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
+            ?.also { SystemLogger.debug { "module-hash source=cache hash=${it.toHex().take(8)}" } }
+            ?: supplementaryModuleHash()?.also {
+                SystemLogger.debug { "module-hash source=framework-api hash=${it.toHex().take(8)}" }
+            }
             ?: runCatching {
-                    // 1. Create a container to hold the sort key (name encoded) and the full data
-                    // (sequence encoded)
-                    data class ModuleEntry(
-                        val nameEncoded: ByteArray, // The sort key
-                        val fullEncoded: ByteArray, // The data to hash
-                    )
+                    data class ModuleEntry(val nameEncoded: ByteArray, val fullEncoded: ByteArray)
 
                     val modules =
                         apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) ->
-                            // Create the components
                             val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8))
                             val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode)
 
-                            // Create the Sequence: SEQUENCE { packageName, version }
                             val vec = ASN1EncodableVector()
                             vec.add(nameOctet)
                             vec.add(versionInt)
                             val sequence = DERSequence(vec)
 
-                            // We store the encoded name separately because Rust sorts ONLY by this
+                            // AOSP sorts by encoded name only, not full sequence
                             ModuleEntry(
                                 nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
                                 fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
                             )
                         }
 
-                    // 2. Sort manually based on the encoded Package Name (lexicographically)
-                    // This mimics the Rust 'impl DerOrd for ModuleInfo' which delegates to
-                    // 'self.name'
                     val sortedModules =
                         modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 ->
                             compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
                         }
 
-                    // 3. Concatenate the full sequences in the specific sorted order
                     val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
                     sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
                     val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()
 
-                    // 4. Wrap manually in a DER SET tag (0x31)
-                    // We cannot use DERSet(vector) because it would re-sort incorrectly.
+                    // Wrap in DER SET tag manually — DERSet() re-sorts by full encoding
                     val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)
 
-                    // 5. Compute SHA-256
                     MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
                 }
+                .onSuccess {
+                    SystemLogger.debug { "module-hash source=rederive hash=${it.toHex().take(8)}" }
+                }
+                .onFailure { SystemLogger.debug { "module-hash source=zero hash=00000000" } }
                 .getOrElse {
                     SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it)
                     ByteArray(32)
                 }
     }
 
-    /** Compares two byte arrays lexicographically (unsigned). */
+    /**
+     * Reads the module-hash DER pre-image straight from the framework's own KeyStoreManager and
+     * SHA-256's it, so the value byte-matches what a verifier derives from the same
+     * getSupplementaryAttestationInfo call. Returns null on any failure (e.g. the API is
+     * unreachable from this process) so the caller falls back to local re-derivation.
+     */
+    private fun supplementaryModuleHash(): ByteArray? =
+        runCatching {
+                // @SystemApi surface added in Android 16, absent from the compile SDK, so reflect.
+                val managerClass = Class.forName("android.security.keystore.KeyStoreManager")
+                val manager = managerClass.getMethod("getInstance").invoke(null)
+                // MODULE_HASH is the KeyMint tag (TagType.BYTES | 724 = 0x900002D4), read from the
+                // framework so it matches the verifier's argument exactly.
+                val moduleHashTag = managerClass.getField("MODULE_HASH").getInt(null)
+                val derPreImage =
+                    managerClass
+                        .getMethod("getSupplementaryAttestationInfo", Int::class.java)
+                        .invoke(manager, moduleHashTag) as ByteArray
+                MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(derPreImage)
+            }
+            .getOrNull()
+
     private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
         val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
         for (i in 0 until length) {
@@ -565,31 +862,25 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
         return a.size - b.size
     }
 
-    /** Manually wraps the payload in an ASN.1 SET (0x31) tag with correct length encoding. */
     private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
         val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
-        out.write(0x31) // ASN.1 Tag for SET
+        out.write(0x31)
         writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
         out.write(payload)
         return out.toByteArray()
     }
 
-    /** Writes the ASN.1 length field to the stream. */
     private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
         if (length < 128) {
-            // Short form
             out.write(length)
         } else {
-            // Long form
             var size = length
             val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
             while (size > 0) {
                 bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
                 size = size ushr 8
             }
-            // First byte: 0x80 | number of length bytes
             out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
-            // Write length bytes in big-endian (reverse of how we extracted them)
             for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
                 out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
             }

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/AndroidPermissionUtils.kt

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
+
+import android.annotation.SuppressLint
+import android.content.Context
+import android.content.pm.PackageManager
+import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
+
+object AndroidPermissionUtils {
+
+    @SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
+    private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
+        return try {
+            // 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
+            val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
+
+            // 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
+            val currentActivityThreadMethod =
+                activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
+            currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
+            val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
+
+            if (activityThread == null) {
+                SystemLogger.warning(
+                    "Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null"
+                )
+                return null
+            }
+
+            // 3. Try to get the application context
+            val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
+            getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
+            val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
+
+            if (application != null) return application
+
+            // 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in
+            // system_server)
+            val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
+            getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
+            getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
+        } catch (e: Exception) {
+            SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
+            null
+        }
+    }
+
+    /** Core permission check. */
+    fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
+        val context =
+            getGlobalContext()
+                ?: run {
+                    SystemLogger.warning(
+                        "AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely."
+                    )
+                    return false
+                }
+
+        val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
+        return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
+    }
+
+    fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
+    }
+
+    fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
+    }
+
+    fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
+    }
+
+    fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
+        return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
+    }
+}

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/Extensions.kt

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
  * @return A new string with each line individually trimmed.
  */
 fun String.trimLines(): String =
-    this.trim()
-        .lines()
-        .filter { !it.trim().startsWith("<!--") }
-        .joinToString("\n") { it.trim() }
+    this.trim().lines().filter { !it.trim().startsWith("<!--") }.joinToString("\n") { it.trim() }
 
 /**
  * Converts a ByteArray to its hexadecimal string representation.

app/src/main/java/org/matrix/TEESimulator/util/TeeLatencySimulator.kt

@@ -8,21 +8,6 @@ import kotlin.math.exp
 import kotlin.math.ln
 import kotlin.math.max
 
-/**
- * Simulates realistic TEE hardware latency for software key generation.
- *
- * The delay model is derived from 64+ timing measurements across QTEE (Qualcomm) and Trustonic
- * (MediaTek) hardware. It combines four independent noise sources that model different physical
- * latency origins in a real TrustZone-based TEE:
- *
- * 1. Base crypto processing (log-normal): hardware RNG + key derivation + cert signing
- * 2. Binder/kernel transit (exponential): IPC scheduling, context switches
- * 3. TrustZone scheduler jitter (Gaussian): world-switch non-determinism
- * 4. Cold-start penalty (half-normal): first operation after idle is slower due to TEE
- *    secure world re-initialization and TLB/cache warming
- *
- * Per-boot session bias models manufacturing variance between TEE hardware instances.
- */
 object TeeLatencySimulator {
 
     private val rng = SecureRandom()
@@ -56,11 +41,6 @@ object TeeLatencySimulator {
         return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
     }
 
-    /**
-     * Log-normal base delay. Parameters tuned to match observed hardware profiles:
-     * EC P-256 on QTEE averages ~65ms, RSA-2048 ~75ms, AES ~40ms.
-     * Sigma kept low (0.08) to match the tight clustering seen in real measurements.
-     */
     private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
         val (mu, sigma) =
             when (algorithm) {

module/action.sh

@@ -2,10 +2,59 @@
 MODDIR=${0%/*}
 CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store
 
+. "$MODDIR/action_i18n.sh"
+
+confirm() {
+    # Sample getevent in 1s bursts; a piped stream block-buffers and misses
+    # a single key-press before the timeout.
+    deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + 10 ))
+    while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
+        events=$(/system/bin/timeout 1 /system/bin/getevent -l 2>/dev/null)
+        case "$events" in
+            *KEY_VOLUMEUP*)   return 0 ;;
+            *KEY_VOLUMEDOWN*) return 1 ;;
+        esac
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+
+# Debug builds ship diag.sh, adding a one-tap log export before the destructive clear-keys action.
+if [ -f "$MODDIR/diag.sh" ]; then
+    . "$MODDIR/diag.sh"
+    echo " "
+    echo "  📦 Export diagnostic logs to /sdcard/Download?"
+    echo "  🔊  Vol-Up = export logs"
+    echo "  🔉  Vol-Down = skip to clear keys"
+    echo " "
+    if confirm; then
+        diag_export
+        exit 0
+    fi
+fi
+
+echo "  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
+echo "  ⚠️  $(_msg confirm_header)"
+echo "  ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
+echo " "
+echo "  $(_msg confirm_warning_1)"
+echo "  $(_msg confirm_warning_2)"
+echo " "
+echo "  🔊  $(_msg confirm_vol_up)"
+echo "  🔉  $(_msg confirm_vol_down)"
+echo " "
+
+if ! confirm; then
+    echo " "
+    echo "  ❌ $(_msg confirm_cancelled)"
+    exit 0
+fi
+
 if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then
     rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
     mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
-    echo "Persistent key storage cleared"
+    echo " "
+    echo "  ✅ $(_msg confirm_cleared)"
 else
-    echo "No persistent key storage found"
+    echo " "
+    echo "  ℹ️  $(_msg confirm_not_found)"
 fi

