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45 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Enginex0 634a1293c1 docs(readme): credit MhmRdd for upstream AOSP compliance work 2026-03-19 07:37:53 +01:00
Enginex0 f115eda2dc chore(version): bump to v5.0 with changelog for AOSP compliance overhaul 2026-03-19 07:36:20 +01:00
Enginex0 217edf61fe docs: credit upstream PR #157 contributors 2026-03-19 07:33:57 +01:00
Enginex0 ee5bf2e1a7 feat(config): add SELinux permission checks, latency simulation, and hbk seed
ConfigurationManager gains checkSELinuxPermission (reads /proc/pid/attr)
and hasPermissionForUid (delegates to IPackageManager.checkPermission)
for AOSP-compliant access control. TeeLatencySimulator provides log-normal
distribution matching real QTEE/Trustonic hardware timing profiles.

Module customize.sh now generates a device-unique hardware-bound key seed
(32 bytes from /dev/random) and clears stale tee_status.txt on install.
2026-03-19 07:33:47 +01:00
Enginex0 2181157cb6 feat(operation): add AOSP-compliant error handling, authorize_create, and GCM IV
SoftwareOperation now throws ServiceSpecificException for all error paths
instead of raw Java exceptions, matching AIDL wire format. updateAad on
non-AEAD operations returns INVALID_TAG (-76) per AOSP operation.rs.
SoftwareOperationBinder methods are @Synchronized to match AOSP Mutex
semantics. GCM encrypt operations return the generated IV in
CreateOperationResponse.parameters.

AuthorizeCreate enforces PURPOSE validation, algorithm-purpose
compatibility (EC rejects ENCRYPT/DECRYPT, RSA rejects AGREE_KEY),
temporal constraints (ACTIVE_DATETIME, ORIGINATION_EXPIRE, USAGE_EXPIRE),
and CALLER_NONCE prohibition. GeneratedKeyInfo carries keyParams for
authorize_create enforcement on software createOperation.
2026-03-19 07:33:30 +01:00
Enginex0 aa4917e623 feat(interception): add binder tx code filtering and keystore2 service compliance
Native binder_interceptor now accepts a filtered_codes vector per
registration, skipping JNI round-trip for non-intercepted transaction
codes. Keystore2Interceptor adds getNumberOfEntries software key counting,
deleteKey KEY_ID domain resolution, patchAuthorizations for OS/VENDOR/BOOT
patch levels, importedKeys tracking to prevent stale attest-key overrides,
and nspace consistency fix in the attest-key override path.

InterceptorUtils gains createServiceSpecificErrorReply for AIDL-compliant
error serialization and patchAuthorizations for authorization array patching.
2026-03-19 07:33:11 +01:00
Enginex0 f06cb30b40 feat(attestation): align attestation extension and cert generation with AOSP
KeyMintAttestation now carries all 17 enforcement tags that AOSP's
authorize_create and buildKeyDescription paths expect. AttestationBuilder
populates BLOCK_MODE as SET OF INTEGER, gates version-guarded tags
(RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST >=100, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE >=3, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY >=4),
computes INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID via HMAC-SHA256 per KeyMint HAL spec, and
gates AAID on challenge presence.

CertificateGenerator uses AOSP cert validity defaults (epoch notBefore,
9999-12-31 notAfter), returns ServiceSpecificException(-75) for missing
keybox, and adds RSA exponent null safety.
2026-03-19 07:32:53 +01:00
Enginex0 03c71bd202 docs(release): add v4.8.1 changelog for StrongBox op rejection fix 2026-03-18 03:24:58 +01:00
Enginex0 7e2fc0b288 fix(interception): enforce StrongBox op limit for software-generated keys
trackAndEnforceOpLimit was only called in the Domain.KEY_ID not-found
path, so software-generated keys (found via Domain.APP) bypassed the
STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4 limit entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent
signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU
pruning instead of being rejected with TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29).
2026-03-18 03:21:34 +01:00
Enginex0 258a65ba59 docs(release): add v4.8 changelog for StrongBox hardening and LRU pruning 2026-03-17 19:56:45 +01:00
Enginex0 d2b8a92fbd chore(version): bump to v4.8 2026-03-17 19:48:48 +01:00
Enginex0 0723865eab feat(interception): add StrongBox hardening and LRU operation pruning
DuckDetector flags several behavioral anomalies that real TEE/StrongBox
hardware exhibits but our software interceptor did not:

- LRU pruning: cap concurrent ops at 15 (TEE) / 4 (StrongBox) per UID,
  aborting oldest when exceeded — matches AOSP keystore2 malus scoring
- StrongBox param guard: forward unsupported params (RSA>2048, non-P256)
  to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software
- StrongBox latency floors: 250ms keygen, 80ms sign to match real SE
  timing characteristics
- Sliding-window op limit for hardware-generated StrongBox keys that
  bypass the software pruning path
- Domain.APP lookup path for createOperation to find software-generated
  keys that never reach keystore2's database
2026-03-17 19:48:40 +01:00
Enginex0 7cb44b9999 feat(operation): add LRU pruning support and latency floor to SoftwareOperation
Expose finalized state for pruning, add latency floor parameter for
StrongBox timing simulation, and add trace logging for 32KB test
diagnosis.
2026-03-17 19:48:29 +01:00
Enginex0 eddd9908af fix(certgen): accept ECDSA as EC algorithm alias in JCA key type matching
Some Android 10 devices (e.g. Sony H8296) report EC private key
algorithm as "ECDSA" instead of "EC", causing IllegalArgumentException
in certificate signing and a SIGSEGV crash in the keystore process.

Closes #4
2026-03-17 19:48:19 +01:00
Enginex0 36ccd22cdc fix(operation): correct TOO_MUCH_DATA fallback to match AOSP ResponseCode
AOSP ResponseCode.TOO_MUCH_DATA = 21, not 29.
2026-03-17 14:16:00 +01:00
Enginex0 81e6fbf97e fix(keygen): forward symmetric algorithms to HAL and add missing JCA mappings
Symmetric keys (AES/HMAC/3DES) don't have KeyPairs or attestation
certs — routing them through doSoftwareKeyGen crashes with
"Unsupported algorithm: 32". Skip the software path entirely and
let the real HAL handle them.

Also adds CTR block mode, RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN cipher padding, and
RSA_PSS signature padding to JcaAlgorithmMapper.
2026-03-17 13:44:25 +01:00
Enginex0andGitHub 7f63713f07 fix(interception): add permission checks for device ID attestation tags
fix(interception): Add permission checks for KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor and fix some regression
2026-03-17 13:05:36 +01:00
fatalcoder524 5df76eacd1 fix(interception): Add permission checks for KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor and fix some regression
1. Add permission checks for KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor to ensure that only authorized users can access sensitive information about the security level of the key mint.
2. Fix regression where device id attestation was allowed for all users by adding appropriate permission checks.
3. Update .gitignore to exclude build artifacts and generated files to keep the repository clean and prevent accidental commits of unnecessary files.
2026-03-17 11:49:54 +00:00
Enginex0 ca3978888e docs(release): bump to v4.7 with operation and attestation fixes changelog 2026-03-17 07:12:30 +01:00
Enginex0 023d7f929d fix(operation): match AOSP error-path semantics for software operations
KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker (flag 0x400000) probes three
error-path behaviors that real keystore2 operations expose. Our
SoftwareOperationBinder was missing all three, plus had no updateAad
implementation which caused AbstractMethodError on Android 16 where
the runtime Stub declares it abstract.

SoftwareOperation changes:
- Add finalized state tracking; post-abort calls now throw
  INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28) matching AOSP operation.rs
- Add input length guard (0x8000) throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA (29)
  matching AOSP operation.rs MAX_RECEIVE_DATA
- Add updateAad to CryptoPrimitive interface and SoftwareOperationBinder
- Add KeystoreErrorCodes with runtime reflection + AOSP fallback values

KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor changes:
- Infer algorithm from stored key pair when operation params omit
  ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior where createOperation uses
  the key's stored algorithm rather than requiring it in op params

Stub addition:
- ServiceSpecificException compile stub (framework-internal class
  resolved at runtime on device)

Tested on OnePlus Android 16 (SDK 36) — KeyDetector passes all three
probes: updateAad succeeds, TOO_MUCH_DATA returns code=21,
INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE returns after abort.
2026-03-17 07:04:59 +01:00
Enginex0 bd40f4b950 fix(attestation): encode PADDING as SET OF INTEGER per AOSP schema
PADDING (tag 6) is ENUM_REP in Tag.aidl, meaning SET OF INTEGER in the
attestation extension ASN.1 — same as PURPOSE and DIGEST. Commit f8bfa0d
added it as individual [6] INTEGER entries, causing parsers to fail with
CertificateParsingException on any RSA key attestation.
2026-03-17 04:36:49 +01:00
Enginex0 23696d2f61 ci(release): fetch full history for accurate commit count 2026-03-17 03:43:16 +01:00
Enginex0 dfacb34cf9 chore(brand): rebrand to TEESimulator-RS with simplified versioning
Fork identity: rename across module metadata, CI pipeline, and build
scripts. Version scheme changed from v4.5-115-7e87766 to v4.6-117
format — commit count auto-increments, git hash dropped from filenames.
2026-03-17 03:35:32 +01:00
Enginex0 06d9db443c perf(keygen): replace Gaussian RTT normalization with 15ms floor fence
The old Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms, stddev=12ms) triggered detection on
Chunqiu Native Check 2.8. A flat 15ms floor satisfies the minimum RTT
threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern — both attested
and non-attested paths get identical treatment, keeping the D50 ratio
at ~1.0 while staying above the >=15ms requirement.
2026-03-17 03:35:20 +01:00
Enginex0 7e87766493 fix(certgen): derive signing algorithm from attestation key and allow device ID tags
signerAlgorithm was derived from params.algorithm (the generated key)
instead of the signing key, causing BouncyCastle to throw when signing
RSA keys with an EC attestation key. Now reads signingKeyPair.private.algorithm.

Device ID tags (serial/imei/meid/secondImei) were blanket-rejected
instead of flowing through to software cert gen like AOSP does.
Narrowed rejection to DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION only.
2026-03-17 00:05:56 +01:00
Enginex0 f8bfa0dfd8 fix(attestation): align authorization list and cert extension with AOSP keystore2 semantics
toAuthorizations() was missing OS_VERSION, OS_PATCHLEVEL, VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, CREATION_DATETIME, USER_ID, PADDING, and RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT
tags that real TEE-generated KeyMetadata always includes. EC_CURVE was also
hardcoded unconditionally, producing invalid authorizations for RSA keys.

Additionally, live-patched certificate chains in getKeyEntry weren't cached,
causing re-patching on every call with potentially different signatures.

Ports upstream JingMatrix/TEESimulator#148 and #150.
2026-03-16 23:01:28 +01:00
Enginex0 90ff59e0aa fix(interception): check generatedKeys before deletedSoftwareKeys on getKeyEntry
The deletion guard must not shadow re-generated keys. If an app
deletes a key then re-creates it, getKeyEntry was still returning
KEY_NOT_FOUND because deletedSoftwareKeys was checked first.
2026-03-16 22:36:02 +01:00
Enginex0 8bdf0d59fa docs(release): bump to v4.5 with detection hardening changelog 2026-03-16 22:07:56 +01:00
Enginex0 6ab09f4889 fix(interception): prevent ghost key responses after software key deletion
After deleting a software-generated key, getKeyEntry was falling
through to the real keystore2 service which could return a stale
hardware key with the same alias. The post-transact live-patch
fallback would then resurrect the key with a patched chain —
detectors flag this as binder inconsistency.

Track deleted software key aliases and return KEY_NOT_FOUND (7) for
subsequent getKeyEntry calls. Also always invoke cleanupKeyData on
delete to clear stale patchedChains entries for hardware keys.
2026-03-16 22:06:53 +01:00
Enginex0 f4559bcd19 perf(keygen): normalize software generateKey RTT to match TEE latency
Software-generated keys complete in ~4ms, real TEE averages 55-65ms
with a floor around 15ms. Detectors measure this RTT to distinguish
software from hardware paths. Gaussian delay sampling (mean=55ms,
σ=12ms, floor=15ms) brings total RTT into the expected range.
2026-03-16 22:06:38 +01:00
Enginex0 3b5043a1bb docs(release): bump to v4.4 with AOSP conformance changelog 2026-03-16 13:26:34 +01:00
Enginex0 8001a8678a fix(interception): absorb upstream correctness fixes and patch error reply format
Cherry-pick three upstream fixes: Parcel position reset in hasException()
so the method doesn't consume reply data (7804743), list_past_alias
enumeration filter inversion (2aac65c), and KeyMetadata alignment with
AOSP semantics — modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, KeyDescriptor
normalization (86db5bf).

