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21 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Enginex0 f50004d9a5 docs(release): write v3.2 changelog and point update.json to fork
Changelog covers all 22 commits since v3.1: rate limiter,
importKey hardening, key persistence, supervisor daemon,
security patch consistency, and lifecycle scripts.
update.json now targets Enginex0/TEESimulator releases.
2026-02-06 23:50:30 +01:00
Enginex0 8c10cf71ce chore(module): add co-author credit, verbose action output, point updates to fork 2026-02-06 23:31:03 +01:00
Enginex0 1ed3d9ad6e fix(install): extract action.sh and uninstall.sh during module install 2026-02-06 23:22:16 +01:00
Enginex0 4107127506 chore(build): bump version to v3.2 2026-02-06 23:17:20 +01:00
Enginex0 e36c4e351c feat(module): add action.sh and uninstall.sh lifecycle scripts
action.sh clears persistent key storage on user trigger.
uninstall.sh kills daemon processes and removes all module
artifacts while preserving target.txt and keybox config.
2026-02-06 22:34:02 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 1546c3bba0 Derive boot and vendor patch levels from system prop when system=prop
TrickyAddon fetches Pixel bulletin dates for boot/vendor but system=prop
resolves to the real device prop, creating a cross-component date mismatch
on non-Pixel devices. Force all three through the same prop resolution path.
2026-02-06 21:10:59 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 81a8ce0c60 Rate-limit per-UID hardware keygen and harden importKey eviction
Sliding window limits each UID to 2 hardware generateKey calls per
30s burst window with max 2 concurrent. Overflow falls back to
software cert generation.

importKey post-hook retains patched chains instead of full eviction,
preventing detectors from using generate-then-import to bypass
attestation patching. getKeyEntry serves retained chains for imported
keys that overwrote attested aliases.
2026-02-06 21:10:59 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 7c4df3e237 Cap interceptable binder payload size at 256KB
Prevents thread starvation from flood attacks targeting the
binder interceptor with oversized payloads.
2026-02-06 21:10:59 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 1ac08411be Revert "Add X.509 certificate extensions for RFC 5280 compliance"
This reverts commit a11a5e41a2.
2026-02-06 21:10:59 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder a11a5e41a2 Add X.509 certificate extensions for RFC 5280 compliance
- BasicConstraints: CA=false (critical)
- SubjectKeyIdentifier via SHA-1 hash
- AuthorityKeyIdentifier linked to issuer cert
2026-02-06 00:47:32 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder c367aa5efc Add file-level locking to prevent race conditions in key persistence
Per-key ReentrantLock prevents concurrent writes to same key file
2026-02-06 00:31:53 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 88781ff31d Delegate key re-persistence to GeneratedKeyPersistence layer
Remove duplicate rePersistKeyIfNeeded, use centralized implementation
2026-02-06 00:24:50 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 409fb5fcc3 Reject oversized aliases to prevent binder buffer exhaustion
MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH (256KB) with 4x safety margin for transaction overhead
2026-02-06 00:24:50 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 0cf8f70544 fix(pki): strip HTML comments from PEM blocks before parsing
Some upstream keybox sources inject HTML comments inside PEM
certificate blocks. BouncyCastle's PEMParser chokes on these
non-base64 lines, silently failing to load the keybox.

Filter lines starting with <!-- in trimLines() before the content
reaches the PEM parser.
2026-02-06 00:16:07 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 7ecea09ec6 fix(app): add global uncaught exception handler for clean restart
Individual thread crashes silently kill the thread without bringing
down the process. The half-dead process stays alive but broken, and
the service.sh restart loop never fires.

Install a default uncaught exception handler that logs the error and
calls exitProcess(0), triggering the restart loop for full recovery.
2026-02-06 00:16:07 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder 887c5fc666 fix(config): prevent FileObserver NPE on config file deletion
When a config file is deleted, the event handler sets file=null but
then force-unwraps it with file!! in the when block, crashing the
FileObserver thread. All subsequent config change notifications are
silently lost.

Replace force-unwrap with safe call, log a warning on deletion.
2026-02-06 00:16:07 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder ce0ca18d98 Preserve generated keys across keybox rotation
Only invalidate patched cert chains when keybox changes.
Generated key material is independent and survives rotation.
2026-02-06 00:07:46 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder fa28e9fc71 Integrate key persistence with interceptors
Save keys on generation, restore on daemon startup, delete on cleanup.
Re-persist when cert chain updates via updateSubcomponents.
2026-02-06 00:07:46 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder c3822197b1 Add generated key persistence layer
Persist GENERATE-mode keys to disk so they survive daemon restarts.
Binary format with version header, atomic write via tmp+rename.
2026-02-06 00:07:46 +01:00
Enginex0andGKI Builder f276806096 fix(native): block attestation leak when interceptor service is dead
When the Java interceptor process dies, callback->transact() returns
DEAD_OBJECT but the code fell through to the real keystore, exposing
genuine TEE state to requesting apps.

Add pingBinder() liveness check on pre-transact failure. If the
interceptor is confirmed dead, return DEAD_OBJECT to the caller
instead of forwarding to real hardware. Apps see a transient service
error rather than the actual device attestation state.
2026-02-05 23:57:40 +01:00
Enginex0 9aa4a33c5e Add fork-based supervisor daemon for instant restart 2026-02-05 23:57:24 +01:00
58 changed files with 519 additions and 6223 deletions
+73 -92
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,16 @@ name: Build
on: on:
push: push:
branches: [ "main" ] branches: [ "main" ]
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ] paths-ignore:
- '**.md'
- '.github/**'
- '!.github/workflows/**'
pull_request: pull_request:
branches: [ "main" ] branches: [ "main" ]
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ] paths-ignore:
- '**.md'
- '.github/**'
- '!.github/workflows/**'
workflow_dispatch: workflow_dispatch:
concurrency: concurrency:
@@ -16,9 +22,18 @@ concurrency:
jobs: jobs:
build: build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
attestations: write
contents: read
outputs:
releaseName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
debugName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
steps: steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Check out
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with: with:
submodules: "recursive" submodules: "recursive"
fetch-depth: 0 fetch-depth: 0
@@ -30,25 +45,6 @@ jobs:
java-version: 21 java-version: 21
cache: 'gradle' cache: 'gradle'
- name: Setup Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: aarch64-linux-android,armv7-linux-androideabi,i686-linux-android,x86_64-linux-android
- name: Cache Rust artifacts
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
~/.cargo/bin/cargo-ndk
native-certgen/target
key: rust-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('native-certgen/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: rust-${{ runner.os }}-
- name: Install cargo-ndk
run: command -v cargo-ndk || cargo install cargo-ndk
- name: Set up ccache - name: Set up ccache
uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2 uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2
with: with:
@@ -64,88 +60,73 @@ jobs:
- name: Build with Gradle - name: Build with Gradle
run: | run: |
chmod +x ./gradlew chmod +x ./gradlew
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug -Porg.gradle.parallel=true -Porg.gradle.vfs.watch=true -Dorg.gradle.jvmargs=-Xmx2048m ./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug -Porg.gradle.parallel=true -Porg.gradle.vfs.watch=true -Dorg.gradle.jvmargs=-Xmx2048m
- name: Read version - name: Prepare artifact
id: ver if: success()
id: prepareArtifact
run: | run: |
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/') set -e
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count) RELEASE_FILE=$(find out -name "*Release*.zip" | head -1)
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" DEBUG_FILE=$(find out -name "*Debug*.zip" | head -1)
if [[ -z "$RELEASE_FILE" || -z "$DEBUG_FILE" ]]; then
echo "Error: Could not find release or debug files in out/"
echo "Contents of out/ directory:"
ls -la out/ || echo "out/ directory does not exist"
exit 1
fi
# Extract names
RELEASE_NAME=$(basename "$RELEASE_FILE" .zip)
DEBUG_NAME=$(basename "$DEBUG_FILE" .zip)
echo "releaseName=$RELEASE_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "debugName=$DEBUG_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: List build artifacts mkdir -p module-release module-debug
run: | unzip -q "$RELEASE_FILE" -d module-release
echo "Release: $(ls out/*Release*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Release*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))" unzip -q "$DEBUG_FILE" -d module-debug
echo "Debug: $(ls out/*Debug*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Debug*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))" echo " Release: $RELEASE_NAME"
echo " Debug: $DEBUG_NAME"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 - name: Upload release
if: success()
id: release
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with: with:
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Release.zip path: "./module-release/*"
retention-days: 30 retention-days: 30
compression-level: 0 compression-level: 6
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 - name: Upload debug
if: success()
id: debug
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with: with:
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Debug.zip path: "./module-debug/*"
retention-days: 7 retention-days: 7
compression-level: 0 compression-level: 6
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4 - name: Upload release mappings
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with: with:
name: release-mappings name: release-mappings-${{ github.run_number }}
path: app/build/outputs/mapping/release path: "./app/build/outputs/mapping/release"
retention-days: 30 retention-days: 30
compression-level: 9 compression-level: 9
release: - name: Summary
needs: build if: always()
if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Read version
id: ver
run: | run: |
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/') echo "## Build Summary" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count) echo "- **Status**: ${{ job.status }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" echo "- **Gradle Tasks**: assembleRelease, assembleDebug" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
if [[ "${{ job.status }}" == "success" ]]; then
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4 echo "- **Release Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
with: echo "- **Debug Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip fi
path: zips
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
path: zips
- name: Extract changelog
run: |
ver="${VER#v}"
awk "/^## TEESimulator-RS v${ver%%-*}/{flag=1; next} /^## TEESimulator-RS v/{if(flag) exit} flag" module/changelog.md > /tmp/notes.md
cat /tmp/notes.md
env:
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
- name: Create release
run: |
gh release delete "$VER" --yes 2>/dev/null || true
RELEASE=$(ls zips/*Release*.zip | head -1)
DEBUG=$(ls zips/*Debug*.zip | head -1)
gh release create "$VER" \
--title "$VER" \
--latest \
--notes-file /tmp/notes.md \
"$RELEASE" \
"$DEBUG"
env:
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-6
View File
@@ -1,7 +1 @@
out out
.gradle
.kotlin
app/build
build
native-certgen/target
app/src/main/jniLibs
+75 -194
View File
@@ -1,143 +1,32 @@
<p align="center"> # TEESimulator A Full TEE Emulation Framework
<h1 align="center">🔐 TEESimulator</h1>
<p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
<p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
</p>
</p>
--- **TEESimulator** is a system module designed to create a complete, software-based simulation of a hardware-backed Trusted Execution Environment ([TEE](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty)) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation).
> [!NOTE] The project's goal is to move beyond simple certificate patching and build a robust framework that can create and manage virtual, self-consistent cryptographic keys.
> **This is a personal fork of [JingMatrix/TEESimulator](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** with additional hardening, native Rust certificate generation, key persistence, and anti-detection features. For the upstream project, see the original repo.
--- ## ✨ Core Principles
## 🧬 What is TEESimulator? * **Bypass Hardware-Backed Attestation:** The primary goal of this project is to defeat Key Attestation, a security mechanism that allows apps to verify that they are running on a secure, unmodified device. This module provides the tools to bypass these checks on rooted or modified devices.
* **Stateful Emulation:** Instead of patching responses from the real TEE, the ultimate goal is to create and manage virtual keys entirely in a simulated software environment. Any request concerning a virtual key will be handled by the simulator, ensuring perfect consistency without ever touching the real hardware.
* **Architectural Interception:** By hooking low-level Binder IPC calls to the Keystore, the framework can transparently redirect requests for virtual keys to the software-based simulator, while allowing requests for real keys to pass through to the hardware TEE.
* **100% FOSS:** Licensed under GPLv3, ensuring it stays free, auditable, and compliant with open-source laws.
TEESimulator is a **complete software simulation** of Android's hardware-backed [Trusted Execution Environment](https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/trusty) for [Key Attestation](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/security-key-attestation). Instead of patching certificates from the real TEE after the fact, TEESimulator intercepts Binder IPC at the `ioctl` level and generates entire certificate chains from scratch — signed by your keybox, with correct attestation extensions, indistinguishable from hardware-generated keys. ## 📱 Requirements
- Android 10 or above
The result: **apps that verify hardware attestation see a legitimate, unmodified device** — even on rooted hardware with an unlocked bootloader. ## 📦 Installation & Configuration
> **This is not TrickyStore.** TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore and its forks entirely. It shares the same config paths for drop-in compatibility, but the architecture is fundamentally different: native Rust certificate generation, binder-level interception via `lsplt`, per-UID rate limiting, key persistence, and a multi-layer defense against detector apps. 1. Flash this module via (Magisk / KernelSU / APatch) and reboot. It will replace [TrickyStore](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore), [TrickyStoreOSS](https://github.com/beakthoven/TrickyStoreOSS) and their forks.
2. (Optional) Place a hardware-backed `keybox.xml` at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`. This provides the cryptographic "root of trust" for the simulator.
3. (Optional) Customize target packages in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`.
4. (Optional) Customize the simulated security patch level in `/data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt`.
5. Enjoy!
--- **All configuration files are monitored and will take effect immediately upon saving.**
## 🔥 Why TEESimulator?
🔐 **Native Cert Generation** — v4.0 generates X.509 certificate chains in Rust with `ring` and manual DER encoding. No BouncyCastle overhead, no Java crypto quirks, byte-perfect issuer chain linkage.
🎯 **Binder-Level Interception** — Hooks `ioctl()` on `libc.so` via `lsplt` inside the `keystore2` process. Intercepts `generateKey`, `importKey`, and `getKeyEntry` transactions before the HAL ever sees them.
🛡️ **Detector Resistant** — Per-UID rate limiting blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding. Oversized challenges rejected with real KeyMint error codes. Chain consistency verified byte-for-byte.
💾 **Key Persistence** — Generated keys survive reboots. Apps that store attestation keys (banking, biometrics) don't break after a restart.
🔧 **Drop-In Replacement** — Same config paths as TrickyStore (`/data/adb/tricky_store/`). Swap the module ZIP, keep your keybox and target list.
---
## ✨ Features
**Core Attestation Engine**
- [x] **Full certificate chain generation** — leaf + intermediates + root, signed by your keybox
- [x] **Native Rust certgen**`libcertgen.so` built with `ring`, `rsa`, and manual DER assembly
- [x] **BouncyCastle fallback** — unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519) fall back to Java
- [x] **ASN.1 attestation extensions** — OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17 with all AOSP-specified tags
- [x] **Multi-keybox support** — different keybox files per app group via `target.txt`
**Interception Layer**
- [x] **Binder ioctl hook**`lsplt` PLT hook on `libc.so` inside `keystore2` process
- [x] **generateKey / importKey / getKeyEntry** — all three transaction types intercepted
- [x] **256KB native payload cap** — oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly
- [x] **Challenge validation** — rejects >128-byte attestation challenges with `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH`
**Hardening**
- [x] **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst window, software fallback on overflow
- [x] **importKey eviction guard** — retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import cache attacks
- [x] **Key persistence** — file-backed storage with file-level locking, survives reboots and keybox rotations
- [x] **Global exception handler** — uncaught exceptions logged, daemon stays alive
**Configuration**
- [x] **Live config reload**`FileObserver` watches all config files, changes apply immediately
- [x] **Security patch spoofing** — per-package `system`, `vendor`, `boot` patch levels with dynamic templates
- [x] **Lifecycle scripts** — KSU Action button clears key cache, uninstall removes all traces
---
## 📋 Requirements
> [!IMPORTANT]
> TEESimulator requires root access and a valid `keybox.xml` for hardware-level attestation results. Without a keybox, the module generates software-level certificates that won't pass strict hardware attestation checks.
**You need:**
1. Android 10 or above
2. A supported root manager (KernelSU, Magisk, or APatch)
3. A hardware-backed `keybox.xml` placed at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
---
## 📱 Compatibility
### Root Managers
| Manager | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| KernelSU | ✅ Tested | Full support including Action button and lifecycle scripts |
| Magisk | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
| APatch | ✅ Supported | Standard module install |
### Tested Devices
| Device | Android | TEE | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redmi 14C (2409BRN2CA) | 14 (SDK 34) | Beanpod KeyMaster | ✅ Daily driver |
> Tested against DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, and Key Attestation Demo. If you test on a different device, [open an issue](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/issues) with your results.
---
## 🚀 Quick Start
1. **Download** the latest release ZIP from [Releases](https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases)
2. **Install** via your root manager (KSU / Magisk / APatch) and reboot
3. **Place your keybox** at `/data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml`
4. **Configure targets** in `/data/adb/tricky_store/target.txt`
5. **Verify** — check Play Integrity or run Key Attestation Demo
TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing config files are compatible.
---
## 🔨 Building from Source
The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
cd TEESimulator
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
```
Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
---
## ⚙️ Configuration
All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust ### The `keybox.xml` Root of Trust
This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key and a hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. TEESimulator signs all generated certificates with this key, making them appear legitimate to verifiers. This file provides the master cryptographic identity for the simulator. It contains a private key and a valid, hardware-backed certificate chain from a real device. The simulator uses this to sign the virtual certificates it generates, making them appear legitimate to verifiers.
```xml ```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?> <?xml version="1.0"?>
@@ -151,109 +40,101 @@ This file provides the master cryptographic identity. It contains a private key
</AndroidAttestation> </AndroidAttestation>
``` ```
### Target Packages (`target.txt`) ### Mode and Keybox Configuration (`target.txt`)
Controls which apps get intercepted and what simulation mode to use. TEESimulator currently operates in two primary modes as it transitions towards full emulation.
You can control the simulation mode and the specific keybox.xml file used on a per-package basis.
#### Mode Suffixes #### Mode Suffixes
* **`!` → Force Generation** Creates a complete software-based virtual key. Full TEE simulation. * **`!` → Force Generation Mode:** Creates a complete, software-based virtual key. This is the foundation of the full TEE simulation.
* **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking** — Real TEE key generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and patched. * **`?` → Force Leaf Hacking Mode:** A legacy mode where a real TEE key is generated, but its attestation certificate is intercepted and modified.
* **No symbol → Automatic** — Module selects the best mode for your device. * **No symbol → Automatic Mode:** The module selects the most appropriate mode for the device.
#### Multi-Keybox #### Multi-Keybox Configuration
Specify different keybox files for different app groups. Apps listed after a `[filename.xml]` line use that keybox. Apps before any declaration use the default `keybox.xml`. You can specify different keybox files for different groups of applications. This is done by adding a line with the filename in square brackets (e.g., [demo_keybox.xml]).
All applications listed after this line will use the specified keybox file, until a new keybox is declared. Applications listed before any custom keybox declaration will use the default `keybox.xml`.
For example:
``` ```
# Default keybox # These two apps will use the default /data/adb/tricky_store/keybox.xml
com.google.android.gms! com.google.android.gms!
io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation? io.github.vvb2060.keyattestation?
# Switch to a different keybox for the following apps # Switch to a different keybox for the following apps.
# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/aosp_keybox.xml
[aosp_keybox.xml] [aosp_keybox.xml]
com.google.android.gsf com.google.android.gsf
# Another keybox # Switch again to another keybox.
# The file must be located at /data/adb/tricky_store/demo_keybox.xml
[demo_keybox.xml] [demo_keybox.xml]
org.matrix.demo org.matrix.demo
``` ```
### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`) ### Security Patch Level (`security_patch.txt`)
Configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` reported in attestation certificates. This only affects attestation data — it does not change actual system properties. This file allows you to configure the `osPatchLevel`, `vendorPatchLevel`, and `bootPatchLevel` that the simulator will report in its patched or forged attestation certificates.
#### Global and Per-Package **Note:** This only affects the Key Attestation data generated by the simulator. It does not change the actual system properties of your device.
Settings at the top of the file are global defaults. Add `[package.name]` to override for specific apps. #### Global and Per-Package Configuration
#### Keys You can set a global patch level that applies to all applications, and you can also override these settings for specific packages. The syntax is hierarchical:
| Key | Scope | * Settings defined at the top of the file, before any `[package.name]` line, are **global** and serve as the default for all apps.
|---|---| * To create a specific configuration for an application, add its package name in square brackets (e.g., `[com.google.android.gms]`). All settings following this line will apply *only* to that package until a new package context is declared.
| `system` | OS patch level |
| `vendor` | Vendor patch level | #### Configuration Keys and Values
| `boot` | Boot/kernel patch level |
| `all` | Shorthand — sets all three at once | You can specify the patch level for the following components using a `key=value` format:
* `system`: The main OS patch level.
* `vendor`: The vendor patch level.
* `boot`: The boot/kernel patch level.
* `all`: A convenient shorthand to set the same date for `system`, `vendor`, and `boot` simultaneously. Any individual key can still be used to override the value set by `all`.
Dates should be provided in `YYYY-MM-DD` format (e.g., `2025-11-05`).
#### Special Keywords #### Special Keywords
| Keyword | Effect | In addition to static dates, several special keywords provide advanced, dynamic control:
|---|---|
| `today` | Current date, dynamically resolved on each attestation |
| `YYYY-MM-DD` templates | Semi-dynamic — `YYYY-MM-05` resolves to the 5th of the current month |
| `no` | Omit this patch level tag entirely from the attestation |
| `device_default` | Use the device's real hardware value |
| `prop` | Read from `ro.build.version.security_patch` (matches what detectors see via getprop) |
#### Example * **`today`**: Dynamically uses the current date every time an attestation is generated. This ensures the device always appears up-to-date without needing manual edits.
* **Date Templates**: You can create semi-dynamic dates using `YYYY`, `MM`, and `DD` as placeholders for the current year, month, and day. For example, `YYYY-MM-05` will always resolve to the 5th of the current month and year.
* **`no`**: This keyword instructs the simulator to **completely omit** the corresponding patch level tag from the generated attestation.
* **`device_default`**: This keyword forces the simulator to fall back and use the device's **real hardware value** for that specific patch level. This is essential for creating exceptions to a global override or an `all` rule.
#### Example Configuration
This example demonstrates how to combine global settings, per-package overrides, and special keywords for fine-grained control.