module/action_i18n.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+ACTION_LANG="en"
+_detect_lang() {
+    local raw
+    raw=$(getprop persist.sys.locale 2>/dev/null)
+    [ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.product.locale 2>/dev/null)
+    [ -z "$raw" ] && raw=$(getprop ro.system.locale 2>/dev/null)
+    local code=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | sed 's/_/-/g')
+    case "$code" in
+        zh-Hans*|zh-CN*) code="zh-CN" ;;
+        zh-Hant*|zh-TW*|zh-HK*) code="zh-TW" ;;
+        pt-BR*) code="pt-BR" ;;
+        pt*) code="pt-BR" ;;
+        es-ES*|es*) code="es-ES" ;;
+        *-*) code="${code%%-*}" ;;
+    esac
+    case "$code" in
+        ar|az|bn|de|el|es-ES|fa|fr|id|it|ja|ko|pl|pt-BR|ru|th|tl|tr|uk|vi|zh-CN|zh-TW) ACTION_LANG="$code" ;;
+    esac
+}
+_detect_lang
+
+_msg() {
+    case "$ACTION_LANG" in
+    zh-CN) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "清除持久化密钥存储" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "这将删除所有缓存的证明密钥。" ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "使用证明的应用将在下次使用时重新注册。" ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 确认清除" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = 取消（10秒后默认）" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "已取消 - 密钥已保留" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "持久化密钥存储已清除" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "未找到持久化密钥存储" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    zh-TW) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "清除持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "這將刪除所有快取的證明金鑰。" ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "使用證明的應用程式將在下次使用時重新註冊。" ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 確認清除" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = 取消（10秒後預設）" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "已取消 - 金鑰已保留" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "持久化金鑰儲存已清除" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "未找到持久化金鑰儲存" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    ja) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "永続キーストレージを消去" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "キャッシュされた証明キーをすべて削除します。" ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "証明を使用するアプリは次回使用時に再登録されます。" ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "音量+ = 消去を確認" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "音量- = キャンセル（10秒後デフォルト）" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "キャンセルされました - キーは保持されます" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "永続キーストレージを消去しました" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "永続キーストレージが見つかりません" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    ko) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "영구 키 저장소 지우기" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "캐시된 모든 증명 키를 삭제합니다." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "증명을 사용하는 앱은 다음 사용 시 재등록됩니다." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "볼륨+ = 지우기 확인" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "볼륨- = 취소 (10초 후 기본값)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "취소됨 - 키 유지됨" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "영구 키 저장소가 지워졌습니다" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "영구 키 저장소를 찾을 수 없습니다" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    ru) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Очистить постоянное хранилище ключей" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Это удалит все кэшированные ключи аттестации." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Приложения, использующие аттестацию, перерегистрируются при следующем использовании." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Громкость+ = Подтвердить очистку" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Громкость- = Отмена (по умолчанию через 10с)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Отменено - ключи сохранены" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей очищено" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Постоянное хранилище ключей не найдено" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    de) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Persistenten Schlüsselspeicher löschen" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Dies löscht alle zwischengespeicherten Attestierungsschlüssel." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps mit Attestierung registrieren sich bei der nächsten Nutzung neu." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Laut+ = Löschen bestätigen" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Leise- = Abbrechen (Standard nach 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Abgebrochen - Schlüssel beibehalten" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gelöscht" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Kein persistenter Schlüsselspeicher gefunden" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    fr) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Effacer le stockage de clés persistant" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Ceci supprime toutes les clés d'attestation en cache." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Les apps utilisant l'attestation se réinscriront à la prochaine utilisation." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmer l'effacement" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Annuler (par défaut après 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Annulé - clés conservées" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Stockage de clés persistant effacé" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Aucun stockage de clés persistant trouvé" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    es-ES) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Borrar almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Esto elimina todas las claves de atestación en caché." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Las apps que usan atestación se volverán a registrar en el próximo uso." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmar borrado" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Cancelar (predeterminado tras 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelado - claves conservadas" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Almacenamiento persistente de claves borrado" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "No se encontró almacenamiento persistente de claves" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    pt-BR) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Limpar armazenamento persistente de chaves" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Isso exclui todas as chaves de atestação em cache." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps que usam atestação serão re-registrados no próximo uso." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Confirmar limpeza" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Cancelar (padrão após 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelado - chaves preservadas" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Armazenamento persistente de chaves limpo" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nenhum armazenamento persistente de chaves encontrado" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    it) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Cancella archivio chiavi persistente" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Questo elimina tutte le chiavi di attestazione in cache." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Le app che usano l'attestazione si re-registreranno al prossimo utilizzo." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Conferma cancellazione" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Annulla (predefinito dopo 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Annullato - chiavi conservate" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Archivio chiavi persistente cancellato" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nessun archivio chiavi persistente trovato" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    tr) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Kalıcı Anahtar Deposunu Temizle" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Bu, önbelleğe alınmış tüm doğrulama anahtarlarını siler." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Doğrulama kullanan uygulamalar bir sonraki kullanımda yeniden kaydolacak." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Ses+ = Temizlemeyi onayla" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Ses- = İptal (10sn sonra varsayılan)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "İptal edildi - anahtarlar korundu" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu temizlendi" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Kalıcı anahtar deposu bulunamadı" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    id) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Hapus Penyimpanan Kunci Persisten" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Ini menghapus semua kunci atestasi yang di-cache." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Aplikasi yang menggunakan atestasi akan mendaftar ulang saat digunakan." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Konfirmasi hapus" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Batal (default setelah 10 detik)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Dibatalkan - kunci dipertahankan" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten dihapus" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Penyimpanan kunci persisten tidak ditemukan" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    vi) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Thao tác này xóa tất cả khóa chứng thực được lưu cache." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Các ứng dụng dùng chứng thực sẽ đăng ký lại khi sử dụng tiếp theo." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Xác nhận xóa" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Hủy (mặc định sau 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Đã hủy - giữ nguyên khóa" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Đã xóa lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Không tìm thấy lưu trữ khóa cố định" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    ar) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "يؤدي هذا إلى حذف جميع مفاتيح التصديق المخزنة مؤقتاً." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "التطبيقات التي تستخدم التصديق ستعيد التسجيل في الاستخدام التالي." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "رفع الصوت = تأكيد المسح" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "خفض الصوت = إلغاء (افتراضي بعد 10 ثوانٍ)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "تم الإلغاء - تم الاحتفاظ بالمفاتيح" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "تم مسح تخزين المفاتيح الدائم" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "لم يتم العثور على تخزين مفاتيح دائم" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    th) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "การดำเนินการนี้จะลบคีย์การรับรองที่แคชไว้ทั้งหมด" ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "แอปที่ใช้การรับรองจะลงทะเบียนใหม่ในการใช้งานครั้งถัดไป" ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "เพิ่มเสียง = ยืนยันการล้าง" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "ลดเสียง = ยกเลิก (ค่าเริ่มต้นหลัง 10 วินาที)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "ยกเลิกแล้ว - คีย์ยังคงอยู่" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "ล้างที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวรแล้ว" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "ไม่พบที่จัดเก็บคีย์ถาวร" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    uk) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Очистити постійне сховище ключів" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Це видаляє всі кешовані ключі атестації." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Програми, що використовують атестацію, повторно зареєструються при наступному використанні." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Гучність+ = Підтвердити очищення" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Гучність- = Скасувати (за замовчуванням через 10с)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Скасовано - ключі збережено" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Постійне сховище ключів очищено" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Постійне сховище ключів не знайдено" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    pl) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Wyczyść trwały magazyn kluczy" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "To usuwa wszystkie buforowane klucze atestacji." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Aplikacje używające atestacji zarejestrują się ponownie przy następnym użyciu." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Głośność+ = Potwierdź czyszczenie" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Głośność- = Anuluj (domyślnie po 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Anulowano - klucze zachowane" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Trwały magazyn kluczy wyczyszczony" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Nie znaleziono trwałego magazynu kluczy" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    az) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Davamlı Açar Yaddaşını Təmizlə" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Bu, keşlənmiş bütün təsdiqləmə açarlarını silir." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Təsdiqləmədən istifadə edən tətbiqlər növbəti istifadədə yenidən qeydiyyatdan keçəcək." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Səs+ = Təmizləməni təsdiqlə" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Səs- = Ləğv et (10 saniyə sonra defolt)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Ləğv edildi - açarlar saxlanıldı" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı təmizləndi" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Davamlı açar yaddaşı tapılmadı" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    bn) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করুন" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "এটি সমস্ত ক্যাশড অ্যাটেস্টেশন কী মুছে ফেলে।" ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "অ্যাটেস্টেশন ব্যবহারকারী অ্যাপগুলি পরবর্তী ব্যবহারে পুনরায় নিবন্ধন করবে।" ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "ভলিউম+ = পরিষ্কার নিশ্চিত করুন" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "ভলিউম- = বাতিল (১০ সেকেন্ডে ডিফল্ট)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "বাতিল করা হয়েছে - কী সংরক্ষিত" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পরিষ্কার করা হয়েছে" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "কোনো স্থায়ী কী সংরক্ষণ পাওয়া যায়নি" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    el) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Εκκαθάριση Μόνιμου Αποθηκευτικού Χώρου Κλειδιών" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Διαγράφει όλα τα προσωρινά αποθηκευμένα κλειδιά πιστοποίησης." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Οι εφαρμογές που χρησιμοποιούν πιστοποίηση θα επανεγγραφούν στην επόμενη χρήση." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Ένταση+ = Επιβεβαίωση εκκαθάρισης" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Ένταση- = Ακύρωση (προεπιλογή μετά από 10 δευτ)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Ακυρώθηκε - τα κλειδιά διατηρήθηκαν" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Ο μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών εκκαθαρίστηκε" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Δεν βρέθηκε μόνιμος αποθηκευτικός χώρος κλειδιών" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    fa) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "پاک کردن ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "این کار همه کلیدهای تأیید کش‌شده را حذف می‌کند." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "برنامه‌های استفاده‌کننده از تأیید در استفاده بعدی دوباره ثبت‌نام می‌کنند." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "صدا+ = تأیید پاک کردن" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "صدا- = لغو (پیش‌فرض پس از ۱۰ ثانیه)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "لغو شد - کلیدها حفظ شدند" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید پاک شد" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "ذخیره‌سازی دائمی کلید یافت نشد" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    tl) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Burahin ang Persistent Key Storage" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "Buburahin nito ang lahat ng naka-cache na attestation keys." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Magre-rehistro muli ang mga app na gumagamit ng attestation sa susunod na paggamit." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+ = Kumpirmahin ang pagbura" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol- = Kanselahin (default pagkatapos ng 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Nakansela - napanatili ang mga key" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Nabura ang persistent key storage" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "Walang nahanap na persistent key storage" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    *) case "$1" in
+        confirm_header)     echo "Clear Persistent Key Storage" ;;
+        confirm_warning_1)  echo "This deletes all cached attestation keys." ;;
+        confirm_warning_2)  echo "Apps using attestation will re-enroll on next use." ;;
+        confirm_vol_up)     echo "Vol+  = Confirm clear" ;;
+        confirm_vol_down)   echo "Vol-  = Cancel (default after 10s)" ;;
+        confirm_cancelled)  echo "Cancelled - keys preserved" ;;
+        confirm_cleared)    echo "Persistent key storage cleared" ;;
+        confirm_not_found)  echo "No persistent key storage found" ;;
+    esac ;;
+    esac
+}