Additionally, createErrorReply() was missing the empty remote stack
trace header int between the exception message and error code, per
AOSP Status.cpp:196. Binder readers expecting the standard
EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire format would misparse our error replies.
2026-03-16 13:23:36 +01:00
Enginex0 d21822eb9d docs(release): bump to v4.3 with changelog and update metadata 2026-03-11 13:12:03 +01:00
Enginex0 095a658996 ci(build): fix pipeline trigger and release job gating
paths-ignore for .github/** was preventing workflow-only pushes
from triggering the pipeline at all. Release job was gated to
push events only, so workflow_dispatch never published. Simplify
paths-ignore to just **.md and allow both push and dispatch to
trigger the release job.
2026-03-11 13:03:35 +01:00
Enginex0 70e8968e44 ci(build): use mv instead of cp to avoid duplicate artifacts
cp left the original zip alongside the renamed copy, so the glob
matched both — doubling artifact size. mv removes the original.
2026-03-11 12:51:02 +01:00
Enginex0 c122ded7bf perf(daemon): add restart backoff, process priority, and map eviction
Supervisor had zero-delay restart on crash loops — pins CPU core at
100% if daemon keeps dying. Add exponential backoff (500ms to 30s cap,
resets after 30s stable). Set nice=10 on daemon child to yield CPU
to foreground apps. Evict stale entries from fileLocks and rate limiter
ConcurrentHashMaps that grew unbounded. Upload pre-built flashable zips
in CI instead of unpacking and re-compressing loose files.
2026-03-11 12:41:57 +01:00
Enginex0 7b510a9915 perf(logging): gate debug-level logs behind isDebugBuild
debug() was hitting Log.d() unconditionally in release builds —
every intercepted binder transaction triggered string formatting
and logcat syscalls. verbose() already had the guard; debug() was
just missing it. Also remove dead SERVICE_SLEEP_MS constant.
2026-03-11 12:41:46 +01:00
Enginex0 8f63dda31b ci(build): add release job with changelog and both ZIPs
The workflow only uploaded unzipped contents as CI artifacts —
no GitHub release was ever created from CI. Restructured into
build + release jobs: build produces both debug and release ZIPs
(renamed to clean `TEESimulator-vX.Y-{Variant}.zip` format),
release extracts changelog from module/changelog.md and publishes
a GitHub release with both ZIPs attached.
2026-03-11 04:06:20 +01:00
Enginex0 9896df93de build(gradle): keep debug symbols in debug variant
Debug ZIPs now ship unstripped native libs sourced from
merged_native_libs instead of stripped_native_libs. Gives
meaningful stack traces for crash debugging on-device.
2026-03-11 00:45:00 +01:00
Enginex0 0280bcf189 docs(readme): add build badge and building-from-source section 2026-03-11 00:28:28 +01:00
Enginex0 438a462bdf ci(build): add Rust toolchain and cargo-ndk for native-certgen
Gradle's buildRustCertgen task requires cargo-ndk and Android NDK
targets to cross-compile libcertgen.so. Without these, CI fails on
any commit after 32cfcb3 which wired the Rust crate into the pipeline.
2026-03-11 00:12:02 +01:00
Enginex0 40b08cd648 docs(release): bump to v4.2 with changelog and update metadata 2026-03-10 16:55:39 +01:00
Enginex0 c5ed627f68 chore(module): bump versionCode to 95 2026-03-10 16:37:58 +01:00
Enginex0 bee73eb39b perf(binder): skip interception for system transaction codes
AIDL methods use codes 1..0x00ffffff. System transactions like
PING_TRANSACTION (0x5f4e4750) fall above that range. Intercepting
pings forces a full JNI round-trip to Java and back, adding enough
latency for timing detectors to flag the ratio (3.85x vs 3.0x
threshold). Early-return for codes above LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION
eliminates this overhead while preserving all AIDL interception.
2026-03-10 16:37:50 +01:00
Enginex0 a0ee77202c fix(attestation): correct leaf CN casing and enforce keystore2 parameter policy
Leaf cert Subject CN used "KeyStore" (capital S) but AOSP
KeyGenParameterSpec uses "Keystore" (lowercase s). Fixed in both
the Rust native certgen and BouncyCastle paths.

Replicate keystore2's security_level.rs parameter validation for
software-generated keys: reject CREATION_DATETIME (output-only tag,
ResponseCode 20) and device ID attestation tags (CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS
-66) that real keystore2 blocks before they reach the HAL.