``` ```
# Global — default for all apps # --- Global Configuration ---
# This is the default for all apps unless specified otherwise.
# - Forge a recent system patch level, the 5th of the current month (a common patch date).
# - Use the device's real vendor patch level.
# - Do not report a boot patch level at all.
system=YYYY-MM-05 system=YYYY-MM-05
vendor=device_default vendor=device_default
boot=no boot=no
# Override for GMS # --- Per-Package Override for Google Play Services ---
# This app will report an older, specific date for its system patch.
# It will inherit the global settings for vendor (device_default) and boot (no).
[com.google.android.gms] [com.google.android.gms]
system=2024-10-01 system=2024-10-01
# Custom config for a demo app # --- Per-Package Override for a Demo App ---
# This app gets a completely custom configuration.
[org.matrix.demo] [org.matrix.demo]
# Set a base date for all patch levels...
all=2025-09-15 all=2025-09-15
# ...but make an exception: use the real boot patch level instead of the one from 'all'.
boot=device_default boot=device_default
``` ```
---
## 💬 Community
<p align="center">
<a href="https://t.me/superpowers9">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/⚡_JOIN_THE_GRID-SuperPowers_Telegram-black?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram&logoColor=cyan&labelColor=0d1117&color=00d4ff" alt="Telegram">
</a>
</p>
---
## 🙏 Credits
- **[JingMatrix](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator)** — original author of TEESimulator and the interception architecture
- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester
---
## 📄 License
This project is licensed under the [GNU General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
---
<p align="center">
<b>🔐 Because the best attestation is the one the TEE never generated.</b>
</p>
+17 -47
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt() val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir) val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
val verName = "v5.0" val verName = "v3.2"
android { android {
namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator" namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
@@ -71,35 +71,6 @@ dependencies {
implementation(libs.bcpkix) implementation(libs.bcpkix)
} }
// --- Rust native cert gen build task ---
val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
commandLine(
"cargo", "ndk",
"-t", "arm64-v8a",
"-o", rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs").absolutePath,
"build", "--release"
)
inputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/src"))
inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.toml"))
inputs.file(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen/Cargo.lock"))
outputs.dir(rootProject.projectDir.resolve("app/src/main/jniLibs"))
environment("ANDROID_NDK_HOME", android.ndkDirectory.absolutePath)
}
// AGP auto-detects jniLibs/ as an input to mergeJniLibFolders — wire the dependency
tasks.configureEach {
if (name.endsWith("JniLibFolders") && name.startsWith("merge")) {
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
}
}
androidComponents { androidComponents {
onVariants(selector().all()) { variant -> onVariants(selector().all()) { variant ->
val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() } val capitalized = variant.name.replaceFirstChar { it.uppercase() }
@@ -108,22 +79,21 @@ androidComponents {
// --- Define output locations and file names --- // --- Define output locations and file names ---
// Stage all files in a temporary directory inside 'build' before zipping // Stage all files in a temporary directory inside 'build' before zipping
val tempModuleDir = project.layout.buildDirectory.dir("module/${variant.name}") val tempModuleDir = project.layout.buildDirectory.dir("module/${variant.name}")
val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-RS-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$capitalized.zip" val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-$capitalized.zip"
// Task 1: Prepare all module files in the temporary build directory. // Task 1: Prepare all module files in the temporary build directory.
// Using Sync ensures that stale files from previous runs are removed. // Using Sync ensures that stale files from previous runs are removed.
val prepareModuleFilesTask = val prepareModuleFilesTask =
tasks.register<Sync>("prepareModuleFiles${capitalized}") { tasks.register<Sync>("prepareModuleFiles${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging" group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
description = "Prepares all files for the ${variant.name} module zip." description = "Prepares all files for the ${variant.name} module zip."
if (isDebug) { if (isDebug) {
dependsOn("package${capitalized}") dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
} else { } else {
dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8") dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
} }
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen) dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
if (isDebug) { if (isDebug) {
from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) { from(variant.artifacts.get(SingleArtifact.APK)) {
@@ -140,14 +110,13 @@ androidComponents {
} }
} }
val nativeLibsDir = if (isDebug) { from(
"intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib" project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
} else { "intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib" )
} ) {
from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) { into("lib") // Place them in the 'lib' subfolder of the staging directory.
into("lib") include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so")
include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
} }
// Now, copy and process the files from 'module' directory. // Now, copy and process the files from 'module' directory.
@@ -162,7 +131,8 @@ androidComponents {
// Use expand() for simple key-value replacement. // Use expand() for simple key-value replacement.
expand( expand(
"REPLACEMEVERCODE" to gitCommitCount.toString(), "REPLACEMEVERCODE" to gitCommitCount.toString(),
"REPLACEMEVER" to "$verName-$gitCommitCount", "REPLACEMEVER" to
"$verName ($gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-${variant.name})",
) )
} }
@@ -173,7 +143,7 @@ androidComponents {
// Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory. // Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory.
val zipTask = val zipTask =
tasks.register<Zip>("zip${capitalized}") { tasks.register<Zip>("zip${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging" group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
description = "Creates the flashable zip for the ${variant.name} module." description = "Creates the flashable zip for the ${variant.name} module."
dependsOn(prepareModuleFilesTask) dependsOn(prepareModuleFilesTask)
@@ -186,7 +156,7 @@ androidComponents {
fun createInstallTasks(rootProvider: String, installCli: String) { fun createInstallTasks(rootProvider: String, installCli: String) {
val pushTask = val pushTask =
tasks.register<Exec>("push${rootProvider}Module${capitalized}") { tasks.register<Exec>("push${rootProvider}Module${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation" group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
description = description =
"Pushes the ${variant.name} module to the device for $rootProvider." "Pushes the ${variant.name} module to the device for $rootProvider."
dependsOn(zipTask) dependsOn(zipTask)
@@ -200,7 +170,7 @@ androidComponents {
val installTask = val installTask =
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}${capitalized}") { tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation" group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider." description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider."
dependsOn(pushTask) dependsOn(pushTask)
commandLine( commandLine(
@@ -213,7 +183,7 @@ androidComponents {
} }
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}AndReboot${capitalized}") { tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}AndReboot${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation" group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider and reboots." description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider and reboots."
dependsOn(installTask) dependsOn(installTask)
commandLine("adb", "reboot") commandLine("adb", "reboot")
-6
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,3 @@
-keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.App { -keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.App {
public static void main(java.lang.String[]); public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
} }
-keepclasseswithmembers class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen {
native <methods>;
*;
}
-keep class org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertGenConfig { *; }
+8 -27
View File
@@ -235,21 +235,19 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
struct RegistrationEntry { struct RegistrationEntry {
wp<IBinder> target; wp<IBinder> target;
sp<IBinder> callback_interface; sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
}; };
// Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_; mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_; std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;
public: public:
BinderInterceptor() = default; BinderInterceptor() = default;
bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const { // Checks if a specific Binder instance is currently registered for interception
bool isBinderIntercepted(const wp<BBinder> &target) const {
std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_); std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
auto it = registry_.find(target); return registry_.find(target) != registry_.end();
if (it == registry_.end()) return false;
const auto &codes = it->second.filtered_codes;
return codes.empty() || std::find(codes.begin(), codes.end(), code) != codes.end();
} }
// Main entry point for processing the "Man-in-the-Middle" logic // Main entry point for processing the "Man-in-the-Middle" logic
@@ -360,12 +358,6 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
if (txn_data->data_size > kMaxInterceptableDataSize) if (txn_data->data_size > kMaxInterceptableDataSize)
return; return;
// AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
// System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
// Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
return;
bool hijack = false; bool hijack = false;
ThreadTransactionInfo info; ThreadTransactionInfo info;
@@ -395,7 +387,7 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
// This is safe because we are holding a strong reference. // This is safe because we are holding a strong reference.
wp<BBinder> wp_target = target_binder_ptr; wp<BBinder> wp_target = target_binder_ptr;
if (g_interceptor_instance->shouldIntercept(wp_target, txn_data->code)) { if (g_interceptor_instance->isBinderIntercepted(wp_target)) {
info.transaction_code = txn_data->code; info.transaction_code = txn_data->code;
info.target_binder = wp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer info.target_binder = wp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer
hijack = true; hijack = true;
@@ -540,29 +532,18 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback) if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
return BAD_VALUE; return BAD_VALUE;
// We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) { if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies."); LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
return BAD_TYPE; return BAD_TYPE;
} }
std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
int32_t code_count = 0;
if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
codes.reserve(code_count);
for (int32_t i = 0; i < code_count; i++) {
uint32_t c = 0;
if (data.readUint32(&c) == OK) codes.push_back(c);
}
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p with %zu filtered codes", target.get(), codes.size());
} else {
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p (all codes)", target.get());
}
wp<IBinder> weak_target = target; wp<IBinder> weak_target = target;
std::unique_lock lock(registry_mutex_); std::unique_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback, std::move(codes)}; registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback};
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p", target.get());
return OK; return OK;
} }
+1 -20
View File
@@ -2,13 +2,11 @@
#include <unistd.h> #include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h> #include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <signal.h> #include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h> #include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h> #include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h> #include <string.h>
#include <errno.h> #include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>
static volatile sig_atomic_t should_exit = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t should_exit = 0;
@@ -29,12 +27,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
const char *daemon_path = argv[1]; const char *daemon_path = argv[1];
char **daemon_argv = &argv[1]; char **daemon_argv = &argv[1];
int backoff_ms = 500;
while (!should_exit) { while (!should_exit) {
struct timespec child_start;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &child_start);
pid_t pid = fork(); pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { if (pid < 0) {
@@ -46,7 +39,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (pid == 0) { if (pid == 0) {
// Child: become the daemon // Child: become the daemon
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // Die if parent dies prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // Die if parent dies
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 10); // lower CPU priority than foreground
execv(daemon_path, daemon_argv); execv(daemon_path, daemon_argv);
perror("execv failed"); perror("execv failed");
_exit(127); _exit(127);
@@ -58,18 +50,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (should_exit) break; if (should_exit) break;
// Exponential backoff on rapid crashes, reset if child was stable // Instant restart - no delay
struct timespec now;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &now);
long lived_ms = (now.tv_sec - child_start.tv_sec) * 1000 +
(now.tv_nsec - child_start.tv_nsec) / 1000000;
if (lived_ms > 30000) {
backoff_ms = 500;
} else {
usleep(backoff_ms * 1000);
if (backoff_ms < 30000) backoff_ms *= 2;
}
} }
return 0; return 0;
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.AbstractKeystoreInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.Keystore2Interceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeystoreInterceptor import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeystoreInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
import kotlin.system.exitProcess
/** /**
* Main application object for TEESimulator. This object manages the application's lifecycle, * Main application object for TEESimulator. This object manages the application's lifecycle,
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
object App { object App {
// The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor. // The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
// The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L
/** /**
* The main entry point of the TEESimulator application. * The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
@@ -31,6 +33,11 @@ object App {
*/ */
@JvmStatic @JvmStatic
fun main(args: Array<String>) { fun main(args: Array<String>) {
Thread.setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler { thread, throwable ->
SystemLogger.error("Uncaught exception on thread '${thread.name}'. Exiting for restart.", throwable)
exitProcess(0)
}
SystemLogger.info("Welcome to TEESimulator!") SystemLogger.info("Welcome to TEESimulator!")
try { try {
@@ -50,8 +57,6 @@ object App {
Security.removeProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME) Security.removeProvider(BouncyCastleProvider.PROVIDER_NAME)
Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider()) Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider())
NativeCertGen.initialize("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/libcertgen.so")
// This starts the message queue processing. It blocks here indefinitely // This starts the message queue processing. It blocks here indefinitely
// processing messages until Looper.myLooper().quit() is called. // processing messages until Looper.myLooper().quit() is called.
Looper.loop() Looper.loop()
@@ -2,11 +2,8 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
import android.content.pm.PackageManager import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.os.Build import android.os.Build
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
import java.security.MessageDigest import java.security.MessageDigest
import javax.crypto.Mac
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Boolean import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Boolean
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Enumerated import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Enumerated
@@ -130,59 +127,33 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
return properties return properties
} }
/** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
private fun buildKeyDescription( private fun buildKeyDescription(
params: KeyMintAttestation, params: KeyMintAttestation,
uid: Int, uid: Int,
securityLevel: Int, securityLevel: Int,
): ASN1Sequence { ): ASN1Sequence {
val creationTime = System.currentTimeMillis()
val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel) val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel)
val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel, creationTime) val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid, securityLevel)
val uniqueId =
if (params.includeUniqueId == true && params.attestationChallenge != null) {
computeUniqueId(creationTime, createApplicationId(uid).octets)
} else {
ByteArray(0)
}
val fields = val fields =
arrayOf( arrayOf(
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()), ASN1Integer(
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()), ), // attestationVersion
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), ASN1Integer(
DEROctetString(uniqueId), AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
), // keymasterVersion
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
DEROctetString(ByteArray(0)), // uniqueId
softwareEnforced, softwareEnforced,
teeEnforced, teeEnforced,
) )
return DERSequence(fields) return DERSequence(fields)
} }
private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
val message =
ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
.putLong(temporalCounter)
.put(aaidDer)
.put(0x00)
.array()
val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
}
private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
file.readBytes()
} else {
SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
}
}
/** Builds the `TeeEnforced` authorization list. These are properties the TEE "guarantees". */ /** Builds the `TeeEnforced` authorization list. These are properties the TEE "guarantees". */
private fun buildTeeEnforcedList( private fun buildTeeEnforcedList(
params: KeyMintAttestation, params: KeyMintAttestation,
@@ -211,110 +182,23 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
AttestationConstants.TAG_DIGEST, AttestationConstants.TAG_DIGEST,
DERSet(params.digest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()), DERSet(params.digest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
), ),
)
if (params.ecCurve != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject( DERTaggedObject(
true, true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_EC_CURVE, AttestationConstants.TAG_EC_CURVE,
ASN1Integer(params.ecCurve.toLong()), ASN1Integer(params.ecCurve.toLong()),
) ),
) DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE),
}
if (params.blockMode.isNotEmpty()) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_BLOCK_MODE,
DERSet(params.blockMode.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.padding.isNotEmpty()) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_PADDING,
DERSet(params.padding.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
ASN1Integer(params.rsaPublicExponent.toLong()),
)
)
}
val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
if (params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.isNotEmpty() && attestVersion >= 100) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.earlyBootOnly == true && attestVersion >= 4) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.noAuthRequired == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
list.addAll(
listOf(
DERTaggedObject( DERTaggedObject(
true, true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGIN, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGIN,
ASN1Integer((params.origin ?: 0).toLong()), ASN1Integer(0L),
), ), // KeyOrigin.GENERATED
DERTaggedObject( DERTaggedObject(
true, true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST,
buildRootOfTrust(null), buildRootOfTrust(null),
), ),
) )
)
// Use the same logic as getSimulatedHardwareProperties to conditionally add patch levels. // Use the same logic as getSimulatedHardwareProperties to conditionally add patch levels.
val simulatedProperties = getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid) val simulatedProperties = getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid)
@@ -411,32 +295,20 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
* Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by * Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by
* Keystore. * Keystore.
*/ */
private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList( private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid: Int, securityLevel: Int): DERSequence {
params: KeyMintAttestation, val list =
uid: Int, mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>(
securityLevel: Int, DERTaggedObject(
creationTimeMs: Long = System.currentTimeMillis(), true,
): DERSequence { AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
val list = mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>() ASN1Integer(System.currentTimeMillis()),
),
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
ASN1Integer(creationTimeMs),
)
)
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject( DERTaggedObject(
true, true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
createApplicationId(uid), createApplicationId(uid),
) ),
) )
}
if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) { if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
list.add( list.add(
DERTaggedObject( DERTaggedObject(
@@ -446,34 +318,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
) )
) )
} }
return DERSequence(list.toTypedArray())
params.activeDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.usageCountLimit?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1Integer(it.toLong()))
)
}
if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
return DERSequence(list.sortedBy { (it as DERTaggedObject).tagNo }.toTypedArray())
} }
/** /**
@@ -500,12 +345,7 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
* retrieved. * retrieved.
*/ */
@Throws(Throwable::class) @Throws(Throwable::class)
internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString { private fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
val appUid = uid % 100000
if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
}
val pm = val pm =
ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager() ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
?: throw IllegalStateException("PackageManager not found!") ?: throw IllegalStateException("PackageManager not found!")
@@ -513,11 +353,12 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
pm.getPackagesForUid(uid) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No packages for UID $uid") pm.getPackagesForUid(uid) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No packages for UID $uid")
val sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256") val sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>() val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<DERSequence>()
val signatureDigests = mutableSetOf<Digest>() val signatureDigests = mutableSetOf<Digest>()
val userId = uid / 100000 // Process all packages associated with the UID in a single loop.
packages.forEach { packageName -> packages.forEach { packageName ->
val userId = uid / 100000
val packageInfo = val packageInfo =
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) { if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
pm.getPackageInfo( pm.getPackageInfo(
@@ -530,36 +371,34 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES, userId) pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES, userId)
} }
packageInfoList.add(packageInfo.packageName to packageInfo.longVersionCode) // Add package information (name and version code) to our list.
packageInfoList.add(
DERSequence(
arrayOf(
DEROctetString(packageInfo.packageName.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
ASN1Integer(packageInfo.longVersionCode),
)
)
)
// Collect unique signature digests from the signing history.
packageInfo.signingInfo?.signingCertificateHistory?.forEach { signature -> packageInfo.signingInfo?.signingCertificateHistory?.forEach { signature ->
signatureDigests.add(Digest(sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray()))) val digest = sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())
signatureDigests.add(Digest(digest))
} }
} }
return buildApplicationIdDer(packageInfoList, signatureDigests) // The application ID is a sequence of two sets:
} // 1. A set of package information (name and version).
// 2. A set of SHA-256 digests of the signing certificates.
private fun buildApplicationIdDer(
packages: List<Pair<String, Long>>,
digests: Set<Digest>,
): DEROctetString {
val packageInfoList =
packages.map { (name, version) ->
DERSequence(
arrayOf(
DEROctetString(name.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
ASN1Integer(version),
)
)
}
val applicationIdSequence = val applicationIdSequence =
DERSequence( DERSequence(
arrayOf( arrayOf(
DERSet(packageInfoList.toTypedArray()), DERSet(packageInfoList.toTypedArray()),
DERSet(digests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()), DERSet(signatureDigests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
) )
) )
return DEROctetString(applicationIdSequence.encoded) return DEROctetString(applicationIdSequence.encoded)
} }
} }
@@ -44,11 +44,9 @@ object AttestationConstants {
// --- Key Lifetime and Usage Control --- // --- Key Lifetime and Usage Control ---
const val TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 303 const val TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 303
const val TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = 305
const val TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = 400 const val TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = 400
const val TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 401 const val TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 401
const val TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 402 const val TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 402
const val TAG_MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = 403
const val TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 404 const val TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 404
const val TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = 405 const val TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = 405
@@ -58,10 +56,6 @@ object AttestationConstants {
const val TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 503 const val TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 503
const val TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = 504 const val TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = 504
const val TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 505 const val TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 505
const val TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = 506
const val TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = 507
const val TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = 508
const val TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = 509
// --- Attestation and Application Info --- // --- Attestation and Application Info ---
const val TAG_APPLICATION_ID = 601 const val TAG_APPLICATION_ID = 601
@@ -95,5 +89,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {
// --- Other Constants --- // --- Other Constants ---
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp // https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
} }
@@ -249,10 +249,6 @@ object DeviceAttestationService {
verifiedBootKey = null verifiedBootKey = null
} }
if (verifiedBootHash?.all { it == 0.toByte() } == true) {
verifiedBootHash = null
}
SystemLogger.info( SystemLogger.info(
"Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}" "Successfully extracted attestation data: version=$attestVersion, osVersion=$osVersion, osPatch=$osPatchLevel, vendorPatch=$vendorPatchLevel, bootPatch=$bootPatchLevel, moduleHash=${moduleHash?.toHex()}, bootKey=${verifiedBootKey?.toHex()}, bootHash=${verifiedBootHash?.toHex()}"
) )
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
import android.hardware.security.keymint.* import android.hardware.security.keymint.*
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
import java.math.BigInteger import java.math.BigInteger
import java.util.Date import java.util.Date
import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal import javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
@@ -19,9 +18,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
data class KeyMintAttestation( data class KeyMintAttestation(
val keySize: Int, val keySize: Int,
val algorithm: Int, val algorithm: Int,
val ecCurve: Int?, val ecCurve: Int,
val ecCurveName: String, val ecCurveName: String,
val origin: Int?,
val blockMode: List<Int>, val blockMode: List<Int>,
val padding: List<Int>, val padding: List<Int>,
val purpose: List<Int>, val purpose: List<Int>,
@@ -41,40 +39,21 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
val manufacturer: ByteArray?, val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
val model: ByteArray?, val model: ByteArray?,
val secondImei: ByteArray?, val secondImei: ByteArray?,
val activeDateTime: Date?,
val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
val usageCountLimit: Int?,
val callerNonce: Boolean?,
val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
val earlyBootOnly: Boolean?,
val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
val maxBootLevel: Int?,
val minMacLength: Int?,
val rsaOaepMgfDigest: List<Int>,
) { ) {
/** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */ /** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */
constructor( constructor(
params: Array<KeyParameter> params: Array<KeyParameter>
) : this( ) : this(
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(), // AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: 0,
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)] // AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0, algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)] // AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE), ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE) ?: 0,
ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(), ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
origin = params.findOrigin(Tag.ORIGIN),
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)] // AOSP: [key_param(tag = BLOCK_MODE, field = BlockMode)]
blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE), blockMode = params.findAllBlockMode(Tag.BLOCK_MODE),
@@ -116,31 +95,10 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER), manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL), model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI), secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
earlyBootOnly = params.findBoolean(Tag.EARLY_BOOT_ONLY),
allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
rsaOaepMgfDigest = params.findAllDigests(Tag.RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST),
) { ) {
// Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes. // Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes.
params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) } params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
} }
fun isAttestKey(): Boolean = purpose.size == 1 && purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
fun isImportKey(): Boolean = origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED
} }
// --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays --- // --- Private helper extension functions for parsing KeyParameter arrays ---
@@ -157,10 +115,6 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAlgorithm(tag: Int): Int? =
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findEcCurve(tag: Int): Int? = private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findEcCurve(tag: Int): Int? =
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.ecCurve this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.ecCurve
/** Maps to AOSP field = Origin */
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findOrigin(tag: Int): Int? =
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.origin
/** Maps to AOSP field = LongInteger */ /** Maps to AOSP field = LongInteger */
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findLongInteger(tag: Int): BigInteger? = private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findLongInteger(tag: Int): BigInteger? =
this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.longInteger?.toBigInteger() this.find { it.tag == tag }?.value?.longInteger?.toBigInteger()
@@ -189,21 +143,6 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> = private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest } this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
return when (curveId) {
EcCurve.P_224 -> 224
EcCurve.P_256 -> 256
EcCurve.P_384 -> 384
EcCurve.P_521 -> 521
EcCurve.CURVE_25519 -> 256
else -> 0
}
}
/** /**
* Derives the EC Curve name. Logic: Checks specific EC_CURVE tag first (field=EcCurve), falls back * Derives the EC Curve name. Logic: Checks specific EC_CURVE tag first (field=EcCurve), falls back
* to KEY_SIZE (field=Integer). * to KEY_SIZE (field=Integer).