module/changelog.md

@@ -1,73 +1,212 @@
-## TEESimulator-RS v5.1.1: Pre-Stash Restoration
-
-Restores all custom hardening fixes that were lost during the PR #157 migration. These were working in pre-stash builds but never carried over to the post-stash codebase, causing user-reported regressions (boot hash instability, DuckDetector score regression, config crash on file deletion).
-
-- **Boot hash persistence** restored: 4-step fallback (sysprop, TEE, file, random) with file writes at every step. Fixes "Boot: Unavailable" where boot hash randomized every reboot on devices without `ro.boot.vbmeta.digest`
-- **Presence-based findBoolean** for KeyMint tags: boolean tags are presence-based per AIDL spec, `.boolValue` field isn't reliably populated across Android versions
-- **noAuthRequired** defaults to true when not explicitly false, matching AOSP KeyMint behavior
-- **callerNonce** tag now flows through to software-enforced attestation list
-- **CTR block mode** restored in cipher algorithm mapping (was dropped in PR #157)
-- **AEAD guard** on updateAad: non-GCM operations throw INVALID_TAG
-- **Error code resolution** via lazy reflection with correct KeyMint AIDL fallback values
-- **Latency floor** on SoftwareOperation.finish() for StrongBox timing simulation
-- **FileObserver NPE** fixed: null-safe handling on config file DELETE events
-- **system=prop** consistency: forces boot/vendor patch levels to derive from device props
-- **StrongBox simulation** restored: capability checks (RSA<=2048, EC=P256), concurrent op limits (4 max), keygen latency floor (250ms), op latency floor (80ms)
-- **Binder buffer guard**: MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH (256KB) rejects oversized aliases before processing
-- **Key lifecycle tracking**: deletedSoftwareKeys set prevents ghost key responses after deletion
-- **Per-UID operation limits**: 15 TEE, 4 StrongBox with LRU eviction
-- **EC+DECRYPT rejection** in createOperation, matching AOSP unsupported purpose check
-- **Attest key nspace update** aligned with upstream PR #169
+> [!NOTE]
+> The project is going through a heavy refactor at the moment, so public commits may lag behind for a while.
 
 ---
 
-## TEESimulator-RS v5.1: Interception Architecture Rewrite
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-307
 
-Major release. 27 files changed, 2300 lines rewritten. The entire Kotlin interception layer has been rebuilt with a clean architecture, proper AIDL alignment, and significantly lower binder overhead.
+Fixes five gaps in the module's TEE key-operation and attestation emulation. Two of them fix crashes in real app crypto on a broken-TEE device: any app using an AndroidKeyStore HMAC key or an RSA-OAEP-SHA256 key was throwing. This is a beta; the confirmation logs are in the debug build only, and nothing is field-verified yet.
 
-### Interception Layer Rewrite
-- KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor completely restructured: GeneratedKeyInfo now carries full KeyMintAttestation instead of nullable stub, eliminating scattered null checks across every operation path
-- SoftwareOperation rewritten with sealed CryptoPrimitive interface separating Signer, Verifier, Encryptor, and Decryptor into isolated implementations with proper JCA algorithm mapping
-- KeystoreErrorCode centralized object replaces scattered magic numbers for all KeyMint and Keystore2 error codes
-- listEntries moved from pre-transact parameter caching to post-transact injection, eliminating a race condition where cached params could go stale
-- deleteKey now handles both APP domain (by alias) and KEY_ID domain (by nspace) resolution paths correctly
-- AuthorizeCreate and AndroidPermissionUtils removed, authorization logic consolidated into the operation dispatch path
-- DeviceAttestationService removed, attestation routing simplified into the main interceptor
+### App crypto correctness
+- HMAC operations now run instead of throwing. An AndroidKeyStore HMAC key is symmetric, so an HMAC SIGN fell into the asymmetric SIGN path and failed on a null key pair, and no MAC primitive existed. SIGN and VERIFY now work: the tag is computed with Mac (HmacSHA256/384/512), truncated to the requested MAC_LENGTH (full digest when unspecified), and checked with a constant-time compare.
+- RSA-OAEP-SHA256 decrypt no longer fails with BadPaddingException. The cipher ran with no OAEPParameterSpec, so JCA fell back to SHA-1 and rejected SHA-256 ciphertext. It now applies the correct main and MGF1 digests. A key that authorizes several MGF1 digests uses the one the operation requested, not the key's first.
+- Grant-domain attestation keys now resolve. A self-granted PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY (a Domain.GRANT descriptor) could not resolve its signer alias, so generateKey failed and the subject key was never stored, returning KEY_NOT_FOUND on readback. The grant now resolves to the owner key's alias, and the subject key stays readable under Domain.APP.
 
-### Software Crypto Operations
-- GCM nonce returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations, matching real KeyMint HAL behavior
-- updateAad correctly throws INVALID_TAG on non-AEAD operations instead of silently succeeding
-- Cipher algorithm mapping cleaned up: dropped CTR block mode and RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding that caused JCA provider mismatches
-- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes instead of raw exceptions
+### Supplementary attestation
+- MODULE_HASH now comes from the framework's own getSupplementaryAttestationInfo, so it matches the value a verifier computes. It falls back to local re-derivation when that API is unreachable.
 
-### Attestation & Certificate Generation
-- CertificateGenerator rewritten with clean Kotlin Pair return type instead of Android's util.Pair
-- AttestationBuilder field ordering aligned with AOSP KeyDescription ASN.1 schema
-- Unique ID computation follows KeyMint HAL spec: HMAC-SHA256(temporal_counter || AAID || reset_flag, HBK) truncated to 128 bits
-- Patch level logging removed from hot path to reduce logcat noise on every attestation
+### Diagnostics (debug builds only)
+- New per-operation (oaep-op, hmac-op, attest-grant) and device-level (module-hash, vintf-version) source logs. R8 strips them from release builds.
 
-### Configuration & Device Properties
-- ConfigurationManager target package parsing refactored: mode/package extraction deduplicated across GENERATE/PATCH/AUTO branches
-- system=prop forced boot/vendor override removed, now respects explicit per-component patch level configuration
-- FileObserver delete handler simplified with direct file access instead of defensive null-checks
-- AndroidDeviceUtils expanded with additional device property accessors for attestation fields
+### 中文说明
 
-### Binder Performance
-- Safe parcel reads at 6 deserialization sites, replacing force-unwrap NPE paths with early-return on null. A single NPE generates a full stack trace that blocks the binder thread for ~2ms
-- teeResponses cache populated on generateKey/importKey post-transact, reducing getKeyEntry from 2+ binder round-trips to 1
-- pingBinder liveness check removed from pre-transact failure path, eliminating a synchronous IPC call on every failed transaction
-- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI entirely for PING/INTERFACE/DUMP
+修复本模块在 TEE 密钥操作与证明模拟中的五处缺陷。其中两处修复的是真实应用在 TEE 损坏设备上的加密崩溃：任何使用 AndroidKeyStore HMAC 密钥或 RSA-OAEP-SHA256 密钥的应用此前都会抛出异常。本版本为测试版；确认日志仅存在于 debug 构建中，且尚未经过真机验证。
 
-### Dynamic SecurityLevel Binder Registration
-- Intercepts getSecurityLevel replies to register hooks on every new BBinder instance keystore2 returns, not just the initial one from setup
-- Identity hash deduplication prevents double-hooking when keystore2 returns the same binder across multiple calls
-- Resolves apps that call getSecurityLevel independently and receive a different binder than the one registered at startup
+**应用加密正确性**
+- HMAC 操作现在可正常执行，不再抛出异常。AndroidKeyStore 的 HMAC 密钥是对称密钥，因此 HMAC SIGN 此前落入了非对称的 SIGN 分支，并因 key pair 为空而失败，当时也没有 MAC 原语。现在 SIGN 与 VERIFY 均可工作：用 Mac (HmacSHA256/384/512) 计算标签，按请求的 MAC_LENGTH 截断（未指定时取完整摘要长度），并用恒定时间比较进行校验。
+- RSA-OAEP-SHA256 解密不再抛出 BadPaddingException。此前 cipher 未传入 OAEPParameterSpec，JCA 因而回退到 SHA-1 并拒绝 SHA-256 密文。现在会应用正确的主摘要与 MGF1 摘要。若密钥授权了多个 MGF1 摘要，将使用本次操作请求的那个，而非密钥的第一个。
+- Grant 域证明密钥现在可以解析。自授权的 PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY（Domain.GRANT 描述符）此前无法解析其签名者别名，导致 generateKey 失败且从不存储主体密钥，读取时返回 KEY_NOT_FOUND。现在该 grant 会解析为属主密钥的别名，主体密钥在 Domain.APP 下仍可读取。
 