Also fix createErrorReply parcel write order — AIDL protocol expects
exception_code, message, error_code but we had message and error_code
swapped, causing malformed replies for positive error codes.
2026-03-10 14:23:33 +01:00
38 changed files with 1541 additions and 296 deletions
+92 -73
View File
@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@ name: Build
on:
push:
branches: [ "main" ]
paths-ignore:
- '**.md'
- '.github/**'
- '!.github/workflows/**'
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
pull_request:
branches: [ "main" ]
paths-ignore:
- '**.md'
- '.github/**'
- '!.github/workflows/**'
paths-ignore: [ '**.md' ]
workflow_dispatch:
concurrency:
@@ -22,18 +16,9 @@ concurrency:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
attestations: write
contents: read
outputs:
releaseName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
debugName: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
steps:
- name: Check out
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
submodules: "recursive"
fetch-depth: 0
@@ -45,6 +30,25 @@ jobs:
java-version: 21
cache: 'gradle'
- name: Setup Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
targets: aarch64-linux-android,armv7-linux-androideabi,i686-linux-android,x86_64-linux-android
- name: Cache Rust artifacts
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
~/.cargo/bin/cargo-ndk
native-certgen/target
key: rust-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('native-certgen/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: rust-${{ runner.os }}-
- name: Install cargo-ndk
run: command -v cargo-ndk || cargo install cargo-ndk
- name: Set up ccache
uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2
with:
@@ -60,73 +64,88 @@ jobs:
- name: Build with Gradle
run: |
chmod +x ./gradlew
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug -Porg.gradle.parallel=true -Porg.gradle.vfs.watch=true -Dorg.gradle.jvmargs=-Xmx2048m
- name: Prepare artifact
if: success()
id: prepareArtifact
- name: Read version
id: ver
run: |
set -e
RELEASE_FILE=$(find out -name "*Release*.zip" | head -1)
DEBUG_FILE=$(find out -name "*Debug*.zip" | head -1)
if [[ -z "$RELEASE_FILE" || -z "$DEBUG_FILE" ]]; then
echo "Error: Could not find release or debug files in out/"
echo "Contents of out/ directory:"
ls -la out/ || echo "out/ directory does not exist"
exit 1
fi
# Extract names
RELEASE_NAME=$(basename "$RELEASE_FILE" .zip)
DEBUG_NAME=$(basename "$DEBUG_FILE" .zip)
echo "releaseName=$RELEASE_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "debugName=$DEBUG_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
mkdir -p module-release module-debug
unzip -q "$RELEASE_FILE" -d module-release
unzip -q "$DEBUG_FILE" -d module-debug
echo " Release: $RELEASE_NAME"
echo " Debug: $DEBUG_NAME"
- name: List build artifacts
run: |
echo "Release: $(ls out/*Release*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Release*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
echo "Debug: $(ls out/*Debug*.zip | head -1) ($(du -h out/*Debug*.zip | head -1 | cut -f1))"
- name: Upload release
if: success()
id: release
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}
path: "./module-release/*"
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Release.zip
retention-days: 30
compression-level: 6
compression-level: 0
- name: Upload debug
if: success()
id: debug
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}
path: "./module-debug/*"
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
path: out/TEESimulator-RS-*-Debug.zip
retention-days: 7
compression-level: 6
compression-level: 0
- name: Upload release mappings
if: success()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: release-mappings-${{ github.run_number }}
path: "./app/build/outputs/mapping/release"
name: release-mappings
path: app/build/outputs/mapping/release
retention-days: 30
compression-level: 9
- name: Summary
if: always()
release:
needs: build
if: (github.event_name == 'push' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Read version
id: ver
run: |
echo "## Build Summary" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Status**: ${{ job.status }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Gradle Tasks**: assembleRelease, assembleDebug" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
if [[ "${{ job.status }}" == "success" ]]; then
echo "- **Release Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.releaseName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
echo "- **Debug Artifact**: ${{ steps.prepareArtifact.outputs.debugName }}" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
fi
ver=$(grep 'val verName' app/build.gradle.kts | sed 's/.*"\(.*\)".*/\1/')
count=$(git rev-list HEAD --count)
echo "version=${ver}-${count}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: TEESimulator-RS-release-zip
path: zips
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
name: TEESimulator-RS-debug-zip
path: zips
- name: Extract changelog
run: |
ver="${VER#v}"
awk "/^## TEESimulator-RS v${ver%%-*}/{flag=1; next} /^## TEESimulator-RS v/{if(flag) exit} flag" module/changelog.md > /tmp/notes.md
cat /tmp/notes.md
env:
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
- name: Create release
run: |
gh release delete "$VER" --yes 2>/dev/null || true
RELEASE=$(ls zips/*Release*.zip | head -1)
DEBUG=$(ls zips/*Debug*.zip | head -1)
gh release create "$VER" \
--title "$VER" \
--latest \
--notes-file /tmp/notes.md \
"$RELEASE" \
"$DEBUG"
env:
VER: ${{ steps.ver.outputs.version }}
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+6
View File
@@ -1 +1,7 @@
out
.gradle
.kotlin
app/build
build
native-certgen/target
app/src/main/jniLibs
+23 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
<p align="center"><b>Full TEE Emulation for Rooted Android</b></p>
<p align="center">Hardware attestation. Software keys. Zero detection.</p>
<p align="center">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.0-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.0">
<a href="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/actions/workflows/build.yml/badge.svg" alt="Build"></a>
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-v4.2-blue?style=for-the-badge" alt="v4.2">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Android-10%2B-green?style=for-the-badge&logo=android" alt="Android 10+">
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-community-blue?style=for-the-badge&logo=telegram" alt="Telegram">
</p>
@@ -112,6 +113,24 @@ TEESimulator replaces TrickyStore, TrickyStoreOSS, and their forks. Existing con
---
## 🔨 Building from Source
The CI workflow builds on every push to `main`. You can also build locally or trigger a build from your own fork.
**Prerequisites:** JDK 21, Android SDK/NDK 27, Rust stable with `aarch64-linux-android` target, `cargo-ndk`.
```bash
git clone https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator.git
cd TEESimulator
./gradlew zipRelease zipDebug
```
Output ZIPs land in `out/`. The Gradle build automatically invokes `cargo ndk` to cross-compile `libcertgen.so` before packaging.
To rebuild from a fork, push to `main` or use **Actions → Build → Run workflow**. The workflow installs all toolchains (Java, Rust, cargo-ndk, ccache) and uploads Release + Debug ZIPs as artifacts.
---
## ⚙️ Configuration
All configuration files live at `/data/adb/tricky_store/` and are monitored by `FileObserver` — changes take effect immediately without rebooting.
@@ -223,6 +242,9 @@ boot=device_default
- **[5ec1cff](https://github.com/5ec1cff/TrickyStore)** — TrickyStore, the project that pioneered keystore interception on Android
- **[LSPlt](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPlt)** — PLT hook library used for binder interception
- **[ring](https://github.com/briansmith/ring)** — Rust cryptography library powering native cert generation
- **[MhmRdd](https://github.com/MhmRdd)** — AOSP compliance improvements via upstream [PR #157](https://github.com/JingMatrix/TEESimulator/pull/157), including authorize_create enforcement, attestation extension alignment, and binder transaction filtering
- **[fatalcoder524](https://github.com/fatalcoder524)** — a real contributor and collaborator on this project
- **[huguangares](https://github.com/huguangares)** — collaborator and tester
---
+17 -17
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ val gitExecutor = objects.newInstance(GitExecutor::class.java)
val gitCommitCount = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-list HEAD --count", rootDir).toInt()
val gitCommitHash = gitExecutor.execute("git rev-parse --verify --short HEAD", rootDir)
val verName = "v4.1"
val verName = "v5.0"
android {
namespace = "org.matrix.TEESimulator"
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ dependencies {
// --- Rust native cert gen build task ---
val buildRustCertgen by tasks.registering(Exec::class) {
group = "TEESimulator Native Build"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Native Build"
description = "Builds libcertgen.so via cargo-ndk for arm64-v8a."
workingDir = rootProject.projectDir.resolve("native-certgen")
@@ -108,21 +108,21 @@ androidComponents {
// --- Define output locations and file names ---
// Stage all files in a temporary directory inside 'build' before zipping
val tempModuleDir = project.layout.buildDirectory.dir("module/${variant.name}")
val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-$capitalized.zip"
val zipFileName = "TEESimulator-RS-$verName-$gitCommitCount-$capitalized.zip"
// Task 1: Prepare all module files in the temporary build directory.
// Using Sync ensures that stale files from previous runs are removed.
val prepareModuleFilesTask =
tasks.register<Sync>("prepareModuleFiles${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
description = "Prepares all files for the ${variant.name} module zip."
if (isDebug) {
dependsOn("package${capitalized}")
} else {
dependsOn("minify${capitalized}WithR8")
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
}
dependsOn("strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols")
dependsOn(buildRustCertgen)
if (isDebug) {
@@ -140,12 +140,13 @@ androidComponents {
}
}
from(
project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
)
) {
into("lib") // Place them in the 'lib' subfolder of the staging directory.
val nativeLibsDir = if (isDebug) {
"intermediates/merged_native_libs/${variant.name}/merge${capitalized}NativeLibs/out/lib"
} else {
"intermediates/stripped_native_libs/${variant.name}/strip${capitalized}DebugSymbols/out/lib"
}
from(project.layout.buildDirectory.dir(nativeLibsDir)) {
into("lib")
include("**/libinject.so", "**/libTEESimulator.so", "**/libsupervisor.so", "**/libcertgen.so")
}
@@ -161,8 +162,7 @@ androidComponents {
// Use expand() for simple key-value replacement.
expand(
"REPLACEMEVERCODE" to gitCommitCount.toString(),
"REPLACEMEVER" to
"$verName ($gitCommitCount-$gitCommitHash-${variant.name})",
"REPLACEMEVER" to "$verName-$gitCommitCount",
)
}
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ androidComponents {
// Task 2: Zip the prepared files from the temporary directory.
val zipTask =
tasks.register<Zip>("zip${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator Module Packaging"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Packaging"
description = "Creates the flashable zip for the ${variant.name} module."
dependsOn(prepareModuleFilesTask)
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ androidComponents {
fun createInstallTasks(rootProvider: String, installCli: String) {
val pushTask =
tasks.register<Exec>("push${rootProvider}Module${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
description =
"Pushes the ${variant.name} module to the device for $rootProvider."
dependsOn(zipTask)
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ androidComponents {
val installTask =
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider."
dependsOn(pushTask)
commandLine(
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ androidComponents {
}
tasks.register<Exec>("install${rootProvider}AndReboot${capitalized}") {
group = "TEESimulator Module Installation"
group = "TEESimulator-RS Module Installation"
description = "Installs the ${variant.name} module via $rootProvider and reboots."
dependsOn(installTask)
commandLine("adb", "reboot")
+27 -8
View File
@@ -235,19 +235,21 @@ class BinderInterceptor : public BBinder {
struct RegistrationEntry {
wp<IBinder> target;
sp<IBinder> callback_interface;
std::vector<uint32_t> filtered_codes;
};
// Reader-Writer lock for the registry to allow concurrent reads (lookups)
mutable std::shared_mutex registry_mutex_;
std::map<wp<IBinder>, RegistrationEntry> registry_;
public:
BinderInterceptor() = default;
// Checks if a specific Binder instance is currently registered for interception
bool isBinderIntercepted(const wp<BBinder> &target) const {
bool shouldIntercept(const wp<BBinder> &target, uint32_t code) const {
std::shared_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
return registry_.find(target) != registry_.end();
auto it = registry_.find(target);
if (it == registry_.end()) return false;
const auto &codes = it->second.filtered_codes;
return codes.empty() || std::find(codes.begin(), codes.end(), code) != codes.end();
}
// Main entry point for processing the "Man-in-the-Middle" logic
@@ -358,6 +360,12 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
if (txn_data->data_size > kMaxInterceptableDataSize)
return;
// AIDL methods use codes in [FIRST_CALL_TRANSACTION, LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION] (1..0x00ffffff).
// System transactions (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP, SHELL_COMMAND) use codes above that range.
// Skip those — intercepting a ping adds measurable latency that timing detectors flag.
if (txn_data->code > 0x00ffffffu && txn_data->code != intercept::kBackdoorCode)
return;
bool hijack = false;
ThreadTransactionInfo info;
@@ -387,7 +395,7 @@ void inspectAndRewriteTransaction(binder_transaction_data *txn_data) {
// This is safe because we are holding a strong reference.
wp<BBinder> wp_target = target_binder_ptr;
if (g_interceptor_instance->isBinderIntercepted(wp_target)) {
if (g_interceptor_instance->shouldIntercept(wp_target, txn_data->code)) {
info.transaction_code = txn_data->code;
info.target_binder = wp_target; // Assign the valid weak pointer
hijack = true;
@@ -532,18 +540,29 @@ status_t BinderInterceptor::handleRegister(const Parcel &data) {
if (data.readStrongBinder(&callback) != OK || !callback)
return BAD_VALUE;
// We can only intercept local Binders (BBinder), not remote proxies (BpBinder)
if (target->localBinder() == nullptr) {
LOGE("Cannot intercept remote binder proxies.");
return BAD_TYPE;
}
std::vector<uint32_t> codes;
int32_t code_count = 0;
if (data.dataAvail() >= sizeof(int32_t) && data.readInt32(&code_count) == OK && code_count > 0) {
codes.reserve(code_count);
for (int32_t i = 0; i < code_count; i++) {
uint32_t c = 0;
if (data.readUint32(&c) == OK) codes.push_back(c);
}
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p with %zu filtered codes", target.get(), codes.size());
} else {
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p (all codes)", target.get());
}
wp<IBinder> weak_target = target;
std::unique_lock lock(registry_mutex_);
registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback};
registry_[weak_target] = {weak_target, callback, std::move(codes)};
LOGI("Interceptor registered for binder %p", target.get());
return OK;
}
+20 -1
View File
@@ -2,11 +2,13 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>
static volatile sig_atomic_t should_exit = 0;
@@ -27,7 +29,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
const char *daemon_path = argv[1];
char **daemon_argv = &argv[1];
int backoff_ms = 500;
while (!should_exit) {
struct timespec child_start;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &child_start);
pid_t pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
@@ -39,6 +46,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (pid == 0) {
// Child: become the daemon
prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL); // Die if parent dies
setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, 10); // lower CPU priority than foreground
execv(daemon_path, daemon_argv);
perror("execv failed");
_exit(127);
@@ -50,7 +58,18 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (should_exit) break;
// Instant restart - no delay
// Exponential backoff on rapid crashes, reset if child was stable
struct timespec now;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &now);
long lived_ms = (now.tv_sec - child_start.tv_sec) * 1000 +
(now.tv_nsec - child_start.tv_nsec) / 1000000;
if (lived_ms > 30000) {
backoff_ms = 500;
} else {
usleep(backoff_ms * 1000);
if (backoff_ms < 30000) backoff_ms *= 2;
}
}
return 0;
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
object App {
// The delay in milliseconds before retrying to initialize the interceptor.
private const val RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000L
// The sleep duration in milliseconds for the main service loop to keep the process alive.
private const val SERVICE_SLEEP_MS = 1000000L
/**
* The main entry point of the TEESimulator application.
@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@ package org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import android.os.Build
import java.nio.ByteBuffer
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
import java.security.MessageDigest
import javax.crypto.Mac
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Boolean
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Encodable
import org.bouncycastle.asn1.ASN1Enumerated
@@ -127,33 +130,59 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
return properties
}
/** Constructs the main `KeyDescription` sequence, which is the core of the attestation. */
private fun buildKeyDescription(