@@ -327,10 +327,10 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
) )
KeyBoxManager.invalidateCache(path) KeyBoxManager.invalidateCache(path)
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > Build.VERSION_CODES.R) { if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > Build.VERSION_CODES.R) {
// Clear cached keys possibly containing old certificates // Patched chains are stale; generated keys survive rotation
org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor .KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
.clearAllGeneratedKeys("updating $file") .invalidatePatchedChains("keybox change: $path")
} }
} }
} }
@@ -360,29 +360,7 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
return iPackageManager return iPackageManager
} }
fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean { /** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
return try {
val callerCtx =
java.io.File("/proc/$callingPid/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
val selfCtx =
java.io.File("/proc/self/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
android.os.SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess(callerCtx, selfCtx, tclass, perm)
} catch (_: Exception) {
false
}
}
fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
val userId = uid / 100000
return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
try {
getPackageManager()?.checkPermission(permission, pkg, userId) == 0
} catch (_: Exception) {
false
}
}
}
fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> { fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) { return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
try { try {
@@ -293,21 +293,15 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
} }
} }
fun register( /** Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service. */
backdoor: IBinder, fun register(backdoor: IBinder, target: IBinder, interceptor: BinderInterceptor) {
target: IBinder,
interceptor: BinderInterceptor,
filteredCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf(),
) {
val data = Parcel.obtain() val data = Parcel.obtain()
val reply = Parcel.obtain() val reply = Parcel.obtain()
try { try {
data.writeStrongBinder(target) data.writeStrongBinder(target)
data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor) data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor)
data.writeInt(filteredCodes.size)
for (code in filteredCodes) data.writeInt(code)
backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0) backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)") SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target")
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e) SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e)
} finally { } finally {
@@ -68,12 +68,11 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
} }
} }
protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf() /** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) { private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
keystoreService = service keystoreService = service
SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName") SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
register(backdoor, service, this, interceptedCodes) register(backdoor, service, this)
service.linkToDeath(createDeathRecipient(), 0) service.linkToDeath(createDeathRecipient(), 0)
onInterceptorReady(service, backdoor) onInterceptorReady(service, backdoor)
} }
@@ -1,34 +1,17 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import android.os.Parcel import android.os.Parcel
import android.os.Parcelable import android.os.Parcelable
import android.security.KeyStore import android.security.KeyStore
import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse
import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
data class KeyIdentifier(val uid: Int, val alias: String) data class KeyIdentifier(val uid: Int, val alias: String)
/** A collection of utility functions to support binder interception. */ /** A collection of utility functions to support binder interception. */
object InterceptorUtils { object InterceptorUtils {
private const val EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC = -8
fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
writeString(null)
writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
writeInt(errorCode)
}
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
/** /**
* Uses reflection to get the integer transaction code for a given method name from a Stub * Uses reflection to get the integer transaction code for a given method name from a Stub
* class. This is necessary for older Android versions where codes are not public constants. * class. This is necessary for older Android versions where codes are not public constants.
@@ -125,57 +108,6 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
/** Checks if a reply parcel contains an exception without consuming it. */ /** Checks if a reply parcel contains an exception without consuming it. */
fun hasException(reply: Parcel): Boolean { fun hasException(reply: Parcel): Boolean {
val exception = runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull() return runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull() != null
if (exception != null) reply.setDataPosition(0)
return exception != null
}
fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
errorCode: Int
): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
val parcel =
Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeException(android.os.ServiceSpecificException(errorCode))
}
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
fun patchAuthorizations(
authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
callingUid: Int,
): Array<Authorization>? {
if (authorizations == null) return null
val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid)
val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
return authorizations
.map { auth ->
val replacement =
when (auth.keyParameter.tag) {
Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) osPatch else null
Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) vendorPatch
else null
Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) bootPatch else null
else -> null
}
if (replacement != null) {
Authorization().apply {
keyParameter =
KeyParameter().apply {
tag = auth.keyParameter.tag
value = KeyParameterValue.integer(replacement)
}
securityLevel = auth.securityLevel
}
} else {
auth
}
}
.toTypedArray()
} }
} }
@@ -1,39 +1,28 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
import android.annotation.SuppressLint import android.annotation.SuppressLint
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import android.os.Build import android.os.Build
import android.os.IBinder import android.os.IBinder
import android.os.Parcel import android.os.Parcel
import android.system.keystore2.Domain
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
import java.security.SecureRandom
import java.security.cert.Certificate import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.GeneratedKeyPersistence
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim.KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
/**
* Interceptor for the `IKeystoreService` on Android S (API 31) and newer.
*
* This version of Keystore delegates most cryptographic operations to `IKeystoreSecurityLevel`
* sub-services (for TEE, StrongBox, etc.). This interceptor's main role is to set up interceptors
* for those sub-services and to patch certificate chains on their way out.
*/
@SuppressLint("BlockedPrivateApi") @SuppressLint("BlockedPrivateApi")
object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() { object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
private val stubBinderClass = IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java private val stubBinderClass = IKeystoreService.Stub::class.java
// Transaction codes for the IKeystoreService interface methods we are interested in.
private val GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION = private val GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION =
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getKeyEntry") InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getKeyEntry")
private val DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION = private val DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION =
@@ -46,8 +35,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 34) if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 34)
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntriesBatched") InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntriesBatched")
else null else null
private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy { private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
stubBinderClass.declaredFields stubBinderClass.declaredFields
@@ -58,65 +45,33 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] } .associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
} }
private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default" override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
override val processName = "keystore2" override val processName = "keystore2"
override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry" override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry"
override val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
listOfNotNull(
GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION,
DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION,
UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION,
LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
)
.toIntArray()
}
/**
* This method is called once the main service is hooked. It proceeds to find and hook the
* security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
*/
override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) { override fun onInterceptorReady(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service) val keystoreInterface = IKeystoreService.Stub.asInterface(service)
setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor) setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(keystoreInterface, backdoor)
} }
private fun setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(service: IKeystoreService, backdoor: IBinder) { private fun setupSecurityLevelInterceptors(service: IKeystoreService, backdoor: IBinder) {
// Attempt to get and intercept the TEE security level service.
runCatching { runCatching {
service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)?.let { tee -> service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)?.let { tee ->
SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...") SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
val interceptor = val interceptor =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
register( register(backdoor, tee.asBinder(), interceptor)
backdoor,
tee.asBinder(),
interceptor,
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
)
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys() interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
} }
} }
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept TEE SecurityLevel.", it) } .onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to intercept TEE SecurityLevel.", it) }
// Attempt to get and intercept the StrongBox security level service.
runCatching { runCatching {
service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)?.let { strongbox -> service.getSecurityLevel(SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)?.let { strongbox ->
SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...") SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
val interceptor = val interceptor =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
register( register(backdoor, strongbox.asBinder(), interceptor)
backdoor,
strongbox.asBinder(),
interceptor,
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
)
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys() interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
} }
} }
@@ -132,20 +87,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
callingPid: Int, callingPid: Int,
data: Parcel, data: Parcel,
): TransactionResult { ): TransactionResult {
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) { if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true) logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid)
return if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
else TransactionResult.Continue
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString() if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
val isGMS = packages.contains("com.google.android.gms")
if (isGMS || ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid)) {
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
return runCatching { return runCatching {
val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION val isBatchMode = code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION
@@ -180,49 +126,24 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) { SystemLogger.info("Handling ${transactionNames[code]!!} ${descriptor.alias}")
val keyId =
if (descriptor.alias != null) {
KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
} else if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
)?.let { info ->
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
.find { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
?.key
}
} else null
if (keyId != null) {
val isSoftwareKey =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
if (isSoftwareKey) {
deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
)
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
}
}
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
if (descriptor.alias == null) {
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias) val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId) if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
if (response == null) { if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId) != null) {
if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}") SystemLogger.info(
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND) "[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${descriptor.alias}, replying with empty response."
)
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
} }
return TransactionResult.Continue return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
} }
val response =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
?: return TransactionResult.Continue
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId)) if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key") SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
@@ -241,7 +162,6 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
) )
} }
// Let most calls go through to the real service.
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
} }
@@ -259,26 +179,7 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply)) if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) { if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
return runCatching {
val hardwareCount = reply.readInt()
val softwareCount =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys.count {
it.uid == callingUid
}
val totalCount = hardwareCount + softwareCount
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeNoException()
writeInt(totalCount)
}
TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
.getOrElse {
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify getNumberOfEntries.", it)
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid) logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
return runCatching { return runCatching {
@@ -294,142 +195,73 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
} }
} else if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION) { } else if (code == GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR) data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
val keyDescriptor = val keyDescriptor =
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction ?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
logTransaction(
txId,
"post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}",
callingUid,
callingPid,
)
if (!ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid)) if (!ConfigurationManager.shouldPatch(callingUid))
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
runCatching { SystemLogger.info("Handling post-${transactionNames[code]!!} ${keyDescriptor.alias}")
val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!! return try {
val response =
reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
reply.setDataPosition(0) // Reset for potential reuse.
val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
val authorizations = response.metadata?.authorizations
val origin =
authorizations
?.find { it.keyParameter.tag == Tag.ORIGIN }
?.let { it.keyParameter.value.origin }
if (origin == KeyOrigin.IMPORTED || origin == KeyOrigin.SECURELY_IMPORTED) {
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias) val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) { if (retainedChain == null) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.") SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
} }
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
val authorizations = response.metadata.authorizations CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
val parsedParameters =
KeyMintAttestation(
authorizations?.map { it.keyParameter }?.toTypedArray() ?: emptyArray()
)
if (parsedParameters.isImportKey()) {
val retainedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
if (retainedChain == null) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching for imported key (no prior attestation).")
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Imported key overwrote attested alias, serving retained chain for $keyId")
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, retainedChain).getOrThrow()
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
}
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId")
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
SystemLogger.warning(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
)
val keyData =
CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
callingUid,
keyId.alias,
null,
parsedParameters,
response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
) ?: throw Exception("Failed to create overriding attest key pair.")
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(
response.metadata,
keyData.second.toTypedArray(),
)
.getOrThrow()
keyDescriptor.nspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
response.metadata.key.nspace = keyDescriptor.nspace
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[keyId] =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo(
keyData.first,
keyDescriptor.nspace,
response,
parsedParameters,
)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
keyId = keyId,
keyPair = keyData.first,
nspace = keyDescriptor.nspace,
securityLevel = response.metadata.keySecurityLevel,
certChain = keyData.second,
algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
digests = parsedParameters.digest,
isAttestationKey = true,
)
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
}
val originalChain = CertificateHelper.getCertificateChain(response)
if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
)
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
if (cachedChain != null) {
SystemLogger.debug(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Using cached patched certificate chain for $keyId."
)
finalChain = cachedChain
} else {
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
)
finalChain =
AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
}
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
.getOrThrow()
response.metadata.authorizations =
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
response.metadata.authorizations,
callingUid,
)
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response) return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
} }
.onFailure {
SystemLogger.error( if (originalChain == null || originalChain.size < 2) {
"[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify hardware KeyEntryResponse.", SystemLogger.info(
it, "[TX_ID: $txId] Skip patching short certificate chain of length ${originalChain?.size}."
) )
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
} }
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
val cachedChain = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getPatchedChain(keyId)
val finalChain: Array<Certificate>
if (cachedChain != null) {
SystemLogger.debug(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Using cached patched certificate chain for $keyId."
)
finalChain = cachedChain
} else {
// Live patch fallback for keys created before simulator started
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] No cached chain for $keyId. Performing live patch as a fallback."
)
finalChain = AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
}
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain).getOrThrow()
InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to patch certificate chain.", e)
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
} }
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
} }
@@ -437,25 +269,9 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult { private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR) data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR) val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
val generatedKeyInfo = val generatedKeyInfo =
when (descriptor.domain) { KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor?.nspace)
Domain.KEY_ID -> ?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
)
Domain.APP ->
descriptor.alias?.let {
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)]
}
else -> null
}
if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]") SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]")
val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
@@ -407,9 +407,8 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
return KeyMintAttestation( return KeyMintAttestation(
keySize = this.keySize, keySize = this.keySize,
algorithm = this.algorithm, algorithm = this.algorithm,
ecCurve = 0, ecCurve = 0, // Not explicitly available in legacy args, but not critical
ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "", ecCurveName = this.ecCurveName ?: "",
origin = null,
blockMode = listOf<Int>(), blockMode = listOf<Int>(),
padding = listOf<Int>(), padding = listOf<Int>(),
purpose = this.purpose, purpose = this.purpose,
@@ -431,23 +430,6 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
manufacturer = null, manufacturer = null,
model = null, model = null,
secondImei = null, secondImei = null,
activeDateTime = null,
originationExpireDateTime = null,
usageExpireDateTime = null,
usageCountLimit = null,
callerNonce = null,
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
includeUniqueId = null,
rollbackResistance = null,
earlyBootOnly = null,
allowWhileOnBody = null,
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
noAuthRequired = null,
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
maxBootLevel = null,
minMacLength = null,
rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
) )
} }
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
startPastAlias: String?, startPastAlias: String?,
): List<KeyDescriptor> { ): List<KeyDescriptor> {
return KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys return KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys
.filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias > startPastAlias) } .filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias < startPastAlias) }
.map { keyId -> .map { keyId ->
KeyDescriptor().apply { KeyDescriptor().apply {
this.domain = Domain.APP this.domain = Domain.APP
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
object AuthorizeCreate {
fun check(
keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
): Int? {
if (keyParams == null) return null
return checkPurpose(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, rawOpParams)
}
private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val requestedPurpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
if (requestedPurpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY)
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
if (requestedPurpose !in keyParams.purpose)
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
return null
}
private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
return when (keyParams.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> when (purpose) {
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> null
else -> null
}
Algorithm.RSA -> when (purpose) {
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
else -> null
}
else -> null
}
}
private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull()
keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
}
keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
}
}
keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
}
}
return null
}
private fun checkCallerNonce(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?): Int? {
if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
val hasNonce = rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true
if (hasNonce) return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
return null
}
}
@@ -129,7 +129,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias)) val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
if (file.exists()) { if (file.exists()) {
if (file.delete()) { if (file.delete()) {
fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId") SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
} else { } else {
SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}") SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
@@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
if (file.delete()) count++ if (file.delete()) count++
} }
} }
fileLocks.clear()
SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files") SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
}.onFailure { e -> }.onFailure { e ->
SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e) SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e)
@@ -1,18 +1,13 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
import android.hardware.security.keymint.EcCurve
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import android.os.IBinder import android.os.IBinder
import android.os.Parcel import android.os.Parcel
import android.system.keystore2.* import android.system.keystore2.*
import android.util.Pair as AndroidPair
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
import java.security.KeyFactory import java.security.KeyFactory
import java.security.KeyPair import java.security.KeyPair
@@ -21,10 +16,7 @@ import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentLinkedDeque
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationBuilder
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationConstants
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
@@ -32,13 +24,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.InterceptorUtils
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.KeyIdentifier
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertGenConfig
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateGenerator
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidPermissionUtils
class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor( class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
private val original: IKeystoreSecurityLevel, private val original: IKeystoreSecurityLevel,
@@ -49,12 +36,8 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val keyPair: KeyPair, val keyPair: KeyPair,
val nspace: Long, val nspace: Long,
val response: KeyEntryResponse, val response: KeyEntryResponse,
val keyParams: KeyMintAttestation? = null,
) )
private val activeOps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, ConcurrentLinkedDeque<SoftwareOperation>>()
private val recentOps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, ConcurrentLinkedDeque<Long>>()
override fun onPreTransact( override fun onPreTransact(
txId: Long, txId: Long,
target: IBinder, target: IBinder,
@@ -135,7 +118,6 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
GeneratedKeyPersistence.delete(keyId) GeneratedKeyPersistence.delete(keyId)
} }
attestationKeys.remove(keyId) attestationKeys.remove(keyId)
importedKeys.add(keyId)
} else if (code == CREATE_OPERATION_TRANSACTION) { } else if (code == CREATE_OPERATION_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid) logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
@@ -162,7 +144,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val backdoor = getBackdoor(target) val backdoor = getBackdoor(target)
if (backdoor != null) { if (backdoor != null) {
val interceptor = OperationInterceptor(operation, backdoor) val interceptor = OperationInterceptor(operation, backdoor)
register(backdoor, operationBinder, interceptor, OperationInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES) register(backdoor, operationBinder, interceptor)
interceptedOperations[operationBinder] = interceptor interceptedOperations[operationBinder] = interceptor
} else { } else {
SystemLogger.error( SystemLogger.error(
@@ -203,113 +185,41 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
} }
private fun pruneOpsForUid(uid: Int, newOp: SoftwareOperation, maxOps: Int = MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID) {
val ops = activeOps.computeIfAbsent(uid) { ConcurrentLinkedDeque() }
val before = ops.size
ops.removeIf { it.finalized }
val afterClean = ops.size
while (ops.size >= maxOps) {
val oldest = ops.pollFirst() ?: break
if (!oldest.finalized) {
SystemLogger.info("[LRU] Pruning operation for uid=$uid (active=${ops.size}/$maxOps)")
oldest.abort()
}
}
ops.addLast(newOp)
SystemLogger.debug("[LRU] uid=$uid ops: before=$before cleaned=${before - afterClean} active=${ops.size}")
}
private fun trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid: Int, txId: Long): TransactionResult? {
if (securityLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) return null
val timestamps = recentOps.computeIfAbsent(callingUid) { ConcurrentLinkedDeque() }
val cutoff = System.nanoTime() - STRONGBOX_OP_WINDOW_NS
timestamps.removeIf { it < cutoff }
val swOps = activeOps[callingUid]?.count { !it.finalized } ?: 0
if (timestamps.size + swOps >= STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] StrongBox op limit reached for uid=$callingUid (hw=${timestamps.size} sw=$swOps max=$STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS)")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)
}
timestamps.addLast(System.nanoTime())
return null
}
private fun handleCreateOperation( private fun handleCreateOperation(
txId: Long, txId: Long,
callingUid: Int, callingUid: Int,
data: Parcel, data: Parcel,
): TransactionResult { ): TransactionResult {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation parcel: dataSize=${data.dataSize()} dataAvail=${data.dataAvail()} dataPos=${data.dataPosition()}")
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreSecurityLevel.DESCRIPTOR) data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreSecurityLevel.DESCRIPTOR)
val keyDescriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)!! val keyDescriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)!!
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation descriptor: domain=${keyDescriptor.domain} nspace=${keyDescriptor.nspace} alias=${keyDescriptor.alias}") // An operation must use the KEY_ID domain.
if (keyDescriptor.domain != Domain.KEY_ID) {
// Android framework calls createOperation with domain=APP+alias; return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
// keystore2 internally resolves to KEY_ID — but software keys never
// reach keystore2's database, so we must handle both lookup paths.
val generatedKeyInfo = when (keyDescriptor.domain) {
Domain.APP -> {
val alias = keyDescriptor.alias ?: run {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation domain=APP with null alias, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, alias)] ?: run {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation alias=$alias not in generatedKeys, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
}
Domain.KEY_ID -> {
findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, keyDescriptor.nspace) ?: run {
trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid, txId)?.let { return it }
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation KeyId(${keyDescriptor.nspace}) NOT FOUND for uid=$callingUid. Forwarding to HAL.")
return TransactionResult.Continue
}
}
else -> {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation domain=${keyDescriptor.domain}, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
} }
trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid, txId)?.let { return it } val nspace = keyDescriptor.nspace
val generatedKeyInfo = findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, nspace)
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Creating SOFTWARE operation for uid=$callingUid.") if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
SystemLogger.debug(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Operation for unknown/hardware KeyId ($nspace). Forwarding."
)
return TransactionResult.Continue
}
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Creating SOFTWARE operation for KeyId $nspace.")
val params = data.createTypedArray(KeyParameter.CREATOR)!! val params = data.createTypedArray(KeyParameter.CREATOR)!!
val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params).let { p -> val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params)
if (p.algorithm != 0) p
else p.copy(algorithm = when (generatedKeyInfo.keyPair.private.algorithm) {
"EC", "ECDSA" -> Algorithm.EC
"RSA" -> Algorithm.RSA
else -> p.algorithm
})
}
AuthorizeCreate.check(generatedKeyInfo.keyParams, parsedParams, params)?.let { errorCode -> val softwareOperation = SoftwareOperation(txId, generatedKeyInfo.keyPair, parsedParams)
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] authorize_create rejected: errorCode=$errorCode")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(errorCode)
}
val opLatency = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_OP_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS else 0L
val softwareOperation = SoftwareOperation(txId, generatedKeyInfo.keyPair, parsedParams, opLatency)
val maxOps = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS else MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID
pruneOpsForUid(callingUid, softwareOperation, maxOps)
val operationBinder = SoftwareOperationBinder(softwareOperation) val operationBinder = SoftwareOperationBinder(softwareOperation)
val response = val response =
CreateOperationResponse().apply { CreateOperationResponse().apply {
iOperation = operationBinder iOperation = operationBinder
operationChallenge = null operationChallenge = null
softwareOperation.iv?.let { iv ->
parameters = KeyParameters().apply {
keyParameter = arrayOf(
KeyParameter().apply {
tag = Tag.NONCE
value = KeyParameterValue.blob(iv)
}
)
}
}
} }
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response) return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
@@ -331,52 +241,10 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
) )
val params = data.createTypedArray(KeyParameter.CREATOR)!! val params = data.createTypedArray(KeyParameter.CREATOR)!!
val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params) val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params)
val challenge = parsedParams.attestationChallenge
if (challenge != null && challenge.size > AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting oversized attestation challenge: ${challenge.size} bytes (max ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH)
}
if (params.any { it.tag == Tag.CREATION_DATETIME }) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting CREATION_DATETIME in generateKey params")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_INVALID_ARGUMENT)
}
if (params.any { it.tag == Tag.DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION } && !AndroidPermissionUtils.hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(callingUid)) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION for uid=$callingUid")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
}
val hasDeviceIdAttestation = params.any {
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MEID ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL ||
it.tag == Tag.DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI
}
if(hasDeviceIdAttestation && !AndroidPermissionUtils.hasDeviceAttestationPermission(callingUid)) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting DEVICE_ID_ATTESTATION for uid=$callingUid")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
}
val isSymmetric = parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.AES ||
parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.HMAC ||
parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.TRIPLE_DES
if (isSymmetric) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Symmetric algorithm ${parsedParams.algorithm} → forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX && !isStrongBoxCapable(parsedParams)) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] StrongBox-unsupported params (algo=${parsedParams.algorithm} size=${parsedParams.keySize}) → forwarding to HAL for rejection")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias) val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
val isAttestKeyRequest = parsedParams.isAttestKey() val isAttestKeyRequest =
parsedParams.purpose.size == 1 &&
parsedParams.purpose.contains(KeyPurpose.ATTEST_KEY)
val needsSoftwareGeneration = val needsSoftwareGeneration =
ConfigurationManager.shouldGenerate(callingUid) || ConfigurationManager.shouldGenerate(callingUid) ||
@@ -425,24 +293,16 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
keyId: KeyIdentifier, keyId: KeyIdentifier,
isAttestKeyRequest: Boolean, isAttestKeyRequest: Boolean,
): TransactionResult { ): TransactionResult {
val startNs = System.nanoTime()
keyDescriptor.nspace = secureRandom.nextLong() keyDescriptor.nspace = secureRandom.nextLong()
SystemLogger.info("Generating software key for ${keyDescriptor.alias}[${keyDescriptor.nspace}].") SystemLogger.info("Generating software key for ${keyDescriptor.alias}[${keyDescriptor.nspace}].")
val keyData = if (NativeCertGen.isAvailable && attestationKey == null) { val keyData = CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
generateAttestedKeyPairNative(callingUid, parsedParams) callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias, attestationKey?.alias, parsedParams, securityLevel,
?: CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair( ) ?: throw Exception("CertificateGenerator failed to create key pair.")
callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias, attestationKey?.alias, parsedParams, securityLevel,
)
} else {
CertificateGenerator.generateAttestedKeyPair(
callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias, attestationKey?.alias, parsedParams, securityLevel,
)
} ?: throw Exception("Both native and BouncyCastle cert gen failed.")