-### Build & Packaging
-- Rust native build task integrated into Gradle with cargo-ndk for aarch64/armv7/x86/x86_64
-- Module ZIP includes all 4 native libraries (libTEESimulator, libsupervisor, libcertgen, libinject)
-- customize.sh extraction restored for supervisor daemon and native cert gen library
-- TeeLatencySimulator added as standalone utility for log-normal hardware latency emulation
+**补充证明**
+- MODULE_HASH 现在取自框架自带的 getSupplementaryAttestationInfo，因而与验证方计算出的值一致。当该 API 不可用时，回退到本地重新推导。
+
+**诊断（仅 debug 构建）**
+- 新增按操作 (oaep-op、hmac-op、attest-grant) 与设备级 (module-hash、vintf-version) 的来源日志。R8 会在 release 构建中将其剥离。
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-282
+
+AUTO-mode key attestation now forges plain attestation from the keybox instead of deferring to the real TEE.
+
+### Detection coverage
+- AUTO dispatch probed the device with `checkTeeFunctionality`, which only proves the TEE can mint one EC key. It says nothing about RSA attestation, device-ID attestation, or whether a patched chain survives RSA verify. Plain attestation requests (attest-key OFF, challenge present) were routed to PATCH and deferred to hardware, so devices that can't back that surfaced KeyAttestation reds: `ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED` (-49) and `BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01`.
+- AUTO targets carrying an attestation challenge now take the FORGE path, the same one attest-key-ON already used: a synthetic chain built from the keybox and rooted under the Google root key. Requests with no challenge still pass through to real hardware, so KeyDetector's hardware-backed checks are unaffected.
+
+### Verified
+- Offline conformance against real FORGE captures: uid10389 and uid10154 chains are GREEN; the root SPKI byte-matches `GOOGLE_ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY`.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-280
+
+Clears the Duck Detector generate-mode parcel fingerprint that real Android 16 hardware also trips, fixes RSA attestation under an EC-only keybox, and restores device-property attestation for Play Integrity hardware apps such as BHIM and UPI. Generate-mode fix field-confirmed on Android 16.
+
+### Detection coverage
+- Generate-mode fingerprint: Duck reads the reply at a flat 12-byte stride and flags the sentinel tuple at positions 12 and 13 that the device's native ALGORITHM-first authorization order lands on. Real A16 silicon trips the same probe, so faithful mirroring stayed flagged. `normalizeAuthorizationLayout` marshals the auth array, runs Duck's exact predicate, and applies a minimal deterministic reorder only when it would match. Count, values, security levels, and the cert chain are untouched, and the reorder keys on the byte condition, never on a package. Applied on both the patch and forge reply paths. (#33)
+- `updateAad` on a non-AEAD operation now answers per vendor: Samsung and Xiaomi-MTK TEEs return success, others return INVALID_TAG, matching Duck's OperationErrorPathProbe on both the sign/verify and cipher paths.
+
+### Attestation correctness (Android 16, EC and RSA)
+- RSA leaf under an EC-only keybox: patching used to catch the no-RSA-key throw and return the chain untouched, leaking the device's real unlocked Root of Trust for RSA keys while EC keys patched cleanly. It now falls back to any keybox key (EC preferred) and signs the patched leaf with the keybox key's own algorithm, so the RSA leaf re-roots to the Google keybox under a forged locked RoT.
+- RSA attest-key forge on an EC-only keybox: the forge path matched the algorithm exactly and threw -75 ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED on a miss, so an RSA ATTEST_KEY request never rooted and verifiers reported an unknown certificate. It now falls back to any attestation key, since an EC key validly ECDSA-signs an RSA-subject leaf. No-op on a dual keybox.
+- A16 attestVersion: the device's KeyMint reports version 100 and the lazy cache shadowed the BAKLAVA-to-400 map, so the forge presented 100. It now caches the AOSP value per SDK and presents the correct 400.
+- Algorithm-split key on restore: a persisted record holding an EC private key under an RSA leaf failed every signature as DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS. Restore now drops the record when the private key and served leaf disagree, so the next generateKey rebuilds a coherent key.
+- Stale chain on regenerate: reusing an alias in generateKey now evicts the cached chain, matching keystore2, so getKeyEntry serves the current key instead of a stale forge from an earlier generation.
+
+### App compatibility
+- Device-property attestation (BRAND, MODEL, and the rest) now forges unconditionally. The old gate probed the live TEE, which is dead on every device the module serves, so it rejected GMS Play Integrity's hardware path and broke BHIM and other UPI and Play-Integrity apps. Device-ID attestation (IMEI, serial) stays governed by the real KeyMint caller-permission rule: privileged callers get it, ordinary apps do not.
+- getKeyEntry now reaches the owned-key lookup for skipped privileged UIDs, so framework attestKeyAlias resolution no longer returns "Invalid attestKeyAlias" for Key Attestation over Shizuku. Non-owned keys still skip post-processing, so a real app's key is never patched.
+- Device-ID attestation over Shizuku (a privileged UID absent from target.txt) now takes the forge path instead of hitting the real TEE's CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66). "Use attest key" no longer double-roots: a reused persistent attest key is resolved by KEY_ID as well as alias, and an unresolved designated attest key refuses to emit a leaf rather than silently re-rooting under the keybox.
+
+### Diagnostics (debug builds only)
+- Per-UID attestation dossier for targeted UIDs at /data/local/tmp/teesim/, recording the decoded chain on both forge and patch paths, key params, the keybox pick (including EC fail-safe), prop sources, forge failures, the emitted authorization shape, and served-versus-verified chains. Release builds strip this through R8 and stay silent. Keybox certificate serials log on every fetch for revocation triage.
+
+### Verified
+- Android 16: generate-mode fingerprint signal gone, confirmed on device 2026-06-19.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.1-251
+
+14 commits since v6.0.0-235. Clears the remaining Duck Detector grant-domain rows (incl. the Android 16 OnePlus report), restores Google Wallet and fingerprint compatibility, and removes the in-module patch-level/bulletin resolvers. Test device (SDK 35) TEE tamper score 28 → 8.
+
+### Detection coverage
+- Grant plane virtualized: owner read and cross-app `Domain.GRANT` read return one identical chain. 6 RED rows cleared. (28 → 18)
+- Generate-mode fingerprint: dropped 2 surplus authorizations (both patchlevels), USER_ID moved to SOFTWARE to mirror a captured device. (18 → 8)
+- Android 16 grant: patch-mode keys now served on the grant plane, so owner and grant reads match, fixes CHAIN_SPLIT.
+- Grant gated to SDK ≥ 36: Android 15 answers PERMISSION_DENIED, no synthetic over-capability.
+- Stale-chain eviction: import and updateSubcomponent drop the cached attestation; no pre-mutation chain replays.
+- Lifecycle coherence: clearNamespace / deleteAllKeys / migrateKeyNamespace mirror synthetic key and grant state, defeats delete-then-read probes.
+- Device-ID attestation mirrors the real TEE: returns CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS where silicon can't attest, instead of forging it.
+
+### App compatibility
+- Google Wallet: INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID stripped (not rejected) when the caller lacks the permission; card binding works. (PR #27)
+- Fingerprint / vendor keys: KEY_ID miss skips the post-handler, so real HAL operations are no longer wrapped and broken. (PR #26)
+
+### Removed
+- PatchLevelManager, auto-resolved the security-patch date from an installed PlayIntegrityFix module (with hot-reload) and applied it to props.
+- BulletinPoller, scheduled security-bulletin refresh.
+
+### Other
+- Release builds purge stale `teesim-*.bin` diagnostics from `/data/local/tmp` at boot.
+- Vol-key confirmation rewritten to 1s `getevent` bursts (piped stream missed single presses on Magisk).
+
+### Verified
+- SDK 35, Xiaomi 23106RN0DA: tamper 28 → 8; generate-mode signal gone; 4 grant rows UNAVAILABLE (correct for Android 15); no regressions.
+- Android 16 grant fix built but unconfirmed on SDK 36, needs an affected OnePlus user to confirm the grant rows clear.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-235
+
+11 commits since v6.0.0-224. Duck Detector generate-mode fingerprint cleared. Shizuku-routed BYO attestation fixed. Vol-key confirmation restored on Magisk.
+
+### Detection Coverage
+- Duck Detector "TEE Simulator generate-mode fingerprint" cleared. `toAuthorizations` reordered to AOSP keymint reference order; KEY_SIZE moves from auth#4 to auth#2, breaking the byte-224 anchor the probe relied on. 0/31 matches on fresh self-probes (was 15/36).
+- `persist.logd.size` variants blanked at boot via `service.sh`. Removes a logd-tuning side-channel.
+
+### BYO & Shizuku Routing
+- Shizuku-routed BYO attestation no longer fails with `-49 UNSUPPORTED_TAG`. `shouldSkipUid` moved into `handleGenerateKey`, evaluated after BYO parameters are parsed.
+- `createOperation` parallel fix: outer UID gate removed; the cache-or-forward lookup is the sole gate. BYO keys created under Shizuku UID can now be used for signing under the same UID.
+- `forceGenerate` simplified: any attest-key or BYO request routes to software unconditionally.
+- BYO attest-key miss returns the full keybox chain instead of a malformed depth-1 chain.
+- AUTO TEE race dispatch removed. Resolution uses `DeviceAttestationService.isTeeFunctional` only.
+- Symmetric gen rejects `attestationKey != null` early with `INVALID_ARGUMENT`. Unsupported-algorithm branch returns `-38` instead of `-49`.
+
+### Action Button
+- Vol+ / Vol- confirmation restored on Magisk. Streaming `getevent -lq` matched inline against `KEY_VOLUMEUP DOWN` / `KEY_VOLUMEDOWN DOWN`, wrapped in `/system/bin/timeout 10`. The prior polled approach timed out on six-events-per-keypress kernels.
+
+### Verified
+- Android 15 (SDK 35), daemon PID 1466.
+- Cross-device confirmation pending on OnePlus PKX110 and Samsung SM-S928B.
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0-224
+
+59 commits since v6.0.0-162. Self-sufficient spoofing infrastructure, Duck Detector TamperScore-4 cleared on Xiaomi A16, persistent symmetric key storage (PR #22), 22-language action button hardening.
+
+### Detection Coverage
+- Duck Detector TimingSideChannelProbe cleared on Xiaomi A16 (SDK 35). Timing ratio dropped 1.555x to 1.055x, verdict WARNING to CLEAR. Threshold is > 1.1x.
+- `KEY_ID` resolved from `teeResponses` instead of synthesized, matching real KeyMint binder behavior.
+- Non-attested key cache mirrors attested path for byte-level metadata parity.
+- `KEY_SIZE` emitted for EC keys; omitted when `ecCurve` is present, matching AOSP attestation_record.h.
+- SSE messages synthesized canonically on non-AEAD `updateAad`; passthrough shape normalized.
+- StrongBox attest version no longer hardcoded; resolved from device context.
+- TEE op latency floor enforced to defeat micro-timing probes.
+- Attest key resolution restored to nspace-aware lookup after revert/restore cycle.
+
+### Self-Sufficient Spoofing
+- `PatchLevelManager` resolves OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels via PIF without external bulletin fetch.
+- `BulletinPoller` refreshes bulletin data on a schedule, isolated from boot path via umbrella `try/catch`.
+- Bootloader-lock props pushed via `resetprop` at boot; absent vbmeta complement props filled; `vbmeta.device_state` included.
+- PIF hot-reload via `FileObserver`; empty source files skipped; future patch dates bounded by `MAX_FUTURE_DAYS`.
+- Default `security_patch.txt` dropped at install time.
+- `sepolicy.rule` allows UDP egress for DNS resolution.
+
+### Key Persistence (PR #22)
+- Symmetric keys persist across reboots with byte-identical metadata.
+- Keybox edits no longer wipe stored keys.
+- Delete marker dropped on key regeneration to prevent stale state.
+- Defensive symmetric fallback path with clean error codes.
+
+### Reliability
+- `atomicWrite` preserves `[pkg]` sections; errors guarded in `updateTo`.
+- `applyToProps` serialized against concurrent callers.
+- `pollOnce` wrapped in umbrella `try/catch`; `BulletinPoller.start` failure isolated from spoofer init.
+- Spoofer ordering fixed: runs before keystore hook to prevent attest-time prop drift.
+- `isAutoMode` reads raw package mode; `system=prop` passive default respected.
+- `mergedContents` propagates read errors instead of swallowing them.
+- Date regex validation on `currentPatch`; YYYY-MM input skips day synthesis.
+- Global key-assignment check requires `=` delimiter (no more partial matches).
+- `validation_rejected` status emitted on invalid spoof input.
+
+### Action Button UX
+- Vol+ required to clear `persistent_keys`. Vol- cancels. 10-second timeout defaults to cancel.
+- Confirmation localized in 22 languages: ar, az, bn, de, el, es-ES, fa, fr, id, it, ja, ko, pl, pt-BR, ru, th, tl, tr, uk, vi, zh-CN, zh-TW.
+- Every echoed string resolves through `_msg()` against device locale.
+
+### Build & Ops
+- Kotlin `jvmTarget` raised to JVM 21.
+- Gradle auto-rewrites `module/update.json` on packaging.
+- `scripts/package.sh` locates user-local cargo; rust task receives cargo bin path.
+- Verified on Xiaomi Android 16 (SDK 35) `v6.0.0-224-Release`. Daemon alive PID 1392. Pending cross-device confirm on OnePlus PKX110 (qcom sun) and Samsung SM-S928B (pineapple).
+
+---
+
+## TEESimulator-RS v6.0.0
+
+Repository consolidation release. All tee-rebuild work merged as the new main branch.
+
+### AOSP Self-Signed Cert Compliance
+- No-challenge keys now generate self-signed certs (subject == issuer, depth 1), matching AOSP `ta/src/keys.rs:451-478`
+- Both Kotlin (BouncyCastle) and Rust (native-certgen) paths corrected
+- Eliminates attestation behavioral probes that detect keybox issuer on non-attested keys
+
+### Stability
+- Binder stress crash hardening for concurrent generateKey calls
+- AUTO mode TEE race for consistent attestation on devices with working G10
+- Oversized transactions routed to software gen instead of crashing
+- Operation-time params (BLOCK_MODE, PADDING, DIGEST) passed through to CipherPrimitive
+
+### Banking App Compatibility
+- Bare `target.txt` entries now default to AUTO mode, resolved at config level to PATCH (working TEE) or GENERATE (broken TEE)
+- Fixes BHIM and similar banking apps that require TEE-backed attestation keys
+- Restores v5.0 behavior where AUTO was resolved before the interceptor dispatch, avoiding the non-deterministic `raceTeePatch` path
+
+### Infrastructure
+- Version scheme changed to semver (v6.0.0)
+- Repository moved to TEESimulator-RS as canonical source
 