params: KeyMintAttestation,
uid: Int,
securityLevel: Int,
): ASN1Sequence {
val creationTime = System.currentTimeMillis()
val teeEnforced = buildTeeEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel)
val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid, securityLevel)
val softwareEnforced = buildSoftwareEnforcedList(params, uid, securityLevel, creationTime)
val uniqueId =
if (params.includeUniqueId == true && params.attestationChallenge != null) {
computeUniqueId(creationTime, createApplicationId(uid).octets)
} else {
ByteArray(0)
}
val fields =
arrayOf(
ASN1Integer(
AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
), // attestationVersion
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // attestationSecurityLevel
ASN1Integer(
AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()
), // keymasterVersion
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel), // keymasterSecurityLevel
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)), // attestationChallenge
DEROctetString(ByteArray(0)), // uniqueId
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
ASN1Integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.getKeymasterVersion(securityLevel).toLong()),
ASN1Enumerated(securityLevel),
DEROctetString(params.attestationChallenge ?: ByteArray(0)),
DEROctetString(uniqueId),
softwareEnforced,
teeEnforced,
)
return DERSequence(fields)
}
private fun computeUniqueId(creationTimeMs: Long, aaidDer: ByteArray): ByteArray {
val temporalCounter = creationTimeMs / 2592000000L
val message =
ByteBuffer.allocate(8 + aaidDer.size + 1)
.putLong(temporalCounter)
.put(aaidDer)
.put(0x00)
.array()
val mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256")
mac.init(SecretKeySpec(hbk, "HmacSHA256"))
return mac.doFinal(message).copyOf(16)
}
private val hbk: ByteArray by lazy {
val file = java.io.File(ConfigurationManager.CONFIG_PATH, "hbk")
if (file.exists() && file.length() == 32L) {
file.readBytes()
} else {
SystemLogger.warning("hbk not found, generating ephemeral HBK.")
ByteArray(32).also { java.security.SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }
}
}
/** Builds the `TeeEnforced` authorization list. These are properties the TEE "guarantees". */
private fun buildTeeEnforcedList(
params: KeyMintAttestation,
@@ -182,23 +211,110 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
AttestationConstants.TAG_DIGEST,
DERSet(params.digest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
),
)
if (params.ecCurve != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_EC_CURVE,
ASN1Integer(params.ecCurve.toLong()),
),
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE),
)
)
}
if (params.blockMode.isNotEmpty()) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_BLOCK_MODE,
DERSet(params.blockMode.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.padding.isNotEmpty()) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_PADDING,
DERSet(params.padding.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
ASN1Integer(params.rsaPublicExponent.toLong()),
)
)
}
val attestVersion = AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel)
if (params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.isNotEmpty() && attestVersion >= 100) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST,
DERSet(params.rsaOaepMgfDigest.map { ASN1Integer(it.toLong()) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
}
if (params.rollbackResistance == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.earlyBootOnly == true && attestVersion >= 4) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.noAuthRequired == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.allowWhileOnBody == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.trustedUserPresenceRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
if (params.trustedConfirmationRequired == true && attestVersion >= 3) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
list.addAll(
listOf(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGIN,
ASN1Integer(0L),
), // KeyOrigin.GENERATED
ASN1Integer((params.origin ?: 0).toLong()),
),
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST,
buildRootOfTrust(null),
),
)
)
// Use the same logic as getSimulatedHardwareProperties to conditionally add patch levels.
val simulatedProperties = getSimulatedHardwareProperties(uid)
@@ -295,20 +411,32 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
* Builds the `SoftwareEnforced` authorization list. These are properties guaranteed by
* Keystore.
*/
private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(uid: Int, securityLevel: Int): DERSequence {
val list =
mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
ASN1Integer(System.currentTimeMillis()),
),
private fun buildSoftwareEnforcedList(
params: KeyMintAttestation,
uid: Int,
securityLevel: Int,
creationTimeMs: Long = System.currentTimeMillis(),
): DERSequence {
val list = mutableListOf<ASN1Encodable>()
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_CREATION_DATETIME,
ASN1Integer(creationTimeMs),
)
)
if (params.attestationChallenge != null) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
true,
AttestationConstants.TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
createApplicationId(uid),
),
)
)
}
if (AndroidDeviceUtils.getAttestVersion(securityLevel) >= 400) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(
@@ -318,7 +446,34 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
)
)
}
return DERSequence(list.toTypedArray())
params.activeDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.originationExpireDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.usageExpireDateTime?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, ASN1Integer(it.time))
)
}
params.usageCountLimit?.let {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1Integer(it.toLong()))
)
}
if (params.unlockedDeviceRequired == true) {
list.add(
DERTaggedObject(true, AttestationConstants.TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, DERNull.INSTANCE)
)
}
return DERSequence(list.sortedBy { (it as DERTaggedObject).tagNo }.toTypedArray())
}
/**
@@ -346,6 +501,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
*/
@Throws(Throwable::class)
internal fun createApplicationId(uid: Int): DEROctetString {
val appUid = uid % 100000
if (appUid == 0 || appUid == 1000) {
return buildApplicationIdDer(listOf("AndroidSystem" to 1L), emptySet())
}
val pm =
ConfigurationManager.getPackageManager()
?: throw IllegalStateException("PackageManager not found!")
@@ -353,12 +513,11 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
pm.getPackagesForUid(uid) ?: throw IllegalStateException("No packages for UID $uid")
val sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<DERSequence>()
val packageInfoList = mutableListOf<Pair<String, Long>>()
val signatureDigests = mutableSetOf<Digest>()
// Process all packages associated with the UID in a single loop.
val userId = uid / 100000
packages.forEach { packageName ->
val userId = uid / 100000
val packageInfo =
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.TIRAMISU) {
pm.getPackageInfo(
@@ -371,34 +530,36 @@ object AttestationBuilder {
pm.getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET_SIGNING_CERTIFICATES, userId)
}
// Add package information (name and version code) to our list.
packageInfoList.add(
DERSequence(
arrayOf(
DEROctetString(packageInfo.packageName.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
ASN1Integer(packageInfo.longVersionCode),
)
)
)
packageInfoList.add(packageInfo.packageName to packageInfo.longVersionCode)
// Collect unique signature digests from the signing history.
packageInfo.signingInfo?.signingCertificateHistory?.forEach { signature ->
val digest = sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())
signatureDigests.add(Digest(digest))
signatureDigests.add(Digest(sha256.digest(signature.toByteArray())))
}
}
// The application ID is a sequence of two sets:
// 1. A set of package information (name and version).
// 2. A set of SHA-256 digests of the signing certificates.
return buildApplicationIdDer(packageInfoList, signatureDigests)
}
private fun buildApplicationIdDer(
packages: List<Pair<String, Long>>,
digests: Set<Digest>,
): DEROctetString {
val packageInfoList =
packages.map { (name, version) ->
DERSequence(
arrayOf(
DEROctetString(name.toByteArray(StandardCharsets.UTF_8)),
ASN1Integer(version),
)
)
}
val applicationIdSequence =
DERSequence(
arrayOf(
DERSet(packageInfoList.toTypedArray()),
DERSet(signatureDigests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
DERSet(digests.map { DEROctetString(it.digest) }.toTypedArray()),
)
)
return DEROctetString(applicationIdSequence.encoded)
}
}
@@ -44,9 +44,11 @@ object AttestationConstants {
// --- Key Lifetime and Usage Control ---
const val TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 303
const val TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = 305
const val TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME = 400
const val TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 401
const val TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = 402
const val TAG_MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = 403
const val TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = 404
const val TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = 405
@@ -56,6 +58,10 @@ object AttestationConstants {
const val TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = 503
const val TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE = 504
const val TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 505
const val TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = 506
const val TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = 507
const val TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = 508
const val TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = 509
// --- Attestation and Application Info ---
const val TAG_APPLICATION_ID = 601
@@ -89,5 +95,5 @@ object AttestationConstants {
// --- Other Constants ---
// https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128 // kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength
const val CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT = 128
}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
data class KeyMintAttestation(
val keySize: Int,
val algorithm: Int,
val ecCurve: Int,
val ecCurve: Int?,
val ecCurveName: String,
val origin: Int?,
val blockMode: List<Int>,
@@ -41,19 +41,35 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
val manufacturer: ByteArray?,
val model: ByteArray?,
val secondImei: ByteArray?,
val activeDateTime: Date?,
val originationExpireDateTime: Date?,
val usageExpireDateTime: Date?,
val usageCountLimit: Int?,
val callerNonce: Boolean?,
val unlockedDeviceRequired: Boolean?,
val includeUniqueId: Boolean?,
val rollbackResistance: Boolean?,
val earlyBootOnly: Boolean?,
val allowWhileOnBody: Boolean?,
val trustedUserPresenceRequired: Boolean?,
val trustedConfirmationRequired: Boolean?,
val noAuthRequired: Boolean?,
val maxUsesPerBoot: Int?,
val maxBootLevel: Int?,
val minMacLength: Int?,
val rsaOaepMgfDigest: List<Int>,
) {
/** Secondary constructor that populates the fields by parsing an array of `KeyParameter`. */
constructor(
params: Array<KeyParameter>
) : this(
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = KEY_SIZE, field = Integer)]
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: 0,
keySize = params.findInteger(Tag.KEY_SIZE) ?: params.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(),
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ALGORITHM, field = Algorithm)]
algorithm = params.findAlgorithm(Tag.ALGORITHM) ?: 0,
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = EC_CURVE, field = EcCurve)]
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE) ?: 0,
ecCurve = params.findEcCurve(Tag.EC_CURVE),
ecCurveName = params.deriveEcCurveName(),
// AOSP: [key_param(tag = ORIGIN, field = Origin)]
@@ -100,6 +116,23 @@ data class KeyMintAttestation(
manufacturer = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER),
model = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL),
secondImei = params.findBlob(Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI),
activeDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ACTIVE_DATETIME),
originationExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
usageExpireDateTime = params.findDate(Tag.USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME),
usageCountLimit = params.findInteger(Tag.USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT),
callerNonce = params.findBoolean(Tag.CALLER_NONCE),
unlockedDeviceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED),
includeUniqueId = params.findBoolean(Tag.INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID),
rollbackResistance = params.findBoolean(Tag.ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE),
earlyBootOnly = params.findBoolean(Tag.EARLY_BOOT_ONLY),
allowWhileOnBody = params.findBoolean(Tag.ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY),
trustedUserPresenceRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED),
trustedConfirmationRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED),
noAuthRequired = params.findBoolean(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
maxUsesPerBoot = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_USES_PER_BOOT),
maxBootLevel = params.findInteger(Tag.MAX_BOOT_LEVEL),
minMacLength = params.findInteger(Tag.MIN_MAC_LENGTH),
rsaOaepMgfDigest = params.findAllDigests(Tag.RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST),
) {
// Log all parsed parameters for debugging purposes.
params.forEach { KeyMintParameterLogger.logParameter(it) }
@@ -156,6 +189,21 @@ private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllKeyPurpose(tag: Int): List<Int> =
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findAllDigests(tag: Int): List<Int> =
this.filter { it.tag == tag }.map { it.value.digest }
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.findBoolean(tag: Int): Boolean? =
if (this.any { it.tag == tag }) true else null
private fun Array<KeyParameter>.deriveKeySizeFromCurve(): Int {
val curveId = this.find { it.tag == Tag.EC_CURVE }?.value?.ecCurve ?: return 0
return when (curveId) {
EcCurve.P_224 -> 224
EcCurve.P_256 -> 256
EcCurve.P_384 -> 384
EcCurve.P_521 -> 521
EcCurve.CURVE_25519 -> 256
else -> 0
}
}
/**
* Derives the EC Curve name. Logic: Checks specific EC_CURVE tag first (field=EcCurve), falls back
* to KEY_SIZE (field=Integer).
@@ -360,7 +360,29 @@ object ConfigurationManager {
return iPackageManager
}
/** Retrieves the package names associated with a UID. */
fun checkSELinuxPermission(callingPid: Int, tclass: String, perm: String): Boolean {
return try {
val callerCtx =
java.io.File("/proc/$callingPid/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
val selfCtx =
java.io.File("/proc/self/attr/current").readText().trim('\u0000', ' ', '\n')
android.os.SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess(callerCtx, selfCtx, tclass, perm)
} catch (_: Exception) {
false
}
}
fun hasPermissionForUid(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
val userId = uid / 100000
return getPackagesForUid(uid).any { pkg ->
try {
getPackageManager()?.checkPermission(permission, pkg, userId) == 0
} catch (_: Exception) {
false
}
}
}
fun getPackagesForUid(uid: Int): Array<String> {
return uidToPackagesCache.getOrPut(uid) {
try {
@@ -293,15 +293,21 @@ abstract class BinderInterceptor : Binder() {
}
}
/** Uses the backdoor binder to register an interceptor for a specific target service. */
fun register(backdoor: IBinder, target: IBinder, interceptor: BinderInterceptor) {
fun register(
backdoor: IBinder,
target: IBinder,
interceptor: BinderInterceptor,
filteredCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf(),
) {
val data = Parcel.obtain()
val reply = Parcel.obtain()
try {
data.writeStrongBinder(target)
data.writeStrongBinder(interceptor)
data.writeInt(filteredCodes.size)
for (code in filteredCodes) data.writeInt(code)
backdoor.transact(REGISTER_INTERCEPTOR_CODE, data, reply, 0)
SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target")
SystemLogger.info("Registered interceptor for target: $target (${filteredCodes.size} filtered codes)")
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to register binder interceptor.", e)
} finally {
@@ -68,11 +68,12 @@ abstract class AbstractKeystoreInterceptor : BinderInterceptor() {
}
}
/** Registers this interceptor with the native hook layer and sets up a death recipient. */
protected open val interceptedCodes: IntArray = intArrayOf()
private fun setupInterceptor(service: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
keystoreService = service
SystemLogger.info("Registering interceptor for service: $serviceName")
register(backdoor, service, this)
register(backdoor, service, this, interceptedCodes)
service.linkToDeath(createDeathRecipient(), 0)
onInterceptorReady(service, backdoor)
}
@@ -1,11 +1,16 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import android.os.Parcel
import android.os.Parcelable
import android.security.KeyStore
import android.security.keystore.KeystoreResponse
import android.system.keystore2.Authorization
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.core.BinderInterceptor
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
data class KeyIdentifier(val uid: Int, val alias: String)
@@ -17,8 +22,9 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
fun createErrorReply(errorCode: Int): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeInt(EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
writeInt(errorCode)
writeString(null)
writeInt(0) // empty remote stack trace header (AOSP Status.cpp:196)
writeInt(errorCode)
}
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
@@ -119,6 +125,57 @@ object InterceptorUtils {
/** Checks if a reply parcel contains an exception without consuming it. */