cleanupKeyData(keyId) cleanupKeyData(keyId)
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(callingUid, keyData.second, parsedParams, keyDescriptor) val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(keyData.second, parsedParams, keyDescriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyData.first, keyDescriptor.nspace, response, parsedParams) generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyData.first, keyDescriptor.nspace, response)
if (isAttestKeyRequest) attestationKeys.add(keyId) if (isAttestKeyRequest) attestationKeys.add(keyId)
GeneratedKeyPersistence.save( GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
@@ -453,108 +313,26 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
certChain = keyData.second.toList(), certChain = keyData.second.toList(),
algorithm = parsedParams.algorithm, algorithm = parsedParams.algorithm,
keySize = parsedParams.keySize, keySize = parsedParams.keySize,
ecCurve = parsedParams.ecCurve ?: 0, ecCurve = parsedParams.ecCurve,
purposes = parsedParams.purpose, purposes = parsedParams.purpose,
digests = parsedParams.digest, digests = parsedParams.digest,
isAttestationKey = isAttestKeyRequest, isAttestationKey = isAttestKeyRequest,
) )
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
val floor = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_KEYGEN_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS else TEE_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS
val delayMs = floor - elapsedMs
if (delayMs > 0) Thread.sleep(delayMs)
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response.metadata) return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response.metadata)
} }
private fun generateAttestedKeyPairNative(
callingUid: Int,
params: KeyMintAttestation,
): AndroidPair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
return runCatching {
val algorithmName = when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> "EC"
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
else -> return null
}
val keyboxFile = ConfigurationManager.getKeyboxFileForUid(callingUid)
val keybox = KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName) ?: return null
val keyboxPrivateKeyBytes = keybox.keyPair.private.encoded
val keyboxCertChainBytes = keybox.certificates
.map { it.encoded }
.fold(ByteArray(0)) { acc, der -> acc + der }
val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
val keymasterVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel)
val appId = AttestationBuilder.createApplicationId(callingUid)
val config = CertGenConfig(
algorithm = params.algorithm,
keySize = params.keySize,
ecCurve = params.ecCurve ?: 0,
rsaPublicExponent = params.rsaPublicExponent?.toLong() ?: 65537L,
attestationChallenge = params.attestationChallenge,
purposes = params.purpose.toIntArray(),
digests = params.digest.toIntArray(),
certSerial = params.certificateSerial?.toByteArray(),
certSubject = params.certificateSubject?.encoded,
certNotBefore = params.certificateNotBefore?.time ?: -1L,
certNotAfter = params.certificateNotAfter?.time ?: -1L,
keyboxPrivateKey = keyboxPrivateKeyBytes,
keyboxCertChain = keyboxCertChainBytes,
securityLevel = securityLevel,
attestVersion = attestVersion,
keymasterVersion = keymasterVersion,
osVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.osVersion,
osPatchLevel = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid),
vendorPatchLevel = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid),
bootPatchLevel = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid),
bootKey = AndroidDeviceUtils.bootKey,
bootHash = AndroidDeviceUtils.bootHash,
creationDatetime = System.currentTimeMillis(),
attestationApplicationId = appId.octets,
moduleHash = if (attestVersion >= 400) AndroidDeviceUtils.moduleHash else null,
idBrand = params.brand,
idDevice = params.device,
idProduct = params.product,
idSerial = params.serial,
idImei = params.imei,
idMeid = params.meid,
idManufacturer = params.manufacturer,
idModel = params.model,
idSecondImei = if (attestVersion >= 300) params.secondImei else null,
)
val resultBytes = NativeCertGen.generateAttestedKeyPair(config) ?: return null
val (keyPair, certs) = NativeCertGen.parseNativeResult(resultBytes)
SystemLogger.info("NativeCertGen: generated key pair successfully (${certs.size} certs)")
AndroidPair(keyPair, certs)
}.onFailure {
SystemLogger.error("NativeCertGen: generation failed, falling back to BouncyCastle", it)
}.getOrNull()
}
private fun buildKeyEntryResponse( private fun buildKeyEntryResponse(
callingUid: Int,
chain: List<Certificate>, chain: List<Certificate>,
params: KeyMintAttestation, params: KeyMintAttestation,
descriptor: KeyDescriptor, descriptor: KeyDescriptor,
): KeyEntryResponse { ): KeyEntryResponse {
val normalizedKeyDescriptor =
KeyDescriptor().apply {
domain = Domain.KEY_ID
nspace = descriptor.nspace
alias = null
blob = null
}
val metadata = val metadata =
KeyMetadata().apply { KeyMetadata().apply {
keySecurityLevel = securityLevel keySecurityLevel = securityLevel
key = normalizedKeyDescriptor key = descriptor
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(this, chain.toTypedArray()).getOrThrow() CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(this, chain.toTypedArray()).getOrThrow()
authorizations = params.toAuthorizations(callingUid, securityLevel) authorizations = params.toAuthorizations(securityLevel)
modificationTimeMs = System.currentTimeMillis()
} }
return KeyEntryResponse().apply { return KeyEntryResponse().apply {
this.metadata = metadata this.metadata = metadata
@@ -609,7 +387,6 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
algorithm = record.algorithm, algorithm = record.algorithm,
ecCurve = record.ecCurve, ecCurve = record.ecCurve,
ecCurveName = "", ecCurveName = "",
origin = null,
blockMode = emptyList(), blockMode = emptyList(),
padding = emptyList(), padding = emptyList(),
purpose = record.purposes, purpose = record.purposes,
@@ -629,27 +406,10 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
manufacturer = null, manufacturer = null,
model = null, model = null,
secondImei = null, secondImei = null,
activeDateTime = null,
originationExpireDateTime = null,
usageExpireDateTime = null,
usageCountLimit = null,
callerNonce = null,
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
includeUniqueId = null,
rollbackResistance = null,
earlyBootOnly = null,
allowWhileOnBody = null,
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
noAuthRequired = null,
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
maxBootLevel = null,
minMacLength = null,
rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
) )
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(record.uid, certChain, attestation, descriptor) val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(certChain, attestation, descriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyPair, record.nspace, response, attestation) generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyPair, record.nspace, response)
if (record.isAttestationKey) attestationKeys.add(keyId) if (record.isAttestationKey) attestationKeys.add(keyId)
SystemLogger.debug("Restored persisted key: $keyId") SystemLogger.debug("Restored persisted key: $keyId")
@@ -667,30 +427,15 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
// Maximum alias length to prevent binder buffer exhaustion (Issue #109) // Maximum alias length to prevent binder buffer exhaustion (Issue #109)
// Binder buffer is ~1MB; 256KB provides 4x safety margin for transaction overhead // Binder buffer is ~1MB; 256KB provides 4x safety margin for transaction overhead
private const val MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH = 256 * 1024 private const val MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH = 256 * 1024
private const val KEYMINT_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH = -21
private const val RESPONSE_INVALID_ARGUMENT = 20
private const val TEE_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 15L
private const val STRONGBOX_KEYGEN_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 250L
private const val STRONGBOX_OP_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 80L
private const val KEYMINT_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS = -29
private const val KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66
private const val MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID = 15
private const val STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS = 4
private const val STRONGBOX_OP_WINDOW_NS = 10_000_000_000L // 10s
private const val MAX_CONCURRENT_HW_KEYGEN_PER_UID = 2 private const val MAX_CONCURRENT_HW_KEYGEN_PER_UID = 2
// Sliding window: max hardware keygen permits per UID within the burst window // Sliding window: max hardware keygen permits per UID within the burst window
private const val MAX_HW_KEYGEN_PER_WINDOW = 2 private const val MAX_HW_KEYGEN_PER_WINDOW = 2
private const val BURST_WINDOW_MS = 30_000L private const val BURST_WINDOW_MS = 30_000L
private val uidHardwareKeygenCount = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, AtomicInteger>() private val uidHardwareKeygenCount = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, AtomicInteger>()
private val hardwareKeygenTxIds = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<Long>() private val hardwareKeygenTxIds = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<Long>()
private val uidKeygenTimestamps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, MutableList<Long>>() private val uidKeygenTimestamps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, MutableList<Long>>()
private fun isStrongBoxCapable(params: KeyMintAttestation): Boolean = when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.RSA -> params.keySize <= 2048
Algorithm.EC -> params.ecCurve == null || params.ecCurve == EcCurve.P_256
else -> true
}
private fun hardwareKeygenCount(uid: Int): AtomicInteger = private fun hardwareKeygenCount(uid: Int): AtomicInteger =
uidHardwareKeygenCount.computeIfAbsent(uid) { AtomicInteger(0) } uidHardwareKeygenCount.computeIfAbsent(uid) { AtomicInteger(0) }
@@ -699,10 +444,6 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val timestamps = uidKeygenTimestamps.computeIfAbsent(uid) { mutableListOf() } val timestamps = uidKeygenTimestamps.computeIfAbsent(uid) { mutableListOf() }
synchronized(timestamps) { synchronized(timestamps) {
timestamps.removeAll { now - it > BURST_WINDOW_MS } timestamps.removeAll { now - it > BURST_WINDOW_MS }
if (timestamps.isEmpty()) {
uidKeygenTimestamps.remove(uid, timestamps)
uidHardwareKeygenCount.remove(uid)
}
return timestamps.size return timestamps.size
} }
} }
@@ -724,9 +465,6 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
"createOperation", "createOperation",
) )
val INTERCEPTED_CODES =
intArrayOf(GENERATE_KEY_TRANSACTION, IMPORT_KEY_TRANSACTION, CREATE_OPERATION_TRANSACTION)
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy { private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub::class IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub::class
.java .java
@@ -739,9 +477,9 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
} }
val generatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, GeneratedKeyInfo>() val generatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, GeneratedKeyInfo>()
val patchedChains = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, Array<Certificate>>() // Caches patched chains to prevent re-generation and signature inconsistencies
val attestationKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet() private val patchedChains = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, Array<Certificate>>()
val importedKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet() private val attestationKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
private val interceptedOperations = ConcurrentHashMap<IBinder, OperationInterceptor>() private val interceptedOperations = ConcurrentHashMap<IBinder, OperationInterceptor>()
fun getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId: KeyIdentifier): KeyEntryResponse? = fun getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId: KeyIdentifier): KeyEntryResponse? =
@@ -770,7 +508,6 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
if (attestationKeys.remove(keyId)) { if (attestationKeys.remove(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.debug("Remove cached attestaion key ${keyId}") SystemLogger.debug("Remove cached attestaion key ${keyId}")
} }
importedKeys.remove(keyId)
} }
fun removeOperationInterceptor(operationBinder: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) { fun removeOperationInterceptor(operationBinder: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
@@ -795,17 +532,13 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
generatedKeys.clear() generatedKeys.clear()
patchedChains.clear() patchedChains.clear()
attestationKeys.clear() attestationKeys.clear()
importedKeys.clear()
GeneratedKeyPersistence.deleteAll() GeneratedKeyPersistence.deleteAll()
SystemLogger.info("Cleared all cached keys ($count entries)$reasonMessage.") SystemLogger.info("Cleared all cached keys ($count entries)$reasonMessage.")
} }
} }
} }
private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations( private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations(securityLevel: Int): Array<Authorization> {
callingUid: Int,
securityLevel: Int,
): Array<Authorization> {
val authList = mutableListOf<Authorization>() val authList = mutableListOf<Authorization>()
fun createAuth(tag: Int, value: KeyParameterValue): Authorization { fun createAuth(tag: Int, value: KeyParameterValue): Authorization {
@@ -820,45 +553,13 @@ private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations(
} }
} }
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.ALGORITHM, KeyParameterValue.algorithm(this.algorithm)))
if (this.ecCurve != null) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.EC_CURVE, KeyParameterValue.ecCurve(this.ecCurve)))
}
this.purpose.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PURPOSE, KeyParameterValue.keyPurpose(it))) } this.purpose.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PURPOSE, KeyParameterValue.keyPurpose(it))) }
this.blockMode.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.BLOCK_MODE, KeyParameterValue.blockMode(it))) }
this.digest.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.DIGEST, KeyParameterValue.digest(it))) } this.digest.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.DIGEST, KeyParameterValue.digest(it))) }
this.padding.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PADDING, KeyParameterValue.paddingMode(it))) }
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.KEY_SIZE, KeyParameterValue.integer(this.keySize)))
if (this.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, KeyParameterValue.longInteger(this.rsaPublicExponent.toLong())))
}
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, KeyParameterValue.boolValue(true)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.ORIGIN, KeyParameterValue.origin(this.origin ?: KeyOrigin.GENERATED)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.OS_VERSION, KeyParameterValue.integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.osVersion)))
val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid) authList.add(createAuth(Tag.ALGORITHM, KeyParameterValue.algorithm(this.algorithm)))
if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.KEY_SIZE, KeyParameterValue.integer(this.keySize)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(osPatch))) authList.add(createAuth(Tag.EC_CURVE, KeyParameterValue.ecCurve(this.ecCurve)))
} authList.add(createAuth(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, KeyParameterValue.boolValue(true)))
val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(vendorPatch)))
}
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(bootPatch)))
}
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.CREATION_DATETIME, KeyParameterValue.dateTime(System.currentTimeMillis())))
authList.add(
Authorization().apply {
this.keyParameter =
KeyParameter().apply {
this.tag = Tag.USER_ID
this.value = KeyParameterValue.integer(callingUid / 100000)
}
this.securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE
}
)
return authList.toTypedArray() return authList.toTypedArray()
} }
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
private val ABORT_TRANSACTION = private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort") InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy { private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class
.java .java
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
import android.os.ServiceSpecificException import android.os.RemoteException
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
import java.security.KeyPair import java.security.KeyPair
import java.security.Signature import java.security.Signature
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive { private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
}
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
fun abort() fun abort()
fun getIv(): ByteArray? = null
} }
// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
private object JcaAlgorithmMapper { private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String { fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
val digest = val digest =
@@ -34,18 +34,16 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512" Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
else -> "NONE" else -> "NONE"
} }
return when (params.algorithm) { val keyAlgo =
Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA" when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.RSA -> { Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA" else ->
throw IllegalArgumentException(
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
)
} }
else -> return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
throw ServiceSpecificException(
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
)
}
} }
fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String { fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
@@ -54,32 +52,30 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA" Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
Algorithm.AES -> "AES" Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
else -> else ->
throw ServiceSpecificException( throw IllegalArgumentException(
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm, "Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
) )
} }
val blockMode = val blockMode =
when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) { when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB" BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC" BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM" BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
else -> "ECB" else -> "ECB" // Default for RSA
} }
val padding = val padding =
when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) { when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding" PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding" PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding" PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding" PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
else -> "NoPadding" else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
} }
return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding" return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
} }
} }
// Concrete implementation for Signing.
private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive { private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val signature: Signature = private val signature: Signature =
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply { Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
@@ -99,6 +95,7 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
override fun abort() {} override fun abort() {}
} }
// Concrete implementation for Verification.
private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive { private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val signature: Signature = private val signature: Signature =
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply { Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
@@ -112,60 +109,50 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? { override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
if (data != null) update(data) if (data != null) update(data)
if (signature == null) { if (signature == null) throw SignatureException("Signature to verify is null")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature to verify is null")
}
if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) { if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature verification failed") // Throwing an exception is how Keystore signals verification failure.
throw SignatureException("Signature verification failed")
} }
// A successful verification returns no data.
return null return null
} }
override fun abort() {} override fun abort() {}
} }
// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
private class CipherPrimitive( private class CipherPrimitive(
keyPair: KeyPair, keyPair: KeyPair,
params: KeyMintAttestation, params: KeyMintAttestation,
private val opMode: Int, private val opMode: Int,
) : CryptoPrimitive { ) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
private val cipher: Cipher = private val cipher: Cipher =
Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply { Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
val key = if (opMode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) keyPair.public else keyPair.private val key = if (opMode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) keyPair.public else keyPair.private
init(opMode, key) init(opMode, key)
} }
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
}
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
if (data != null) cipher.update(data) else null if (data != null) cipher.update(data) else null
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? = override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal() if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
override fun getIv(): ByteArray? = if (isAead) cipher.iv else null
override fun abort() {} override fun abort() {}
} }
class SoftwareOperation( /**
private val txId: Long, * A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
keyPair: KeyPair, * delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
params: KeyMintAttestation, */
private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L, class SoftwareOperation(private val txId: Long, keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) {
) { // This now holds the specific strategy object (Signer, Verifier, etc.)
private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
@Volatile var finalized = false
private set
val iv: ByteArray?
get() = primitive.getIv()
init { init {
// The "Strategy" pattern: choose the implementation based on the purpose.
// For simplicity, we only consider the first purpose listed.
val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull() val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN" val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.") SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
@@ -177,174 +164,52 @@ class SoftwareOperation(
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE) KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
else -> else ->
throw ServiceSpecificException( throw UnsupportedOperationException("Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose")
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
"Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
)
} }
} }
private fun checkActive() {
if (finalized) {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
}
}
private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
}
}
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}")
checkActive()
checkInputLength(aadInput)
primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
}
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? { fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
checkActive()
checkInputLength(data)
try { try {
return primitive.update(data) return primitive.update(data)
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e) SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e) throw e
} }
} }
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? { fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
checkActive()
checkInputLength(data)
try { try {
val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
val result = primitive.finish(data, signature) val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
if (delayMs > 0) Thread.sleep(delayMs)
}
finalized = true
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.") SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
return result return result
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e) SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e) // Re-throw the exception so the binder can report it to the client.
throw e
} }
} }
fun abort() { fun abort() {
finalized = true
primitive.abort() primitive.abort()
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.") SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
} }
private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
}
companion object {
private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
}
}
internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
}
val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
}
val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
}
val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
}
val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
}
val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
}
val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
}
val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
}
val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
}
val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
}
val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
}
val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
}
val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
}
val unknownError: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
}
fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
runCatching {
Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null)
}.getOrElse {
SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
fallback
}
} }
/** The Binder interface for our [SoftwareOperation]. */
class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) : class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
IKeystoreOperation.Stub() { IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
@Synchronized @Throws(RemoteException::class)
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
operation.updateAad(aadInput)
}
@Synchronized
override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? { override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
return operation.update(input) return operation.update(input)
} }
@Synchronized @Throws(RemoteException::class)
override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? { override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
return operation.finish(input, signature) return operation.finish(input, signature)
} }
@Synchronized @Throws(RemoteException::class)
override fun abort() { override fun abort() {
operation.abort() operation.abort()
} }
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ object SystemLogger {
* @param message The message to log. * @param message The message to log.
*/ */
fun debug(message: String) { fun debug(message: String) {
if (!isDebugBuild) return
Log.d(TAG, message) Log.d(TAG, message)
} }
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import java.math.BigInteger
import java.security.KeyPair import java.security.KeyPair
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
import java.security.cert.Certificate import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
import java.util.Date import java.util.Date
@@ -35,8 +36,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
*/ */
object CertificateGenerator { object CertificateGenerator {
private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
/** /**
* Generates a software-based cryptographic key pair. * Generates a software-based cryptographic key pair.
* *
@@ -50,10 +49,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
Algorithm.EC -> "EC" to ECGenParameterSpec(params.ecCurveName) Algorithm.EC -> "EC" to ECGenParameterSpec(params.ecCurveName)
Algorithm.RSA -> Algorithm.RSA ->
"RSA" to "RSA" to
RSAKeyGenParameterSpec( RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(params.keySize, params.rsaPublicExponent)
params.keySize,
params.rsaPublicExponent ?: RSAKeyGenParameterSpec.F4,
)
else -> else ->
throw IllegalArgumentException( throw IllegalArgumentException(
"Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}" "Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
@@ -92,9 +88,11 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
"Attestation challenge exceeds length limit (${challenge.size} > ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})" "Attestation challenge exceeds length limit (${challenge.size} > ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})"
) )
return try { return runCatching {
val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm) val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
// Determine the signing key and issuer. If an attestKey is provided, use it.
// Otherwise, fall back to the root key from the keybox.
val (signingKey, issuer) = val (signingKey, issuer) =
if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) { if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second } getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
@@ -103,20 +101,20 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox) keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
} }
// Build the new leaf certificate with the simulated attestation.
val leafCert = val leafCert =
buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel) buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
// If not self-attesting, the chain is just the leaf. Otherwise, append the keybox
// chain.
if (attestKeyAlias != null) { if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
listOf(leafCert) listOf(leafCert)
} else { } else {
listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
} }
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
null
} }
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", it) }
.getOrNull()
} }
/** /**
@@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
params: KeyMintAttestation, params: KeyMintAttestation,
securityLevel: Int, securityLevel: Int,
): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? { ): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
return try { return runCatching {
SystemLogger.info( SystemLogger.info(
"Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)" "Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
) )
@@ -146,12 +144,11 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
"Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'." "Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'."
) )
Pair(newKeyPair, chain) Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
null
} }
.onFailure {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", it)
}
.getOrNull()
} }
fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) = fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
@@ -166,10 +163,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm") else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm")
} }
return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName) return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException( ?: throw Exception("Could not load keybox for UID $uid and algorithm $algorithmName")
-75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
"No attestation key for algorithm $algorithmName in $keyboxFile",
)
} }
/** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */ /** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */
@@ -219,16 +213,17 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
uid: Int, uid: Int,
securityLevel: Int, securityLevel: Int,
): Certificate { ): Certificate {
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key") val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android KeyStore Key")
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0) val leafNotAfter =
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER) (signingKeyPair.public as? X509Certificate)?.notAfter
?: Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 31536000000L)
val builder = val builder =
JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder( JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
issuer, issuer,
params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE, params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
notBefore, params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(),
notAfter, params.certificateNotAfter ?: leafNotAfter,
subject, subject,
subjectKeyPair.public, subjectKeyPair.public,
) )
@@ -244,10 +239,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
) )
val signerAlgorithm = val signerAlgorithm =
when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) { when (params.algorithm) {
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA" Algorithm.EC -> "SHA256withECDSA"
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA" Algorithm.RSA -> "SHA256withRSA"
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}") else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}")
} }
val contentSigner = val contentSigner =
JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm) JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
import java.nio.ByteOrder
import java.security.KeyFactory
import java.security.KeyPair
import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
data class CertGenConfig(
val algorithm: Int,
val keySize: Int,
val ecCurve: Int,
val rsaPublicExponent: Long,
val attestationChallenge: ByteArray?,
val purposes: IntArray,
val digests: IntArray,
val certSerial: ByteArray?,
val certSubject: ByteArray?,
val certNotBefore: Long,
val certNotAfter: Long,
val keyboxPrivateKey: ByteArray,
val keyboxCertChain: ByteArray,
val securityLevel: Int,
val attestVersion: Int,
val keymasterVersion: Int,
val osVersion: Int,
val osPatchLevel: Int,
val vendorPatchLevel: Int,
val bootPatchLevel: Int,
val bootKey: ByteArray,
val bootHash: ByteArray,
val creationDatetime: Long,
val attestationApplicationId: ByteArray,
val moduleHash: ByteArray?,
val idBrand: ByteArray?,
val idDevice: ByteArray?,
val idProduct: ByteArray?,
val idSerial: ByteArray?,
val idImei: ByteArray?,
val idMeid: ByteArray?,
val idManufacturer: ByteArray?,
val idModel: ByteArray?,
val idSecondImei: ByteArray?,
)
object NativeCertGen {
private const val LOG_DIR = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs"
@Volatile
var isAvailable: Boolean = false
private set
fun initialize(libraryPath: String) {
try {
System.load(libraryPath)
initLogging(false, LOG_DIR)
isAvailable = true
SystemLogger.info("NativeCertGen: loaded libcertgen.so successfully")
} catch (e: UnsatisfiedLinkError) {
SystemLogger.error("NativeCertGen: failed to load libcertgen.so, falling back to BouncyCastle", e)
}
}
external fun generateAttestedKeyPair(config: CertGenConfig): ByteArray?
private external fun initLogging(verbose: Boolean, logDir: String): Boolean
private external fun dumpLogs(): String?
fun dump(): String? = if (isAvailable) dumpLogs() else null
fun parseNativeResult(bytes: ByteArray): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>> {
val buf = ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes).order(ByteOrder.BIG_ENDIAN)
val pkLen = buf.getInt()
if (pkLen < 0 || pkLen > buf.remaining()) {
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid private key length: $pkLen")
}
val pkBytes = ByteArray(pkLen)
buf.get(pkBytes)
val numCerts = buf.getInt()
if (numCerts < 0 || numCerts > buf.remaining()) {
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert count: $numCerts")
}
val certs = mutableListOf<Certificate>()
val certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509")
repeat(numCerts) {
val certLen = buf.getInt()
if (certLen < 0 || certLen > buf.remaining()) {
throw IllegalStateException("Invalid cert length: $certLen")
}
val certBytes = ByteArray(certLen)
buf.get(certBytes)
certs.add(certFactory.generateCertificate(ByteArrayInputStream(certBytes)))
}
if (certs.isEmpty()) {
throw IllegalStateException("No certificates in native result")
}
val algorithmName = when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "EC"
"RSA" -> "RSA"
else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
}
val keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance(algorithmName)
val privateKey = keyFactory.generatePrivate(PKCS8EncodedKeySpec(pkBytes))
val publicKey = certs[0].publicKey
return Pair(KeyPair(publicKey, privateKey), certs)
}
}
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
import android.os.Build import android.os.Build
import android.os.SystemProperties import android.os.SystemProperties
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
import java.io.File
import java.io.FileInputStream
import java.security.MessageDigest import java.security.MessageDigest
import java.time.LocalDate import java.time.LocalDate
import java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom import java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
@@ -13,6 +11,7 @@ import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1EncodableVector
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Integer
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DEROctetString
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSequence
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.DERSet
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.DeviceAttestationService
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
@@ -91,33 +90,27 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?, attestationValueProvider: () -> ByteArray?,
expectedSize: Int, expectedSize: Int,
): ByteArray { ): ByteArray {
// 1. Attempt to get the value from the system property.
getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let { getProperty(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let {
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}") SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from system property: ${it.toHex()}")
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
return it return it
} }
// 2. Fallback to the value from a cached TEE attestation.
try { try {
attestationValueProvider()?.let { attestationValueProvider()?.let {
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}") SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from TEE attestation: ${it.toHex()}")
setProperty(propertyName, it) setProperty(propertyName, it) // Persist for consistency
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
return it return it
} }
} catch (e: Exception) { } catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e) SystemLogger.error("Failed to get $propertyName from attestation.", e)
} }
readFromFile(propertyName, expectedSize)?.let { // 3. As a final fallback, generate a random value.