 ---
 
@@ -115,7 +254,7 @@ Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157
 
 ## TEESimulator-RS v4.8.1: StrongBox Op Rejection Fix
 
-- **StrongBox op limit gate fix** — `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
+- **StrongBox op limit gate fix**, `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
 
 ---
 
@@ -123,13 +262,13 @@ Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157
 
 Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped from 32 to 8.
 
-- **LRU operation pruning** — Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
-- **StrongBox param guard** — Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
-- **StrongBox timing** — Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
-- **StrongBox op limit** — Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
-- **ECDSA algorithm alias** — Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
-- **createOperation domain handling** — Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
-- **Permission guards** — Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
+- **LRU operation pruning**, Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
+- **StrongBox param guard**, Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
+- **StrongBox timing**, Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
+- **StrongBox op limit**, Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
+- **ECDSA algorithm alias**, Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
+- **createOperation domain handling**, Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
+- **Permission guards**, Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
 
 ---
 
@@ -137,20 +276,20 @@ Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped f
 
 Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [Key Attestation](https://github.com/nickel-lang/nickel) on OnePlus (Android 16) and Xiaomi Redmi 14C (Android 14).
 
-- **PADDING encoding** — Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
-- **Operation error-path conformance** — Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
-- **updateAad support** — Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
-- **Algorithm inference** — `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
+- **PADDING encoding**, Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
+- **Operation error-path conformance**, Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
+- **updateAad support**, Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
+- **Algorithm inference**, `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
 
 ---
 
 ## TEESimulator-RS v4.6: Rebrand & Detection Fix
 
-- **RTT normalization rework** — Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
-- **Cross-algorithm attestation** — Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
-- **Device ID attestation** — Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
-- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS** — Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
-- **CI streamlined** — Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
+- **RTT normalization rework**, Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
+- **Cross-algorithm attestation**, Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
+- **Device ID attestation**, Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
+- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS**, Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
+- **CI streamlined**, Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
 
 ---
 
@@ -158,28 +297,28 @@ Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [K
 
 Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) (23-check attestation validator). All keystore-level checks now pass.
 
-- **Key deletion consistency** — After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
-- **generateKey timing normalization** — Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
-- **Delete cleanup scope** — `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
+- **Key deletion consistency**, After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
+- **generateKey timing normalization**, Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
+- **Delete cleanup scope**, `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
 
 ---
 
 ## TEESimulator v4.4: AOSP Conformance
 
-- **Binder error reply format** — Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
-- **Key enumeration** — Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
-- **KeyMetadata fields** — Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
-- **Parcel handling** — hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
+- **Binder error reply format**, Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
+- **Key enumeration**, Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
+- **KeyMetadata fields**, Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
+- **Parcel handling**, hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
 
 ---
 
 ## TEESimulator v4.3: Performance & Reliability
 
-- **Debug log gating** — `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
-- **Supervisor backoff** — Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
-- **Process priority** — Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
-- **Map eviction** — Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
-- **CI pipeline** — Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
+- **Debug log gating**, `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
+- **Supervisor backoff**, Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
+- **Process priority**, Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
+- **Map eviction**, Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
+- **CI pipeline**, Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
 
 ---
 
@@ -191,9 +330,9 @@ Fixes 6 detection vectors flagged by attestation validator apps.
 
 Replicate AOSP keystore2's `add_required_parameters()` validation that our software keygen path was bypassing:
 
-- **CREATION_DATETIME** — Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
-- **Device ID attestation** — Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
-- **Error reply format** — Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
+- **CREATION_DATETIME**, Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
+- **Device ID attestation**, Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
+- **Error reply format**, Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
 
 ### Certificate Fix
 
@@ -221,15 +360,15 @@ Major release. Certificate chain generation rebuilt from the ground up in Rust,
 
 ### Native Cert Generation
 
-The headline feature. `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 certificate chains using `ring` (EC-P256/P384) and `rsa` (RSA-2048/4096) with manual DER assembly. No more BouncyCastle quirks — issuer/subject DN bytes are injected directly from the keybox, ensuring byte-perfect chain linkage. BouncyCastle remains as fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
+The headline feature. `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 certificate chains using `ring` (EC-P256/P384) and `rsa` (RSA-2048/4096) with manual DER assembly. No more BouncyCastle quirks, issuer/subject DN bytes are injected directly from the keybox, ensuring byte-perfect chain linkage. BouncyCastle remains as fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
 
 ### Anti-Detection Hardening
 
-- **Challenge validation** — Oversized attestation challenges (>128 bytes) now return `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH (-21)`, matching real KeyMint behavior. Previously accepted silently — DuckDetector exploited this.
-- **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst, 2 concurrent max. Overflow falls back to software certs. Blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding that starves GMS.
-- **importKey eviction guard** — Retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import attacks that evict cached attestation data.
-- **256KB native payload cap** — Oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly instead of stalling threads.
-- **Alias size rejection** — Oversized key aliases rejected before they hit the binder buffer.
+- **Challenge validation**, Oversized attestation challenges (>128 bytes) now return `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH (-21)`, matching real KeyMint behavior. Previously accepted silently, DuckDetector exploited this.
+- **Per-UID rate limiter**, 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst, 2 concurrent max. Overflow falls back to software certs. Blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding that starves GMS.
+- **importKey eviction guard**, Retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import attacks that evict cached attestation data.
+- **256KB native payload cap**, Oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly instead of stalling threads.
+- **Alias size rejection**, Oversized key aliases rejected before they hit the binder buffer.
 