fun hasException(reply: Parcel): Boolean {
return runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull() != null
val exception = runCatching { reply.readException() }.exceptionOrNull()
if (exception != null) reply.setDataPosition(0)
return exception != null
}
fun createServiceSpecificErrorReply(
errorCode: Int
): BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply {
val parcel =
Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeException(android.os.ServiceSpecificException(errorCode))
}
return BinderInterceptor.TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
fun patchAuthorizations(
authorizations: Array<Authorization>?,
callingUid: Int,
): Array<Authorization>? {
if (authorizations == null) return null
val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid)
val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
return authorizations
.map { auth ->
val replacement =
when (auth.keyParameter.tag) {
Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) osPatch else null
Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) vendorPatch
else null
Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL ->
if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) bootPatch else null
else -> null
}
if (replacement != null) {
Authorization().apply {
keyParameter =
KeyParameter().apply {
tag = auth.keyParameter.tag
value = KeyParameterValue.integer(replacement)
}
securityLevel = auth.securityLevel
}
} else {
auth
}
}
.toTypedArray()
}
}
@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
import android.os.Build
import android.os.IBinder
import android.os.Parcel
import android.system.keystore2.Domain
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService
import android.system.keystore2.KeyDescriptor
import android.system.keystore2.KeyEntryResponse
import java.security.SecureRandom
import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationPatcher
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.config.ConfigurationManager
@@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 34)
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "listEntriesBatched")
else null
private val GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION =
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(stubBinderClass, "getNumberOfEntries")
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
stubBinderClass.declaredFields
@@ -54,10 +58,26 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
.associate { field -> (field.get(null) as Int) to field.name.split("_")[1] }
}
private const val RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND = 7
private val deletedSoftwareKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
private val userUpdatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<KeyIdentifier>()
override val serviceName = "android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreService/default"
override val processName = "keystore2"
override val injectionCommand = "exec ./inject `pidof keystore2` libTEESimulator.so entry"
override val interceptedCodes: IntArray by lazy {
listOfNotNull(
GET_KEY_ENTRY_TRANSACTION,
DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION,
UPDATE_SUBCOMPONENT_TRANSACTION,
LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION,
GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION,
)
.toIntArray()
}
/**
* This method is called once the main service is hooked. It proceeds to find and hook the
* security level sub-services (e.g., TEE, StrongBox).
@@ -74,7 +94,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
SystemLogger.info("Found TEE SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
val interceptor =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(tee, SecurityLevel.TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT)
register(backdoor, tee.asBinder(), interceptor)
register(
backdoor,
tee.asBinder(),
interceptor,
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
)
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
}
}
@@ -86,7 +111,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
SystemLogger.info("Found StrongBox SecurityLevel. Registering interceptor...")
val interceptor =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(strongbox, SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX)
register(backdoor, strongbox.asBinder(), interceptor)
register(
backdoor,
strongbox.asBinder(),
interceptor,
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES,
)
interceptor.loadPersistedKeys()
}
}
@@ -102,7 +132,12 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
callingPid: Int,
data: Parcel,
): TransactionResult {
if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
return if (ConfigurationManager.shouldSkipUid(callingUid))
TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
else TransactionResult.Continue
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, transactionNames[code]!!, callingUid, callingPid, true)
val packages = ConfigurationManager.getPackagesForUid(callingUid).joinToString()
@@ -145,30 +180,48 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
if (descriptor.alias != null) {
SystemLogger.info("Handling ${transactionNames[code]!!} ${descriptor.alias}")
} else {
SystemLogger.info(
"Skip ${transactionNames[code]!!} for key [alias, blob, domain, nspace]: [${descriptor.alias}, ${descriptor.blob}, ${descriptor.domain}, ${descriptor.nspace}]"
)
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
if (code == DELETE_KEY_TRANSACTION) {
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId) != null) {
val keyId =
if (descriptor.alias != null) {
KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
} else if (descriptor.domain == Domain.KEY_ID) {
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
)?.let { info ->
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.entries
.find { it.value.nspace == info.nspace && it.key.uid == callingUid }
?.key
}
} else null
if (keyId != null) {
val isSoftwareKey =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.containsKey(keyId)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.cleanupKeyData(keyId)
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${descriptor.alias}, replying with empty response."
)
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
if (isSoftwareKey) {
deletedSoftwareKeys.add(keyId)
SystemLogger.info(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Deleted cached keypair ${keyId.alias}, replying with empty response."
)
return InterceptorUtils.createSuccessReply(writeResultCode = false)
}
}
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val response =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
?: return TransactionResult.Continue
if (descriptor.alias == null) {
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, descriptor.alias)
val response = KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId)
if (response == null) {
if (deletedSoftwareKeys.remove(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Returning KEY_NOT_FOUND for deleted key ${descriptor.alias}")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
}
return TransactionResult.Continue
}
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.isAttestationKey(keyId))
SystemLogger.info("${descriptor.alias} was an attestation key")
@@ -206,7 +259,26 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
if (target != keystoreService || reply == null || InterceptorUtils.hasException(reply))
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
if (code == GET_NUMBER_OF_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
return runCatching {
val hardwareCount = reply.readInt()
val softwareCount =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys.count {
it.uid == callingUid
}
val totalCount = hardwareCount + softwareCount
val parcel = Parcel.obtain().apply {
writeNoException()
writeInt(totalCount)
}
TransactionResult.OverrideReply(parcel)
}
.getOrElse {
SystemLogger.error("[TX_ID: $txId] Failed to modify getNumberOfEntries.", it)
TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
} else if (code == LIST_ENTRIES_TRANSACTION || code == LIST_ENTRIES_BATCHED_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
return runCatching {
@@ -241,6 +313,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
val response = reply.readTypedObject(KeyEntryResponse.CREATOR)!!
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
if (userUpdatedKeys.remove(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping cert patch for user-updated key $keyId.")
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
val authorizations = response.metadata.authorizations
val parsedParameters =
KeyMintAttestation(
@@ -258,6 +335,11 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
}
if (KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.importedKeys.contains(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Skipping attest-key override for imported key $keyId")
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
if (parsedParameters.isAttestKey()) {
SystemLogger.warning(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Found hardware attest key ${keyId.alias} in the reply."
@@ -278,11 +360,13 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
.getOrThrow()
keyDescriptor.nspace = SecureRandom().nextLong()
response.metadata.key.nspace = keyDescriptor.nspace
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[keyId] =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.GeneratedKeyInfo(
keyData.first,
keyDescriptor.nspace,
response,
parsedParameters,
)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.attestationKeys.add(keyId)
@@ -294,7 +378,7 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
certChain = keyData.second,
algorithm = parsedParameters.algorithm,
keySize = parsedParameters.keySize,
ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve,
ecCurve = parsedParameters.ecCurve ?: 0,
purposes = parsedParameters.purpose,
digests = parsedParameters.digest,
isAttestationKey = true,
@@ -326,10 +410,16 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
)
finalChain =
AttestationPatcher.patchCertificateChain(originalChain, callingUid)
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.patchedChains[keyId] = finalChain
}
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(response.metadata, finalChain)
.getOrThrow()
response.metadata.authorizations =
InterceptorUtils.patchAuthorizations(
response.metadata.authorizations,
callingUid,
)
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
}
@@ -347,9 +437,25 @@ object Keystore2Interceptor : AbstractKeystoreInterceptor() {
private fun handleUpdateSubcomponent(callingUid: Int, data: Parcel): TransactionResult {
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreService.DESCRIPTOR)
val descriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
val generatedKeyInfo =
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, descriptor?.nspace)
?: return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
when (descriptor.domain) {
Domain.KEY_ID ->
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(
callingUid, descriptor.nspace
)
Domain.APP ->
descriptor.alias?.let {
KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)]
}
else -> null
}
if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
descriptor.alias?.let { userUpdatedKeys.add(KeyIdentifier(callingUid, it)) }
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
SystemLogger.info("Updating sub-component with key[${generatedKeyInfo.nspace}]")
val metadata = generatedKeyInfo.response.metadata
@@ -431,6 +431,23 @@ private data class LegacyKeygenParameters(
manufacturer = null,
model = null,
secondImei = null,
activeDateTime = null,
originationExpireDateTime = null,
usageExpireDateTime = null,
usageCountLimit = null,
callerNonce = null,
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
includeUniqueId = null,
rollbackResistance = null,
earlyBootOnly = null,
allowWhileOnBody = null,
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
noAuthRequired = null,
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
maxBootLevel = null,
minMacLength = null,
rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
)
}
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ object ListEntriesHandler {
startPastAlias: String?,
): List<KeyDescriptor> {
return KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor.generatedKeys.keys
.filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias < startPastAlias) }
.filter { it.uid == uid && (startPastAlias == null || it.alias > startPastAlias) }
.map { keyId ->
KeyDescriptor().apply {
this.domain = Domain.APP
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
object AuthorizeCreate {
fun check(
keyParams: KeyMintAttestation?,
opParams: KeyMintAttestation,
rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>? = null,
): Int? {
if (keyParams == null) return null
return checkPurpose(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkTemporalValidity(keyParams, opParams)
?: checkCallerNonce(keyParams, rawOpParams)
}
private fun checkPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val requestedPurpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
if (requestedPurpose == KeyPurpose.WRAP_KEY)
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
if (requestedPurpose !in keyParams.purpose)
return KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatiblePurpose
return null
}
private fun checkAlgorithmPurpose(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull() ?: return null
return when (keyParams.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> when (purpose) {
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> null
else -> null
}
Algorithm.RSA -> when (purpose) {
KeyPurpose.AGREE_KEY -> KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose
else -> null
}
else -> null
}
}
private fun checkTemporalValidity(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, opParams: KeyMintAttestation): Int? {
val now = System.currentTimeMillis()
val purpose = opParams.purpose.firstOrNull()
keyParams.activeDateTime?.let { activeDate ->
if (now < activeDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyNotYetValid
}
keyParams.originationExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.SIGN || purpose == KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT) {
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
}
}
keyParams.usageExpireDateTime?.let { expireDate ->
if (purpose == KeyPurpose.VERIFY || purpose == KeyPurpose.DECRYPT) {
if (now > expireDate.time) return KeystoreErrorCodes.keyExpired
}
}
return null
}
private fun checkCallerNonce(keyParams: KeyMintAttestation, rawOpParams: Array<KeyParameter>?): Int? {
if (keyParams.callerNonce == true) return null
val hasNonce = rawOpParams?.any { it.tag == Tag.NONCE } == true
if (hasNonce) return KeystoreErrorCodes.callerNonceProhibited
return null
}
}
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
val file = File(PERSISTENCE_DIR, keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
if (file.exists()) {
if (file.delete()) {
fileLocks.remove(keyFileName(keyId.uid, keyId.alias))
SystemLogger.debug("Deleted persisted key: $keyId")
} else {
SystemLogger.warning("Failed to delete persisted key file: ${file.name}")
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ object GeneratedKeyPersistence {
if (file.delete()) count++
}
}
fileLocks.clear()
SystemLogger.info("Deleted $count persisted key files")
}.onFailure { e ->
SystemLogger.error("Failed to delete all persisted keys", e)
@@ -1,8 +1,13 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.interception.keystore.shim
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
import android.hardware.security.keymint.EcCurve
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameterValue
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyOrigin
import android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Tag
import android.os.IBinder
import android.os.Parcel
@@ -16,6 +21,7 @@ import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
import java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentLinkedDeque
import java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationBuilder
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.AttestationConstants
@@ -32,6 +38,7 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.CertificateHelper
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.KeyBoxManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.pki.NativeCertGen
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidDeviceUtils
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.util.AndroidPermissionUtils
class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
private val original: IKeystoreSecurityLevel,
@@ -42,8 +49,12 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val keyPair: KeyPair,
val nspace: Long,
val response: KeyEntryResponse,
val keyParams: KeyMintAttestation? = null,
)
private val activeOps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, ConcurrentLinkedDeque<SoftwareOperation>>()
private val recentOps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, ConcurrentLinkedDeque<Long>>()
override fun onPreTransact(
txId: Long,
target: IBinder,
@@ -124,6 +135,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
GeneratedKeyPersistence.delete(keyId)
}
attestationKeys.remove(keyId)
importedKeys.add(keyId)
} else if (code == CREATE_OPERATION_TRANSACTION) {
logTransaction(txId, "post-${transactionNames[code]!!}", callingUid, callingPid)
@@ -150,7 +162,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val backdoor = getBackdoor(target)
if (backdoor != null) {
val interceptor = OperationInterceptor(operation, backdoor)
register(backdoor, operationBinder, interceptor)
register(backdoor, operationBinder, interceptor, OperationInterceptor.INTERCEPTED_CODES)
interceptedOperations[operationBinder] = interceptor
} else {
SystemLogger.error(