SystemLogger.debug("Using $propertyName from persistent file: ${it.toHex()}")
setProperty(propertyName, it)
return it
}
return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also { return generateRandomBytes(expectedSize).also {
SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}") SystemLogger.debug("Using randomly generated $propertyName: ${it.toHex()}")
setProperty(propertyName, it) setProperty(propertyName, it)
persistToFile(propertyName, it)
} }
} }
@@ -164,37 +157,10 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
} }
} }
/** Generates a cryptographically random byte array of a specified length. */
private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray = private fun generateRandomBytes(size: Int): ByteArray =
ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) } ByteArray(size).also { ThreadLocalRandom.current().nextBytes(it) }
private val PERSIST_DIR = File("/data/adb/tricky_store")
private fun fileForProperty(propertyName: String): File = when (propertyName) {
"ro.boot.vbmeta.digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_hash.bin")
"ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest" -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "boot_key.bin")
else -> File(PERSIST_DIR, "${propertyName.replace('.', '_')}.bin")
}
private fun persistToFile(propertyName: String, bytes: ByteArray) {
try {
fileForProperty(propertyName).writeBytes(bytes)
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to persist $propertyName to file.", e)
}
}
private fun readFromFile(propertyName: String, expectedSize: Int): ByteArray? {
return try {
val file = fileForProperty(propertyName)
if (!file.exists()) return null
val bytes = file.readBytes()
if (bytes.size == expectedSize) bytes else null
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to read $propertyName from file.", e)
null
}
}
// --- Patch Level Properties --- // --- Patch Level Properties ---
fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int { fun getPatchLevel(uid: Int): Int {
@@ -405,174 +371,52 @@ object AndroidDeviceUtils {
// --- APEX and Module Hash Properties --- // --- APEX and Module Hash Properties ---
// Minimal protobuf parser for apex_manifest.pb (field 1: name, field 2: version)
private class MinimalApexManifestParser(private val data: ByteArray) {
var pos = 0
fun parse(): Pair<String, Long>? {
var name: String? = null
var version: Long? = null
while (pos < data.size) {
val tag = readVarint()
val fieldNum = tag ushr 3
val wireType = (tag and 0x07).toInt()
when (fieldNum) {
1L -> {
val length = readVarint().toInt()
if (pos + length > data.size) return null
name = String(data, pos, length, Charsets.UTF_8)
pos += length
}
2L -> {
version = readVarint()
}
else -> skipField(wireType)
}
}
return if (name != null && version != null) {
name to version
} else {
null
}
}
private fun readVarint(): Long {
var value = 0L
var shift = 0
while (pos < data.size) {
val b = data[pos++].toInt()
value = value or ((b and 0x7F).toLong() shl shift)
if ((b and 0x80) == 0) return value
shift += 7
}
return value
}
private fun skipField(wireType: Int) {
when (wireType) {
0 -> readVarint()
1 -> pos += 8
2 -> {
val len = readVarint().toInt()
pos += len
}
5 -> pos += 4
else -> throw IllegalStateException("Unknown wire type $wireType")
}
}
}
private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy { private val apexInfos: List<Pair<String, Long>> by lazy {
val results = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>() runCatching {
val apexRoot = File("/apex") val pm = ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
val packages =
if (!apexRoot.exists() || !apexRoot.isDirectory) { if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
return@lazy emptyList() pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX.toLong(), 0)
} } else {
@Suppress("DEPRECATION")
apexRoot.listFiles()?.forEach { file -> pm?.getInstalledPackages(PackageManager.MATCH_APEX, 0)
if (!file.isDirectory) return@forEach }
val name = file.name packages?.list.orEmpty().map { it.packageName to it.longVersionCode }
}
if (name.startsWith(".")) return@forEach .getOrElse {
if (name.contains("@")) return@forEach SystemLogger.error("Failed to get APEX package information.", it)
if (name == "sharedlibs") return@forEach emptyList()
val manifestFile = File(file, "apex_manifest.pb")
if (manifestFile.exists()) {
runCatching {
val bytes = FileInputStream(manifestFile).use { it.readBytes() }
val parser = MinimalApexManifestParser(bytes)
parser.parse()?.let { (pkgName, version) -> results.add(pkgName to version) }
}
} }
}
results.distinctBy { it.first }
} }
val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy { val moduleHash: ByteArray by lazy {
DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash DeviceAttestationService.CachedAttestationData?.moduleHash
?: runCatching { ?: runCatching {
data class ModuleEntry( // TODO: figure out the correct calculation
val nameEncoded: ByteArray, val moduleSequences = ASN1EncodableVector()
val fullEncoded: ByteArray,
)
val modules = // 1. Create a DERSequence for each module.
apexInfos.map { (packageName, versionCode) -> apexInfos.forEach { (packageName, versionCode) ->
val nameOctet = DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)) val moduleVector = ASN1EncodableVector()
val versionInt = ASN1Integer(versionCode) // Use explicit UTF-8 encoding for the package name.
moduleVector.add(DEROctetString(packageName.toByteArray(Charsets.UTF_8)))
moduleVector.add(ASN1Integer(versionCode))
moduleSequences.add(DERSequence(moduleVector))
}
val vec = ASN1EncodableVector() // 2. Create a DERSet. Bouncy Castle will automatically handle
vec.add(nameOctet) // the sorting based on the DER-encoded value of each sequence.
vec.add(versionInt) val modulesSet = DERSet(moduleSequences)
val sequence = DERSequence(vec)
// AOSP sorts by encoded name only, not full sequence // 3. Get the final DER-encoded byte array of the SET.
ModuleEntry( val encodedModules = modulesSet.encoded
nameEncoded = nameOctet.encoded,
fullEncoded = sequence.encoded,
)
}
val sortedModules = // 4. Compute the SHA-256 hash.
modules.sortedWith { m1, m2 -> MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(encodedModules)
compareByteArrays(m1.nameEncoded, m2.nameEncoded)
}
val payloadStream = ByteArrayOutputStream()
sortedModules.forEach { payloadStream.write(it.fullEncoded) }
val payload = payloadStream.toByteArray()
// Wrap in DER SET tag manually — DERSet() re-sorts by full encoding
val finalDerSet = encodeAsDerSet(payload)
MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(finalDerSet)
} }
.getOrElse { .getOrElse {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it) SystemLogger.error("Failed to compute module hash.", it)
ByteArray(32) ByteArray(32) // Return empty hash on failure
} }
} }
private fun compareByteArrays(a: ByteArray, b: ByteArray): Int {
val length = minOf(a.size, b.size)
for (i in 0 until length) {
val byteA = a[i].toInt() and 0xFF
val byteB = b[i].toInt() and 0xFF
if (byteA != byteB) {
return byteA - byteB
}
}
return a.size - b.size
}
private fun encodeAsDerSet(payload: ByteArray): ByteArray {
val out = ByteArrayOutputStream()
out.write(0x31)
writeDerLength(out, payload.size)
out.write(payload)
return out.toByteArray()
}
private fun writeDerLength(out: ByteArrayOutputStream, length: Int) {
if (length < 128) {
out.write(length)
} else {
var size = length
val bytes = ArrayList<Byte>()
while (size > 0) {
bytes.add((size and 0xFF).toByte())
size = size ushr 8
}
out.write(0x80 or bytes.size)
for (i in bytes.indices.reversed()) {
out.write(bytes[i].toInt())
}
}
}
} }
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
import android.content.Context
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
object AndroidPermissionUtils {
@SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
return try {
// 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
// 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
val currentActivityThreadMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
if (activityThread == null) {
SystemLogger.warning("Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null")
return null
}
// 3. Try to get the application context
val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
if (application != null) return application
// 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in system_server)
val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
null
}
}
/**
* Core permission check.
*/
fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
val context = getGlobalContext() ?: run {
SystemLogger.warning("AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely.")
return false
}
val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
}
fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
}
fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
}
fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
}
fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
}
}
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import java.security.SecureRandom
import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
import kotlin.math.abs
import kotlin.math.exp
import kotlin.math.ln
import kotlin.math.max
object TeeLatencySimulator {
private val rng = SecureRandom()
private val sessionBiasMs: Double by lazy { rng.nextGaussian() * 5.0 }
private val coldPenaltyMs: Double by lazy { abs(rng.nextGaussian() * 12.0) }
@Volatile private var firstCall = true
fun simulateGenerateKeyDelay(algorithm: Int, elapsedNanos: Long) {
val elapsedMs = elapsedNanos / 1_000_000.0
val targetMs = sampleTotalDelay(algorithm)
val remainingMs = targetMs - elapsedMs
if (remainingMs > 1.0) {
LockSupport.parkNanos((remainingMs * 1_000_000).toLong())
}
}
private fun sampleTotalDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
val base = sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm)
val transit = sampleExponential(2.5)
val jitter = (rng.nextGaussian() * 2.5).coerceIn(-8.0, 12.0)
var cold = 0.0
if (firstCall) {
firstCall = false
cold = coldPenaltyMs
}
return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
}
private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
val (mu, sigma) =
when (algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> ln(60.0) to 0.08
Algorithm.RSA -> ln(70.0) to 0.08
Algorithm.AES -> ln(35.0) to 0.10
else -> ln(40.0) to 0.10
}
return sampleLogNormal(mu, sigma)
}
private fun sampleLogNormal(mu: Double, sigma: Double): Double {
return exp(mu + sigma * rng.nextGaussian())
}
private fun sampleExponential(mean: Double): Double {
var u = rng.nextDouble()
while (u == 0.0) u = rng.nextDouble()
return -mean * ln(u)
}
}
+20 -2
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,28 @@
MODDIR=${0%/*} MODDIR=${0%/*}
CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store CONFIG_DIR=/data/adb/tricky_store
echo "============================================"
echo " TEESimulator — Key Storage Maintenance"
echo "============================================"
echo ""
if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then if [ -d "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" ]; then
KEY_COUNT=$(find "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" -name "*.bin" 2>/dev/null | wc -l)
STORAGE_SIZE=$(du -sh "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" 2>/dev/null | cut -f1)
echo " Cached keys found : $KEY_COUNT"
echo " Storage used : $STORAGE_SIZE"
echo ""
rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
echo "Persistent key storage cleared"
echo " [OK] All cached attestation keys purged"
echo " [OK] Fresh keys will generate on next request"
else else
echo "No persistent key storage found" echo " No persistent key storage found"
echo " Nothing to clear"
fi fi
echo ""
echo "============================================"
+28 -172
View File
@@ -1,187 +1,43 @@
## TEESimulator-RS v5.0: AOSP Compliance Overhaul ## TEESimulator v3.2: Anti-Detection Hardening & Key Persistence
Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157 analysis, layered on top of our StrongBox hardening and native cert gen architecture. This release hardens TEESimulator against active attestation probing by detector apps (DuckDetector, Luna, GarfieldHan) while introducing persistent key storage that survives daemon restarts and reboots.
### Attestation Extension Alignment
- 17 enforcement tags added to KeyMintAttestation (ACTIVE_DATETIME, ORIGINATION_EXPIRE, USAGE_EXPIRE, USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, CALLER_NONCE, UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, MAX_BOOT_LEVEL, MIN_MAC_LENGTH, RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST)
- BLOCK_MODE encoded as SET OF INTEGER per AOSP attestation_record.h
- Version-guarded tags (RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST >=100, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE >=3, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY >=4)
- INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID computed via HMAC-SHA256 per KeyMint HAL spec using device HBK
- AAID gated on attestation challenge presence
- Certificate validity defaults aligned with AOSP (epoch notBefore, 9999-12-31 notAfter)
### Binder Infrastructure
- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI for non-intercepted codes
- getNumberOfEntries includes software-generated key count
- deleteKey resolves KEY_ID domain via generatedKeys lookup
- patchAuthorizations for OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels in authorization arrays
### Software Operation AOSP Conformance
- updateAad on non-AEAD operations returns INVALID_TAG (-76), matching AOSP operation.rs
- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes
- GCM IV returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations
- SoftwareOperationBinder methods @Synchronized, matching AOSP Mutex per operation
- authorize_create enforcement: PURPOSE validation, algorithm-purpose compatibility, temporal constraints, CALLER_NONCE prohibition, WRAP_KEY rejection
### Security and Configuration
- SELinux permission checks via /proc/pid/attr/current
- Per-UID permission verification through IPackageManager.checkPermission
- Imported key tracking prevents stale attest-key overrides in getKeyEntry
- nspace consistency fix in attest-key override path
- TeeLatencySimulator with log-normal distribution matching real hardware profiles
- Device-unique HBK seed generated on install (32 bytes from /dev/random)
### Preserved from v4.8
- StrongBox op limits (4 concurrent max, TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS rejection)
- LRU operation pruning per security level
- Hardware keygen rate limiting (2/30s sliding window, 2 concurrent cap)
- Native Rust cert generation with BouncyCastle fallback
- Key persistence across reboots
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8.1: StrongBox Op Rejection Fix
- **StrongBox op limit gate fix** — `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8: StrongBox Hardening & LRU Pruning
Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped from 32 to 8.
- **LRU operation pruning** — Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
- **StrongBox param guard** — Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
- **StrongBox timing** — Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
- **StrongBox op limit** — Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
- **ECDSA algorithm alias** — Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
- **createOperation domain handling** — Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
- **Permission guards** — Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.7: Operation & Attestation Fixes
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [Key Attestation](https://github.com/nickel-lang/nickel) on OnePlus (Android 16) and Xiaomi Redmi 14C (Android 14).
- **PADDING encoding** — Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
- **Operation error-path conformance** — Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
- **updateAad support** — Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
- **Algorithm inference** — `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.6: Rebrand & Detection Fix
- **RTT normalization rework** — Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
- **Cross-algorithm attestation** — Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
- **Device ID attestation** — Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS** — Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
- **CI streamlined** — Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
---
## TEESimulator v4.5: Detection Hardening
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) (23-check attestation validator). All keystore-level checks now pass.
- **Key deletion consistency** — After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
- **generateKey timing normalization** — Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
- **Delete cleanup scope** — `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
---
## TEESimulator v4.4: AOSP Conformance
- **Binder error reply format** — Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
- **Key enumeration** — Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
- **KeyMetadata fields** — Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
- **Parcel handling** — hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
---
## TEESimulator v4.3: Performance & Reliability
- **Debug log gating** — `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
- **Supervisor backoff** — Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
- **Process priority** — Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
- **Map eviction** — Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
- **CI pipeline** — Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
---
## TEESimulator v4.2: Detection Evasion Hardening
Fixes 6 detection vectors flagged by attestation validator apps.
### Attestation Policy Enforcement
Replicate AOSP keystore2's `add_required_parameters()` validation that our software keygen path was bypassing:
- **CREATION_DATETIME** — Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
- **Device ID attestation** — Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
- **Error reply format** — Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
### Certificate Fix
Leaf certificate Subject CN corrected from "Android KeyStore Key" to "Android Keystore Key" (lowercase s), matching AOSP `KeyGenParameterSpec.java:282`. Both Kotlin and Rust paths.
### Binder Timing
Skip interception for system transaction codes (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) above LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION. Eliminates the JNI round-trip that inflated binder ping ratio to 3.85x (detector threshold: 3.0x).
---
## TEESimulator v4.1: Boot Identity Persistence
Bugfix release. The vbmeta boot key digest was randomizing on every reboot, producing a different RootOfTrust in attestation certificates each boot.
On devices where the kernel doesn't set `ro.boot.vbmeta.public_key_digest`, the fallback chain hit random generation every boot because `resetprop` overrides for `ro.boot.*` props don't survive reboots. Added file-based persistence (`boot_hash.bin`, `boot_key.bin`) between the TEE cache and random fallback. Once determined, boot identity values persist across reboots.
Verified on Redmi 14C: second boot reads from persistent file instead of regenerating.
---
## TEESimulator v4.0: Native Rust Cert Generation
Major release. Certificate chain generation rebuilt from the ground up in Rust, replacing the BouncyCastle Java path for EC and RSA keys. Hardened against every known detector app.
### Native Cert Generation
The headline feature. `libcertgen.so` generates X.509 certificate chains using `ring` (EC-P256/P384) and `rsa` (RSA-2048/4096) with manual DER assembly. No more BouncyCastle quirks — issuer/subject DN bytes are injected directly from the keybox, ensuring byte-perfect chain linkage. BouncyCastle remains as fallback for unsupported curves (P-224, P-521, Curve25519).
### Anti-Detection Hardening ### Anti-Detection Hardening
- **Challenge validation** — Oversized attestation challenges (>128 bytes) now return `INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH (-21)`, matching real KeyMint behavior. Previously accepted silently — DuckDetector exploited this. * **Per-UID Hardware Keygen Rate Limiter**: Caps hardware key generation at 2 per 30-second window with 2 max concurrent requests per UID. Overflow requests fall back to software certificate generation, preventing binder thread starvation from flood attacks.
- **Per-UID rate limiter** — 2 hardware keygens per 30s burst, 2 concurrent max. Overflow falls back to software certs. Blocks DuckDetector-style keygen flooding that starves GMS. * **importKey Eviction Defense**: Retains patched attestation chains when `importKey` overwrites an attested alias. Blocks the generate-then-import attack vector used by GarfieldHan and similar detectors.
- **importKey eviction guard** — Retained patch chains prevent generate-then-import attacks that evict cached attestation data. * **Native Binder Payload Cap**: Bypasses interception for payloads exceeding 256KB, preventing thread starvation from oversized binder transactions.
- **256KB native payload cap** — Oversized binder payloads bypass interception cleanly instead of stalling threads. * **Oversized Alias Rejection**: Rejects aliases that would exhaust the binder buffer, closing another flooding vector.
- **Alias size rejection** — Oversized key aliases rejected before they hit the binder buffer.
### Security Patch Consistency
* **Three-Way Patch Level Alignment**: When `system=prop` in `security_patch.txt`, boot and vendor patch levels are forced to `prop` as well. All three ASN.1 attestation tags (706/718/719) now resolve via `SystemProperties.get()` to match what detector apps see through `getprop`.
### Key Persistence ### Key Persistence
Generated keys now survive reboots. File-backed storage with file-level locking, preserved across keybox rotations. Banking and biometric apps that cache attestation keys no longer break after restart. * **Generated Key Persistence Layer**: Keys from `generateKey` are persisted to disk in binary format with version headers and atomic writes (tmp + rename).
* **Automatic Restoration**: Persisted keys are restored on daemon startup without re-attestation.
* **Keybox Rotation Survival**: Generated keys survive keybox.xml changes — only PATCH-mode cert chains are invalidated.
* **File-Level Locking**: Concurrent read/write access to persisted keys is serialized to prevent corruption.
### Attestation Fixes ### Process Reliability
- Null out all-zero `verifiedBootHash` from TEE cache (fingerprinting vector) * **Fork-Based Supervisor Daemon**: Replaces the restart loop with a native fork-based supervisor for near-instant recovery.
- Correct `module_hash` field to match AOSP Keystore2 format * **Attestation Leak Blocking**: Returns `DEAD_OBJECT` to callers when the interceptor service is unavailable, preventing unpatched attestation from leaking through.
- Override pre-existing attest keys instead of skipping them * **Global Exception Handler**: Catches uncaught exceptions and triggers clean daemon restart instead of silent death.
- Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks in keybox parsing * **FileObserver NPE Fix**: Prevents crash when config files are deleted while being observed.
- Security patch consistency — `system=prop` forces boot/vendor to match
### Upstream Cherry-Picks
* **KeyUsage per HAL spec** (#119): Correct certificate KeyUsage based on KeyPurpose.
* **Reference leak fix** (#122): Resolve strong reference leak and warnings in binder interception.
### Module Lifecycle ### Module Lifecycle
- Supervisor daemon keeps the interceptor alive * **`action.sh`**: Purge persistent key storage via KSU Manager Action button. Shows key count and storage size before clearing.
- KSU Action button clears persistent key cache * **`uninstall.sh`**: Clean module removal — kills daemon, removes generated data, preserves `target.txt`, `keybox.xml`, and `security_patch.txt`.
- Clean uninstall removes all traces (persistent keys, TEE status, daemon)
### Stability ### PKI Fixes
- FileObserver NPE on config deletion fixed * Strip HTML comments from PEM blocks before parsing.
- Global uncaught exception handler — daemon stays alive on unexpected errors
- PEM parsing hardened against malformed keybox files
### Tested Against
DuckDetector, Luna, Play Integrity, Key Attestation Demo — all passing on Redmi 14C (Android 14, Beanpod KeyMaster, KSU).