 ### Key Persistence
 
@@ -241,7 +380,7 @@ Generated keys now survive reboots. File-backed storage with file-level locking,
 - Correct `module_hash` field to match AOSP Keystore2 format
 - Override pre-existing attest keys instead of skipping them
 - Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks in keybox parsing
-- Security patch consistency — `system=prop` forces boot/vendor to match
+- Security patch consistency, `system=prop` forces boot/vendor to match
 
 ### Module Lifecycle
 
@@ -252,9 +391,9 @@ Generated keys now survive reboots. File-backed storage with file-level locking,
 ### Stability
 
 - FileObserver NPE on config deletion fixed
-- Global uncaught exception handler — daemon stays alive on unexpected errors
+- Global uncaught exception handler, daemon stays alive on unexpected errors
 - PEM parsing hardened against malformed keybox files
 
 ### Tested Against
 
-DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, Key Attestation Demo — all passing on Redmi 14C (Android 14, Beanpod KeyMaster, KSU).
+DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, Key Attestation Demo, all passing on Redmi 14C (Android 14, Beanpod KeyMaster, KSU).

module/customize.sh

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ install_file() {
 
 # --- Installation ---
 ui_print "- Extracting module files"
-for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh uninstall.sh; do
+for file in customize.sh module.prop service.sh sepolicy.rule daemon action.sh action_i18n.sh uninstall.sh; do
   install_file "$file" "$MODPATH"
 done
 
@@ -76,6 +76,20 @@ mv "$MODPATH/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH/supervisor"
 chmod 755 "$MODPATH/inject"
 chmod 755 "$MODPATH/supervisor"
 
+# Debug builds carry diag.sh (the diagnostic plane); release builds do not. Extract it when
+# present; otherwise sweep any external-storage diagnostics a prior debug install left behind,
+# since the release keystore domain has no grant to remove them itself.
+# Detect presence by the extracted FILE, not unzip's exit code: the busybox/toybox unzip in
+# the install environment exits 0 even when the entry is absent, so the sweep never ran.
+unzip -qqjo "$ZIPFILE" "diag.sh" -d "$MODPATH" 2>/dev/null
+if [ -f "$MODPATH/diag.sh" ]; then
+  chmod 644 "$MODPATH/diag.sh"
+  ui_print "- Debug diagnostic plane enabled"
+else
+  rm -rf /data/media/0/TEESimulator /data/local/tmp/teesim
+  ui_print "- Release build: swept stale diagnostics"
+fi
+
 # --- Configuration Files ---
 if [ ! -d "$CONFIG_DIR" ]; then
   ui_print "- Creating configuration directory"
@@ -92,6 +106,17 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
   install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
 fi
 
+if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" ]; then
+  ui_print "- Adding default security patch config (mirror device props)"
+  printf '%s\n' \
+    '# TEESimulator default: mirror live device props.' \
+    '# system=prop reads ro.build.version.security_patch at cert-gen time;' \
+    '# boot and vendor are auto-forced to prop too (ConfigurationManager.kt:253-256).' \
+    '# Override with explicit YYYY-MM-DD dates if you want active spoofing.' \
+    'system=prop' > "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
+  chmod 644 "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt"
+fi
+
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
 
 if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then

module/diag.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/system/bin/sh
+# Debug-only diagnostic plane. Shipped solely in debug ZIPs; its presence is the gate that
+# service.sh (setup) and action.sh (export) test before touching external storage.
+DIAG_DIR=/data/media/0/TEESimulator
+
+diag_setup() {
+    mkdir -p "$DIAG_DIR"
+    chmod 0777 "$DIAG_DIR"
+    chcon u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 "$DIAG_DIR" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+diag_export() {
+    _ts=$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
+    _dest=/sdcard/Download/teesim-logs-$_ts
+    mkdir -p "$_dest"
+    cp -f "$DIAG_DIR"/teesim-uid-* "$_dest"/ 2>/dev/null
+    cp -f /data/adb/tricky_store/logs/certgen.log* "$_dest"/ 2>/dev/null
+    logcat -d -s TEESimulator > "$_dest/logcat.txt" 2>/dev/null
+    echo "  ✅ Saved to $_dest"
+}

module/sepolicy.rule

@@ -1,2 +1,20 @@
 allow keystore {adb_data_file shell_data_file} file *
 allow crash_dump keystore process *
+
+# SOTER Layer-A (10.C): ptrace inject into soterserver (platform_app). The debug NDJSON
+# media_rw_data_file grant is debug-only — appended for debug builds in app/build.gradle.kts.
+allow crash_dump platform_app process *
+
+allow ksu self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
+allow ksu node:tcp_socket node_bind
+allow ksu port:tcp_socket name_connect
+allow magisk self:tcp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
+allow magisk node:tcp_socket node_bind
+allow magisk port:tcp_socket name_connect
+
+allow ksu self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
+allow ksu node:udp_socket node_bind
+allow ksu port:udp_socket name_connect
+allow magisk self:udp_socket { create connect read write getopt setopt }
+allow magisk node:udp_socket node_bind
+allow magisk port:udp_socket name_connect

module/service.sh

@@ -3,3 +3,20 @@ cd $MODDIR
 
 # Fork-based supervisor for instant restart
 ./supervisor ./daemon "$MODDIR" &
+
+# Debug builds ship diag.sh; its presence enables the external-storage diagnostic plane.
+if [ -f "$MODDIR/diag.sh" ]; then
+  . "$MODDIR/diag.sh"
+  diag_setup
+fi
+
+# Clear logd size persist properties once boot completes
+(
+  until [ "$(getprop sys.boot_completed)" = "1" ]; do
+    sleep 1
+  done
+  setprop persist.logd.size ""
+  setprop persist.logd.size.crash ""
+  setprop persist.logd.size.system ""
+  setprop persist.logd.size.main ""
+) &

module/uninstall.sh

@@ -10,3 +10,7 @@ done
 rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
 rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_hash.bin" "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_key.bin"
+rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR/security_patch.txt.next" "$CONFIG_DIR/last_bulletin_fetch.json"
+
+# Debug diagnostics live on external storage; remove them on uninstall.
+rm -rf /data/media/0/TEESimulator

module/update.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-	"version": "v4.5",
-	"versionCode": 111,
-	"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip",
-	"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
+  "version": "v6.0.1-307",
+  "versionCode": 307,
+  "zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/releases/download/v6.0.1-307/TEESimulator-RS-v6.0.1-307-Release.zip",
+  "changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/changelog.md"
 }

native-certgen/Cargo.lock

@@ -2,12 +2,6 @@
 # It is not intended for manual editing.
 version = 4
 
-[[package]]
-name = "adler2"
-version = "2.0.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "320119579fcad9c21884f5c4861d16174d0e06250625266f50fe6898340abefa"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "aho-corasick"
 version = "1.1.4"
@@ -23,15 +17,6 @@ version = "1.0.102"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "7f202df86484c868dbad7eaa557ef785d5c66295e41b460ef922eca0723b842c"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "arbitrary"
-version = "1.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3d036a3c4ab069c7b410a2ce876bd74808d2d0888a82667669f8e783a898bf1"
-dependencies = [
- "derive_arbitrary",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "autocfg"
 version = "1.5.0"
@@ -53,12 +38,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "generic-array",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "bumpalo"
-version = "3.20.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5d20789868f4b01b2f2caec9f5c4e0213b41e3e5702a50157d699ae31ced2fcb"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "bytes"
 version = "1.11.1"
@@ -83,7 +62,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "const-oid",
  "der",
  "jni",
- "libc",
  "pkcs8",
  "rand",
  "ring",
@@ -93,7 +71,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "tracing",
  "tracing-subscriber",
  "x509-cert",
- "zip",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -133,21 +110,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "libc",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "crc32fast"
-version = "1.5.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9481c1c90cbf2ac953f07c8d4a58aa3945c425b7185c9154d67a65e4230da511"
-dependencies = [
- "cfg-if",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "crossbeam-utils"
-version = "0.8.21"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d0a5c400df2834b80a4c3327b3aad3a4c4cd4de0629063962b03235697506a28"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "crypto-common"
 version = "0.1.7"
@@ -191,17 +153,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "powerfmt",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "derive_arbitrary"
-version = "1.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1e567bd82dcff979e4b03460c307b3cdc9e96fde3d73bed1496d2bc75d9dd62a"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "digest"
 version = "0.10.7"
@@ -213,23 +164,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "crypto-common",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "displaydoc"
-version = "0.2.5"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "97369cbbc041bc366949bc74d34658d6cda5621039731c6310521892a3a20ae0"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "equivalent"
-version = "1.0.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "877a4ace8713b0bcf2a4e7eec82529c029f1d0619886d18145fea96c3ffe5c0f"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
 version = "0.1.9"
@@ -242,16 +176,6 @@ version = "0.4.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b7ac824320a75a52197e8f2d787f6a38b6718bb6897a35142d749af3c0e8f4fe"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "flate2"
-version = "1.1.9"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "843fba2746e448b37e26a819579957415c8cef339bf08564fe8b7ddbd959573c"
-dependencies = [
- "crc32fast",
- "miniz_oxide",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "generic-array"
 version = "0.14.7"
@@ -273,22 +197,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "wasi",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "hashbrown"
-version = "0.16.1"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "841d1cc9bed7f9236f321df977030373f4a4163ae1a7dbfe1a51a2c1a51d9100"
-
-[[package]]
-name = "indexmap"
-version = "2.13.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7714e70437a7dc3ac8eb7e6f8df75fd8eb422675fc7678aff7364301092b1017"
-dependencies = [
- "equivalent",
- "hashbrown",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "itoa"
 version = "1.0.17"
@@ -306,7 +214,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "combine",
  "jni-sys",
  "log",
- "thiserror 1.0.69",
+ "thiserror",
  "walkdir",
  "windows-sys 0.45.0",
 ]
@@ -359,16 +267,6 @@ version = "2.8.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "f8ca58f447f06ed17d5fc4043ce1b10dd205e060fb3ce5b979b8ed8e59ff3f79"
 