@@ -191,41 +203,113 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
return TransactionResult.SkipTransaction
}
private fun pruneOpsForUid(uid: Int, newOp: SoftwareOperation, maxOps: Int = MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID) {
val ops = activeOps.computeIfAbsent(uid) { ConcurrentLinkedDeque() }
val before = ops.size
ops.removeIf { it.finalized }
val afterClean = ops.size
while (ops.size >= maxOps) {
val oldest = ops.pollFirst() ?: break
if (!oldest.finalized) {
SystemLogger.info("[LRU] Pruning operation for uid=$uid (active=${ops.size}/$maxOps)")
oldest.abort()
}
}
ops.addLast(newOp)
SystemLogger.debug("[LRU] uid=$uid ops: before=$before cleaned=${before - afterClean} active=${ops.size}")
}
private fun trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid: Int, txId: Long): TransactionResult? {
if (securityLevel != SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) return null
val timestamps = recentOps.computeIfAbsent(callingUid) { ConcurrentLinkedDeque() }
val cutoff = System.nanoTime() - STRONGBOX_OP_WINDOW_NS
timestamps.removeIf { it < cutoff }
val swOps = activeOps[callingUid]?.count { !it.finalized } ?: 0
if (timestamps.size + swOps >= STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] StrongBox op limit reached for uid=$callingUid (hw=${timestamps.size} sw=$swOps max=$STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS)")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS)
}
timestamps.addLast(System.nanoTime())
return null
}
private fun handleCreateOperation(
txId: Long,
callingUid: Int,
data: Parcel,
): TransactionResult {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation parcel: dataSize=${data.dataSize()} dataAvail=${data.dataAvail()} dataPos=${data.dataPosition()}")
data.enforceInterface(IKeystoreSecurityLevel.DESCRIPTOR)
val keyDescriptor = data.readTypedObject(KeyDescriptor.CREATOR)!!
// An operation must use the KEY_ID domain.
if (keyDescriptor.domain != Domain.KEY_ID) {
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation descriptor: domain=${keyDescriptor.domain} nspace=${keyDescriptor.nspace} alias=${keyDescriptor.alias}")
// Android framework calls createOperation with domain=APP+alias;
// keystore2 internally resolves to KEY_ID — but software keys never
// reach keystore2's database, so we must handle both lookup paths.
val generatedKeyInfo = when (keyDescriptor.domain) {
Domain.APP -> {
val alias = keyDescriptor.alias ?: run {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation domain=APP with null alias, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
generatedKeys[KeyIdentifier(callingUid, alias)] ?: run {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation alias=$alias not in generatedKeys, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
}
Domain.KEY_ID -> {
findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, keyDescriptor.nspace) ?: run {
trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid, txId)?.let { return it }
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation KeyId(${keyDescriptor.nspace}) NOT FOUND for uid=$callingUid. Forwarding to HAL.")
return TransactionResult.Continue
}
}
else -> {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] createOperation domain=${keyDescriptor.domain}, forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
}
val nspace = keyDescriptor.nspace
val generatedKeyInfo = findGeneratedKeyByKeyId(callingUid, nspace)
trackAndEnforceOpLimit(callingUid, txId)?.let { return it }
if (generatedKeyInfo == null) {
SystemLogger.debug(
"[TX_ID: $txId] Operation for unknown/hardware KeyId ($nspace). Forwarding."
)
return TransactionResult.Continue
}
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Creating SOFTWARE operation for KeyId $nspace.")
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] Creating SOFTWARE operation for uid=$callingUid.")
val params = data.createTypedArray(KeyParameter.CREATOR)!!
val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params)
val parsedParams = KeyMintAttestation(params).let { p ->
if (p.algorithm != 0) p
else p.copy(algorithm = when (generatedKeyInfo.keyPair.private.algorithm) {
"EC", "ECDSA" -> Algorithm.EC
"RSA" -> Algorithm.RSA
else -> p.algorithm
})
}
val softwareOperation = SoftwareOperation(txId, generatedKeyInfo.keyPair, parsedParams)
AuthorizeCreate.check(generatedKeyInfo.keyParams, parsedParams, params)?.let { errorCode ->
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] authorize_create rejected: errorCode=$errorCode")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(errorCode)
}
val opLatency = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_OP_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS else 0L
val softwareOperation = SoftwareOperation(txId, generatedKeyInfo.keyPair, parsedParams, opLatency)
val maxOps = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS else MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID
pruneOpsForUid(callingUid, softwareOperation, maxOps)
val operationBinder = SoftwareOperationBinder(softwareOperation)
val response =
CreateOperationResponse().apply {
iOperation = operationBinder
operationChallenge = null
softwareOperation.iv?.let { iv ->
parameters = KeyParameters().apply {
keyParameter = arrayOf(
KeyParameter().apply {
tag = Tag.NONCE
value = KeyParameterValue.blob(iv)
}
)
}
}
}
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response)
@@ -254,6 +338,43 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH)
}
if (params.any { it.tag == Tag.CREATION_DATETIME }) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting CREATION_DATETIME in generateKey params")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(RESPONSE_INVALID_ARGUMENT)
}
if (params.any { it.tag == Tag.DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION } && !AndroidPermissionUtils.hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(callingUid)) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION for uid=$callingUid")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
}
val hasDeviceIdAttestation = params.any {
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_MEID ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL ||
it.tag == Tag.DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION ||
it.tag == Tag.ATTESTATION_ID_SECOND_IMEI
}
if(hasDeviceIdAttestation && !AndroidPermissionUtils.hasDeviceAttestationPermission(callingUid)) {
SystemLogger.warning("[TX_ID: $txId] Rejecting DEVICE_ID_ATTESTATION for uid=$callingUid")
return InterceptorUtils.createErrorReply(KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS)
}
val isSymmetric = parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.AES ||
parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.HMAC ||
parsedParams.algorithm == Algorithm.TRIPLE_DES
if (isSymmetric) {
SystemLogger.debug("[TX_ID: $txId] Symmetric algorithm ${parsedParams.algorithm} → forwarding to HAL")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX && !isStrongBoxCapable(parsedParams)) {
SystemLogger.info("[TX_ID: $txId] StrongBox-unsupported params (algo=${parsedParams.algorithm} size=${parsedParams.keySize}) → forwarding to HAL for rejection")
return TransactionResult.ContinueAndSkipPost
}
val keyId = KeyIdentifier(callingUid, keyDescriptor.alias)
val isAttestKeyRequest = parsedParams.isAttestKey()
@@ -304,6 +425,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
keyId: KeyIdentifier,
isAttestKeyRequest: Boolean,
): TransactionResult {
val startNs = System.nanoTime()
keyDescriptor.nspace = secureRandom.nextLong()
SystemLogger.info("Generating software key for ${keyDescriptor.alias}[${keyDescriptor.nspace}].")
@@ -319,8 +441,8 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
} ?: throw Exception("Both native and BouncyCastle cert gen failed.")
cleanupKeyData(keyId)
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(keyData.second, parsedParams, keyDescriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyData.first, keyDescriptor.nspace, response)
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(callingUid, keyData.second, parsedParams, keyDescriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyData.first, keyDescriptor.nspace, response, parsedParams)
if (isAttestKeyRequest) attestationKeys.add(keyId)
GeneratedKeyPersistence.save(
@@ -331,12 +453,17 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
certChain = keyData.second.toList(),
algorithm = parsedParams.algorithm,
keySize = parsedParams.keySize,
ecCurve = parsedParams.ecCurve,
ecCurve = parsedParams.ecCurve ?: 0,
purposes = parsedParams.purpose,
digests = parsedParams.digest,
isAttestationKey = isAttestKeyRequest,
)
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
val floor = if (securityLevel == SecurityLevel.STRONGBOX) STRONGBOX_KEYGEN_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS else TEE_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS
val delayMs = floor - elapsedMs
if (delayMs > 0) Thread.sleep(delayMs)
return InterceptorUtils.createTypedObjectReply(response.metadata)
}
@@ -365,7 +492,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val config = CertGenConfig(
algorithm = params.algorithm,
keySize = params.keySize,
ecCurve = params.ecCurve,
ecCurve = params.ecCurve ?: 0,
rsaPublicExponent = params.rsaPublicExponent?.toLong() ?: 65537L,
attestationChallenge = params.attestationChallenge,
purposes = params.purpose.toIntArray(),
@@ -409,16 +536,25 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
}
private fun buildKeyEntryResponse(
callingUid: Int,
chain: List<Certificate>,
params: KeyMintAttestation,
descriptor: KeyDescriptor,
): KeyEntryResponse {
val normalizedKeyDescriptor =
KeyDescriptor().apply {
domain = Domain.KEY_ID
nspace = descriptor.nspace
alias = null
blob = null
}
val metadata =
KeyMetadata().apply {
keySecurityLevel = securityLevel
key = descriptor
key = normalizedKeyDescriptor
CertificateHelper.updateCertificateChain(this, chain.toTypedArray()).getOrThrow()
authorizations = params.toAuthorizations(securityLevel)
authorizations = params.toAuthorizations(callingUid, securityLevel)
modificationTimeMs = System.currentTimeMillis()
}
return KeyEntryResponse().apply {
this.metadata = metadata
@@ -493,10 +629,27 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
manufacturer = null,
model = null,
secondImei = null,
activeDateTime = null,
originationExpireDateTime = null,
usageExpireDateTime = null,
usageCountLimit = null,
callerNonce = null,
unlockedDeviceRequired = null,
includeUniqueId = null,
rollbackResistance = null,
earlyBootOnly = null,
allowWhileOnBody = null,
trustedUserPresenceRequired = null,
trustedConfirmationRequired = null,
noAuthRequired = null,
maxUsesPerBoot = null,
maxBootLevel = null,
minMacLength = null,
rsaOaepMgfDigest = emptyList(),
)
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(certChain, attestation, descriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyPair, record.nspace, response)
val response = buildKeyEntryResponse(record.uid, certChain, attestation, descriptor)
generatedKeys[keyId] = GeneratedKeyInfo(keyPair, record.nspace, response, attestation)
if (record.isAttestationKey) attestationKeys.add(keyId)
SystemLogger.debug("Restored persisted key: $keyId")
@@ -515,15 +668,29 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
// Binder buffer is ~1MB; 256KB provides 4x safety margin for transaction overhead
private const val MAX_ALIAS_LENGTH = 256 * 1024
private const val KEYMINT_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH = -21
private const val RESPONSE_INVALID_ARGUMENT = 20
private const val TEE_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 15L
private const val STRONGBOX_KEYGEN_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 250L
private const val STRONGBOX_OP_LATENCY_FLOOR_MS = 80L
private const val KEYMINT_TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS = -29
private const val KEYMINT_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS = -66
private const val MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS_PER_UID = 15
private const val STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS = 4
private const val STRONGBOX_OP_WINDOW_NS = 10_000_000_000L // 10s
private const val MAX_CONCURRENT_HW_KEYGEN_PER_UID = 2
// Sliding window: max hardware keygen permits per UID within the burst window
private const val MAX_HW_KEYGEN_PER_WINDOW = 2
private const val BURST_WINDOW_MS = 30_000L
private val uidHardwareKeygenCount = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, AtomicInteger>()
private val hardwareKeygenTxIds = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet<Long>()
private val uidKeygenTimestamps = ConcurrentHashMap<Int, MutableList<Long>>()
private fun isStrongBoxCapable(params: KeyMintAttestation): Boolean = when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.RSA -> params.keySize <= 2048
Algorithm.EC -> params.ecCurve == null || params.ecCurve == EcCurve.P_256
else -> true
}
private fun hardwareKeygenCount(uid: Int): AtomicInteger =
uidHardwareKeygenCount.computeIfAbsent(uid) { AtomicInteger(0) }
@@ -532,6 +699,10 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
val timestamps = uidKeygenTimestamps.computeIfAbsent(uid) { mutableListOf() }
synchronized(timestamps) {
timestamps.removeAll { now - it > BURST_WINDOW_MS }
if (timestamps.isEmpty()) {
uidKeygenTimestamps.remove(uid, timestamps)
uidHardwareKeygenCount.remove(uid)
}
return timestamps.size
}
}
@@ -553,6 +724,9 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
"createOperation",
)
val INTERCEPTED_CODES =
intArrayOf(GENERATE_KEY_TRANSACTION, IMPORT_KEY_TRANSACTION, CREATE_OPERATION_TRANSACTION)
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
IKeystoreSecurityLevel.Stub::class
.java
@@ -565,9 +739,9 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
}
val generatedKeys = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, GeneratedKeyInfo>()
// Caches patched chains to prevent re-generation and signature inconsistencies
private val patchedChains = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, Array<Certificate>>()
val patchedChains = ConcurrentHashMap<KeyIdentifier, Array<Certificate>>()
val attestationKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
val importedKeys: MutableSet<KeyIdentifier> = ConcurrentHashMap.newKeySet()
private val interceptedOperations = ConcurrentHashMap<IBinder, OperationInterceptor>()
fun getGeneratedKeyResponse(keyId: KeyIdentifier): KeyEntryResponse? =
@@ -596,6 +770,7 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
if (attestationKeys.remove(keyId)) {
SystemLogger.debug("Remove cached attestaion key ${keyId}")
}
importedKeys.remove(keyId)
}
fun removeOperationInterceptor(operationBinder: IBinder, backdoor: IBinder) {
@@ -620,13 +795,17 @@ class KeyMintSecurityLevelInterceptor(
generatedKeys.clear()
patchedChains.clear()
attestationKeys.clear()
importedKeys.clear()
GeneratedKeyPersistence.deleteAll()
SystemLogger.info("Cleared all cached keys ($count entries)$reasonMessage.")
}
}
}
private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations(securityLevel: Int): Array<Authorization> {
private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations(
callingUid: Int,
securityLevel: Int,
): Array<Authorization> {
val authList = mutableListOf<Authorization>()
fun createAuth(tag: Int, value: KeyParameterValue): Authorization {
@@ -641,13 +820,45 @@ private fun KeyMintAttestation.toAuthorizations(securityLevel: Int): Array<Autho
}
}
this.purpose.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PURPOSE, KeyParameterValue.keyPurpose(it))) }
this.digest.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.DIGEST, KeyParameterValue.digest(it))) }
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.ALGORITHM, KeyParameterValue.algorithm(this.algorithm)))
if (this.ecCurve != null) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.EC_CURVE, KeyParameterValue.ecCurve(this.ecCurve)))
}
this.purpose.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PURPOSE, KeyParameterValue.keyPurpose(it))) }
this.blockMode.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.BLOCK_MODE, KeyParameterValue.blockMode(it))) }
this.digest.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.DIGEST, KeyParameterValue.digest(it))) }
this.padding.forEach { authList.add(createAuth(Tag.PADDING, KeyParameterValue.paddingMode(it))) }
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.KEY_SIZE, KeyParameterValue.integer(this.keySize)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.EC_CURVE, KeyParameterValue.ecCurve(this.ecCurve)))
if (this.rsaPublicExponent != null) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, KeyParameterValue.longInteger(this.rsaPublicExponent.toLong())))
}
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, KeyParameterValue.boolValue(true)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.ORIGIN, KeyParameterValue.origin(this.origin ?: KeyOrigin.GENERATED)))
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.OS_VERSION, KeyParameterValue.integer(AndroidDeviceUtils.osVersion)))
val osPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getPatchLevel(callingUid)
if (osPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.OS_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(osPatch)))
}
val vendorPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getVendorPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
if (vendorPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(vendorPatch)))
}
val bootPatch = AndroidDeviceUtils.getBootPatchLevelLong(callingUid)
if (bootPatch != AndroidDeviceUtils.DO_NOT_REPORT) {
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, KeyParameterValue.integer(bootPatch)))
}
authList.add(createAuth(Tag.CREATION_DATETIME, KeyParameterValue.dateTime(System.currentTimeMillis())))
authList.add(
Authorization().apply {
this.keyParameter =
KeyParameter().apply {
this.tag = Tag.USER_ID
this.value = KeyParameterValue.integer(callingUid / 100000)