+1 -9
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ fi
# --- Version Info --- # --- Version Info ---
VERSION=$(grep_prop version "${TMPDIR}/module.prop") VERSION=$(grep_prop version "${TMPDIR}/module.prop")
ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator-RS $VERSION" ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator $VERSION"
ui_print "" ui_print ""
# --- Architecture Handling --- # --- Architecture Handling ---
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ ui_print "- Extracting $ARCH libraries"
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libTEESimulator.so" "$MODPATH" install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libTEESimulator.so" "$MODPATH"
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libinject.so" "$MODPATH" install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libinject.so" "$MODPATH"
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH" install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libsupervisor.so" "$MODPATH"
install_file "lib/$ABI_DIR/libcertgen.so" "$MODPATH"
ui_print "" ui_print ""
mv "$MODPATH/libinject.so" "$MODPATH/inject" mv "$MODPATH/libinject.so" "$MODPATH/inject"
@@ -91,10 +90,3 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
ui_print "- Adding default target scope" ui_print "- Adding default target scope"
install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR" install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
fi fi
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then
ui_print "- Generating device-unique hardware-bound key seed"
head -c 32 /dev/random > "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk"
fi
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
id=tricky_store id=tricky_store
name=TEESimulator-RS name=TEESimulator
version=${REPLACEMEVER} version=${REPLACEMEVER}
versionCode=${REPLACEMEVERCODE} versionCode=${REPLACEMEVERCODE}
author=JingMatrix, Enginex0 author=JingMatrix, Enginex0
description=Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation description=Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation
updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/update.json updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/update.json
-1
View File
@@ -9,4 +9,3 @@ done
rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys" rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR/persistent_keys"
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt" rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_hash.bin" "$CONFIG_DIR/boot_key.bin"
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{ {
"version": "v4.5", "version": "v3.2",
"versionCode": 111, "versionCode": 82,
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip", "zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v3.2/TEESimulator-v3.2-82-Release.zip",
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md" "changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
} }
-11
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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
[target.aarch64-linux-android]
linker = "aarch64-linux-android29-clang"
[target.armv7-linux-androideabi]
linker = "armv7a-linux-androideabi29-clang"
[target.i686-linux-android]
linker = "i686-linux-android29-clang"
[target.x86_64-linux-android]
linker = "x86_64-linux-android29-clang"
-1166
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
[package]
name = "certgen"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
publish = false
[lib]
crate-type = ["cdylib"]
[dependencies]
jni = { version = "0.21.1", default-features = false }
ring = "0.17.14"
rsa = { version = "0.9", features = ["sha2"] }
pkcs8 = { version = "0.10", features = ["alloc"] }
rand = "0.8"
der = { version = "0.7.10", features = ["alloc", "oid"] }
const-oid = "0.9.6"
x509-cert = { version = "0.2.5", features = ["pem"] }
time = { version = "0.3", features = ["std"] }
anyhow = "1.0"
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
libc = "0.2"
zip = { version = "2.2", default-features = false, features = ["deflate"] }
serde_json = "1.0"
[profile.release]
opt-level = "z"
lto = true
codegen-units = 1
strip = "symbols"
panic = "abort"
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
[toolchain]
channel = "stable"
targets = [
"aarch64-linux-android",
"armv7-linux-androideabi",
"i686-linux-android",
"x86_64-linux-android",
]
-644
View File
@@ -1,644 +0,0 @@
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::types::CertGenParams;
const DO_NOT_REPORT: i32 = -1;
pub fn build_attestation_extension(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let sw = build_software_enforced(params)?;
let tee = build_tee_enforced(params)?;
let mut inner = Vec::new();
// attestationVersion — INTEGER
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.attest_version as i64));
// attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
// keymintVersion — INTEGER
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_integer(params.keymaster_version as i64));
// keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED, not INTEGER
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(params.security_level));
// attestationChallenge — OCTET STRING
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(
params.attestation_challenge.as_deref().unwrap_or(&[]),
));
// uniqueId — OCTET STRING (always empty)
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&[]));
// softwareEnforced
inner.extend_from_slice(&sw);
// teeEnforced
inner.extend_from_slice(&tee);
Ok(enc_sequence(&inner))
}
fn build_software_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
// Tag 701: CREATION_DATETIME — INTEGER (milliseconds)
fields.push((701, enc_integer(params.creation_datetime)));
// Tag 709: ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID — OCTET STRING
// The bytes are already the DER-encoded AttestationApplicationId wrapped in OCTET STRING
// by the Kotlin layer. We wrap them in an EXPLICIT tag.
if !params.attestation_application_id.is_empty() {
fields.push((709, enc_octet_string(&params.attestation_application_id)));
}
// Tag 724: MODULE_HASH — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 400)
if params.attest_version >= 400 {
if let Some(ref hash) = params.module_hash {
fields.push((724, enc_octet_string(hash)));
}
}
Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
}
fn build_tee_enforced(params: &CertGenParams) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut fields: Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
// Tag 1: PURPOSE — SET OF INTEGER
if !params.purposes.is_empty() {
fields.push((1, build_set_of_integer(&params.purposes)));
}
// Tag 2: ALGORITHM — INTEGER
fields.push((2, enc_integer(params.algorithm as i32 as i64)));
// Tag 3: KEY_SIZE — INTEGER
fields.push((3, enc_integer(params.key_size as i64)));
// Tag 5: DIGEST — SET OF INTEGER
if !params.digests.is_empty() {
fields.push((5, build_set_of_integer(&params.digests)));
}
// Tag 10: EC_CURVE — INTEGER (only for EC keys)
if let Some(curve) = params.ec_curve {
fields.push((10, enc_integer(curve as i32 as i64)));
}
// Tag 503: NO_AUTH_REQUIRED — NULL (presence = true)
fields.push((503, enc_null()));
// Tag 702: ORIGIN — INTEGER 0 (GENERATED)
fields.push((702, enc_integer(0)));
// Tag 704: ROOT_OF_TRUST — SEQUENCE
fields.push((704, build_root_of_trust(params)));
// Tag 705: OS_VERSION — INTEGER
if params.os_version != DO_NOT_REPORT {
fields.push((705, enc_integer(params.os_version as i64)));
}
// Tag 706: OS_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
if params.os_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
fields.push((706, enc_integer(params.os_patch_level as i64)));
}
// Tags 710-717: ATTESTATION_ID_* — OCTET STRING (optional)
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_brand {
fields.push((710, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_device {
fields.push((711, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_product {
fields.push((712, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_serial {
fields.push((713, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_imei {
fields.push((714, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_meid {
fields.push((715, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_manufacturer {
fields.push((716, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_model {
fields.push((717, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
// Tag 718: VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
if params.vendor_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
fields.push((718, enc_integer(params.vendor_patch_level as i64)));
}
// Tag 719: BOOT_PATCHLEVEL — INTEGER
if params.boot_patch_level != DO_NOT_REPORT {
fields.push((719, enc_integer(params.boot_patch_level as i64)));
}
// Tag 723: ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI — OCTET STRING (only if attestVersion >= 300)
if params.attest_version >= 300 {
if let Some(ref v) = params.id_second_imei {
fields.push((723, enc_octet_string(v)));
}
}
Ok(build_authorization_list(&mut fields))
}
fn build_root_of_trust(params: &CertGenParams) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut inner = Vec::new();
// verifiedBootKey — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&params.boot_key));
// deviceLocked — BOOLEAN TRUE (0xFF, not 0x01)
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_boolean(true));
// verifiedBootState — ENUMERATED 0 (Verified), not INTEGER
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_enumerated(0));
// verifiedBootHash — OCTET STRING (32 bytes)
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_octet_string(&params.boot_hash));
enc_sequence(&inner)
}
fn build_authorization_list(fields: &mut Vec<(u32, Vec<u8>)>) -> Vec<u8> {
fields.sort_by_key(|(tag, _)| *tag);
let mut inner = Vec::new();
for (tag, value) in fields.iter() {
inner.extend_from_slice(&enc_explicit_tag(*tag, value));
}
enc_sequence(&inner)
}
fn build_set_of_integer(values: &[i32]) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER SET OF: elements sorted by encoded byte value
let mut encoded: Vec<Vec<u8>> = values.iter().map(|v| enc_integer(*v as i64)).collect();
encoded.sort();
let mut inner = Vec::new();
for e in &encoded {
inner.extend_from_slice(e);
}
enc_set(&inner)
}
// --- DER primitives ---
fn enc_length(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
if len < 0x80 {
vec![len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFF {
vec![0x81, len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFFFF {
vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
} else {
vec![
0x84,
(len >> 24) as u8,
(len >> 16) as u8,
(len >> 8) as u8,
len as u8,
]
}
}
fn enc_integer(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER INTEGER: tag 0x02, minimal two's complement big-endian
let bytes = integer_bytes(value);
let mut out = vec![0x02];
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
out
}
fn integer_bytes(value: i64) -> Vec<u8> {
if value == 0 {
return vec![0x00];
}
let raw = value.to_be_bytes();
// Find first significant byte
let mut start = 0;
if value > 0 {
while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0x00 {
start += 1;
}
// If high bit set, need leading 0x00 to keep positive
if raw[start] & 0x80 != 0 {
let mut out = vec![0x00];
out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
return out;
}
} else {
while start < 7 && raw[start] == 0xFF {
start += 1;
}
// If high bit clear, need leading 0xFF to keep negative
if raw[start] & 0x80 == 0 {
let mut out = vec![0xFF];
out.extend_from_slice(&raw[start..]);
return out;
}
}
raw[start..].to_vec()
}
fn enc_enumerated(value: i32) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER ENUMERATED: tag 0x0A, same value encoding as INTEGER
let bytes = integer_bytes(value as i64);
let mut out = vec![0x0A];
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(bytes.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
out
}
fn enc_octet_string(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = vec![0x04];
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(data.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(data);
out
}
fn enc_null() -> Vec<u8> {
vec![0x05, 0x00]
}
fn enc_boolean(value: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER BOOLEAN: TRUE = 0xFF, FALSE = 0x00
vec![0x01, 0x01, if value { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }]
}
fn enc_sequence(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = vec![0x30];
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(contents);
out
}
fn enc_set(contents: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = vec![0x31];
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(contents.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(contents);
out
}
fn enc_explicit_tag(tag_number: u32, inner: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
// EXPLICIT context-specific constructed tag
let mut out = Vec::new();
if tag_number < 31 {
// Short form: single byte 0xA0 | tag_number
out.push(0xA0 | tag_number as u8);
} else {
// Long form: 0xBF followed by base-128 encoding of tag number
out.push(0xBF);
enc_base128_tag(&mut out, tag_number);
}
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_length(inner.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(inner);
out
}
fn enc_base128_tag(out: &mut Vec<u8>, tag: u32) {
// Base-128 with continuation bits: MSB first, bit 7 set on all but last byte
let mut digits = Vec::new();
let mut val = tag;
digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8);
val >>= 7;
while val > 0 {
digits.push((val & 0x7F) as u8 | 0x80);
val >>= 7;
}
// Written MSB first
for b in digits.iter().rev() {
out.push(*b);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve};
#[test]
fn test_enc_integer_zero() {
assert_eq!(enc_integer(0), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_integer_small_positive() {
assert_eq!(enc_integer(3), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
assert_eq!(enc_integer(127), vec![0x02, 0x01, 0x7F]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_integer_needs_leading_zero() {
// 128 = 0x80, high bit set so needs 0x00 prefix
assert_eq!(enc_integer(128), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x80]);
assert_eq!(enc_integer(256), vec![0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_integer_multi_byte() {
// 140000 = 0x02_22_E0
assert_eq!(enc_integer(140000), vec![0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x22, 0xE0]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_integer_large() {
// 20250301 = 0x01_34_FE_BD
assert_eq!(
enc_integer(20250301),
vec![0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x34, 0xFE, 0xBD]
);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_enumerated() {
// SecurityLevel TEE = 1
assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(1), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x01]);
// VerifiedBootState Verified = 0
assert_eq!(enc_enumerated(0), vec![0x0A, 0x01, 0x00]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_boolean_true() {
// DER: TRUE = 0xFF
assert_eq!(enc_boolean(true), vec![0x01, 0x01, 0xFF]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_null() {
assert_eq!(enc_null(), vec![0x05, 0x00]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_octet_string_empty() {
assert_eq!(enc_octet_string(&[]), vec![0x04, 0x00]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_short() {
// Tag 1 wrapping INTEGER 2: A1 03 02 01 02
let inner = enc_integer(2);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(1, &inner);
assert_eq!(tagged, vec![0xA1, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_10() {
// Tag 10: 0xAA
let inner = enc_integer(1);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(10, &inner);
assert_eq!(tagged[0], 0xAA);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_503() {
// Tag 503: 0xBF 0x83 0x77
// 503 = 3*128 + 119 => 0x83 0x77
let inner = enc_null();
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(503, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x83, 0x77]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_704() {
// Tag 704: 0xBF 0x85 0x40
// 704 = 5*128 + 64 => 0x85 0x40
let inner = enc_sequence(&[]);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(704, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x40]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_718() {
// Tag 718: 0xBF 0x85 0x4E
let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(718, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4E]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_719() {
// Tag 719: 0xBF 0x85 0x4F
let inner = enc_integer(20250301);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(719, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x4F]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_701() {
// Tag 701: 0xBF 0x85 0x3D
let inner = enc_integer(1000);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(701, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x3D]);
}
#[test]
fn test_enc_explicit_tag_709() {
// Tag 709: 0xBF 0x85 0x45
let inner = enc_octet_string(&[0x01]);
let tagged = enc_explicit_tag(709, &inner);
assert_eq!(&tagged[..3], &[0xBF, 0x85, 0x45]);
}
#[test]
fn test_build_set_of_integer_sorted() {
// SET OF INTEGER must sort by encoded bytes
let result = build_set_of_integer(&[3, 2]);
// Expect sorted: INTEGER 2 before INTEGER 3
let expected = enc_set(&[0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03]);
assert_eq!(result, expected);
}
#[test]
fn test_root_of_trust_structure() {
let params = make_test_params();
let rot = build_root_of_trust(&params);
// Should be a SEQUENCE (0x30)
assert_eq!(rot[0], 0x30);
// Find BOOLEAN TRUE inside
let rot_inner = &rot[2..]; // skip tag+length
// First: OCTET STRING (32 bytes boot key)
assert_eq!(rot_inner[0], 0x04);
assert_eq!(rot_inner[1], 0x20); // 32 bytes
// After boot key (34 bytes): BOOLEAN TRUE
assert_eq!(rot_inner[34], 0x01); // BOOLEAN tag
assert_eq!(rot_inner[35], 0x01); // length 1
assert_eq!(rot_inner[36], 0xFF); // TRUE = 0xFF
// Then ENUMERATED 0 (verifiedBootState)
assert_eq!(rot_inner[37], 0x0A); // ENUMERATED tag, not 0x02
assert_eq!(rot_inner[38], 0x01);
assert_eq!(rot_inner[39], 0x00);
}
#[test]
fn test_do_not_report_omits_fields() {
let mut params = make_test_params();
params.os_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
params.vendor_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
params.boot_patch_level = DO_NOT_REPORT;
let tee = build_tee_enforced(&params).unwrap();
let hex = hex_string(&tee);
// Tags 706, 718, 719 should not appear
// Tag 706 = BF 85 42, 718 = BF 85 4E, 719 = BF 85 4F
assert!(!hex.contains("bf8542"), "os_patch_level should be omitted");
assert!(
!hex.contains("bf854e"),
"vendor_patch_level should be omitted"
);
assert!(
!hex.contains("bf854f"),
"boot_patch_level should be omitted"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_key_description_security_level_is_enumerated() {
let params = make_test_params();
let ext = build_attestation_extension(&params).unwrap();
// KeyDescription is a SEQUENCE: 0x30 ...
assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
// Skip SEQUENCE tag + length to get to inner fields
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&ext);
// Field 0: attestationVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
assert_eq!(inner[0], 0x02);
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(inner);
// Field 1: attestationSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "attestationSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
// Field 2: keymintVersion — INTEGER (0x02)
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x02);
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(rest);
// Field 3: keymintSecurityLevel — ENUMERATED (0x0A)
assert_eq!(rest[0], 0x0A, "keymintSecurityLevel must be ENUMERATED");
}
#[test]
fn test_authorization_list_sorted_by_tag() {
let params = make_test_params();
let tee = build_tee_enforced(&params).unwrap();
let inner = skip_tlv_header(&tee);
let tags = extract_tag_numbers(inner);
let mut sorted = tags.clone();
sorted.sort();
assert_eq!(tags, sorted, "AuthorizationList fields must be sorted by tag number");
}
#[test]
fn test_full_extension_roundtrip() {
let params = make_test_params();
let ext = build_attestation_extension(&params).unwrap();
// Must be valid DER: starts with SEQUENCE tag
assert_eq!(ext[0], 0x30);
// Length must account for all inner bytes
let (header_len, total_content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(&ext);
assert_eq!(ext.len(), header_len + total_content_len);
}
// --- test helpers ---
fn make_test_params() -> CertGenParams {
CertGenParams {
algorithm: Algorithm::Ec,
key_size: 256,
ec_curve: Some(EcCurve::P256),
rsa_public_exponent: 0,
attestation_challenge: Some(vec![0xAB; 32]),
purposes: vec![2, 3],
digests: vec![4],
cert_serial: None,
cert_subject: None,
cert_not_before: -1,
cert_not_after: -1,
keybox_private_key: vec![],
keybox_cert_chain: vec![],
security_level: 1,
attest_version: 200,
keymaster_version: 200,
os_version: 140000,
os_patch_level: 202503,
vendor_patch_level: 20250301,
boot_patch_level: 20250301,
boot_key: vec![0x01; 32],
boot_hash: vec![0x02; 32],
creation_datetime: 1709913600000,
attestation_application_id: vec![0xDE, 0xAD],
module_hash: None,
id_brand: None,
id_device: None,
id_product: None,
id_serial: None,
id_imei: None,
id_meid: None,
id_manufacturer: None,
id_model: None,
id_second_imei: None,
}
}
fn hex_string(data: &[u8]) -> String {
data.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect()
}
fn skip_tlv_header(data: &[u8]) -> &[u8] {
let (header_len, _) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
&data[header_len..]
}
fn skip_one_tlv(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, &[u8]) {
let (header_len, content_len) = parse_tlv_lengths(data);
let total = header_len + content_len;
(total, &data[total..])
}
fn parse_tlv_lengths(data: &[u8]) -> (usize, usize) {
// Returns (header_bytes, content_bytes)
let tag_len = tag_byte_len(data);
let len_start = tag_len;
if data[len_start] < 0x80 {
(len_start + 1, data[len_start] as usize)
} else {
let num_len_bytes = (data[len_start] & 0x7F) as usize;
let mut content_len = 0usize;
for i in 0..num_len_bytes {
content_len = (content_len << 8) | data[len_start + 1 + i] as usize;
}
(len_start + 1 + num_len_bytes, content_len)
}
}
fn tag_byte_len(data: &[u8]) -> usize {
if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
1
} else {
let mut i = 1;
while data[i] & 0x80 != 0 {
i += 1;
}
i + 1
}
}
fn extract_tag_numbers(mut data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u32> {
let mut tags = Vec::new();
while !data.is_empty() {
let tag = read_tag_number(data);
tags.push(tag);
let (_, rest) = skip_one_tlv(data);
data = rest;
}
tags
}
fn read_tag_number(data: &[u8]) -> u32 {
if data[0] & 0x1F != 0x1F {
(data[0] & 0x1F) as u32
} else {
let mut val = 0u32;
let mut i = 1;
loop {
val = (val << 7) | (data[i] & 0x7F) as u32;
if data[i] & 0x80 == 0 {
break;
}
i += 1;
}
val
}
}
}
-523
View File
@@ -1,523 +0,0 @@
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
use crate::keybox::ParsedKeybox;
use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, GeneratedKeyPair};
use time::OffsetDateTime;
const ATTESTATION_OID: &[u64] = &[1, 3, 6, 1, 4, 1, 11129, 2, 1, 17];
// Signature algorithm OIDs
const OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2];
const OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3];
const OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA: &[u64] = &[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 11];
// Extension OIDs
const OID_KEY_USAGE: &[u64] = &[2, 5, 29, 15];
pub fn build_certificate_chain(
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
params: &CertGenParams,
) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
let leaf_der = build_leaf_cert(key_pair, attestation_ext_der, keybox, params)?;
let mut chain = Vec::with_capacity(1 + keybox.cert_chain_ders.len());
chain.push(leaf_der);
for cert_der in &keybox.cert_chain_ders {
chain.push(cert_der.clone());
}
Ok(chain)
}
fn build_leaf_cert(
key_pair: &GeneratedKeyPair,
attestation_ext_der: &[u8],
keybox: &ParsedKeybox,
params: &CertGenParams,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let spki_der = extract_spki_from_pkcs8(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8)?;
let sig_alg_der = signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(&keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
// Serial number
let serial_bytes = if let Some(ref serial) = params.cert_serial {
serial.clone()
} else {
vec![1u8]
};
// Subject DN
let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
subject.clone()
} else {
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
};
// Validity
let not_before = timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_before)?;
let not_after = if params.cert_not_after == -1 {
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(keybox.leaf_not_after)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() + time::Duration::days(365))
} else {
timestamp_to_datetime(params.cert_not_after)?