-[[package]]
-name = "miniz_oxide"
-version = "0.8.9"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1fa76a2c86f704bdb222d66965fb3d63269ce38518b83cb0575fca855ebb6316"
-dependencies = [
- "adler2",
- "simd-adler32",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "nu-ansi-term"
 version = "0.50.3"
@@ -674,12 +572,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "rand_core",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "simd-adler32"
-version = "0.3.8"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e320a6c5ad31d271ad523dcf3ad13e2767ad8b1cb8f047f75a8aeaf8da139da2"
-
 [[package]]
 name = "smallvec"
 version = "1.15.1"
@@ -725,16 +617,7 @@ version = "1.0.69"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b6aaf5339b578ea85b50e080feb250a3e8ae8cfcdff9a461c9ec2904bc923f52"
 dependencies = [
- "thiserror-impl 1.0.69",
-]
-
-[[package]]
-name = "thiserror"
-version = "2.0.18"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4288b5bcbc7920c07a1149a35cf9590a2aa808e0bc1eafaade0b80947865fbc4"
-dependencies = [
- "thiserror-impl 2.0.18",
+ "thiserror-impl",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
@@ -748,17 +631,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "thiserror-impl"
-version = "2.0.18"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ebc4ee7f67670e9b64d05fa4253e753e016c6c95ff35b89b7941d6b856dec1d5"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "thread_local"
 version = "1.1.9"
@@ -1130,37 +1002,8 @@ dependencies = [
  "syn",
 ]
 
-[[package]]
-name = "zip"
-version = "2.4.2"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fabe6324e908f85a1c52063ce7aa26b68dcb7eb6dbc83a2d148403c9bc3eba50"
-dependencies = [
- "arbitrary",
- "crc32fast",
- "crossbeam-utils",
- "displaydoc",
- "flate2",
- "indexmap",
- "memchr",
- "thiserror 2.0.18",
- "zopfli",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "zmij"
 version = "1.0.21"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b8848ee67ecc8aedbaf3e4122217aff892639231befc6a1b58d29fff4c2cabaa"
-
-[[package]]
-name = "zopfli"
-version = "0.8.3"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f05cd8797d63865425ff89b5c4a48804f35ba0ce8d125800027ad6017d2b5249"
-dependencies = [
- "bumpalo",
- "crc32fast",
- "log",
- "simd-adler32",
-]

native-certgen/Cargo.toml

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ time = { version = "0.3", features = ["std"] }
 anyhow = "1.0"
 tracing = "0.1"
 tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
-libc = "0.2"
-zip = { version = "2.2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
 serde_json = "1.0"
 
 [profile.release]

native-certgen/src/certbuilder.rs

@@ -14,9 +14,69 @@ const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
 // Extension OIDs
 const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];
 
+// AOSP ta/src/keys.rs:451-478: no challenge = self-signed leaf, chain depth 1
+pub fn build_self_signed_cert(
+    key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
+    params: &CertGenParams,
+) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+    let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
+    let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
+
+    let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
+        serial.clone()
+    } else {
+        vec![1u8]
+    };
+
+    let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
+        subject.clone()
+    } else {
+        encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
+    };
+
+    let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
+    let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
+        // No keybox fallback available; use far-future (year 9999)
+        OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(253402300799)
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365 * 30))
+    } else {
+        timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
+    };
+
+    let extensions_der = build_extensions(None, &params.purposes)?;
+
+    let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
+    let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
+    let validity_der = encode_validity(&not_before, &not_after);
+    let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
+
+    // issuer == subject (self-signed, per AOSP ta/src/cert.rs:111-114)
+    let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
+        &version_der,
+        &serial_der,
+        &sig_alg_der,
+        &subject_dn_der,
+        &validity_der,
+        &subject_dn_der,
+        &spki_der,
+        &extensions_tagged,
+    ]);
+
+    let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, params.algorithm)?;
+    let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
+
+    let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
+        &tbs_der,
+        &sig_alg_der,
+        &signature_bit_string,
+    ]);
+
+    Ok(vec![cert_der])
+}
+
 pub fn build_certificate_chain(
     key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
-    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
+    attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
     keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
     params: &CertGenParams,
 ) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
@@ -33,7 +93,7 @@ pub fn build_certificate_chain(
 
 fn build_leaf_cert(
     key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
-    attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
+    attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>,
     keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
     params: &CertGenParams,
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
@@ -63,7 +123,6 @@ fn build_leaf_cert(
         timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
     };
 
-    // Extensions
     let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, &params.purposes)?;
 
     // TBS Certificate
@@ -256,19 +315,19 @@ fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
 }
 
-fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: &[u8], purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: Option<&[u8]>, purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
 
-    // KeyUsage extension (critical)
     let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
     if ku_byte != 0 {
         let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
         extensions.push(ku_ext);
     }
 
-    // Attestation extension (non-critical)
-    let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attestation_ext_der);
-    extensions.push(attest_ext);
+    if let Some(attest_der) = attestation_ext_der {
+        let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attest_der);
+        extensions.push(attest_ext);
+    }
 
     Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
 }

native-certgen/src/lib.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ pub mod certbuilder;
 pub mod logging;
 
 use jni::objects::{JByteArray, JClass, JIntArray, JObject, JString};
-use jni::sys::{jboolean, jbyteArray, jstring};
+use jni::sys::{jboolean, jbyteArray};
 use jni::JNIEnv;
 
 use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
@@ -62,21 +62,43 @@ fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteAr
 
     let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(&params.keybox_cert_chain, &params.keybox_private_key)?;
 
-    let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
-
-    let cert_chain = certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(
-        &key_pair,
-        &attest_ext,
-        &keybox,
-        &params,
-    )?;
+    let cert_chain = if params.attestation_challenge.is_some() {
+        let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
+        // Ground truth of what the Rust forger emitted, keyed to the app. Gated on the APK debug
+        // variant so release builds never dump the extension.
+        if params.debug_logging {
+            tracing::info!(
+                uid = params.uid,
+                ext_hex = %hex_encode(&attest_ext),
+                "produced attestation extension"
+            );
+        }
+        certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(&key_pair, Some(&attest_ext), &keybox, &params)?
+    } else {
+        tracing::info!(
+            uid = params.uid,
+            "no attestation challenge, generating self-signed cert (depth 1)"
+        );
+        certbuilder::build_self_signed_cert(&key_pair, &params)?
+    };
 
     let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);
+    tracing::info!(uid = params.uid, certs = cert_chain.len(), "assembled native cert result");
 
     let out = env.byte_array_from_slice(&blob)?;
     Ok(out.into_raw())
 }
 
+/// Lowercase hex of a byte slice for diagnostic dumps; the crate has no `hex` dependency.
+fn hex_encode(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    use std::fmt::Write as _;
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(bytes.len() * 2);
+    for b in bytes {
+        let _ = write!(out, "{:02x}", b);
+    }
+    out
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // JNI entry: initLogging
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -118,44 +140,6 @@ fn init_logging_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, verbose: jboolean, log_dir: &JString) ->
     Ok(())
 }
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// JNI entry: dumpLogs
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_dumpLogs(
-    mut env: JNIEnv,
-    _class: JClass,
-) -> jstring {
-    let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
-        dump_logs_inner(&mut env)
-    }));
-
-    match result {
-        Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
-        Ok(Err(e)) => {
-            tracing::error!(%e, "dumpLogs failed");
-            std::ptr::null_mut()
-        }
-        Err(_) => {
-            tracing::error!("dumpLogs panicked");
-            std::ptr::null_mut()
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-fn dump_logs_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv) -> Result<jstring> {
-    logging::dump::execute_dump()
-        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("dump failed: {e}")))?;
-
-    // Read the dump path written by execute_dump
-    let path = std::fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path")
-        .map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("read dump path: {e}")))?;
-
-    let jpath = env.new_string(&path)?;
-    Ok(jpath.into_raw())
-}
-
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Config extraction from Java CertGenConfig object
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -206,6 +190,8 @@ fn extract_config(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<CertGenParams> {
     let caller_nonce = get_boolean(env, config, "callerNonce")?;
     let unlocked_device_required = get_boolean(env, config, "unlockedDeviceRequired")?;
     let no_auth_required = get_boolean(env, config, "noAuthRequired")?;
+    let uid = get_int(env, config, "uid")?;
+    let debug_logging = get_boolean(env, config, "debugLogging")?;
 