}
this.securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE
}
)
return authList.toTypedArray()
}
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ class OperationInterceptor(
private val ABORT_TRANSACTION =
InterceptorUtils.getTransactCode(IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class.java, "abort")
val INTERCEPTED_CODES = intArrayOf(FINISH_TRANSACTION, ABORT_TRANSACTION)
private val transactionNames: Map<Int, String> by lazy {
IKeystoreOperation.Stub::class
.java
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import android.hardware.security.keymint.BlockMode
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Digest
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose
import android.hardware.security.keymint.PaddingMode
import android.os.RemoteException
import android.os.ServiceSpecificException
import android.system.keystore2.IKeystoreOperation
import java.security.KeyPair
import java.security.Signature
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.attestation.KeyMintAttestation
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.KeyMintParameterLogger
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
// A sealed interface to represent the different cryptographic operations we can perform.
private sealed interface CryptoPrimitive {
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
}
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray?
fun abort()
fun getIv(): ByteArray? = null
}
// Helper object to map KeyMint constants to JCA algorithm strings.
private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
fun mapSignatureAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
val digest =
@@ -34,16 +34,18 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
Digest.SHA_2_512 -> "SHA512"
else -> "NONE"
}
val keyAlgo =
when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> "ECDSA"
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
else ->
throw IllegalArgumentException(
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
)
return when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> "${digest}withECDSA"
Algorithm.RSA -> {
val isPss = params.padding.firstOrNull() == PaddingMode.RSA_PSS
if (isPss) "${digest}withRSA/PSS" else "${digest}withRSA"
}
return "${digest}with${keyAlgo}"
else ->
throw ServiceSpecificException(
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
"Unsupported signature algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
)
}
}
fun mapCipherAlgorithm(params: KeyMintAttestation): String {
@@ -52,30 +54,32 @@ private object JcaAlgorithmMapper {
Algorithm.RSA -> "RSA"
Algorithm.AES -> "AES"
else ->
throw IllegalArgumentException(
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
throw ServiceSpecificException(
KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleAlgorithm,
"Unsupported cipher algorithm: ${params.algorithm}",
)
}
val blockMode =
when (params.blockMode.firstOrNull()) {
BlockMode.ECB -> "ECB"
BlockMode.CBC -> "CBC"
BlockMode.CTR -> "CTR"
BlockMode.GCM -> "GCM"
else -> "ECB" // Default for RSA
else -> "ECB"
}
val padding =
when (params.padding.firstOrNull()) {
PaddingMode.NONE -> "NoPadding"
PaddingMode.PKCS7 -> "PKCS7Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT -> "PKCS1Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN -> "PKCS1Padding"
PaddingMode.RSA_OAEP -> "OAEPPadding"
else -> "NoPadding" // Default for GCM
else -> "NoPadding"
}
return "$keyAlgo/$blockMode/$padding"
}
}
// Concrete implementation for Signing.
private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val signature: Signature =
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
@@ -95,7 +99,6 @@ private class Signer(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimi
override fun abort() {}
}
// Concrete implementation for Verification.
private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val signature: Signature =
Signature.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapSignatureAlgorithm(params)).apply {
@@ -109,50 +112,60 @@ private class Verifier(keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) : CryptoPri
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
if (data != null) update(data)
if (signature == null) throw SignatureException("Signature to verify is null")
if (signature == null) {
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature to verify is null")
}
if (!this.signature.verify(signature)) {
// Throwing an exception is how Keystore signals verification failure.
throw SignatureException("Signature verification failed")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, "Signature verification failed")
}
// A successful verification returns no data.
return null
}
override fun abort() {}
}
// Concrete implementation for Encryption/Decryption.
private class CipherPrimitive(
keyPair: KeyPair,
params: KeyMintAttestation,
private val opMode: Int,
) : CryptoPrimitive {
private val isAead = params.blockMode.firstOrNull() == BlockMode.GCM
private val cipher: Cipher =
Cipher.getInstance(JcaAlgorithmMapper.mapCipherAlgorithm(params)).apply {
val key = if (opMode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) keyPair.public else keyPair.private
init(opMode, key)
}
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
if (!isAead) throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidTag)
if (aadInput != null) cipher.updateAAD(aadInput)
}
override fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
if (data != null) cipher.update(data) else null
override fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? =
if (data != null) cipher.doFinal(data) else cipher.doFinal()
override fun getIv(): ByteArray? = if (isAead) cipher.iv else null
override fun abort() {}
}
/**
* A software-only implementation of a cryptographic operation. This class acts as a controller,
* delegating to a specific cryptographic primitive based on the operation's purpose.
*/
class SoftwareOperation(private val txId: Long, keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMintAttestation) {
// This now holds the specific strategy object (Signer, Verifier, etc.)
class SoftwareOperation(
private val txId: Long,
keyPair: KeyPair,
params: KeyMintAttestation,
private val latencyFloorMs: Long = 0L,
) {
private val primitive: CryptoPrimitive
@Volatile var finalized = false
private set
val iv: ByteArray?
get() = primitive.getIv()
init {
// The "Strategy" pattern: choose the implementation based on the purpose.
// For simplicity, we only consider the first purpose listed.
val purpose = params.purpose.firstOrNull()
val purposeName = KeyMintParameterLogger.purposeNames[purpose] ?: "UNKNOWN"
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Initializing for purpose: $purposeName.")
@@ -164,52 +177,174 @@ class SoftwareOperation(private val txId: Long, keyPair: KeyPair, params: KeyMin
KeyPurpose.ENCRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE)
KeyPurpose.DECRYPT -> CipherPrimitive(keyPair, params, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE)
else ->
throw UnsupportedOperationException("Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose")
throw ServiceSpecificException(
KeystoreErrorCodes.unsupportedPurpose,
"Unsupported operation purpose: $purpose",
)
}
}
private fun checkActive() {
if (finalized) {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Rejected: operation already finalized (pruned or completed)")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidOperationHandle)
}
}
private fun checkInputLength(data: ByteArray?) {
if (data != null && data.size > MAX_RECEIVE_DATA) {
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Input too large: ${data.size} > $MAX_RECEIVE_DATA, throwing TOO_MUCH_DATA(${KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData})")
throw ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.tooMuchData)
}
}
fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] updateAad() inputSize=${aadInput?.size ?: 0}")
checkActive()
checkInputLength(aadInput)
primitive.updateAad(aadInput)
}
fun update(data: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] update() inputSize=${data?.size ?: 0}")
checkActive()
checkInputLength(data)
try {
return primitive.update(data)
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to update operation.", e)
throw e
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
}
}
fun finish(data: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
checkActive()
checkInputLength(data)
try {
val startNs = if (latencyFloorMs > 0) System.nanoTime() else 0L
val result = primitive.finish(data, signature)
if (latencyFloorMs > 0) {
val elapsedMs = (System.nanoTime() - startNs) / 1_000_000
val delayMs = latencyFloorMs - elapsedMs
if (delayMs > 0) Thread.sleep(delayMs)
}
finalized = true
SystemLogger.info("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Finished operation successfully.")
return result
} catch (e: ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Failed to finish operation.", e)
// Re-throw the exception so the binder can report it to the client.
throw e
throw mapToServiceSpecificException(e)
}
}
fun abort() {
finalized = true
primitive.abort()
SystemLogger.debug("[SoftwareOp TX_ID: $txId] Operation aborted.")
}
private fun mapToServiceSpecificException(e: Exception): ServiceSpecificException = when (e) {
is SignatureException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.verificationFailed, e.message)
is javax.crypto.BadPaddingException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidArgument, e.message)
is javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.invalidInputLength, e.message)
is java.security.InvalidKeyException -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.incompatibleKey, e.message)
else -> ServiceSpecificException(KeystoreErrorCodes.unknownError, e.message)
}
companion object {
private const val MAX_RECEIVE_DATA = 0x8000
}
}
internal object KeystoreErrorCodes {
val tooMuchData: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.system.keystore2.ResponseCode", "TOO_MUCH_DATA", 21)
}
val invalidOperationHandle: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE", -28)
}
val invalidTag: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_TAG", -76)
}
val verificationFailed: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "VERIFICATION_FAILED", -30)
}
val invalidArgument: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_ARGUMENT", -38)
}
val invalidInputLength: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH", -21)
}
val incompatibleKey: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_KEY", -31)
}
val incompatiblePurpose: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE", -13)
}
val unsupportedPurpose: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE", -14)
}
val incompatibleAlgorithm: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM", -18)
}
val keyNotYetValid: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_NOT_YET_VALID", -39)
}
val keyExpired: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "KEY_EXPIRED", -40)
}
val callerNonceProhibited: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED", -55)
}
val unknownError: Int by lazy {
resolveField("android.hardware.security.keymint.ErrorCode", "UNKNOWN_ERROR", -1000)
}
fun resolveField(className: String, fieldName: String, fallback: Int): Int =
runCatching {
Class.forName(className).getField(fieldName).getInt(null)
}.getOrElse {
SystemLogger.debug("Resolved $className.$fieldName via fallback: $fallback")
fallback
}
}
/** The Binder interface for our [SoftwareOperation]. */
class SoftwareOperationBinder(private val operation: SoftwareOperation) :
IKeystoreOperation.Stub() {
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
@Synchronized
override fun updateAad(aadInput: ByteArray?) {
operation.updateAad(aadInput)
}
@Synchronized
override fun update(input: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
return operation.update(input)
}
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
@Synchronized
override fun finish(input: ByteArray?, signature: ByteArray?): ByteArray? {
return operation.finish(input, signature)
}
@Throws(RemoteException::class)
@Synchronized
override fun abort() {
operation.abort()
}
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ object SystemLogger {
* @param message The message to log.
*/
fun debug(message: String) {
if (!isDebugBuild) return
Log.d(TAG, message)
}
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import java.math.BigInteger
import java.security.KeyPair
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator
import java.security.cert.Certificate
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate
import java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
import java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
import java.util.Date
@@ -36,6 +35,8 @@ import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
*/
object CertificateGenerator {
private const val UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER = 253402300799000L
/**
* Generates a software-based cryptographic key pair.
*
@@ -49,7 +50,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
Algorithm.EC -> "EC" to ECGenParameterSpec(params.ecCurveName)
Algorithm.RSA ->
"RSA" to
RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(params.keySize, params.rsaPublicExponent)
RSAKeyGenParameterSpec(
params.keySize,
params.rsaPublicExponent ?: RSAKeyGenParameterSpec.F4,
)
else ->
throw IllegalArgumentException(
"Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}"
@@ -88,11 +92,9 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
"Attestation challenge exceeds length limit (${challenge.size} > ${AttestationConstants.CHALLENGE_LENGTH_LIMIT})"
)
return runCatching {
return try {
val keybox = getKeyboxForAlgorithm(uid, params.algorithm)
// Determine the signing key and issuer. If an attestKey is provided, use it.
// Otherwise, fall back to the root key from the keybox.
val (signingKey, issuer) =
if (attestKeyAlias != null && Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
getAttestationKeyInfo(uid, attestKeyAlias)?.let { it.first to it.second }
@@ -101,20 +103,20 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
keybox.keyPair to getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox)
}
// Build the new leaf certificate with the simulated attestation.
val leafCert =
buildCertificate(subjectKeyPair, signingKey, issuer, params, uid, securityLevel)
// If not self-attesting, the chain is just the leaf. Otherwise, append the keybox
// chain.
if (attestKeyAlias != null) {
listOf(leafCert)
} else {
listOf(leafCert) + keybox.certificates
}
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", e)
null
}
.onFailure { SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate certificate chain.", it) }
.getOrNull()
}
/**
@@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
params: KeyMintAttestation,
securityLevel: Int,
): Pair<KeyPair, List<Certificate>>? {
return runCatching {
return try {
SystemLogger.info(
"Generating new attested key pair for alias: '$alias' (UID: $uid)"
)
@@ -144,11 +146,12 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
"Successfully generated new certificate chain for alias: '$alias'."
)
Pair(newKeyPair, chain)
} catch (e: android.os.ServiceSpecificException) {
throw e
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", e)
null
}
.onFailure {
SystemLogger.error("Failed to generate attested key pair for alias '$alias'.", it)
}
.getOrNull()
}
fun getIssuerFromKeybox(keybox: KeyBox) =
@@ -163,7 +166,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm ID: $algorithm")
}
return KeyBoxManager.getAttestationKey(keyboxFile, algorithmName)
?: throw Exception("Could not load keybox for UID $uid and algorithm $algorithmName")
?: throw android.os.ServiceSpecificException(
-75, // ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED
"No attestation key for algorithm $algorithmName in $keyboxFile",
)
}
/** Retrieves the key pair and issuer name for a given attestation key alias. */
@@ -213,17 +219,16 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
uid: Int,
securityLevel: Int,
): Certificate {
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android KeyStore Key")
val leafNotAfter =
(signingKeyPair.public as? X509Certificate)?.notAfter
?: Date(System.currentTimeMillis() + 31536000000L)
val subject = params.certificateSubject ?: X500Name("CN=Android Keystore Key")
val notBefore = params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(0)
val notAfter = params.certificateNotAfter ?: Date(UNDEFINED_NOT_AFTER)
val builder =
JcaX509v3CertificateBuilder(
issuer,
params.certificateSerial ?: BigInteger.ONE,
params.certificateNotBefore ?: Date(),
params.certificateNotAfter ?: leafNotAfter,
notBefore,
notAfter,
subject,
subjectKeyPair.public,
)
@@ -239,10 +244,10 @@ object CertificateGenerator {
)
val signerAlgorithm =
when (params.algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> "SHA256withECDSA"
Algorithm.RSA -> "SHA256withRSA"
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported algorithm: ${params.algorithm}")
when (signingKeyPair.private.algorithm) {
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "SHA256withECDSA"
"RSA" -> "SHA256withRSA"
else -> throw IllegalArgumentException("Unsupported signing key: ${signingKeyPair.private.algorithm}")
}
val contentSigner =
JcaContentSignerBuilder(signerAlgorithm)
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ object NativeCertGen {
}
val algorithmName = when (certs[0].publicKey.algorithm) {
"EC" -> "EC"
"EC", "ECDSA" -> "EC"
"RSA" -> "RSA"
else -> certs[0].publicKey.algorithm
}
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
import android.annotation.SuppressLint
import android.content.Context
import android.content.pm.PackageManager
import org.matrix.TEESimulator.logging.SystemLogger
object AndroidPermissionUtils {
@SuppressLint("PrivateApi", "DiscouragedPrivateApi")
private fun getGlobalContext(): Context? {