};
// Extensions
let extensions_der = build_extensions(attestation_ext_der, &params.purposes)?;
// TBS Certificate
let version_der = encode_der_explicit_tag(0, &encode_der_integer(&[2]));
let serial_der = encode_der_integer(&serial_bytes);
let validity_der = encode_validity(&not_before, &not_after);
let extensions_tagged = encode_der_explicit_tag(3, &extensions_der);
let tbs_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
&version_der,
&serial_der,
&sig_alg_der,
&keybox.issuer_dn_der, // RAW bytes — no re-encoding
&validity_der,
&subject_dn_der,
&spki_der,
&extensions_tagged,
]);
// Sign the TBS
let signature_bytes = sign_tbs(&tbs_der, &keybox.signing_key_der, params.algorithm)?;
let signature_bit_string = encode_der_bit_string(&signature_bytes);
// Final certificate: SEQUENCE { TBS, sigAlgorithm, signature }
let cert_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
&tbs_der,
&sig_alg_der,
&signature_bit_string,
]);
Ok(cert_der)
}
fn sign_tbs(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
match algorithm {
Algorithm::Ec => sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
Algorithm::Rsa => sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der, signing_key_der),
}
}
fn sign_tbs_ec(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
// Determine EC curve from the signing key's PKCS8 AlgorithmIdentifier
let alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
let key_pair = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(alg, signing_key_der, &ring::rand::SystemRandom::new())
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
let sig = key_pair.sign(&rng, tbs_der)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC sign: {e}")))?;
Ok(sig.as_ref().to_vec())
}
fn detect_ec_signing_algorithm(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<&'static ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm> {
use der::Decode;
let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse: {e}")))?;
let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::SigningFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
if params_oid == p256_oid {
Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING)
} else if params_oid == p384_oid {
Ok(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING)
} else {
Err(CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve OID: {params_oid}")))
}
}
fn sign_tbs_rsa(tbs_der: &[u8], signing_key_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
use rsa::signature::{SignatureEncoding, SignerMut};
use rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey;
use rsa::sha2::Sha256;
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(signing_key_der)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SigningFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
let mut signing_key = SigningKey::<Sha256>::new(private_key);
let signature = signing_key.sign(tbs_der);
Ok(signature.to_vec())
}
fn signature_algorithm_for_signing_key(signing_key_der: &[u8], algorithm: Algorithm) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
match algorithm {
Algorithm::Ec => {
let ring_alg = detect_ec_signing_algorithm(signing_key_der)?;
// Determine OID from the algorithm used
let oid = if std::ptr::eq(ring_alg, &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING) {
OID_SHA384_WITH_ECDSA
} else {
OID_SHA256_WITH_ECDSA
};
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(oid);
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der]))
}
Algorithm::Rsa => {
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA);
let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &null_der]))
}
}
}
fn extract_spki_from_pkcs8(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use der::Decode;
let info = pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo::from_der(pkcs8_der)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("PKCS8 parse for SPKI: {e}")))?;
// Reconstruct SPKI from AlgorithmIdentifier + public key
// For EC: derive public key from private key via ring
// For RSA: derive from rsa crate
let alg_id_oid = info.algorithm.oid;
let ec_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.2.1".parse()
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
if alg_id_oid == ec_oid {
extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der, &info)
} else {
extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der)
}
}
fn extract_ec_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8], info: &pkcs8::PrivateKeyInfo) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use ring::signature::KeyPair as _;
let params_oid = info.algorithm.parameters_oid()
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC curve OID: {e}")))?;
let p256_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7".parse()
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
let p384_oid: const_oid::ObjectIdentifier = "1.3.132.0.34".parse()
.map_err(|_| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed("OID parse".into()))?;
let (ring_alg, curve_oid_der): (&ring::signature::EcdsaSigningAlgorithm, Vec<u8>) = if params_oid == p256_oid {
(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 3, 1, 7]))
} else if params_oid == p384_oid {
(&ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING, encode_der_oid(&[1, 3, 132, 0, 34]))
} else {
return Err(CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("unsupported EC curve: {params_oid}")));
};
let kp = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::from_pkcs8(
ring_alg,
pkcs8_der,
&ring::rand::SystemRandom::new(),
).map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("EC key parse: {e}")))?;
let ec_kp = kp.public_key().as_ref().to_vec();
// SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (public key) }
// AlgorithmIdentifier = SEQUENCE { ecPublicKey OID, curve OID }
let ec_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1]);
let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&ec_oid_der, &curve_oid_der]);
let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&ec_kp);
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
}
fn extract_rsa_spki(pkcs8_der: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
use rsa::pkcs8::DecodePrivateKey;
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_pkcs8_der(pkcs8_der)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("RSA key parse: {e}")))?;
let public_key = rsa::RsaPublicKey::from(&private_key);
// Encode RSA public key as DER: SEQUENCE { n INTEGER, e INTEGER }
use rsa::traits::PublicKeyParts;
let n_bytes = public_key.n().to_bytes_be();
let e_bytes = public_key.e().to_bytes_be();
let rsa_pub_der = encode_der_sequence(&[
&encode_der_integer(&n_bytes),
&encode_der_integer(&e_bytes),
]);
// SPKI = SEQUENCE { AlgorithmIdentifier, BIT STRING (DER-encoded RSAPublicKey) }
let rsa_oid_der = encode_der_oid(&[1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1]);
let null_der = vec![0x05, 0x00];
let alg_id = encode_der_sequence(&[&rsa_oid_der, &null_der]);
let pub_key_bits = encode_der_bit_string(&rsa_pub_der);
Ok(encode_der_sequence(&[&alg_id, &pub_key_bits]))
}
fn build_extensions(attestation_ext_der: &[u8], purposes: &[i32]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut extensions: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::new();
// KeyUsage extension (critical)
let ku_byte = map_key_usage_byte(purposes);
if ku_byte != 0 {
let ku_ext = build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte);
extensions.push(ku_ext);
}
// Attestation extension (non-critical)
let attest_ext = build_extension(&encode_der_oid(ATTESTATION_OID), false, attestation_ext_der);
extensions.push(attest_ext);
Ok(encode_der_sequence_of(&extensions))
}
fn build_extension(oid_der: &[u8], critical: bool, value_der: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(value_der);
if critical {
let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
} else {
encode_der_sequence(&[oid_der, &value_octet_string])
}
}
fn build_key_usage_extension(ku_byte: u8) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER BIT STRING: minimal encoding requires trimming trailing zero bits
let unused_bits = ku_byte.trailing_zeros().min(7) as u8;
// BIT STRING = tag (0x03) + length(2) + unused_bits + byte
let bit_string = vec![0x03, 0x02, unused_bits, ku_byte];
let oid_der = encode_der_oid(OID_KEY_USAGE);
let value_octet_string = encode_der_octet_string(&bit_string);
let critical_der = encode_der_boolean(true);
encode_der_sequence(&[&oid_der, &critical_der, &value_octet_string])
}
// KeyUsage BIT STRING byte layout (RFC 5280):
// byte[0] bit 7 = digitalSignature (0x80)
// byte[0] bit 6 = nonRepudiation (0x40)
// byte[0] bit 5 = keyEncipherment (0x20)
// byte[0] bit 4 = dataEncipherment (0x10)
// byte[0] bit 3 = keyAgreement (0x08)
// byte[0] bit 2 = keyCertSign (0x04)
// byte[0] bit 1 = cRLSign (0x02)
// byte[0] bit 0 = encipherOnly (0x01)
// byte[1] bit 7 = decipherOnly (0x80)
fn map_key_usage_byte(purposes: &[i32]) -> u8 {
let mut bits: u8 = 0;
for &purpose in purposes {
match purpose {
2 => bits |= 0x80, // SIGN -> digitalSignature
1 => bits |= 0x10, // DECRYPT -> dataEncipherment
5 => bits |= 0x20, // WRAP_KEY -> keyEncipherment
6 => bits |= 0x08, // AGREE_KEY -> keyAgreement
7 => bits |= 0x04, // ATTEST_KEY -> keyCertSign
_ => {}
}
}
bits
}
fn encode_validity(not_before: &OffsetDateTime, not_after: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
let nb = encode_time(not_before);
let na = encode_time(not_after);
encode_der_sequence(&[&nb, &na])
}
fn encode_time(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
let year = dt.year();
if (1950..2050).contains(&year) {
encode_utctime(dt)
} else {
encode_gentime(dt)
}
}
fn encode_utctime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
// UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
let year = dt.year() % 100;
let s = format!(
"{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
year, dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
out.push(0x17); // UTCTime tag
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
out
}
fn encode_gentime(dt: &OffsetDateTime) -> Vec<u8> {
// GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
let s = format!(
"{:04}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}{:02}Z",
dt.year(), dt.month() as u8, dt.day(), dt.hour(), dt.minute(), dt.second()
);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + s.len());
out.push(0x18); // GeneralizedTime tag
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(s.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
out
}
fn encode_simple_cn_dn(cn: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
// Name = SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
// RDN = SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue
// ATV = SEQUENCE { OID, UTF8String }
let cn_oid = encode_der_oid(&[2, 5, 4, 3]);
let cn_value = encode_der_utf8string(cn);
let atv = encode_der_sequence(&[&cn_oid, &cn_value]);
let rdn = encode_der_set(&[&atv]);
encode_der_sequence(&[&rdn])
}
fn timestamp_to_datetime(ts: i64) -> Result<OffsetDateTime> {
if ts == -1 {
return Ok(OffsetDateTime::now_utc());
}
OffsetDateTime::from_unix_timestamp(ts / 1000)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::CertBuildFailed(format!("invalid timestamp {ts}: {e}")))
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DER encoding primitives
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn encode_der_length_bytes(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
if len < 0x80 {
vec![len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFF {
vec![0x81, len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFFFF {
vec![0x82, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
} else if len <= 0xFF_FFFF {
vec![0x83, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
} else {
vec![0x84, (len >> 24) as u8, (len >> 16) as u8, (len >> 8) as u8, len as u8]
}
}
fn encode_der_tag_length_value(tag: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(1 + 4 + content.len());
out.push(tag);
out.extend_from_slice(&encode_der_length_bytes(content.len()));
out.extend_from_slice(content);
out
}
fn encode_der_sequence(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
for item in items {
content.extend_from_slice(item);
}
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
}
fn encode_der_sequence_of(items: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
for item in items {
content.extend_from_slice(item);
}
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x30, &content)
}
fn encode_der_set(items: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
let total: usize = items.iter().map(|i| i.len()).sum();
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(total);
for item in items {
content.extend_from_slice(item);
}
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x31, &content)
}
fn encode_der_explicit_tag(tag_num: u8, content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
encode_der_tag_length_value(0xA0 | tag_num, content)
}
fn encode_der_integer(value: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
// DER INTEGER must have minimal encoding and leading 0x00 if high bit set
if value.is_empty() {
return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &[0x00]);
}
// Strip leading zeros (but keep at least one byte)
let mut start = 0;
while start < value.len() - 1 && value[start] == 0 {
start += 1;
}
let trimmed = &value[start..];
// Add leading 0x00 if high bit is set (positive integer)
if trimmed[0] & 0x80 != 0 {
let mut padded = Vec::with_capacity(1 + trimmed.len());
padded.push(0x00);
padded.extend_from_slice(trimmed);
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, &padded)
} else {
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x02, trimmed)
}
}
fn encode_der_bit_string(bits: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
// BIT STRING: tag 0x03, length, unused_bits (0), content
let mut content = Vec::with_capacity(1 + bits.len());
content.push(0x00); // 0 unused bits
content.extend_from_slice(bits);
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x03, &content)
}
fn encode_der_octet_string(content: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x04, content)
}
fn encode_der_utf8string(s: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x0C, s.as_bytes())
}
fn encode_der_boolean(val: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x01, &[if val { 0xFF } else { 0x00 }])
}
fn encode_der_oid(components: &[u64]) -> Vec<u8> {
if components.len() < 2 {
return encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &[]);
}
let mut content = Vec::new();
// First two components encoded as 40 * c[0] + c[1]
content.push((components[0] * 40 + components[1]) as u8);
for &c in &components[2..] {
encode_oid_subidentifier(&mut content, c);
}
encode_der_tag_length_value(0x06, &content)
}
fn encode_oid_subidentifier(buf: &mut Vec<u8>, mut value: u64) {
if value == 0 {
buf.push(0);
return;
}
// Encode in base-128 with continuation bits
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
while value > 0 {
bytes.push((value & 0x7F) as u8);
value >>= 7;
}
bytes.reverse();
// Set high bit on all but the last byte
for i in 0..bytes.len() - 1 {
bytes[i] |= 0x80;
}
buf.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
}
-75
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@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
use std::fmt;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum CertGenError {
Jni(String),
NullParam(&'static str),
UnsupportedAlgorithm(i32),
UnsupportedEcCurve(i32),
KeyGenFailed(String),
CertBuildFailed(String),
KeyboxParseFailed(String),
AttestationBuildFailed(String),
DerError(der::Error),
EmptyKeyboxChain,
ChallengeTooLong(usize),
InvalidParameter(String),
SigningFailed(String),
SerializationFailed(String),
}
impl fmt::Display for CertGenError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
Self::Jni(msg) => write!(f, "JNI error: {}", msg),
Self::NullParam(name) => write!(f, "null required parameter: {}", name),
Self::UnsupportedAlgorithm(v) => write!(f, "unsupported algorithm: {}", v),
Self::UnsupportedEcCurve(v) => write!(f, "unsupported EC curve: {}", v),
Self::KeyGenFailed(msg) => write!(f, "key generation failed: {}", msg),
Self::CertBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "certificate build failed: {}", msg),
Self::KeyboxParseFailed(msg) => write!(f, "keybox parse failed: {}", msg),
Self::AttestationBuildFailed(msg) => write!(f, "attestation build failed: {}", msg),
Self::DerError(e) => write!(f, "DER error: {}", e),
Self::EmptyKeyboxChain => write!(f, "keybox certificate chain is empty"),
Self::ChallengeTooLong(len) => write!(f, "attestation challenge too long: {} bytes (max 128)", len),
Self::InvalidParameter(msg) => write!(f, "invalid parameter: {}", msg),
Self::SigningFailed(msg) => write!(f, "signing failed: {}", msg),
Self::SerializationFailed(msg) => write!(f, "serialization failed: {}", msg),
}
}
}
impl std::error::Error for CertGenError {}
impl From<jni::errors::Error> for CertGenError {
fn from(e: jni::errors::Error) -> Self {
Self::Jni(e.to_string())
}
}
impl From<der::Error> for CertGenError {
fn from(e: der::Error) -> Self {
Self::DerError(e)
}
}
impl From<ring::error::Unspecified> for CertGenError {
fn from(e: ring::error::Unspecified) -> Self {
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
}
}
impl From<ring::error::KeyRejected> for CertGenError {
fn from(e: ring::error::KeyRejected) -> Self {
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
}
}
impl From<rsa::Error> for CertGenError {
fn from(e: rsa::Error) -> Self {
Self::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string())
}
}
pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, CertGenError>;
-96
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@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
use der::{Decode, Encode};
use x509_cert::Certificate;
pub struct ParsedKeybox {
pub signing_key_der: Vec<u8>,
pub issuer_dn_der: Vec<u8>,
pub cert_chain_ders: Vec<Vec<u8>>,
pub leaf_not_after: i64,
}
pub fn parse_keybox(cert_chain_bytes: &[u8], private_key_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<ParsedKeybox> {
let certs = split_der_certificates(cert_chain_bytes)?;
if certs.is_empty() {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates found".into()));
}
let leaf = Certificate::from_der(&certs[0])
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("leaf cert parse: {e}")))?;
let issuer_dn_der = leaf.tbs_certificate.subject.to_der()
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(format!("subject DN encode: {e}")))?;
let not_after = leaf.tbs_certificate.validity.not_after;
let leaf_not_after = not_after.to_unix_duration().as_secs() as i64;
Ok(ParsedKeybox {
signing_key_der: private_key_bytes.to_vec(),
issuer_dn_der,
cert_chain_ders: certs,
leaf_not_after,
})
}
fn split_der_certificates(data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
let mut certs = Vec::new();
let mut offset = 0;
while offset < data.len() {
if data[offset] != 0x30 {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
format!("expected SEQUENCE tag 0x30 at offset {offset}, got 0x{:02x}", data[offset])
));
}
let (content_len, header_len) = parse_der_length(&data[offset + 1..])?;
let total_len = 1 + header_len + content_len;
if offset + total_len > data.len() {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
format!("cert at offset {offset} extends beyond buffer: need {total_len}, have {}", data.len() - offset)
));
}
certs.push(data[offset..offset + total_len].to_vec());
offset += total_len;
}
if certs.is_empty() {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("no certificates in chain".into()));
}
Ok(certs)
}
// Returns (content_length, number_of_length_bytes_consumed)
fn parse_der_length(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(usize, usize)> {
if data.is_empty() {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated DER length".into()));
}
let first = data[0];
if first < 0x80 {
// Short form: length is the byte itself
return Ok((first as usize, 1));
}
// Long form: low 7 bits = number of subsequent length bytes
let num_bytes = (first & 0x7f) as usize;
if num_bytes == 0 || num_bytes > 4 {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed(
format!("unsupported DER length encoding: 0x{first:02x}")
));
}
if 1 + num_bytes > data.len() {
return Err(CertGenError::KeyboxParseFailed("truncated multi-byte DER length".into()));
}
let mut len: usize = 0;
for i in 0..num_bytes {
len = (len << 8) | (data[1 + i] as usize);
}
Ok((len, 1 + num_bytes))
}
-59
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@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
use crate::types::{Algorithm, EcCurve, GeneratedKeyPair};
pub fn generate_key_pair(
algorithm: Algorithm,
key_size: u32,
ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
rsa_public_exponent: u64,
) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
match algorithm {
Algorithm::Ec => {
let curve = ec_curve.ok_or_else(|| CertGenError::InvalidParameter("ec_curve required for EC".into()))?;
generate_ec_key_pair(curve)
}
Algorithm::Rsa => generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size, rsa_public_exponent),
}
}
fn generate_ec_key_pair(curve: EcCurve) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
let alg = match curve {
EcCurve::P256 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1_SIGNING,
EcCurve::P384 => &ring::signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1_SIGNING,
_ => return Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(curve as i32)),
};
let rng = ring::rand::SystemRandom::new();
let pkcs8_doc = ring::signature::EcdsaKeyPair::generate_pkcs8(alg, &rng)?;
Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_doc.as_ref().to_vec(),
})
}
fn generate_rsa_key_pair(key_size: u32, rsa_public_exponent: u64) -> Result<GeneratedKeyPair> {
use pkcs8::EncodePrivateKey;
if !matches!(key_size, 2048 | 3072 | 4096) {
return Err(CertGenError::InvalidParameter(
format!("RSA key size must be 2048, 3072, or 4096; got {key_size}")
));
}
let exp = if rsa_public_exponent == 0 {
rsa::BigUint::from(65537u64)
} else {
rsa::BigUint::from(rsa_public_exponent)
};
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let private_key = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::new_with_exp(&mut rng, key_size as usize, &exp)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::KeyGenFailed(e.to_string()))?;
let pkcs8_der = private_key.to_pkcs8_der()
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::SerializationFailed(e.to_string()))?;
Ok(GeneratedKeyPair {
private_key_pkcs8: pkcs8_der.as_bytes().to_vec(),
})
}
-324
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@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
#![deny(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
mod error;
mod types;
mod keygen;
pub mod keybox;
pub mod attestation;
pub mod certbuilder;
pub mod logging;
use jni::objects::{JByteArray, JClass, JIntArray, JObject, JString};
use jni::sys::{jboolean, jbyteArray, jstring};
use jni::JNIEnv;
use crate::error::{CertGenError, Result};
use crate::types::{Algorithm, CertGenParams, EcCurve};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JNI entry: generateAttestedKeyPair
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_generateAttestedKeyPair(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
config: JObject,
) -> jbyteArray {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
generate_attested_inner(&mut env, &config)
}));
match result {
Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
tracing::error!(%e, "generateAttestedKeyPair failed");
let _ = env.throw_new(
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
format!("NativeCertGen: {e}"),
);
std::ptr::null_mut()
}
Err(_) => {
tracing::error!("generateAttestedKeyPair panicked");
let _ = env.throw_new(
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
"NativeCertGen: internal panic",
);
std::ptr::null_mut()
}
}
}
fn generate_attested_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<jbyteArray> {
let params = extract_config(env, config)?;
let key_pair = keygen::generate_key_pair(
params.algorithm,
params.key_size,
params.ec_curve,
params.rsa_public_exponent,
)?;
let keybox = keybox::parse_keybox(&params.keybox_cert_chain, &params.keybox_private_key)?;
let attest_ext = attestation::build_attestation_extension(&params)?;
let cert_chain = certbuilder::build_certificate_chain(
&key_pair,
&attest_ext,
&keybox,
&params,
)?;
let blob = assemble_result(&key_pair.private_key_pkcs8, &cert_chain);
let out = env.byte_array_from_slice(&blob)?;
Ok(out.into_raw())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JNI entry: initLogging
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_initLogging(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
verbose: jboolean,
log_dir: JString,
) -> jboolean {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
init_logging_inner(&mut env, verbose, &log_dir)
}));
match result {
Ok(Ok(())) => 1,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
let _ = env.throw_new(
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
format!("NativeCertGen initLogging: {e}"),
);
0
}
Err(_) => {
let _ = env.throw_new(
"java/lang/RuntimeException",
"NativeCertGen initLogging: internal panic",
);
0
}
}
}
fn init_logging_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv, verbose: jboolean, log_dir: &JString) -> Result<()> {
let dir: String = env.get_string(log_dir)?.into();
logging::init(verbose != 0, &dir, 2, 3)
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("logging init failed: {e}")))?;
Ok(())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JNI entry: dumpLogs
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "system" fn Java_org_matrix_TEESimulator_pki_NativeCertGen_dumpLogs(
mut env: JNIEnv,
_class: JClass,
) -> jstring {
let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
dump_logs_inner(&mut env)
}));
match result {
Ok(Ok(raw)) => raw,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
tracing::error!(%e, "dumpLogs failed");
std::ptr::null_mut()
}
Err(_) => {
tracing::error!("dumpLogs panicked");
std::ptr::null_mut()
}
}
}
fn dump_logs_inner(env: &mut JNIEnv) -> Result<jstring> {
logging::dump::execute_dump()
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("dump failed: {e}")))?;
// Read the dump path written by execute_dump
let path = std::fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path")
.map_err(|e| CertGenError::Jni(format!("read dump path: {e}")))?;
let jpath = env.new_string(&path)?;
Ok(jpath.into_raw())
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Config extraction from Java CertGenConfig object
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn extract_config(env: &mut JNIEnv, config: &JObject) -> Result<CertGenParams> {
let algorithm = get_int(env, config, "algorithm")?;
let key_size = get_int(env, config, "keySize")?;
let ec_curve_raw = get_int(env, config, "ecCurve")?;
let rsa_pub_exp = get_long(env, config, "rsaPublicExponent")?;
let cert_not_before = get_long(env, config, "certNotBefore")?;
let cert_not_after = get_long(env, config, "certNotAfter")?;
let security_level = get_int(env, config, "securityLevel")?;
let attest_version = get_int(env, config, "attestVersion")?;
let keymaster_version = get_int(env, config, "keymasterVersion")?;
let os_version = get_int(env, config, "osVersion")?;
let os_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "osPatchLevel")?;
let vendor_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "vendorPatchLevel")?;
let boot_patch_level = get_int(env, config, "bootPatchLevel")?;
let creation_datetime = get_long(env, config, "creationDatetime")?;
let attestation_challenge = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "attestationChallenge")?;
let purposes = get_int_array(env, config, "purposes")?;
let digests = get_int_array(env, config, "digests")?;
let cert_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSerial")?;
let cert_subject = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "certSubject")?;
let keybox_private_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxPrivateKey")?;
let keybox_cert_chain = get_byte_array(env, config, "keyboxCertChain")?;
let boot_key = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootKey")?;
let boot_hash = get_byte_array(env, config, "bootHash")?;
let attestation_app_id = get_byte_array(env, config, "attestationApplicationId")?;
let module_hash = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "moduleHash")?;
let id_brand = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idBrand")?;
let id_device = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idDevice")?;
let id_product = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idProduct")?;
let id_serial = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSerial")?;
let id_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idImei")?;
let id_meid = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idMeid")?;
let id_manufacturer = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idManufacturer")?;
let id_model = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idModel")?;
let id_second_imei = get_nullable_byte_array(env, config, "idSecondImei")?;
Ok(CertGenParams {
algorithm: Algorithm::try_from(algorithm)?,
key_size: key_size as u32,
ec_curve: if algorithm == 3 {
Some(EcCurve::try_from(ec_curve_raw)?)
} else {
None
},
rsa_public_exponent: rsa_pub_exp as u64,
attestation_challenge,
purposes,
digests,
cert_serial,
cert_subject,
cert_not_before,
cert_not_after,
keybox_private_key,
keybox_cert_chain,
security_level,
attest_version,
keymaster_version,
os_version,
os_patch_level,
vendor_patch_level,
boot_patch_level,
boot_key,
boot_hash,
creation_datetime,
attestation_application_id: attestation_app_id,
module_hash,
id_brand,
id_device,
id_product,
id_serial,
id_imei,
id_meid,
id_manufacturer,
id_model,
id_second_imei,
})
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JNI field accessor helpers — called 35+ times, justifies the abstraction
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn get_int(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i32> {
Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "I")?.i()?)