     Ok(CertGenParams {
         algorithm: Algorithm::try_from(algorithm)?,
@@ -253,6 +239,8 @@ fn extract_config(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<CertGenParams> {
         caller_nonce,
         unlocked_device_required,
         no_auth_required,
+        uid,
+        debug_logging,
     })
 }
 

native-certgen/src/logging/dump.rs

@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-use std::fs::{self, File};
-use std::io::{Read, Write};
-use std::path::Path;
-use std::process::Command;
-use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-
-const DUMP_DIR: &str = "/sdcard/Download";
-const LOCK_PATH: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_lock";
-const DUMP_PATH_FILE: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path";
-const LOG_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs";
-const BASE_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store";
-const LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
-
-struct FlockGuard {
-    _file: File,
-}
-
-impl FlockGuard {
-    fn acquire() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-        if let Some(parent) = Path::new(LOCK_PATH).parent() {
-            fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
-        }
-        let file = File::create(LOCK_PATH)?;
-        let fd = {
-            use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
-            file.as_raw_fd()
-        };
-        let ret = unsafe { libc::flock(fd, libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) };
-        if ret != 0 {
-            return Err("dump already in progress".into());
-        }
-        Ok(Self { _file: file })
-    }
-}
-
-impl Drop for FlockGuard {
-    fn drop(&mut self) {
-        // flock released automatically when file descriptor closes
-    }
-}
-
-fn random_name(len: usize) -> String {
-    use rand::Rng;
-    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
-    (0..len)
-        .map(|_| {
-            let idx = rng.gen_range(0..36u8);
-            if idx < 10 {
-                (b'0' + idx) as char
-            } else {
-                (b'a' + idx - 10) as char
-            }
-        })
-        .collect()
-}
-
-fn collect_logcat(tag: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let output = Command::new("logcat")
-        .args(["-d", "-s", tag])
-        .output();
-
-    match output {
-        Ok(o) => {
-            let mut data = o.stdout;
-            data.truncate(LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT);
-            data
-        }
-        Err(_) => Vec::new(),
-    }
-}
-
-fn collect_device_info() -> String {
-    let mut info = String::new();
-
-    if let Ok(output) = Command::new("uname").arg("-a").output() {
-        info.push_str(&format!(
-            "uname={}\n",
-            String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
-        ));
-    }
-
-    for (key, prop) in [
-        ("device", "ro.product.device"),
-        ("build", "ro.build.display.id"),
-        ("android", "ro.build.version.release"),
-    ] {
-        if let Ok(output) = Command::new("getprop").arg(prop).output() {
-            info.push_str(&format!(
-                "{}={}\n",
-                key,
-                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
-            ));
-        }
-    }
-
-    // KSU version
-    if let Ok(ver) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/ksu/version") {
-        info.push_str(&format!("ksu={}\n", ver.trim()));
-    }
-
-    // Module version from module.prop
-    if let Ok(prop) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/module.prop") {
-        for line in prop.lines() {
-            if let Some(ver) = line.strip_prefix("version=") {
-                info.push_str(&format!("module={}\n", ver.trim()));
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    info
-}
-
-fn read_file_bytes(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
-    let mut buf = Vec::new();
-    File::open(path).ok()?.read_to_end(&mut buf).ok()?;
-    Some(buf)
-}
-
-fn epoch_millis() -> u64 {
-    SystemTime::now()
-        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
-        .map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
-        .unwrap_or(0)
-}
-
-pub fn execute_dump() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    let _lock = FlockGuard::acquire()?;
-
-    let _ = fs::create_dir_all(DUMP_DIR);
-    let zip_name = format!("{}.zip", random_name(8));
-    let zip_path = format!("{}/{}", DUMP_DIR, zip_name);
-
-    let zip_file = File::create(&zip_path)?;
-    let mut zip = zip::ZipWriter::new(zip_file);
-    let options =
-        zip::write::SimpleFileOptions::default().compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated);
-
-    let mut file_count = 0u32;
-
-    // Log files
-    let log_files = [
-        "certgen.log",
-        "certgen.log.1",
-        "certgen.log.2",
-        "certgen.log.3",
-        "certgen.log.4",
-    ];
-    for name in &log_files {
-        let path = format!("{}/{}", LOG_DIR, name);
-        if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
-            zip.start_file(*name, options)?;
-            zip.write_all(&data)?;
-            file_count += 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Logcat
-    let logcat = collect_logcat("TEESimulator");
-    if !logcat.is_empty() {
-        zip.start_file("logcat-teesimulator.log", options)?;
-        zip.write_all(&logcat)?;
-        file_count += 1;
-    }
-
-    // Config files
-    for name in ["tee_status.txt", "security_patch.txt"] {
-        let path = format!("{}/{}", BASE_DIR, name);
-        if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
-            zip.start_file(name, options)?;
-            zip.write_all(&data)?;
-            file_count += 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Device info
-    let device_info = collect_device_info();
-    if !device_info.is_empty() {
-        zip.start_file("device-info.txt", options)?;
-        zip.write_all(device_info.as_bytes())?;
-        file_count += 1;
-    }
-
-    // Manifest
-    let manifest = serde_json::json!({
-        "timestamp": epoch_millis(),
-        "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
-        "files": file_count,
-    });
-    zip.start_file("manifest.json", options)?;
-    zip.write_all(manifest.to_string().as_bytes())?;
-
-    zip.finish()?;
-
-    let zip_size = fs::metadata(&zip_path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
-    fs::write(DUMP_PATH_FILE, &zip_path)?;
-
-    let result = serde_json::json!({
-        "zip": zip_path,
-        "size": zip_size,
-        "files": file_count + 1, // +1 for manifest
-    });
-    println!("{}", result);
-
-    tracing::info!(path = %zip_path, size = zip_size, "diagnostic dump created");
-
-    Ok(())
-}

native-certgen/src/logging/mod.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 mod kmsg;
 mod rotating;
-pub mod sysfs;
-pub mod dump;
 
 use std::path::Path;
 use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt, EnvFilter};

native-certgen/src/logging/sysfs.rs

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-use std::fs;
-use std::path::Path;
-
-const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
-
-pub fn is_verbose() -> bool {
-    Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists()
-}
-
-pub fn set_verbose_marker(enabled: bool) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    if enabled {
-        if let Some(parent) = Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).parent() {
-            fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
-        }
-        fs::write(VERBOSE_MARKER, "")?;
-    } else if Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists() {
-        fs::remove_file(VERBOSE_MARKER)?;
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn enable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    set_verbose_marker(true)?;
-    tracing::info!("verbose logging enabled via marker file");
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn disable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    set_verbose_marker(false)?;
-    tracing::info!("verbose logging disabled, marker file removed");
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn status() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    let state = if is_verbose() { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
-    tracing::info!(verbose = state, "verbose marker status");
-    Ok(())
-}

native-certgen/src/types.rs

@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ pub struct CertGenParams {
     pub caller_nonce: bool,
     pub unlocked_device_required: bool,
     pub no_auth_required: bool,
+
+    /// Calling app UID, used only to key diagnostic log lines to the requesting app.
+    pub uid: i32,
+    /// Mirrors the APK debug variant; gates the produced-extension dump so release stays quiet.
+    pub debug_logging: bool,
 }
 
 pub struct GeneratedKeyPair {

scripts/package.sh

@@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
 #   ./scripts/package.sh --rust --release             # build Rust crate first, then release
 set -euo pipefail
 
+# Gradle's buildRustCertgen resolves `cargo` against the daemon's inherited PATH,
+# not the env we inject via gradle's Exec.environment(). Prepend the per-user
+# rustup install so non-login shells (CI, IDE-launched terminals, fresh tmux)
+# still find it without sourcing /etc/profile.d/cargo-path.sh.
+[ -d "$HOME/.cargo/bin" ] && PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"
+
 SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
 PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
 OUT_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/out"
@@ -21,6 +27,7 @@ REBOOT=false
 VERIFY=false
 BUILD_RUST=false
 CLEAR_KEYS=false
+CLEAR_LOGS=false
 TRACE=false
 ROOT_PROVIDER="ksu"
 
@@ -46,6 +53,7 @@ Deploy options:
   --deploy           Push ZIP to device and install
   --reboot           Reboot device after install
   --clear-keys       Clear persistent_keys before deploy
+  --clear-logs       Clear per-UID diagnostic logs before deploy
   --verify           Run logcat verification after deploy
   --root PROVIDER    Root provider: ksu (default), magisk, apatch
 
@@ -67,6 +75,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
         --verify)     VERIFY=true; shift ;;
         --rust)       BUILD_RUST=true; shift ;;
         --clear-keys) CLEAR_KEYS=true; shift ;;
+        --clear-logs) CLEAR_LOGS=true; shift ;;
         -v|--verbose) TRACE=true; shift ;;
         --root)       ROOT_PROVIDER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
         --help|-h)    usage ;;
@@ -147,6 +156,11 @@ deploy_zip() {
         adb shell "rm -rf /data/adb/tricky_store/persistent_keys/*" 2>/dev/null || true
     fi
 
+    if [[ "$CLEAR_LOGS" == true ]]; then
+        bold "==> Clearing per-UID diagnostic logs"
+        adb shell "rm -rf /data/media/0/TEESimulator /data/local/tmp/teesim" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+
     bold "==> Deploying $name"
     adb push "$zip" /data/local/tmp/module.zip
     adb shell "su -c '$INSTALL_CMD /data/local/tmp/module.zip'"

stub/src/main/java/android/hardware/security/keymint/HardwareAuthenticatorType.java

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-package android.hardware.security.keymint;
-
-public @interface HardwareAuthenticatorType {
-    int NONE = 0;
-    int PASSWORD = 1;
-    int FINGERPRINT = 2;
-    int ANY = -1;
-}

stub/src/main/java/android/os/SELinux.java

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 package android.os;
 
-/** Stub for android.os.SELinux. */
 public class SELinux {
     public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
             String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {

stub/src/main/java/android/os/ServiceSpecificException.java

@@ -1,21 +1,14 @@
 package android.os;
 
-/**
- * Stub for android.os.ServiceSpecificException.
- *
- * <p>Used by AIDL-generated binder stubs to report service-specific errors with numeric codes.
- * The binder framework serializes this as EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC on the wire, preserving the integer
- * error code for the client.
- */
 public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
     public final int errorCode;
 
+    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
+        this.errorCode = errorCode;
+    }
+
     public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
         super(message);
         this.errorCode = errorCode;
     }
-
-    public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
-        this(errorCode, null);
-    }
 }

stub/src/main/java/android/security/maintenance/IKeystoreMaintenance.java

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package android.security.maintenance;
+
+import android.os.IBinder;
+
+/**
+ * Compile-time stub for the hidden keystore2 maintenance binder
+ * ({@code android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance}).
+ *
+ * <p>This module is a {@code compileOnly} dependency, so the real framework class
+ * (which carries the actual {@code TRANSACTION_*} codes) is loaded at runtime. We
+ * only need the {@link #DESCRIPTOR} token to parse the transaction parcel and the
+ * inner {@code Stub} class so {@code getTransactCode} can reflect the real codes.
+ */
+public interface IKeystoreMaintenance {
+    String DESCRIPTOR = "android.security.maintenance.IKeystoreMaintenance";
+
+    class Stub {
+        public static IKeystoreMaintenance asInterface(IBinder b) {
+            throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
+        }
+    }
+}