return try {
// 1. Get the hidden ActivityThread class via reflection
val activityThreadClass = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread")
// 2. Invoke the static currentActivityThread() method
val currentActivityThreadMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("currentActivityThread")
currentActivityThreadMethod.isAccessible = true
val activityThread = currentActivityThreadMethod.invoke(null)
if (activityThread == null) {
SystemLogger.warning("Reflection: ActivityThread.currentActivityThread() returned null")
return null
}
// 3. Try to get the application context
val getApplicationMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getApplication")
getApplicationMethod.isAccessible = true
val application = getApplicationMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
if (application != null) return application
// 4. Fallback to getSystemContext() if application is null (often happens in system_server)
val getSystemContextMethod = activityThreadClass.getDeclaredMethod("getSystemContext")
getSystemContextMethod.isAccessible = true
getSystemContextMethod.invoke(activityThread) as? Context
} catch (e: Exception) {
SystemLogger.error("Reflection failed to get global context for permission check", e)
null
}
}
/**
* Core permission check.
*/
fun hasPermission(uid: Int, permission: String): Boolean {
val context = getGlobalContext() ?: run {
SystemLogger.warning("AndroidPermissionUtils: Context is null, failing permission check safely.")
return false
}
val result = context.checkPermission(permission, -1, uid)
return result == PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED
}
fun hasDeviceAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE")
}
fun hasUniqueIdAttestationPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.REQUEST_UNIQUE_ID_ATTESTATION")
}
fun hasManageUsersPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.MANAGE_USERS")
}
fun hasDumpPermission(uid: Int): Boolean {
return hasPermission(uid, "android.permission.DUMP")
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
package org.matrix.TEESimulator.util
import android.hardware.security.keymint.Algorithm
import java.security.SecureRandom
import java.util.concurrent.locks.LockSupport
import kotlin.math.abs
import kotlin.math.exp
import kotlin.math.ln
import kotlin.math.max
object TeeLatencySimulator {
private val rng = SecureRandom()
private val sessionBiasMs: Double by lazy { rng.nextGaussian() * 5.0 }
private val coldPenaltyMs: Double by lazy { abs(rng.nextGaussian() * 12.0) }
@Volatile private var firstCall = true
fun simulateGenerateKeyDelay(algorithm: Int, elapsedNanos: Long) {
val elapsedMs = elapsedNanos / 1_000_000.0
val targetMs = sampleTotalDelay(algorithm)
val remainingMs = targetMs - elapsedMs
if (remainingMs > 1.0) {
LockSupport.parkNanos((remainingMs * 1_000_000).toLong())
}
}
private fun sampleTotalDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
val base = sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm)
val transit = sampleExponential(2.5)
val jitter = (rng.nextGaussian() * 2.5).coerceIn(-8.0, 12.0)
var cold = 0.0
if (firstCall) {
firstCall = false
cold = coldPenaltyMs
}
return max(20.0, base + transit + jitter + sessionBiasMs + cold)
}
private fun sampleBaseCryptoDelay(algorithm: Int): Double {
val (mu, sigma) =
when (algorithm) {
Algorithm.EC -> ln(60.0) to 0.08
Algorithm.RSA -> ln(70.0) to 0.08
Algorithm.AES -> ln(35.0) to 0.10
else -> ln(40.0) to 0.10
}
return sampleLogNormal(mu, sigma)
}
private fun sampleLogNormal(mu: Double, sigma: Double): Double {
return exp(mu + sigma * rng.nextGaussian())
}
private fun sampleExponential(mean: Double): Double {
var u = rng.nextDouble()
while (u == 0.0) u = rng.nextDouble()
return -mean * ln(u)
}
}
+134
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,137 @@
## TEESimulator-RS v5.0: AOSP Compliance Overhaul
Major release integrating 30+ AOSP compliance improvements from upstream PR #157 analysis, layered on top of our StrongBox hardening and native cert gen architecture.
### Attestation Extension Alignment
- 17 enforcement tags added to KeyMintAttestation (ACTIVE_DATETIME, ORIGINATION_EXPIRE, USAGE_EXPIRE, USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, CALLER_NONCE, UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, MAX_USES_PER_BOOT, MAX_BOOT_LEVEL, MIN_MAC_LENGTH, RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST)
- BLOCK_MODE encoded as SET OF INTEGER per AOSP attestation_record.h
- Version-guarded tags (RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST >=100, ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE >=3, EARLY_BOOT_ONLY >=4)
- INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID computed via HMAC-SHA256 per KeyMint HAL spec using device HBK
- AAID gated on attestation challenge presence
- Certificate validity defaults aligned with AOSP (epoch notBefore, 9999-12-31 notAfter)
### Binder Infrastructure
- Native transaction code filtering at C++ level, skipping JNI for non-intercepted codes
- getNumberOfEntries includes software-generated key count
- deleteKey resolves KEY_ID domain via generatedKeys lookup
- patchAuthorizations for OS/VENDOR/BOOT patch levels in authorization arrays
### Software Operation AOSP Conformance
- updateAad on non-AEAD operations returns INVALID_TAG (-76), matching AOSP operation.rs
- All crypto exceptions wrapped as ServiceSpecificException with correct KeyMint error codes
- GCM IV returned in CreateOperationResponse.parameters for encrypt operations
- SoftwareOperationBinder methods @Synchronized, matching AOSP Mutex per operation
- authorize_create enforcement: PURPOSE validation, algorithm-purpose compatibility, temporal constraints, CALLER_NONCE prohibition, WRAP_KEY rejection
### Security and Configuration
- SELinux permission checks via /proc/pid/attr/current
- Per-UID permission verification through IPackageManager.checkPermission
- Imported key tracking prevents stale attest-key overrides in getKeyEntry
- nspace consistency fix in attest-key override path
- TeeLatencySimulator with log-normal distribution matching real hardware profiles
- Device-unique HBK seed generated on install (32 bytes from /dev/random)
### Preserved from v4.8
- StrongBox op limits (4 concurrent max, TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS rejection)
- LRU operation pruning per security level
- Hardware keygen rate limiting (2/30s sliding window, 2 concurrent cap)
- Native Rust cert generation with BouncyCastle fallback
- Key persistence across reboots
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8.1: StrongBox Op Rejection Fix
- **StrongBox op limit gate fix** — `trackAndEnforceOpLimit` was only called in the `Domain.KEY_ID` not-found path, so software-generated keys (found via `Domain.APP`) bypassed `STRONGBOX_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS=4` entirely. DuckDetector's concurrent signing handles test created 24+ operations that all succeeded via LRU pruning instead of being rejected with `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)`. Now enforced for all StrongBox createOperation paths.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.8: StrongBox Hardening & LRU Pruning
Tested against DuckDetector on OnePlus (Android 16, KSU). Tamper score dropped from 32 to 8.
- **LRU operation pruning** — Concurrent software operations capped at 15 per UID (TEE) and 4 per UID (StrongBox), with oldest-first eviction. Pruned operations return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)`, matching AOSP keystore2 malus-based pruning.
- **StrongBox param guard** — Unsupported StrongBox params (RSA >2048-bit, non-P256 EC curves) forwarded to real HAL for proper rejection instead of generating in software.
- **StrongBox timing** — Key generation floors at 250ms, signing at 80ms on StrongBox security level to match real secure element latency.
- **StrongBox op limit** — Sliding-window enforcer caps concurrent StrongBox operations for both software and hardware key paths, returning `TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS (-29)` when exceeded.
- **ECDSA algorithm alias** — Accept "ECDSA" in addition to "EC" as JCA private key algorithm name. Fixes SIGSEGV crash on Android 10 devices where the provider reports EC keys as "ECDSA". Closes #4.
- **createOperation domain handling** — Software-generated keys now found via both `Domain.APP` (alias) and `Domain.KEY_ID` (nspace) lookup paths.
- **Permission guards** — Device ID attestation tags (IMEI, MEID, serial) require caller permission checks.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.7: Operation & Attestation Fixes
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) and [Key Attestation](https://github.com/nickel-lang/nickel) on OnePlus (Android 16) and Xiaomi Redmi 14C (Android 14).
- **PADDING encoding** — Fixed ASN.1 encoding of PADDING tag in attestation extension from individual `[6] INTEGER` entries to `[6] SET OF INTEGER`, matching AOSP `attestation_record.h` schema. Broke all RSA key attestation since v4.6.
- **Operation error-path conformance** — Software operations now track finalized state and return `INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE (-28)` on post-abort calls. Input length guard (32KB) returns `TOO_MUCH_DATA` matching AOSP `operation.rs`. Passes KeyDetector's OperationErrorPathChecker.
- **updateAad support** — Added `updateAad` to `SoftwareOperationBinder`, fixing `AbstractMethodError` on Android 16 where the runtime Stub declares it abstract.
- **Algorithm inference** — `createOperation` now infers algorithm from the stored key pair when operation params omit the ALGORITHM tag, matching AOSP behavior.
---
## TEESimulator-RS v4.6: Rebrand & Detection Fix
- **RTT normalization rework** — Replaced Gaussian sleep (mean=55ms) with a 15ms floor fence. The old approach triggered Chunqiu Native Check 2.8 timing analysis; the floor-only approach satisfies the minimum RTT threshold without creating a detectable delay pattern.
- **Cross-algorithm attestation** — Signing algorithm now derived from the attestation key's actual type, not the generated key's algorithm. Fixes BouncyCastle crash when signing RSA keys with EC attestation keys (Shizuku attestation flow).
- **Device ID attestation** — Serial/IMEI/MEID/secondImei tags now flow through to software cert gen instead of blanket rejection. Only DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is rejected, matching AOSP keystore2 policy.
- **Rebrand to TEESimulator-RS** — Distinguishes this fork from upstream. Version scheme simplified to v{major}.{minor}-{commitCount}.
- **CI streamlined** — Release pipeline uses Gradle-generated filenames directly, eliminating the rename step.
---
## TEESimulator v4.5: Detection Hardening
Tested against [KeyDetector](https://github.com/XiaoTong6666/KeyDetector) (23-check attestation validator). All keystore-level checks now pass.
- **Key deletion consistency** — After deleting a software-generated key, `getKeyEntry` now correctly returns `KEY_NOT_FOUND` instead of falling through to a stale live-patch fallback. Fixes binder consistency checks that detect ghost key responses.
- **generateKey timing normalization** — Software key generation RTT now matches real TEE latency profile (Gaussian distribution, mean=55ms, floor=15ms). Previously completed in ~4ms, which is an immediate timing side-channel.
- **Delete cleanup scope** — `deleteKey` now clears all cached state (patched chains, attestation keys) regardless of whether the key was software or hardware-generated.
---
## TEESimulator v4.4: AOSP Conformance
- **Binder error reply format** — Aligned EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC wire layout with AOSP Status.cpp, including the remote stack trace header field.
- **Key enumeration** — Corrected list_past_alias pagination order to match AOSP database.rs semantics.
- **KeyMetadata fields** — Generated key responses now include modificationTimeMs, Tag.ORIGIN, and normalized KeyDescriptor fields per AOSP Keystore2.
- **Parcel handling** — hasException() preserves reply position for downstream consumers.
---
## TEESimulator v4.3: Performance & Reliability
- **Debug log gating** — `SystemLogger.debug()` now skipped entirely in release builds, eliminating unnecessary logcat syscalls on every intercepted transaction.
- **Supervisor backoff** — Exponential restart delay (500ms → 30s cap) prevents CPU spin if the daemon crashes repeatedly. Resets automatically once stable.
- **Process priority** — Daemon runs at nice=10, yielding CPU to foreground apps on constrained devices.
- **Map eviction** — Rate limiter and file lock maps now evict stale entries instead of growing unbounded.
- **CI pipeline** — Single-trigger build→release pipeline with proper changelog extraction and correctly sized artifacts.
---
## TEESimulator v4.2: Detection Evasion Hardening
Fixes 6 detection vectors flagged by attestation validator apps.
### Attestation Policy Enforcement
Replicate AOSP keystore2's `add_required_parameters()` validation that our software keygen path was bypassing:
- **CREATION_DATETIME** — Reject caller-provided input with `INVALID_ARGUMENT (20)`, matching `security_level.rs:424`. Our cert gen still adds its own timestamp, same as real keystore2.
- **Device ID attestation** — Reject ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, IMEI, MEID, SECOND_IMEI, and DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION with `CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS (-66)`. No consumer app has READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE.
- **Error reply format** — Fixed AIDL ServiceSpecificException parcel write order (was errorCode→message, now message→errorCode).
### Certificate Fix
Leaf certificate Subject CN corrected from "Android KeyStore Key" to "Android Keystore Key" (lowercase s), matching AOSP `KeyGenParameterSpec.java:282`. Both Kotlin and Rust paths.
### Binder Timing
Skip interception for system transaction codes (PING, INTERFACE, DUMP) above LAST_CALL_TRANSACTION. Eliminates the JNI round-trip that inflated binder ping ratio to 3.85x (detector threshold: 3.0x).
---
## TEESimulator v4.1: Boot Identity Persistence
Bugfix release. The vbmeta boot key digest was randomizing on every reboot, producing a different RootOfTrust in attestation certificates each boot.
+8 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ fi
# --- Version Info ---
VERSION=$(grep_prop version "${TMPDIR}/module.prop")
ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator $VERSION"
ui_print "- Installing TEESimulator-RS $VERSION"
ui_print ""
# --- Architecture Handling ---
@@ -91,3 +91,10 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/target.txt" ]; then
ui_print "- Adding default target scope"
install_file "target.txt" "$CONFIG_DIR"
fi
rm -f "$CONFIG_DIR/tee_status.txt"
if [ ! -f "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk" ]; then
ui_print "- Generating device-unique hardware-bound key seed"
head -c 32 /dev/random > "$CONFIG_DIR/hbk"
fi
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
id=tricky_store
name=TEESimulator
name=TEESimulator-RS
version=${REPLACEMEVER}
versionCode=${REPLACEMEVERCODE}
author=JingMatrix, Enginex0
description=Software simulation for Android hardware-backed key pairs with key attestation
updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/update.json
updateJson=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator-RS/main/module/update.json
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"version": "v4.1",
"versionCode": 94,
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.1/TEESimulator-v4.1-Release.zip",
"version": "v4.5",
"versionCode": 111,
"zipUrl": "https://github.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/releases/download/v4.5/TEESimulator-v4.5-Release.zip",
"changelog": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Enginex0/TEESimulator/main/module/changelog.md"
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ fn build_leaf_cert(
let subject_dn_der = if let Some(ref subject) = params.cert_subject {
subject.clone()
} else {
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android KeyStore Key")
encode_simple_cn_dn("Android Keystore Key")
};
// Validity
+1 -1
View File
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ print_summary() {
# --- Main ---
echo ""
bold "TEESimulator package pipeline"
bold "TEESimulator-RS package pipeline"
echo ""
[[ "$BUILD_RUST" == true ]] && build_rust
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ dependencyResolutionManagement {
}
}
rootProject.name = "TEESimulator"
rootProject.name = "TEESimulator-RS"
include(":stub")
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ public interface IPackageManager {
ParceledListSlice<PackageInfo> getInstalledPackages(long flags, int userId);
int checkPermission(String permName, String pkgName, int userId);
class Stub {
public static IPackageManager asInterface(IBinder binder) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
package android.os;
public class SELinux {
public static boolean checkSELinuxAccess(
String scon, String tcon, String tclass, String perm) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
}
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ public class ServiceManager {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
public static boolean isDeclared(String name) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
public static String[] listServices() {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("STUB!");
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
package android.os;
public class ServiceSpecificException extends RuntimeException {
public final int errorCode;
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode) {
this.errorCode = errorCode;
}
public ServiceSpecificException(int errorCode, String message) {
super(message);
this.errorCode = errorCode;
}
}