}
fn get_long(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<i64> {
Ok(env.get_field(obj, name, "J")?.j()?)
}
fn get_byte_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &'static str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
if field.is_null() {
return Err(CertGenError::NullParam(name));
}
let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
Ok(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect())
}
fn get_nullable_byte_array(
env: &mut JNIEnv,
obj: &JObject,
name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[B")?.l()?;
if field.is_null() {
return Ok(None);
}
let arr: JByteArray = field.into();
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
let mut buf = vec![0i8; len as usize];
env.get_byte_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
Ok(Some(buf.into_iter().map(|b| b as u8).collect()))
}
fn get_int_array(env: &mut JNIEnv, obj: &JObject, name: &str) -> Result<Vec<i32>> {
let field = env.get_field(obj, name, "[I")?.l()?;
if field.is_null() {
return Ok(vec![]);
}
let arr: JIntArray = field.into();
let len = env.get_array_length(&arr)?;
let mut buf = vec![0i32; len as usize];
env.get_int_array_region(&arr, 0, &mut buf)?;
env.delete_local_ref(arr)?;
Ok(buf)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Binary result assembly (doc 09 section 4.1)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn assemble_result(private_key: &[u8], cert_chain: &[Vec<u8>]) -> Vec<u8> {
let total = 4 + private_key.len()
+ 4
+ cert_chain.iter().map(|c| 4 + c.len()).sum::<usize>();
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(total);
// Private key segment
buf.extend_from_slice(&(private_key.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(private_key);
// Cert count
buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert_chain.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
// Each cert: length-prefixed DER
for cert in cert_chain {
buf.extend_from_slice(&(cert.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(cert);
}
buf
}
-208
View File
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
use std::fs::{self, File};
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::path::Path;
use std::process::Command;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
const DUMP_DIR: &str = "/sdcard/Download";
const LOCK_PATH: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_lock";
const DUMP_PATH_FILE: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.dump_path";
const LOG_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/logs";
const BASE_DIR: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store";
const LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT: usize = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
struct FlockGuard {
_file: File,
}
impl FlockGuard {
fn acquire() -> Result<Self, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if let Some(parent) = Path::new(LOCK_PATH).parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
let file = File::create(LOCK_PATH)?;
let fd = {
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
file.as_raw_fd()
};
let ret = unsafe { libc::flock(fd, libc::LOCK_EX | libc::LOCK_NB) };
if ret != 0 {
return Err("dump already in progress".into());
}
Ok(Self { _file: file })
}
}
impl Drop for FlockGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
// flock released automatically when file descriptor closes
}
}
fn random_name(len: usize) -> String {
use rand::Rng;
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
(0..len)
.map(|_| {
let idx = rng.gen_range(0..36u8);
if idx < 10 {
(b'0' + idx) as char
} else {
(b'a' + idx - 10) as char
}
})
.collect()
}
fn collect_logcat(tag: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let output = Command::new("logcat")
.args(["-d", "-s", tag])
.output();
match output {
Ok(o) => {
let mut data = o.stdout;
data.truncate(LOGCAT_SIZE_LIMIT);
data
}
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
}
}
fn collect_device_info() -> String {
let mut info = String::new();
if let Ok(output) = Command::new("uname").arg("-a").output() {
info.push_str(&format!(
"uname={}\n",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
));
}
for (key, prop) in [
("device", "ro.product.device"),
("build", "ro.build.display.id"),
("android", "ro.build.version.release"),
] {
if let Ok(output) = Command::new("getprop").arg(prop).output() {
info.push_str(&format!(
"{}={}\n",
key,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim()
));
}
}
// KSU version
if let Ok(ver) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/ksu/version") {
info.push_str(&format!("ksu={}\n", ver.trim()));
}
// Module version from module.prop
if let Ok(prop) = fs::read_to_string("/data/adb/modules/tricky_store/module.prop") {
for line in prop.lines() {
if let Some(ver) = line.strip_prefix("version=") {
info.push_str(&format!("module={}\n", ver.trim()));
break;
}
}
}
info
}
fn read_file_bytes(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = Vec::new();
File::open(path).ok()?.read_to_end(&mut buf).ok()?;
Some(buf)
}
fn epoch_millis() -> u64 {
SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_millis() as u64)
.unwrap_or(0)
}
pub fn execute_dump() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let _lock = FlockGuard::acquire()?;
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(DUMP_DIR);
let zip_name = format!("{}.zip", random_name(8));
let zip_path = format!("{}/{}", DUMP_DIR, zip_name);
let zip_file = File::create(&zip_path)?;
let mut zip = zip::ZipWriter::new(zip_file);
let options =
zip::write::SimpleFileOptions::default().compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated);
let mut file_count = 0u32;
// Log files
let log_files = [
"certgen.log",
"certgen.log.1",
"certgen.log.2",
"certgen.log.3",
"certgen.log.4",
];
for name in &log_files {
let path = format!("{}/{}", LOG_DIR, name);
if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
zip.start_file(*name, options)?;
zip.write_all(&data)?;
file_count += 1;
}
}
// Logcat
let logcat = collect_logcat("TEESimulator");
if !logcat.is_empty() {
zip.start_file("logcat-teesimulator.log", options)?;
zip.write_all(&logcat)?;
file_count += 1;
}
// Config files
for name in ["tee_status.txt", "security_patch.txt"] {
let path = format!("{}/{}", BASE_DIR, name);
if let Some(data) = read_file_bytes(&path) {
zip.start_file(name, options)?;
zip.write_all(&data)?;
file_count += 1;
}
}
// Device info
let device_info = collect_device_info();
if !device_info.is_empty() {
zip.start_file("device-info.txt", options)?;
zip.write_all(device_info.as_bytes())?;
file_count += 1;
}
// Manifest
let manifest = serde_json::json!({
"timestamp": epoch_millis(),
"version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
"files": file_count,
});
zip.start_file("manifest.json", options)?;
zip.write_all(manifest.to_string().as_bytes())?;
zip.finish()?;
let zip_size = fs::metadata(&zip_path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
fs::write(DUMP_PATH_FILE, &zip_path)?;
let result = serde_json::json!({
"zip": zip_path,
"size": zip_size,
"files": file_count + 1, // +1 for manifest
});
println!("{}", result);
tracing::info!(path = %zip_path, size = zip_size, "diagnostic dump created");
Ok(())
}
-93
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@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
use std::io::Write;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
const KMSG_PATH: &str = "/dev/kmsg";
const TAG: &str = "TEESimulator";
pub struct KmsgLayer {
writer: Mutex<Option<File>>,
}
impl KmsgLayer {
pub fn new() -> Self {
let file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(KMSG_PATH).ok();
Self {
writer: Mutex::new(file),
}
}
}
fn syslog_priority(level: &Level) -> u8 {
match *level {
Level::ERROR => 3,
Level::WARN => 4,
Level::INFO => 6,
Level::DEBUG | Level::TRACE => 7,
}
}
struct MessageVisitor {
message: String,
fields: String,
}
impl MessageVisitor {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
message: String::new(),
fields: String::new(),
}
}
}
impl Visit for MessageVisitor {
fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
if field.name() == "message" {
let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
// Strip surrounding debug quotes if present
self.message = raw
.strip_prefix('"')
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
.unwrap_or(&raw)
.to_string();
} else {
if !self.fields.is_empty() {
self.fields.push(' ');
}
self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
}
}
}
impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for KmsgLayer {
fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
let mut guard = match self.writer.lock() {
Ok(g) => g,
Err(_) => return,
};
let file = match guard.as_mut() {
Some(f) => f,
None => return,
};
let priority = syslog_priority(event.metadata().level());
let mut visitor = MessageVisitor::new();
event.record(&mut visitor);
let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
format!("<{}>{}: {}\n", priority, TAG, visitor.message)
} else {
format!(
"<{}>{}: {} {}\n",
priority, TAG, visitor.message, visitor.fields
)
};
let _ = file.write_all(line.as_bytes());
}
}
-41
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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
mod kmsg;
mod rotating;
pub mod sysfs;
pub mod dump;
use std::path::Path;
use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt, EnvFilter};
const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
pub fn init(
verbose_flag: bool,
log_dir: &str,
max_size_mb: u64,
max_files: usize,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let verbose = verbose_flag || Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists();
let (max_size, max_files) = if verbose {
(5 * 1024 * 1024, 5)
} else {
(max_size_mb * 1024 * 1024, max_files)
};
let level = if verbose { "trace" } else { "info" };
let filter = EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| EnvFilter::new(level));
let kmsg_layer = kmsg::KmsgLayer::new();
let rotating_layer = rotating::RotatingFileLayer::new(log_dir, max_size, max_files);
let stderr_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr);
// Idempotent — second call returns Ok instead of propagating SetGlobalDefaultError
let _ = tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter)
.with(kmsg_layer)
.with(rotating_layer)
.with(stderr_layer)
.try_init();
Ok(())
}
-166
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@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
use std::io::Write;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use tracing::field::{Field, Visit};
use tracing::{Event, Level, Subscriber};
use tracing_subscriber::layer::Context;
use tracing_subscriber::Layer;
struct RotatingState {
dir: PathBuf,
current: Option<File>,
current_size: u64,
max_size: u64,
max_files: usize,
}
pub struct RotatingFileLayer {
state: Mutex<RotatingState>,
}
impl RotatingFileLayer {
pub fn new(dir: &str, max_size: u64, max_files: usize) -> Self {
let dir = PathBuf::from(dir);
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(&dir);
let (file, size) = open_current_log(&dir);
Self {
state: Mutex::new(RotatingState {
dir,
current: file,
current_size: size,
max_size,
max_files,
}),
}
}
}
fn open_current_log(dir: &Path) -> (Option<File>, u64) {
let path = dir.join("certgen.log");
let size = fs::metadata(&path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
let file = OpenOptions::new()
.create(true)
.append(true)
.open(&path)
.ok();
(file, size)
}
fn rotate(state: &mut RotatingState) {
// Close current handle before renaming
state.current.take();
let dir = &state.dir;
// Delete the oldest rotated file before shifting
let oldest = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", state.max_files));
if oldest.exists() {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&oldest);
}
// Shift older files up: .{N} -> .{N+1}
for i in (1..state.max_files).rev() {
let from = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i));
let to = dir.join(format!("certgen.log.{}", i + 1));
if from.exists() {
let _ = fs::rename(&from, &to);
}
}
// Current -> .1
let current_path = dir.join("certgen.log");
let first_rotated = dir.join("certgen.log.1");
if current_path.exists() {
let _ = fs::rename(&current_path, &first_rotated);
}
let (file, size) = open_current_log(dir);
state.current = file;
state.current_size = size;
}
fn epoch_secs() -> u64 {
SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(0)
}
fn level_str(level: &Level) -> &'static str {
match *level {
Level::ERROR => "ERROR",
Level::WARN => "WARN",
Level::INFO => "INFO",
Level::DEBUG => "DEBUG",
Level::TRACE => "TRACE",
}
}
struct LogVisitor {
message: String,
fields: String,
}
impl LogVisitor {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
message: String::new(),
fields: String::new(),
}
}
}
impl Visit for LogVisitor {
fn record_debug(&mut self, field: &Field, value: &dyn std::fmt::Debug) {
if field.name() == "message" {
let raw = format!("{:?}", value);
self.message = raw
.strip_prefix('"')
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('"'))
.unwrap_or(&raw)
.to_string();
} else {
if !self.fields.is_empty() {
self.fields.push(' ');
}
self.fields.push_str(&format!("{}={:?}", field.name(), value));
}
}
}
impl<S: Subscriber> Layer<S> for RotatingFileLayer {
fn on_event(&self, event: &Event<'_>, _ctx: Context<'_, S>) {
let mut state = match self.state.lock() {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(_) => return,
};
if state.current_size >= state.max_size {
rotate(&mut state);
}
let file = match state.current.as_mut() {
Some(f) => f,
None => return,
};
let ts = epoch_secs();
let lvl = level_str(event.metadata().level());
let target = event.metadata().target();
let mut visitor = LogVisitor::new();
event.record(&mut visitor);
let line = if visitor.fields.is_empty() {
format!("{} [{}] {}: {}\n", ts, lvl, target, visitor.message)
} else {
format!(
"{} [{}] {}: {} {}\n",
ts, lvl, target, visitor.message, visitor.fields
)
};
if file.write_all(line.as_bytes()).is_ok() {
state.current_size += line.len() as u64;
}
}
}
-38
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@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
const VERBOSE_MARKER: &str = "/data/adb/tricky_store/.verbose";
pub fn is_verbose() -> bool {
Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists()
}
pub fn set_verbose_marker(enabled: bool) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if enabled {
if let Some(parent) = Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).parent() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
}
fs::write(VERBOSE_MARKER, "")?;
} else if Path::new(VERBOSE_MARKER).exists() {
fs::remove_file(VERBOSE_MARKER)?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn enable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
set_verbose_marker(true)?;
tracing::info!("verbose logging enabled via marker file");
Ok(())
}
pub fn disable() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
set_verbose_marker(false)?;
tracing::info!("verbose logging disabled, marker file removed");
Ok(())
}
pub fn status() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let state = if is_verbose() { "enabled" } else { "disabled" };
tracing::info!(verbose = state, "verbose marker status");
Ok(())
}
-121
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@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
use crate::error::CertGenError;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum Algorithm {
Rsa = 1,
Ec = 3,
}
impl TryFrom<i32> for Algorithm {
type Error = CertGenError;
fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
match value {
1 => Ok(Self::Rsa),
3 => Ok(Self::Ec),
_ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedAlgorithm(value)),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum EcCurve {
P224 = 0,
P256 = 1,
P384 = 2,
P521 = 3,
Curve25519 = 4,
}
impl TryFrom<i32> for EcCurve {
type Error = CertGenError;
fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
match value {
0 => Ok(Self::P224),
1 => Ok(Self::P256),
2 => Ok(Self::P384),
3 => Ok(Self::P521),
4 => Ok(Self::Curve25519),
_ => Err(CertGenError::UnsupportedEcCurve(value)),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum KeyPurpose {
Encrypt = 0,
Decrypt = 1,
Sign = 2,
Verify = 3,
WrapKey = 5,
AgreeKey = 6,
AttestKey = 7,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum SecurityLevel {
Software = 0,
TrustedEnvironment = 1,
StrongBox = 2,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(i32)]
pub enum VerifiedBootState {
Verified = 0,
SelfSigned = 1,
Unverified = 2,
Failed = 3,
}
pub struct CertGenParams {
pub algorithm: Algorithm,
pub key_size: u32,
pub ec_curve: Option<EcCurve>,
pub rsa_public_exponent: u64,
pub attestation_challenge: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub purposes: Vec<i32>,
pub digests: Vec<i32>,
pub cert_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub cert_subject: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub cert_not_before: i64,
pub cert_not_after: i64,
pub keybox_private_key: Vec<u8>,
pub keybox_cert_chain: Vec<u8>,
pub security_level: i32,
pub attest_version: i32,
pub keymaster_version: i32,
pub os_version: i32,
pub os_patch_level: i32,
pub vendor_patch_level: i32,
pub boot_patch_level: i32,
pub boot_key: Vec<u8>,
pub boot_hash: Vec<u8>,
pub creation_datetime: i64,
pub attestation_application_id: Vec<u8>,
pub module_hash: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_brand: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_device: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_product: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_serial: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_meid: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_manufacturer: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_model: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub id_second_imei: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
pub struct GeneratedKeyPair {
pub private_key_pkcs8: Vec<u8>,
}
-262
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@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Build, package, deploy, and verify TEESimulator module ZIPs.
# Usage: ./scripts/package.sh [flags]
#
# Examples:
# ./scripts/package.sh --release # build release ZIP
# ./scripts/package.sh --all --clean # clean build, both variants
# ./scripts/package.sh --release --deploy --reboot # build, push, install, reboot
# ./scripts/package.sh --deploy --verify # deploy latest ZIP + verify via logcat
# ./scripts/package.sh --rust --release # build Rust crate first, then release
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
PROJECT_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
OUT_DIR="$PROJECT_ROOT/out"
VARIANT=""
CLEAN=false
DEPLOY=false
REBOOT=false
VERIFY=false
BUILD_RUST=false
CLEAR_KEYS=false
TRACE=false
ROOT_PROVIDER="ksu"
red() { printf '\033[0;31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
green() { printf '\033[0;32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
yellow() { printf '\033[0;33m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
bold() { printf '\033[1m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $(basename "$0") [options]
Build variants (pick one, or --all):
--release Build release variant (default if none specified)
--debug Build debug variant
--all Build both debug and release
Build options:
--clean Run gradle clean before building
--rust Build native-certgen Rust crate before Gradle
Deploy options:
--deploy Push ZIP to device and install
--reboot Reboot device after install
--clear-keys Clear persistent_keys before deploy
--verify Run logcat verification after deploy
--root PROVIDER Root provider: ksu (default), magisk, apatch
Misc:
-v, --verbose Print every command as it runs (set -x)
--help Show this help
EOF
exit 0
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
--release) VARIANT="release"; shift ;;
--debug) VARIANT="debug"; shift ;;
--all) VARIANT="all"; shift ;;
--clean) CLEAN=true; shift ;;
--deploy) DEPLOY=true; shift ;;
--reboot) REBOOT=true; shift ;;
--verify) VERIFY=true; shift ;;
--rust) BUILD_RUST=true; shift ;;
--clear-keys) CLEAR_KEYS=true; shift ;;
-v|--verbose) TRACE=true; shift ;;
--root) ROOT_PROVIDER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
--help|-h) usage ;;
*) red "Unknown flag: $1"; usage ;;
esac
done
[[ -z "$VARIANT" ]] && VARIANT="release"
[[ "$TRACE" == true ]] && set -x
case "$ROOT_PROVIDER" in
ksu) INSTALL_CMD="ksud module install" ;;
magisk) INSTALL_CMD="magisk --install-module" ;;
apatch) INSTALL_CMD="/data/adb/apd module install" ;;
*) red "Unknown root provider: $ROOT_PROVIDER"; exit 1 ;;
esac
build_rust() {
local cargo_toml="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/Cargo.toml"
if [[ ! -f "$cargo_toml" ]]; then
red "native-certgen/Cargo.toml not found — skipping Rust build"
return 0
fi
bold "==> Building native-certgen (aarch64)"
if ! command -v cargo-ndk &>/dev/null; then
red "cargo-ndk not found. Install: cargo install cargo-ndk"
exit 1
fi
(cd "$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen" && \
cargo ndk -t arm64-v8a --platform 29 -- build --release)
local so="$PROJECT_ROOT/native-certgen/target/aarch64-linux-android/release/libcertgen.so"
if [[ -f "$so" ]]; then
local size
size=$(du -h "$so" | cut -f1)
green " libcertgen.so built ($size)"
else
red " libcertgen.so not found after build"
exit 1
fi
}
gradle_build() {
local tasks=()
[[ "$CLEAN" == true ]] && tasks+=(clean)
case "$VARIANT" in
release) tasks+=(zipRelease) ;;
debug) tasks+=(zipDebug) ;;
all) tasks+=(zipDebug zipRelease) ;;
esac
bold "==> Gradle: ${tasks[*]}"
(cd "$PROJECT_ROOT" && ./gradlew "${tasks[@]}")
}
find_latest_zip() {
local pattern="$1"
ls -t "$OUT_DIR"/$pattern 2>/dev/null | head -1
}
deploy_zip() {
local zip="$1"
local name
name=$(basename "$zip")
if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
red "No ADB device connected"
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$CLEAR_KEYS" == true ]]; then
bold "==> Clearing persistent_keys"
adb shell "rm -rf /data/adb/tricky_store/persistent_keys/*" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
bold "==> Deploying $name"
adb push "$zip" /data/local/tmp/module.zip
adb shell "su -c '$INSTALL_CMD /data/local/tmp/module.zip'"
green " Installed via $ROOT_PROVIDER"
if [[ "$REBOOT" == true ]]; then
bold "==> Rebooting"
adb reboot
echo " Waiting for device..."
adb wait-for-device
sleep 10
local pid
pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
green " Daemon alive (PID $pid)"
else
yellow " Daemon not yet started — check logcat"
fi
fi
}
verify_device() {
bold "==> Verification"
if ! adb get-state &>/dev/null; then
red "No ADB device connected"
exit 1
fi
local pid
pid=$(adb shell "pidof TEESimulator" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -n "$pid" ]]; then
green " Daemon: running (PID $pid)"
else
red " Daemon: not running"
fi
local tee_status
tee_status=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/tee_status.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
echo " TEE status: $tee_status"
local sec_patch
sec_patch=$(adb shell "cat /data/adb/tricky_store/security_patch.txt" 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A")
echo " Security patch config: $(echo "$sec_patch" | head -1)"
local errors
errors=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
grep -iE "error|exception" | \
grep -v "StrongBox\|SurfaceRuntime\|ClassLoader\|HARDWARE_TYPE_UNAVAILABLE" | \
wc -l)
if [[ "$errors" -eq 0 ]]; then
green " Logcat errors: 0"
else
yellow " Logcat errors: $errors (run: adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator | grep -iE 'error|exception')"
fi
local throttle_events
throttle_events=$(adb logcat -d -s TEESimulator 2>/dev/null | \
grep -cE "RATE_LIMITED|CONCURRENT_LIMITED" || true)
echo " Rate limit events: $throttle_events"
}
print_summary() {
echo ""
bold "==> Build Summary"
local variants=()
case "$VARIANT" in
release) variants=(Release) ;;
debug) variants=(Debug) ;;
all) variants=(Debug Release) ;;
esac
for v in "${variants[@]}"; do
local zip
zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${v}.zip")
if [[ -n "$zip" ]]; then
local size
size=$(du -h "$zip" | cut -f1)
green " $v: $(basename "$zip") ($size)"
else
red " $v: ZIP not found"
fi
done
}
# --- Main ---
echo ""
bold "TEESimulator-RS package pipeline"
echo ""
[[ "$BUILD_RUST" == true ]] && build_rust
gradle_build
print_summary
if [[ "$DEPLOY" == true ]]; then
local_variant="$VARIANT"
[[ "$local_variant" == "all" ]] && local_variant="release"
cap="${local_variant^}"
zip=$(find_latest_zip "*-${cap}.zip")
if [[ -z "$zip" ]]; then
red "No $cap ZIP found to deploy"
exit 1
fi
deploy_zip "$zip"
fi
[[ "$VERIFY" == true ]] && verify_device
echo ""
green "Done."
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dependencyResolutionManagement {
} }
} }
rootProject.name = "TEESimulator-RS" rootProject.name = "TEESimulator"
include(":stub") include(":stub")
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ public interface IPackageManager {
ParceledListSlice<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(long flags, int userId); ParceledListSlice<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(long flags, int userId);
int checkPermission(String permName, String pkgName, int userId);
class Stub { class Stub {
public static IPackageManager asInterface(IBinder binder) { public static IPackageManager asInterface(IBinder binder) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!"); throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
package android.os;
public class SELinux {
public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
}
@@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ public class ServiceManager {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!"); throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
} }
public static boolean isDeclared(String name) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
public static String[] listServices() { public static String[] listServices() {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!"); throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
} }
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
package android.os;
public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
public final int errorCode;
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
this.errorCode = errorCode;
}
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
super(message);
this.errorCode = errorCode;
}
}